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Abstract 
This work has a single aim, focusing on developing a political risk model relevant for 
tourism organisations, which are operating in an increasingly complex and turbulent 
international environment. It pays particular attention to the language of risk (how risks 
are articulated and described), the culture of risk (how risks are viewed), and the risk 
process (how they are analysed and assessed).  
The work critically evaluates a variety of methods that can be utilised to scan, analyse 
and assess political hazards and risks. It finds that many of the existing methods of 
political and country risk assessment are limited and not sufficiently contextualised to the 
needs of the tourism industry. Whilst many models can have an attractive façade of using 
positivistic methods to calculate political risks, in practice these are fraught with 
problems. The study also highlights a more complex relationship between tourism and 
political instability, whereby tourism can be characterised as much by its robustness, as 
its sensitivity.  
A model is developed which primarily adapts a systems theory approach, whereby a 
language, culture and practical process is developed through which the analysis of 
various factors and indicators can take place. The approach adopted has a number of 
stages, which vary in the amount of data necessary for the analysis and assessment of 
political risks. The model begins by utilising existing travel advice databases, moving 
onto an analysis of the frequency of past events, then to the nature of the political system 
itself, finishing with an analysis and assessment of more complex input factors and 
indicators which relate to notions of causation. One of the more provocative features of 
the model is the argument that it is more than possible to make an assessment of the risks 
that the political environment can pose to a tourism organisation, without necessarily 
understanding theories of causation. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
‘Have we – we who have returned (from Auschwitz) – been able to understand 
our experience? What we mean by “understand” coincides with “simplify”: 
without profound simplification the world around us would be infinite, undefined 
tangle that would defy our ability to orient ourselves and decide upon our actions. 
In short, we are compelled to reduce our knowledge to a schema….The desire for 
simplification is justified, but does not always apply to simplification itself. It is a 
working hypothesis, useful so long as it is recognised as such and not mistaken for 
reality.’ (Levi 1988, p.22) 
1.1 Introduction  
Primo Levi, whilst trying to make sense of his, and others’, experience of Auschwitz and 
the Holocaust, helps reveal a fundamental difficulty encountered so often in research; that 
in order to make sense of the world, we need to simplify it. A simplification process 
which involves breaking up the universe into more manageable components, then 
examined through particular theories and research paradigms. The problem is that whilst 
this simplification process is necessary, it can also result in large gaps in our 
understanding of a phenomenon (Faulkner and Russell 2001b, p.328), or lost 
opportunities for greater understanding (Reynolds 1994, p.3). This paradox of the more 
we try to learn, the more it can create ignorance is something which has been particularly 
evident in the subject area of political risk management and the sport, adventure and 
tourism industries. 
Although the subject fields of tourism, sport and adventure are by their nature multi-
disciplinary (Gratton and Jones 2004, p.74; Faulkner et al 2001b, p.328), this has not 
prevented the development of many blind spots in knowledge, with Hall (1994, p.6) 
lamenting that it has been ‘plagued by a lack of intellectual co-ordination and insufficient 
cross fertilization of ideas among researchers.’ What is more, Faulkner et al (2001b, 
p.329) also question the value of Cartesian or Newtonian research paradigms which have 
dominated much of tourism research, which by their nature are reductionist and focus on 
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identifying linear, positivistic relationships for a business environment that is increasingly 
characterised by its complexity and chaotic nature. 
This work attempts to deal with these issues. The intention is to examine literature and 
use theories from many subject disciplines and fields, in order to try and develop some 
form of intellectual coordination for the topic of tourism and political risk, by developing 
a synthesised political risk process model relevant to the industry. In this respect, it is an 
ambitious piece of work. 
The emergence of this subject as an area for research was influenced by a variety of 
factors. To begin with, there were a number of apparent striking changes in the business 
environment. The word apparent is used self-consciously here, as it is acknowledged that 
these may have been based on perceived changes, rather than any objective reality. These 
changes can be summarised as: 
• The continued, phenomenal growth of the tourism, sports and adventure 
industries. 
• Tourism and adventure organisations being particularly sensitive to political 
changes and events, where operations have stopped abruptly and 
destinations removed from travel schedules. 
• An increase in political instability and global insecurity, with terrorists 
targeting softer targets, such as tourists, having become one of the more 
emotive and shocking developments.  
• An increasing use of risk management processes and cultures in 
organisational operational and strategic practices and plans. 
Underpinning these wider, business environmental changes were my own personal 
experiences of teaching under-graduate and post-graduate programmes related to sport, 
tourism and adventure management, together with working with many tourism related 
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organisations.* My experiences here revealed that although risk management was a vital 
part of operational management, these practices were not always extended to strategic 
considerations and the assessment of political risks. Whilst many organisations seemed to 
make simple, intuitive assessments of political situations in a country, there often seemed 
a remarkable lack of awareness of the more structured methods and databases that could 
be used in the analysis and assessment of political hazards and risk. 
1.2 Context, rationale and originality of this work 
It is important to explore a little deeper the reasons for focusing on tourism and political 
risk in terms of why it is a worthwhile area of study, the originality of this work  and 
what it can contribute to the tourism industry in terms of practical improvements in risk 
management practices. In essence, this is based around the notion that tourism has 
become the worlds largest industry, yet is operating in a more complex world, where 
political turmoil can be a key factor affecting the industry, but this seems to be dealt with 
poorly in terms of literature and operational practices. This is elaborated on in the 
following sub-sections. 
1.2.1 Defining tourism and assessing the industry’s significance 
It should be appreciated that tourism is far richer, varied and more complex compared 
with many common, simplistic and clichéd notions of tourism as primarily consisting of 
frivolous activities in sunny climates.† This does, however, mean it can be difficult to 
define in precise terms (Theobold 2005, p.8).‡ In its broadest sense, Glaesser (2003, p.15) 
describes tourism as a phenomenon of the modern era and can relate to all things to do 
with travel. This is perhaps too broad, inferring that tourism can refer to everything travel 
related, which can result in it losing its conceptual distinctiveness (Franklin 2003, p.28). 
                                                 
*
 The term organisation is used as opposed to business, as it reflects the diversity of operations which are 
involved with tourism and travel, but which may not have a commercial focus, such as the many charities, 
or not-for-profit groups which operate in the industry. 
†
 It is often also associated with the 3 S’s: Sun, Sea and Sand, with the word sand sometimes substituted for 
the word sex! 
‡
 Theobold (2005, p.9) gives a useful discussion of the ways tourism can be defined. He examines its 
derivatives as coming from the Greek tornos and Latin tornare which relates to the idea of circle and the 
movement around a central point.  
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The World Tourism Organisation (WTO) gives a more precise definition of tourism and 
is one commonly referred to in tourism related literature. It defines tourism as:  
‘The activities of persons travelling to and staying in places outside their usual 
environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and 
other purposes not related to the exercise of an activity remunerated from within 
the place visited.’ (World Tourism Organisation 1995, p.7)  
If one examines other definitions of tourism, such as Weaver (2000, p.3), Glaesser (2003, 
p.15), Cooper, Fletcher, Fyall, or Gilbert and Wanhill (2005 pp 5 -17), the key 
components of tourism emerge, relating to a spatial dimension (in a physical movement 
sense), a temporal element (the minimum is usually at least twenty four hours away from 
home, with some stretching this to over three days) and a travel purpose, such as visiting 
friends and family, sport, recreation or business. The latter category of business, or work 
related travel is one often under-represented in tourism literature, but of importance to 
this study. Swarbrooke and Horner’s (2001, p.5) typology of business related tourism* 
helps reveal the complexity of this sector, showing the breadth of business related travel, 
ranging from trade, exhibitions, education, aid work and even aspects of military service, 
with the latter two often operating in what may be deemed as politically volatile 
locations. These elements of tourism can also be generated either domestically or 
internationally, with the flows being defined as outbound, or inbound to a country, all of 
which will utilise a variety of products and services, ranging from hotels, transport, 
catering, visitor attractions and many other amenities, which can be woven together to 
form a package by both large or small tour operators, or can be bought (increasingly) as 
and when they are needed by independent travellers.  
These supply component sectors are significant in themselves, but when they are 
combined together it is easy to understand why many (such as Youell, 1998; Weaver 
2000, p.4; and Floyd, Gibson, Pennington- Grey and Thapa 2003, p.20) claim that 
tourism forms the largest global industry today. This may sound like a grand claim, but it 
is not made without good foundation. According to Mintel (2001) and the WTO (2003a), 
                                                 
*
 Swarbrooke et al (2001) also argue that people travelling for their work represents the oldest form of 
tourism, as people have travelled for trade for thousands of years. 
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tourism is amongst the largest, if not the largest, and most dynamic parts of the world 
economy, with the number of international visitor arrivals having grown by an average 
rate of 7% a year from 1950 to 2000, increasing from 25 million to 698 million in that 
time period (WTO, 2003a). In 2001, in the light of ‘economic malaise and security 
threats’ (WTO, 2003a), there was no growth in tourism, with a 0.6% decline. Yet by 2002 
growth occurred again, with the total number of arrivals to countries exceeding the 700 
million mark for the first time. In the WTO’s 2020 Vision report (WTO 2000), they 
forecast that the number of tourist arrivals would exceed one billion by 2010, rising to 1.6 
billion in 2020. Despite subsequent events, such as the September 11th terrorist attacks 
and the war in Iraq, the WTO has remained optimistic and committed to their previous 
forecasts. Although writers such as Davidson (2005 p.31) question the conceptual 
accuracy of describing tourism as a discrete industry, preferring to refer to it as a social 
and economic phenomena, or sector which impacts on many industries, this by no means 
reduces its significance in the modern world. 
The WTO and many others, such as Todd (2001, p.3) and Mintel (2001), whilst 
acknowledging some of the weakness of the data,* note that the figures still give a broad 
indication of the scale of the tourism industry. Furthermore, as Todd (2001, p.4) 
observes, these figures may represent only the tip of the iceberg, as they do not include 
domestic tourism and travel, which far exceeds the number of international visits. Youell 
(1998) for example, points out that in relation to international tourism, it is estimated that 
ten times more people travel for domestic tourism.† These weaknesses with the data are 
why Mintel (2001) recommend that the data should be used in relativist rather than 
absolute terms, which is how they are used in this work. 
There are various factors which help explain this growth in tourism. To begin with, the 
changing economic and social conditions which occurred with industrialisation saw a 
much clearer demarcation between obligated work activities and leisure time, with the 
latter often seen by many workers as compensation for dull, repetitive work. The steady 
increase in disposable income, free- time and a willingness to travel, underpinned by 
                                                 
*
 Such as being dependent on the quality of the statistics provided by national governments. 
†
  Youell bases his estimation on the WTO figures. 
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many developing technologies, such as in rail, then later in motor cars and aviation  (Poon 
1993, p.34; Theobold 2005, p.5), which took place in a political environment allowing 
freedom of movement and expression, have all been key factors driving tourism growth. 
The result is that tourism and leisure has now become a vital source of employment, 
economic activity and is an important measure of the quality of life for individuals 
(Franklin 2003, p.26).  
Hall (1994) gives another important dimension of tourism in relation to politics. He 
presents some powerful arguments of how it is now inseparable from the field of 
international relations, together with the frequency it is used by regimes as a political 
tool, helping to strengthen legitimacy and build national identity, with Richter (1994, 
p.220)* also adding how it can raise a country’s international prestige. Despite this 
political importance, Hall (1994, p.8) made the comment that political science has 
generally failed to recognise tourism as a legitimate topic of study, which still has validity 
at the time of writing this thesis. 
Franklin (2003) gives an insight into why tourism is not given more recognition to its 
economic, social and political significance, noting that there seems a prejudice against 
these industries which are strongly associated with entertainment, having fun and 
pleasure (Franklin 2003 p.11), with the associated corollary that they are not somehow 
respectable, admirable, but simply frivolous (Franklin 2003 p.28), and therefore less 
important than other industries (Davidson 2005, p.25; Theobold 2005, p.7). Franklin goes 
onto say: 
‘Tourism is more significant than most people believe and its founders and 
innovators should be properly acknowledged alongside other authors of 
modernity such as Henry Ford or Karl Marx. In fact there is a long history of 
holding tourism in contempt as a derisory, shallow and vulgar sort of activity, 
but these sorts of comment tend to be made by social elites who find that more 
and more of the world that was once accessible and exclusive to them is now 
available to all, or almost all.’(Franklin 2003, p.11) 
                                                 
*
 Marcos in the Philippines in the 1980s is a good example of this, even if it ultimately failed (Hall, 1994 
p.85).   
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Whilst Franklin may be overstating the case a little, it is still an interesting point, and 
gives a partial insight into the relative scarcity of the literature on political risk and 
tourism, hence the importance of this work to this area. 
1.2.2 The end of certainty and a changing business paradigm? 
This growth of the tourism industry has been taking place in a world which many argue 
(such as Regester and Larking 2005, p.16; Faulkner 2001, p.135) is becoming more 
complex. Although the notion of complexity has perhaps become a cliché, as Stapenhurst 
(1992) has noted many years ago, it is still important to explore. The period from the end 
of the Second World War to the 1970s can be represented as one of the longest periods of 
stability and continuity in economic history, as Drucker (1989, p.2), Graham (1988, p.61) 
and Ingham (2000, pp.7-9) argue. Even with the backdrop of the Cold War and its threat 
of a nuclear war, it was still a period which was marked by a relative degree of certainty, 
which is not, as Bouchet, Clark and Grolambert (2003, p.1) note, quite the same as saying 
that they were necessarily better days. The end of certainty began in the 1970s, which 
became marked as a time of greater business turbulence in the external business 
environment, as the oil crisis in 1974, or the breakdown of General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) vividly illustrated. This turbulence, however, did not turn out to be an 
aberration, but an indication of things to come, where the global economy would become 
increasingly exposed to more external shocks, from new sources (PMSU 2005, p.9), 
leading to increased risks (Doumpos, Pentaraki, Zpounidis and Agorastos 2001, p.16; 
Monti-Belkaoui and Riahi-Belkaoui 1998, p.2; Cartwright 2001, p.2; Glaesser 2003, 
p.xv; Muller 2001). The future now seems to be one consisting of greater environmental 
uncertainty (Wheelan and Hunger, 2000 p.53), * with increasing dynamism (Johnson and 
Scholes 1999 pp91-92) and interconnectedness of the world, which creates more 
unknown elements (Johnson et al, 1999 p.97; Poole-Robb and Bailey, 2003 p.11; 
Bouchet et al 2003 p.2), and is further compounded by the growing complexity of many 
organisations themselves (Needle, 2003; Regester et al 2005, p.16).† 
                                                 
*
 They define ‘environmental uncertainty’ as the degree of complexity plus the degree of change. 
†
 This organisational complexity can relate to such things as global alliances, contracting out of services 
and reliance on complex IT systems. 
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These changes have had profound implications for all contemporary organisations, not 
just large, multi-national enterprises, as the literature would sometimes suggest. Drucker 
(1980 p.vii) using the Chinese curse of ‘may you live in interesting times’, points out that 
it has never been more interesting for organisations, with one of the few certainties being 
uncertainty for businesses. Initially the debate about change was based on overcoming 
resistance to change (Drucker 2001, p.73). This has steadily evolved to adopting a more 
expansive view of how change can be managed, indeed looked for, in order to maximise 
opportunities and minimise threats to the organisation. To do this effectively, Drucker 
argues, is to become a ‘change leader’ (Drucker 2001, p.74). Some, such as Bernstein 
(1998), or Have, Have, Stevens and Elst (2003, p.39), have gone further by saying not 
only is change necessary for success, but to prevent it can be damaging. Today, so strong 
is the business cultural acceptance of change, that one would now be hard pressed to find 
a contemporary text book on business management which does not acknowledge the 
critical role change represents in relation to new business opportunities, growth and 
profits. In terms of this study, what is of such  interest is how this process of trying to 
understand change has increasingly utilised risk frameworks and cultures, as will be 
further discussed in Section 1.2.4 and Chapters 3 and 4. 
1.2.3 A new global political and security paradigm? 
A key ingredient of this dynamic and complex business environment has been the 
changing global political and security paradigmatic shifts (Bayliss 1997, p.208), which 
have many profound implications for tourism. These changes have been underpinned by 
two key developments; the collapse of communism and globalisation. The collapse of 
communism and the ending of the cold war seemed to remove the major security risk of 
nuclear annihilation. Fukayama (cited in Heywood 2002, p.31), in his book The End of 
History, published in 1992, argued that the collapse of communism marked the end of the 
ideological debate between liberalism and communism. Fukayama argued that the end of 
historical struggle and change was not with communism, as Marx had predicted, but with 
the worldwide triumph of western liberal democracy and capitalism, with the further 
repercussions that Third World regimes were collapsing as a result of the recognition that 
the capitalist, first world offers the prospect of economic prosperity and political stability. 
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Overall, the pattern that was revealed was that the collapse of communism brought not a 
new world order as Fukayama envisioned, but as Wilkinson (2001, p. 47) describes it, a 
‘new world disorder’, where the flows of stability and peace, ebb with instability and 
violence. Yes there were clear periods of optimism in the early 1990s: the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall, both physically and symbolically, in 1989; Nelson Mandela’s release from 
jail and his walk to freedom in 1990; or the coalition formed for the 1991 Gulf war to deal 
with Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, all seemed to illustrate the emergence of a new world 
order. The difficulty was that with each instance of optimism, an alternative set of events 
jarred against this vision of a stable global environment, such as the war in Yugoslavia, 
Zimbabwe’s slow slide into economic and political chaos, or the genocidal conflict in 
Rwanda and Burundi, which took place at the same time as South Africa’s first universal 
elections (Hauss 2001, p.3). 
The second key element which helps explain the ever more complex and rapidly 
changing political environment has been the process of globalisation. It is not a concept 
without its controversies, as Bayliss and Smith (2001, p.9) illustrate, such as to what 
extent the homogenisation of cultures has taken place? Who are the winners and losers? 
Is it globalisation or Americanisation? Or just how new a concept is it? What is harder to 
refute is the increasing inter-connectedness of the world in relation to communications 
and the compression of time and space, whereby events reverberate far beyond the 
national boundaries from whence they occurred, and in a shorter space of time.  
The corollary of these developments is that notions of conflict and political instability 
have become more complex themselves. The evidence, neatly summarized by Hewitt, 
Wilkenfeld and Gurr (2008), was that whilst there has been a growth in democracies over 
the years, so too was there increase in the number of armed conflicts, where the 
boundaries between war, terrorism, insurgency and even crime have become far from 
clear. Conflicts which are not restricted to specific geographic regions, but are global in 
nature, often helped, ironically perhaps, by the huge global tourism infrastructure which 
can be utilised.  
The growth in conflict and state failure in the 1990s also saw an increase in intervention 
on humanitarian grounds (Heywood 2002, p.134), which has resulted in what has been 
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described as a new peacekeeping industry (Piekarz 2007, p.161; Paris 2004, p.3). This in 
turn has meant a growth in aid related travel, as attempts are made to initially deal with 
the humanitarian crises generated, particularly in relation to the problem of displaced 
people, then later to try and rebuild the state. A pattern of development which has often 
played a crucial role in laying the foundations of a more mainstream tourism 
infrastructure, as illustrated in Ethiopia, Sri Lanka and Cambodia, and is discussed further 
in Chapter 2. 
This new security paradigm raises many profound challenges for the tourism industry. On 
the one hand it can mean events, such as war, terrorism and political instability may 
increasingly bisect and impact on tourism flows. On the other, it can create many new 
market opportunities, as failed states rebuild their economic, social and political fabric, 
all of which further emphasises the importance of developing methods and practices to 
help scan for these changes. This challenge of how to view these political changes forms 
a key feature of this work. 
1.2.4 A growth in risk management cultures and processes? 
In order to understand this seemingly more complex and rapidly changing world and the 
opportunities or threats that may be posed to an organisation, various business 
environmental scanning models have been developed,* which as Clarke and Varma 
(1999, p.415) illustrate, can be framed in a risk management framework. A pattern that 
tends to reflect a wider growth in the use of risk management cultures and practices, for 
all types of organisations, at all levels within organisations. It is a growth that Lupton 
(1999, pp.9-11) noted has been exponential in relation to language, research and advice, 
with Adams (1995, p.3 and p.31) arguing it is the world’s largest industry. Hunt (2001) 
argues that:  
‘Today, it is not an exaggeration to say risk assessment has become central to all 
forms of management decision making…Regardless of specific risks, events and 
                                                 
*
 Mercer (1998, p.58) notes that the scanning process of content analysis has it roots in WWII where 
intelligence experts scanned enemy sources of information, such as newspapers and radio broadcasts, to try 
and gauge public opinion towards the leadership of the country.  
 11 
industry sectors, risk management is now seen as highly relevant to all corporate 
functions.’ Hunt (2001, p.289) 
Despite this importance it still remains a slippery and imprecise concept, as Box 1.1 on 
the next page illustrates, with a more critical discussion taking place in Chapter 3. 
There are many factors that help explain this growth in risk management. At its most 
basic level it can be seen as a rational response to try and manage change (Klinke and 
Renne 2001, p.160; Keeling 2000, p.46). Other writers point to the simple fact that risks 
are everywhere, in all aspects of our lives. Moore gives one of the better overviews of the 
variety and complexity of the risks people are exposed to in their everyday lives. He says: 
‘Risk is all pervasive. An individual faces physical risk from driving a car, career 
risks from the possible bankruptcy of one’s employer, the financial risks from 
investing his or her savings in equities. A company faces the risk of collapse of 
traditional market, or of research failure for a new product. A government may 
face an unexpected strike or a foreign government’s rebuff to a diplomatic 
overture. While in some areas, such in life assurance, risk is well understood and 
systematically handled in an accepted manner, this is not common in other areas 
of economic and social activity.’ Moore (1983, p.vix) 
Furthermore, not only can it be deemed as inevitable, many also argue that the taking of 
risk is an instinctive part of human nature, which drives innovation and economic activity 
(Bernstein 1998, p.12). As Chapman and Ward (1997, p.xi) succinctly state, a zero risk 
project is often not worth pursuing because no returns can be gained.* 
                                                 
*
 Maynard Keynes noted that ‘If human nature felt no temptation to take chance … there might not be 
much investment merely as a result of cold calculation.’ (Keynes 1936, p.156, cited in Bernstein 1998, 
p.12). Bernstein also comments how the command economy of the Soviet Union choked of innovation and 
development, resulted in economic stagnation. 
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One can also gain a deeper insight into the growth of risk management by examining a 
number of key works from the fields of sociology and anthropology. Of particular 
importance are the works by Ulrich Beck (1992, 1994 and 1998), Mary Douglas (1992), 
and Anthony Giddens (1990). To begin with, Beck’s various works grounds the growth 
Box 1.1 The historical evolution of risk 
Merna and Faisal (2005, p.9) trace the origins of the word risk as either the Arabic risq (to be given 
by god), or the Latin riscum (the challenge of a barrier reed for sailors and has connotations of a 
fortuitous or unfavourable event). Bernstein (1998, p.3) traces the roots of the modern conception of 
risk in the Hindu-Arabic numbering system, but notes that it is in the Renaissance that it flourished 
and began to achieve conceptual clarity. The key point to appreciate is that our understanding of risk 
has changed over time, reflecting wider socioeconomic shifts (Tarlow 2002, p.202). In the first pre-
industrial age, it is linked to the maritime industry and focused on the perils that could compromise 
a sea voyage (Lupton 1999, p5). Risk was viewed as an objective danger, or a neutral idea (Frosdick 
1999, p.33), or an act of god, which excluded the idea of human fault or responsibility. It was also 
characterised by reacting defensively to risks. 
In the second age, the process of industrialisation influenced how risks were understood, 
particularly as the science of probability and statistics were developed (Lupton 1999, p.6), with the 
extension that it was not just nature that created risks, but also humans. The belief developed that 
through science and maths, the world could be better understood and predicted though calculations, 
with the main focus on assessing and controlling the negative consequences of risks. Risk also 
became contrasted with uncertainty, which referred to a situation where probabilities could not be 
calculated. In terms of the management of risks, these were dealt with in a linear way. Elliot, 
Frosdick and Smith (1999, p.11) illustrate this by using the example of how stadia regulations over 
the past hundred years for the UK only ever dealt with the immediate causes of the stadia disaster, 
rather than the more complex, underlying causes; the result, they argue, was one of reasons why 
fatalities continued to occur. A process they describe as ‘legislation by crisis’ (Elliot et al 1999, 
p.11). 
Sadgrove (1999, p.1) and Tarlow (2002, p.207) argue that risk is now in a third post-industrial age, 
whereby risk is characterised by their complexity in origin, and creating both opportunities/upsides 
as well as the more familiar threats/downsides. Paradoxically perhaps, whilst many organisations 
may view risk in a more neutral way, for the wider public, risk has become strongly associated with 
blame and notions of accountability, or liability (Frosdick 1999, p.36), having also become a tool of 
the legal system. Despite these trends Tarlow (2002, p.208), goes onto to argue that for some areas 
of risk management, it is now entering a fourth age. Risk management in this age, he argues, 
becomes ‘truly interdisciplinary’ (Tarlow 2002, p.209), whereby it is necessary to not only to 
understand the complexity of hazards and risks in terms of their origin, but also in relation to their 
complex interactions and impacts. Whilst aspects of these new paradigms are not necessarily 
completely new - Lupton (1998, p.148) for example notes that in the field of economics, there has 
always existed the notion of a ‘good risk’ - the use of complexity theory is an important 
development and has influenced this research project a great deal.  
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of risk in contemporary societal developments. Essentially, whilst Beck’s work has gone 
through a number of alterations over the years, his central idea of the growth of a modern 
risk culture is interesting and provocative. He argues that contemporary risk cultures and 
practices are a response to the risks created by modernity. His early works were 
particularly influenced by the green and environmental politics in the 1980s together with 
the notion of Giddens ‘reflective modernisation’ (cited by Matten, 2004). In classical 
theories of modernization, the focus was on organising society on firm, rational footings, 
such as in the manufacturing processes and the division of labour. Reflexivity, however 
relates to social practices which are constantly examined and reformed in the light of 
incoming information, with societies always adapting and changing constantly, as new 
problems and issues are generated and created by modern lifestyles (Matten 2004, p.329, 
citing Giddens, 1990 work). The result is that Adam, Beck and van Loon (2000, p.7) 
argue that the hazards and risks  are ‘both more messy and more insidious’ which cannot 
be ‘encompassed’ by traditional concepts of risk, such as actions taken to deal with risk 
being based on rational reasoning, scientific exploration and mathematical modelling.  
What is of interest in this theory of reflexivity is the inherent dynamism of the model, 
which shows the growing recognition of globalisation and the nature of environmental 
problems transcending the boundaries of states, with many profound implications for how 
they should be dealt with. Classical modernity meant that lives were lived within the 
nation state; today, the argument goes, globalisation has rendered national boundaries as 
impotent lines, which is not the same as saying the nation-state has become weaker or 
less important. Using these writers’ works, Lupton (1999) also frames the key reasons for 
the growth of risk in the context of the inherent transformation of societies to the complex 
and uncertain, post-modern era. Lupton (1999, pp.36-39) uses Mary Douglas’s work (a 
pivotal figure in the socio-cultural analysis of risk), and argues that risk is a Western 
strategy for dealing with danger and ‘Otherness’. What is more, Lupton (1999, p.45) goes 
onto argue that there has been  a growth in a ‘blame culture’,* where every death, every 
accident and every misfortune is ‘chargeable’ to someone’s account, or reacted to with 
what Glaesser (2003, p.xv) argues greater intensification. What is less clear however is to 
                                                 
*
 The idea of a blame culture is particularly strong in the USA, where it has been said that not only do 
Americans sleep with a gun under their pillows, but also a lawyer. 
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what extent people are becoming more risk averse, as (Furedi 2002, p.20) and Regester et 
al (2003, p.18) argue, as the picture seems more complex, particularly with the growth of 
adventure tourism, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
In relation to political risk management methods and practices, these became more firmly 
established in the 1970s, with Stapenhurst (1992, p.46) noting that it became both an 
academic discipline and corporate function. The impact of the oil crisis and the problems 
of third world countries servicing their debts* revealed the growing need for businesses to 
make some assessment of political situations and the risks they posed (Doumpos et al 
2001, p.16). Doumpos et al (2001, p.16) state how several attempts were made, mainly 
by banks, to try and develop procedures for effectively estimating risk. They highlight 
how initially these were based on developing checklists of indicators, but gradually 
developing into more sophisticated multivariate statistical techniques. Very importantly, 
they note that despite the progress made in the development of the models, the financial 
crisis of 1997-1998 still demonstrated the vulnerability of organisations to global 
economic changes that were not anticipated in the models developed. 
These underpinning forces have, in turn, helped drive a growth in legislation and 
regulations, whereby the adoption of risk management processes have become a vital 
necessity for organisations. For the UK, not only do tourism operators need to consider 
aspects of Health and Safety legislation, but also a range of regulatory guidelines, the 
most recent being BS 8848:2000 (British Standards Institute 2007), which gives guidance 
on overseas ventures. Very importantly, within these set of guidelines, in addition to the 
usual range of risks which need to be identified and assessed, there is a requirement to 
research the political conditions of a country and a need to consult governmental travel 
advice. At a more strategic level, Hawkins (2006, p.122) argues that post-Enron many 
countries have had to instigate more rigorous financial controls and risk practices, which 
for the UK were established in the Turnbull Report (1999), which gives guidance on 
corporate governance and developing appropriate risk management systems (RMS) and 
holistic risk cultures. Compliance to these regulations has become necessary not only out 
                                                 
*
 This was the problem of many third-world countries defaulting on their debt repayments in the 1970s and 
1980s posing some severe problems for certain banks. 
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of a sense of morality (Cloutier 2000, p.98), but also to ensure it acts as a ‘protective 
shield’ against litigation (Smissen and Gregg 1999, p. 285; Cloutier 2000, p.98), 
particularly in view of the growth of a blame culture and the media amplification which 
can occur. Grainger-Jones (1999) in relation to the sport industry makes the provocative 
comment that: 
‘In no other sphere is risk management so essential but so problematic. In no other 
sphere is legislation becoming so onerous, licensing so substantial, insurance so 
important, and litigation so worrying.’ (Grainger-Jones 1999, p.175) 
The result of all these trends is that it has encouraged many organisations to develop both 
cultures (Clarke et al 1999) and processes that can help with the understanding and 
management of risks. As a culture, this refers to how risk and change is viewed and 
understood. As a process, it deals with the practical methods and stages that data is 
collected, analysed, assessed and dealt with. These two key distinctions, are rarely 
appreciated or discussed in risk related literature, yet in this work, they play a crucial role 
in reviewing the wider body of literature on risk management, whereby risk cultures are 
examined in Chapter 3, and risk processes examined in Chapter 4. As such, these form 
another key feature in terms of the originality of this work. 
1.2.5 A paucity of political risk models and literature for tourism 
organisations? 
From a mixture of normative experiences and preliminary exploration of the literature on 
political risk and tourism, a number of problems were soon revealed in relation to 
political risk and tourism. There is no shortages of writers who stress the importance of 
risk assessing the political environment because of the impacts it can have on operations 
and strategic plans, such as  Cartwright (2001 p.63),  Monti-Belkaoui et al (1998, xi), 
Czinkota, Ronkainen and Moffet (1999, p.95). Indeed, Burmester gives an added 
dimension to the importance of understanding the political environment, particularly in 
an international sense, saying: 
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‘All firms are to some degree exposed to political risk, but to international 
business managers it is a topic of particular concern…. risk is a function of 
ignorance and, in a political context, individual ignorance is generally much 
greater abroad than at home.’ (Tayeb 2000, p.248) 
After an initial impetus of organisations setting up political scanning teams, Stapenhurst 
(1992, p.178) comments that by the 1990s many of these had been reduced through a 
mixture of financial cut backs and the failure of some of the teams to develop accurate 
forecasts to help in decision making. These difficulties related to a variety of factors such 
as the lack of synergy with the experts and the decision makers (Stapenhurst, 1992, 
p.178), where the latter wanted clear yes/no decisions, whereas the former might present 
the scenarios in more cautious, complex terms (Wells, 1998, p.26). The relevance of 
many models was further undermined by what Wells (1998, p.16) describes as the 
‘lackadaisical’ approach of many teams, where they constantly failed to appreciate the 
dynamism of the political environment, or failed to adjust their cultural mindsets from old 
type political risks, which were of declining relevance, such as expropriation, to the new 
risks, such as those posed by democratic systems, or acts of terrorism.  
If one narrows the research parameters down to search for literature just relating to 
political risk management and tourism, then the numbers of detailed references are very 
few. Whilst, there is a strong body of empirical literature which examines the link 
between political instability and tourism demand (reviewed in Chapter 2), this is not 
quite the same topic area as political risk assessment and management. Whilst the former 
body of work seeks to establish the connection and sensitivity of tourism to political 
change and instability, the latter is more concerned with utilising distinctive 
methodologies with which to identify, assess and develop control measures to deal with 
political changes.   
With relation to previous theses, searching the Index to Theses database, few PhD 
projects relating to political risk were found (approximately sixteen), many of which dealt 
with the needs of more traditional industries, such as the petroleum industry, with none 
concerned with tourism. In relation to political instability and tourism, there was only one 
of direct relevance, which was Theochorus’s (2002) work. Whilst an interesting work and 
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providing a useful discussion on political stability and the link with tourism, its remit was 
narrower and does not really approach the topic from a risk paradigm. This lack of 
previous studies added further credence to the validity of the research topic. 
1.3 The aim and objectives  
It has been from this preliminary context that the following aim, objectives and assertions 
have been developed. The aim of this research project is:  
To develop a systematic, practical framework for analysing, assessing and 
controlling political risks, relevant for small to medium sized tourism, adventure 
and sport organisations. 
Related to this aim are a number of more specific objectives. These are: 
• To identify and clarify the key vocabulary used to understand risk 
management in a tourism, business and political risk context.  
• To identify and analyse instances of good and bad practice for risk 
assessment from across a variety of subject fields 
• To examine if it is possible to have a common culture, language and process 
of political risk management embedded in existing management practices 
relevant to tourism organisations. 
• To test the relevance of existing models of political/country risk assessment 
to the tourism industry. 
• To analyse which are the best ways to ascribe a risk value, if at all? 
Underpinning this aim and these objectives are a number of preliminary assertions that 
need further examination via the literature review and the primary data collected. The 
reason why assertions are used, rather than hypotheses, is that this work does not 
approach this topic area through a positivistic research paradigm (although at times it 
does refer to it), where the intention was to prove or disprove arguments or beliefs. 
Instead a series of assertions were generated, based on past experiences and a preliminary 
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examination of the literature, which would help drive a deeper exploration of the subject 
area. These assertions can be stated as: 
• The literature on business and political risk assessment is not sufficiently 
contextualised for the needs of the tourism/sports industry and is skewed 
towards the more traditional economic sectors, dominated by big business, 
often with an American bias. 
• Political risk assessment is becoming more important on the grounds of 
finance, legal regulations and morality. 
• Many tourism organisations’ assessment of political risk is often ad hoc, 
intuitive and variable, with little integration of the strategic and operational 
levels of management. 
• Travel advice issued by governments can lack subtlety as indicators of real 
political risks. 
In studying this topic of tourism and political risk, literature is utilised from many 
disciplines and subject fields. The key subject fields from which literature is drawn are 
categorised as: 
• Political risk management. 
• Tourism, sport and adventure risk management. 
• Strategic business management and managing change. 
• Project risk management. 
• Political international studies. 
• Environmental risk management. 
The materials drawn from these fields emanate from academic literature, business 
consultancies and practitioner discourses. By using such an eclectic range of materials it 
was hoped that any blind spots in knowledge can be reduced, together with developing a 
more consistent vocabulary or language of risk that could be utilised in practical risk 
processes.  
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These objectives and assertions are examined in different ways in each of the subsequent 
chapters. In Chapter 2 the literature is reviewed in relation to the critical relationship 
tourism has with political instability, together with analysing in more detail the key trends  
in tourism. What emerges most strikingly from that chapter is how the work on tourism 
and political risk management must move beyond a narrow, deterministic, inverse 
relationship of tourism decline in relation to political instability increasing. In Chapter 3 
the definitions, cultural paradigms and vocabulary of risk management are critically 
explored, compared and reviewed. This chapter is particularly important in relation to 
developing a lexicon of risk management in order to deal with the confusing descriptors 
and terms which emerge from the diverse source of literature used; differences which are 
not necessarily because of the different subject fields they are written for, but can often 
be based on the temporal context they are written in. In Chapter 4 the practical process 
elements of risk management are critically compared and reviewed. This chapter is 
crucial for developing a model that can be used for later analysis. It highlights the wide 
variety of political risk management models that can be utilised, the complex area of 
causation and the different factors and indicating data that can be used for analysing and 
assessing hazards and risks. In Chapter 5 the methodology is examined. This Chapter not 
only outlines the practical approaches of how the data will be collected, but also critically 
examines the cultural context of the project, seeking to ground the work in the different 
business and academic paradigms which have influenced its development. In Chapter 6 
the frameworks, models and possible indicators of political risk that were identified in 
Chapters 3 and 4 are used and examined in relation to their degree of relevance to 
tourism. A variety of risk values from existing models are also compared to tourism 
patterns to further assess their relevance. In Chapter 7 all the different elements from the 
Chapters are synthesised to develop a framework for political risk analysis and 
assessment relevant for tourism organisations, and is examined in relation to a single case 
study country and organisation. Chapter 8 concludes the work, drawing out the key 
findings, the strengths and weaknesses of the work, and future areas for research. 
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1.4 Chapter summary 
Why this study then? In short it relates to the scale of the tourism industry, operating in a 
more complex, dynamic business environment, whereby it will increasingly need to scan 
for changes that may create opportunities or threats, of which the political environment 
seems a particularly important generator of such drivers of change. The use of conducting 
this scanning process through a risk framework simply reflects the wider legal and 
cultural changes that have occurred in developed countries. Despite this need for 
scanning and the growth in risk management practices, in relation to tourism and political 
risk management, it is a subject that is seemingly poorly served by the literature. Whilst 
certain aspects of risk management are firmly embedded in many tourism and adventure 
organisations operations, this does not seem to necessarily extend to the notions of 
analysing and assessing political risks, whether these represent terrorist threats or 
government policy initiatives, which may affect the organisation for good or ill. As such, 
both the subject area and the approach taken in this work are key factors that help convey 
the originality of the work. 
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Chapter 2 
 Tourism, political instability and the implications 
of post-modern tourism in a new security 
paradigm 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 the context of the research project was examined, focusing on how it has 
developed from a range of normative experiences and perceived changes in the political 
business environment. In this Chapter, the link between tourism and notions of political 
stability/instability are examined in more depth by reviewing a range of literature. The 
growth of post-modern tourism is also explored in relation to the changing global security 
paradigm and the possible implications for tourism of this trend. From this discussion a 
framework is developed which is used for later analysis in Chapter 7.  
2.2 Exploring the sensitivity of tourism to political instability 
There is a strong body of literature that reveals the importance of tourists perceiving 
environments as safe, together with the sensitivity of tourism flows in response to 
political change or instability. Hall (1994, p.92), Weaver (2000, p.107) and Sonmez  
(1998, p.426) are just a few of the writers who have highlighted the importance of 
political serenity and a sense of safety as a central corollary for tourism to thrive, with 
Glaesser (2003, p.xv) arguing that tourism has ‘above average’ sensitivity to crisis events. 
Hall and Sullivan argue that: 
‘Perceptions of political stability and safety are a prerequisite for tourist visitation. 
Violent protests, social unrest, civil war, terrorist actions, the perceived violations 
of human rights, or even the mere threat of these activities can all serve to cause 
tourists to alter their travel behaviour. Tourism managers and planners therefore 
need to become more aware of the political dimensions of tourism development.’ 
(Hall and O’Sullivan 1996, p..117)  
The importance of these issues has led Chiang (2000, p.45), citing Olsen et al (1996), to 
argue that one of the key future drivers of change in the tourism industry will be issues of 
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tourism safety and security. Wilks, Pendergast and Wood (2003, p.79) even argue that 
since 9/11 notions of ‘destination safety’ can be presented as a competitive advantage in 
terms of marketing.  
Political instability, obviously, is not the only variable that influences tourists’ perception 
of safety. Sonmez, Apostolopoulos and Tarlow (1999, p.14) and Glaesser (2003, p.xv), 
all point out that tourism is an industry vulnerable to internal and external shocks, which 
can range from economic downturns, natural disasters, epidemic diseases and 
international conflicts. Yet what is also emphasised in the literature, is that because a 
destination’s attractiveness is derived so much from its image (Tarlow 2002, p.6, citing 
Santanna 1999), events such as political instability,  particular terrorism, intimidates 
tourists more severely, leaving a negative lasting impression of a destination (Sonmez et 
al 1999, p.420, citing Richter and Waugh 1986).  
The following examples drawn from a variety of research literature help illustrate the 
impact of political instability events on tourism demand: 
• The Communist seizure of power in Afghanistan in 1979 saw tourism in the 
country fall by 60% between 1978 and 1979 (Hall 1994, p.94).  
• In the Gambia, the 1994 coup resulted in the number of British travellers (a key 
market) declining by 73%, which devastated its economy (Sharpley et al, 1995 
cited by Glaesser 2003, pp.158-159)  
• After the first Gulf War in 1991, an estimated two billion dollars was lost by the 
USA airline industry (Glaeser 2003, p.xv). 
• Before the war in Yugoslavia in 1991, Croatia received 5 million tourists, with 
tourism not reviving until the end of the war, receiving 1.3 million tourists in 
1995, going up to 2.6 in 1996 (Weaver 2000, p.107). 
• The coup in Fiji on the 19th May, 2000, which lasted for fifty-six days, devastated 
Fiji’s tourism industry, which in 1999 had received record numbers (409,955 
arrivals), employing 45,000 people and generating 27% of Fiji’s GDP (Berno 
2001, p.77). 
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• In Israel, various political events have affected tourism in significant ways, both 
good and bad, as Mansfield (1999) demonstrates with the examples of the 1967 
six day war; the 1973 Yom Kippur war; the 1981 Galilee peace process; the 1985 
and 1987 intifadas; the 1991 Gulf War; and the 1992 and 1995 peace process. 
• Falon (2003, p.142) illustrates how in 2000, the Indonesian conflict between 
Muslim and Christian groups, in Lombok, resulted in many Chinese and tourist 
venues becoming the targets for violence. The result was that room occupancy 
rates fell from 42% to less than 10%. The later bomb in Bali was estimated to 
have cost 2.7 million jobs with the fall out being felt through out all Indonesia and 
its neighbouring countries. 
• Tourism in Nepal for many years thrived, increasing from 6,000 arrivals in 1962, 
to almost 500,000 arrivals in 2000. Since the USA war on terror, the war in 
Afghanistan and tensions between Indian and Pakistan, compounded by the 
growth of Maoist insurgents, tourism declined by 40% in 2002 on the previous 
year, as its peaceful and tranquil image was lost (Thapa 2002, p.118). 
• Cothran and Cothran (1997, p.478) illustrate how the fluctuating political fortunes 
of Mexico has created a roller coaster ride of positive opportunities and negative 
threats, such as the currency collapse in 1995, or the 1994 Zapatista peasant 
uprising, which resulted in a 90% drop in tourist numbers for the first two months 
after the events. 
Significant as these events were in terms of the impact they had on tourism, all were 
surpassed by the events of September 11th, which Glaesser (2003, p.xv) describes as 
having the worst, world wide impact on tourism since World War II. Examples of the 
economic losses suffered by tourism can be found in Box 2.1 on the next page. What 
September 11th also illustrated was how globalised and interconnected the world had 
become, with the events sending shock waves far beyond America. Pratt (2003), for 
example, illustrates the impact the attacks had on the Bahamas, beginning with all flights 
cancelled, followed by an initial emptying of hotels by US citizens, and numerous 
conventions and holiday cancellations. These events severely hurt the Bahamas’ tourism 
industry, as 80% of tourists came from the USA, with tourism contributing 8% of 
Jamaica’s GDP and employing 160,000 direct and indirect jobs (Pratt 2003, p.193). 
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Whilst the literature is strong on showing the inverse relationship of tourism demand 
declining in response to negative political events, it is important to try put this view into a 
more balanced perspective. There are many examples that can be used to illustrate this. 
Box 2.1 Reflecting on the impacts of the September 11th attacks on tourism 
September 11th had many profound impacts, which reverberated around the world. Kegley (2003, 
p1) argues that it marked the dramatic end to the notion of a presumed safety and euphoria of a new 
prosperous era after the Cold-War, together with a shift in geopolitical risk away from Russia and 
China. In the context of tourism, there is little doubt about the negative impacts it had. For example 
Floyd et al (2003, p.20) highlight how inbound, outbound and domestic tourists flows came to an 
abrupt halt as all air transport was grounded until 13th September, leaving 100,000s stranded; Floyd 
et a l (2003, p.21) also noted that hotel occupancy plummeted, with many people subsequently made 
unemployed, such as the Wyndham Hotel Company laying off 1,600 employees. Goodrich (2002 pp 
574-578) illustrates a number of other impacts: 
• In the first month after the attacks, the following numbers of staff were laid off by 
the airlines: United Airlines 20,000; Continental Airlines 13,000; Northwest 
Airlines 10,000; and Delta Airlines 13,000. 
• Supporting services were also affected, such as LSG Sky Chefs - the largest USA 
airline catering company, had to furlough 30% of its 16,000 workers after 
September 11th. 
• Hotels, in first 3 months found bookings down by 20-50% as both recreational and 
business travel was affected, which as been  estimated as representing a loss of $2 
billion. 
• Many sports events were also affected, such as the postponement of the Ryder cup, 
along with fourteen National Football League games in America cancelled (capacity 
of stadiums is between 60,000 – 75,000, which resulted in an estimated $84 to $105 
million of lost revenue for sporting events for the Sunday after an attack.). 
Added to this economic cost were other impacts, such as the increase in insurance costs; the 
psychological damage inflicted on customer confidence; the need to adjust the industry’s service 
infrastructure to meet the changed security needs; increased bureaucracy with stricter visa 
requirements; and changed attitudes towards crisis planning. Burke (2005) also provides a useful 
review of literature on the impacts of 9/11, noting how in the short term it initiated negative 
emotional responses and impacts, but with a passage of time, most returned to normal patterns of 
behaviour. 
Whilst September 11th illustrates the sensitivity of tourism to crisis events, it can, however, also be 
used to show the robustness of tourism, and how a crisis can also create market opportunities for 
tourism organisations. What is perhaps so notable about September 11th is not that international 
passenger miles fell immediately after September 11th, but that it fell so little, noting that by 2004, 
the airline industry was back to exceptionally strong growth, despite the backdrop of the Iraq war. 
Furthermore, for many tourism operators, it proved a lucrative time, such as USA domestic tourism, 
the European budget airlines (which illustrated that whilst people may have been more fearful of 
flying, it did not stop them from flying shorter distances) and Muslim travellers to other Muslim 
countries. Crisis events, it seems, do not simply stop demand, rather it just redirects the flows to 
other destinations. 
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Sonmez et al, (1999, p.13) for example, state boldly that even with the many set backs 
such as the 1991 Gulf War, the War in Yugoslavia and the Asian financial crisis, tourism 
continued to grow and became the worlds pre-eminent industry contributing $3.6 trillion 
global gross domestic product (GDP) and employed an estimated 225 million people by 
the mid-1990s. In Egypt, after the 1997 Luxor terrorists attacks, which initially reduced 
tourism by  approximately 15% (World Tourism Organisation, 2003b), tourism soon 
returned, then surpassed previous demand, only to suffer a 13% decline after the 
September 11th attacks, but again recovering and increasing demand, despite many other 
terrorist incidents. Pratt (2003, p.193) noted that one year after September 11th, many of 
the Caribbean destinations had showed almost a total recovery, with some areas 
exceeding previous demand levels. Anson’s (1999, p.58) study on tourism in Northern 
Ireland, showed how during the 18 month cease-fire (eventually shattered in February 
1996), visitor numbers were up by 20%, with pure holiday visitor up by 68%. Ioannides 
and Apostolopoulos (1999) in their study on Cyprus note the fluctuations of tourism 
demands in relation to political events, with tourism levels gradually increasing as the 
status quo of the divided island became bedded down in peoples’ consciousness. 
Mansfield (1999, p.32) also notes that some highly attractive destinations, such as Egypt, 
can recover more rapidly, as there may be so many interested parties wanting to establish 
a favourable, secure image, which includes the tourists themselves. Hall (1994, p.100) 
illustrate another dimension of the instability events impacting on tourism demand, 
noting that Fiji’s loss of tourism after the coups, proved to be Bali and Queensland’s gain. 
Finally, Butler and Baun (1999, p.24) take a different perspective by looking at the 
tourism opportunities created with the ending of the Cold War, in relation to military 
bases being withdrawn. 
Tourism, then, does exhibit a high degree of elasticity (responsiveness of demand) in 
relation to political events, but it should not just be viewed in a negative sense of tourism 
flows declining, rather that the ‘substitution affect’ (Sonmez and Graefe 1998, p.119) 
means that flows tend to be redirected (Wall, 1996, p.147; Anson 1999 p.58; Hall 1994, 
p.100), or that it seeks to establish (or re-establish) itself when situations are perceived to 
have improved. O’Connor comments: 
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‘It is interesting to note that the destinations that are tipped to be “hot” next year – 
namely Sri Lanka and Cambodia were all war zones themselves until recent times, 
which gives some indication of the fickle nature of the tourism industry: this 
year’s no go area is next year’s travel magazine  front cover.’ (O’Connor, 2002, 
p.3)  
This is particularly true for those locations with a previously established pattern of 
tourism, such as Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Croatia or even Afghanistan.* In the Mintel (2004) 
report on emerging destinations, a number of countries are identified which are noted for 
their ‘extraordinary’ market growth, three having emerged from periods of violent 
conflict (Croatia, Cambodia and Lebanon), whilst two were affected by neighbouring 
conflicts (Bulgaria, Namibia), together with another two having emerged from a period of 
significant political change (Mongolia, Tanzania).  
Not only can the world’s conflict zones become the potential tourism destinations of the 
future, there is also evidence of a demand to experience these countries whilst they are 
still considered as dangerous, or ‘hot’ (Piekarz 2007, p.153). Byrne (1997) reported that 
there are hundreds of British travellers who consciously seek to witness war and famine. 
Many embassies serving war torn countries have also reported an increase in the number 
of tourists wanting visas, such as in Rwanda, Bosnia and the former Soviet Republics. 
Casado makes the observation that: 
‘There seems to be an increasing resilience on the part of travellers to disregard 
threats when visiting attractive destinations. The appeal may be historical 
richness, low prices, geographical beauty, or the thrill of being in a potentially 
dangerous place. Even when a record number of destinations have been placed on 
a blacklist of tourist-originating countries, the willingness of some travellers to 
take the risk and visit troubled areas seems to be on the increase.’ (Casado 1999)  
What should also be recognised is the importance of business related travel and tourism 
to the world’s trouble spots, hence the importance stressed on having a more open 
definition of tourism, as discussed in Chapter 1. It must be stressed that ‘hot war’ 
                                                 
*
 Which formed an important part of the hippy trail to Kashmir and India. 
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business tourism is far from a new phenomenon, as the oil and mineral related companies 
have sent workers to war zones for decades. What has changed however is that the end of 
the Cold War saw an increase in conflicts, primarily civil in nature. Paris (2004, p.1) 
notes that in the 1990s, 94% of the armed struggles were internal in nature, which have 
also been accompanied by an increase in peace keeping operations, with the scale of 
operations meaning that this can be understood as a discrete industry on its own (Paris, 
2004, p.1; Duncan and Opatowski, 2000, p.6). This industry can involve a vast array of 
workers, ranging from lawyers involved in drafting laws and constitutions; observers 
monitoring elections; aid workers; commercial organisations with contracts for 
infrastructure projects, such as rebuilding bridges, or power plants; diplomats; 
professionals involved in educational training programmes with the military, police and 
government staff; and soldiers involved in peacekeeping. All of whom can play a vital 
role in developing some of the key, early foundations of the tourism infra and super-
structures, such as restaurants, accommodation, roads and airports. 
2.3 How political events influence tourist perceptions and willingness to 
travel 
So far, what has emerged is that there is a more complex relationship operating between 
tourism and political events, whereby tourism can be characterised as much by its 
robustness, as its sensitivity to these events. It is too simplistic to say people are risk 
averse, or that all risk needs to be eliminated; an impression that is sometimes given with 
all the regulations, media stories and the growth of a ‘blame culture’, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. In more reasoned discussions, risk is in fact seen as a vital necessity in 
business, tourism and adventure, as will be explored further in Chapter 3. 
One of the key themes to emerge from the literature on tourism and instability was the 
importance of perceptions in relation to destination safety. Dimanche and Lepetic (1999, 
p.20) for example, note how risk perceptions of crime in Florida was inflated by some 
dramatic attacks on tourists, yet at the same time the general crime figures were actually 
falling for the State. Carter (1998, p.351) offers another interesting example, noting how 
peoples’ view of the risks and dangers of individual African countries was often reduced 
down to a ‘single, undifferentiated territory’ of a dangerous African continent. A point 
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also observed by Lepp and Gibson (2003, p.607) who use Enders et al’s (1992) concept 
of the ‘generalisation effect’ to show how conflicts are projected onto neighbouring 
countries, even though they may not be affected by it in real terms. In short, all these 
elements show that a critical factor that tourism organisations must often manage is the 
perceived risk, not necessarily the real risks or dangers (Beirman 2003, p.5), whilst also 
recognising how these perceptions will vary according to different groups or market 
segments catered for (Anson 1999, p.59). 
One can draw upon a wide range of theories and factors to help understand how 
hazardous events frame perceptions and influence travel behaviour. Frosdick (1997, 
p.173) highlights the disagreement between writers who argue risk is best understood 
from an individualistic, behavioural perspective, such as Slovic (1991), cited in Frosdick 
(1997, p173), or from an anthropological viewpoint, which argues how risk perception is 
a social construction.* Glaesser (2003, pp 37-42) however, illustrates how a mixed 
approach can be used, which draws on theories from the disciplines of psychology, 
physiological, sociology and anthropology, in order to distil the key factors that can be 
used to understand the decision making process in response to crisis events. Whilst a very 
useful discussion, Glaesser does not go onto construct a model that can be used to 
conduct an analysis of risk perceptions.  
In relation to this work, it was not possible to conduct a full analysis of all aspects to the 
travel decision-making process. All that is done here is to distil some of the key factors 
that were found to be useful in helping to understand how risk perceptions are created, 
which are presented within a theory of heuristics. This theory relates to how people solve 
problems, or make decisions based on our own experiences, through a system of trial and 
error, rather than some structured, systematic method. The reason for its usefulness in this 
work is that it reflects how most people evaluate risk, whereby our ‘cognitive capacity’ 
(Maule 2004, pp.21-23) to make accurate probability risk assessments is often limited by 
a whole range of factors, therefore we tend to rely on our past experiences to make the 
assessment, but in doing so this brings many possible problems and misconceptions 
                                                 
*
 Mary Douglas (1992) is a key writer here, with the development of the grid-group model and the four key 
groups: hierarchists; egalitarians; fatalists and individualists. 
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(Maule 2004, p.21; Lewin 2001, p.41). The theory of heuristics is used to construct 
Diagram 2.1, highlighting the wide range of factors that can inform experiences and can 
effect people’s perceptions and ultimately their willingness to travel, with a short 
explanation of these factors given in Table 2.1.  
Diagram 2.1 Reflecting on the factors influencing risk perceptions 
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The reason why the factors are shown as overlapping is to try and reflect the inherent 
messiness in travel decision making, whereby it is a complex, composite range of factors 
which help inform the decision, many of which may not always be fully recognised or 
appreciated by individuals. The mix of these factors and their relative importance will 
clearly vary from destination to destination, and indeed, individual to individual, but what 
it does offer is method to reflect on how different clients perceive destinations and is 
applied in Chapter 7, Section 7.3.   
Not all of the factors that are highlighted in Diagram 2.1 and Table 2.1 need discussion 
in depth, but there are a number of critical underpinnings that are important to 
understand. One of the interesting themes to emerge from the literature is the evidence 
that it is the content, nature and severity of the outcome of the risk event, rather than the 
likelihood of it occurring, that is a key element in framing risk perceptions. Sonmez et al 
(1999, p.121) and Moore (1983, p.147) for example, argue that that travellers response to 
risk has little to do with the actual or real probability of being harmed, with Tarlow 
(2002, p.3) commenting that the perceptions about a crisis event tend to be almost as 
devastating as the crisis itself. The result is that it can lead to ‘distorted’ perceptions 
(Glaesser, 2003, p.43), or ‘incongruities’ (Vertzberger 1998, p.20) in assessments. It is 
sometimes stated as the difference between the notion of the real risk (if there is such a 
thing, which is examined in more depth in Chapter 3) and the perceived risk. This is 
commonly illustrated by the examples of people who are more scared of flying than 
driving, even though the latter, statistically speaking, is more likely to cause death or 
injury; or the often cited case of people being more scared of a shark attack, than 
coconuts, even though coconuts are reputed to cause far more injuries or deaths than 
shark attacks.*   
                                                 
*
 Glaesser (1993, p.42) uses the example of shark attacks and coconuts. He illustrates how the perceived 
risks of a shark attack is contrary to the reality, whereby death and injury is far more likely to occur from 
falling coconuts. The latter is perhaps so synonymous with tropical holidays, whilst the former more with 
horror – the differences in perception are understandable. In 2000, 150 people died from falling coconuts, 
whilst the number of shark attacks was 79, with the death rate in the world usually being between ten and 
twenty people.  
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Table 2.1 Summary of the key variables which frame risk perceptions 
Influencing 
variable 
Description 
Degree of 
symbolic 
learning 
This relates to what is learnt about a destination via the media and marketing. If learning is primarily 
based on this, when events occur which contradict the sold image, the loss of demand may be more 
severe. For example, a destination which sells itself as an idyllic, tropical paradise designed for 
relaxation, can find negative images of instability far more devastating on the demand in comparison 
with a location which caters for ‘hard’ adventure trekking. The role of the media cannot be 
underestimated, as so many writers argue, such as Stone, (2001, p.181), Falon (2003, p.140), Sonmez et 
al (1999, p120), Anson (1999, p.58), Hall et al (1996, p.107) and Dimanche et al (1999, p.19). The 
concept of media amplification can also be relevant here. 
Degree of direct 
learning 
This relates to learning from doing, which is particularly relevant in relation to independent travellers, 
who can draw on a greater range of experiences in order to make more objective judgments, and can 
interpret an event beyond the dramatic newspaper headlines.  
Degree of 
familiarity and 
tolerance 
This can manifest itself in a variety of ways. After September 11th travelling to long-haul destinations 
meant more unknown elements, resulting in people tending to switch, or alter their travel plans to the 
more familiar destinations, such within a country or familiar neighbouring countries. 
Degree of 
spatial 
distances 
Glaesser (2003, p.39) points out that knowledge and familiarity can be intimately entwined with 
physical distances, which can mean people who live near unstable countries can view the risks 
differently, and make more subtle distinctions and assessments of the risks.  
Degree of 
cultural 
distance 
This is an old idea which relates to the notion of cultural empathy and cultural distance The more a 
group of people are seen as similar, the more individuals can relate to them and hence the difference in 
reactions. Douglas (1992) makes the important point that risks are made in the context of cultural 
relativity and notions of ‘otherness.’ 
Degree of 
situational 
control  
This relates to the degree of control people have of the risk, with the more control we have, the less we 
can feel fear or perceive something as a risk, which can further help explain the driving/flying fear 
paradox. 
Degree of 
temporal 
distance 
Glaesser (2003, p.44) says that ‘according to available heuristics’, the perceived probability of an 
occurrence increases depending on how easily it is remembered, hence the differences in behaviour 
immediately after a crisis event in comparison with months or years later.    
Degree of 
personal stake   
At its broadest level, this relates to the financial investment put on risk (Ritchie et al 1993, p.34), but 
the notion of stake should be extended to include such things as reputation, prestige amongst peers, or 
the notion of social risk.  
Degree of 
substitutes 
Floyd et al (2003, p.23) citing Sonmez (1998) points out how research has shown that when tourists are 
faced with the threat of terrorism, tourists can substitute risks for other destinations with perceived 
safer alternatives and generalising risks to other potential countries.  
Degree of 
freedom 
This relates to the degree that people freely choose to travel, or feel obligated to travel as part of work 
or other possible commitments (Ritchie et al 1993, p.34). 
Degree of thrill 
seeking 
Lupton (1999) makes the general observation of how risk taking and pleasure seeking can be intimately 
entwined. The reasons are not too difficult to fathom, particularly when one examines the many 
humanistic theories that explain human motivation, such as stimulation theories. It is a very subjective 
element, but helps introduce the notion of risk tolerances and why certain people may be more willing 
to undertake the risk of travel than others. 
Degree of 
perceived 
‘instability 
spillage’  
This relates to the notion that political events and crises can be associated with countries or regions 
beyond the borders of the country where they are taking place. This perception can, indeed often is, 
based on ignorance (e.g. the problems with the Israeli/Palestine conflict being projected onto all 
middle-east countries), but its importance cannot be stressed enough.  
Degree of 
importance 
attached to the 
holiday 
Whereas in the past, tourism was often seen as discretionary spend and so highly inelastic, but as 
argued in Chapter 1, it has become more complex as it is an important measure in the quality of life. 
This helps explain why demand tends to be diverted, rather than reduced. 
Degree of fear 
Dichotomy  
The false dichotomy of fear, which can either produce paralysis of actions, whilst at other times it can 
produce resolution.  
Source: Author 
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Sonmez (1998, p.418) illustrates this point with the example of terrorism attacks on travel 
demand. He notes that in 1985, of the 28 million Americans who travelled abroad, only 
162 were killed in terrorist activities, with the probability of 0.00057% of an American 
becoming a victim of terrorism. He states however, that in 1986 an estimated two million 
Americans changed their travel plans in response to terrorist attacks and political events. 
Viscusi & Zechhauser (2003, p.99) and Heng (2006, p.51) also illustrate this point in 
relation to 9/11 which resulted in nearly 3,000 deaths, which although shocking, is still 
relatively small in comparison with the number of people killed in road accidents 
(approximately 10% of the annual highway accidents in the USA), or even from smoking, 
but this does not prevent the terrorist risk being regarded as more serious or dangerous. 
For Viscusi et al (2003, p.99), the key difference relates to fact that the latter risks of 
driving and smoking involves a voluntary element, whilst for 9/11 they comment that  the 
deaths ‘demand attention’ as they were dramatic, clustered and received extra-ordinary 
publicity.* The real risk then can matter little, because a perceived risk is based on a 
variety of subjective feelings, which are believed, and so, as Larkin (2003, p.86) notes, 
are seen as real truths to the individual concerned.  
The work of Sunstein (2003, p.121) gives a further insight into the value of adopting 
heuristics. He noted that in the face of ignorance people assess probabilities through 
various heuristics, the most notable being to draw on any recent examples of the event, 
whether these are through direct experiences, or indirectly, such as accessing news 
reports. He observed that in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the event is more readily 
recalled and so may be given an increased sense of probability; a process which he 
describes as ‘probability neglect,’ which helps explain the excessive over-reaction to low-
probability catastrophe risks. What was of interest was how more emotive descriptions of 
events, or the visual images generated, particularly when the ‘badness’ of the outcome is 
focused on, can have far greater impacts on perceptions in comparison with raw statistical 
odds, † and is cited as one of the reasons why such events can initiate such large scale 
                                                 
*
 Viscusi et al (2003) also note how before the attacks such a risk would not have even been part of most 
Americans mindset as a possibility. 
†
 He used an experiment based around arsenic, water supply and the risk of cancer and how it is described. 
He noted the differences in response and the willingness to pay in order to reduce the risk, with the more 
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changes in the patterns of behaviour in the short term, as the risks are over-estimated. 
Mairal (2008, p.43) gives another useful insight into this theory, by providing a very 
interesting discussion of how notions of risk probability are constructed not by statistical 
analysis, but by the narrative and story, with each repetition and hearing of the story 
reaffirming and heightening the sense of risk. 
Heng (2006) also gives some useful insights into risk perceptions. As with others, he 
emphasises the distinction which can be made between perceived risks gained through 
science and those gained through direct experiences (heuristics). Using Slovic’s work, 
who he describes as the ‘father of risk perceptions’ (Heng 2006, p.46), he notes the three 
risk dimensions that frame perceptions: the dread factor (lack of control and the potential 
catastrophic fatal effects); the unknown factors (risk tends to be over-estimated if it is 
novel, un-observable, with relatively unknown consequences); and the scale of the risk 
(the number of people exposed). Heng goes onto to argue that risks which result from 
human actions, such as terrorism, and new technologies, are especially feared. Whilst 
these differences between real and perceived risks are important, some, such as Eduljee 
(2000, p.16), citing Schrader (1980) and Adams (1995, p.23), do question the whole 
distinction between real and perceived risks. As they argue, both experts and lay people’s 
views are rooted in cultural systems and shaped by psychological profiles, which means 
one can never really talk of a real risk. 
What the different theories on risk behaviour clearly highlight is the need to understand 
customers and clients in a more holistic way. It shows how one must consider not only 
the economics of demand, the physical supply of a tourism infrastructure, and the 
social/cultural situations of the stakeholders involved, but also the complex area of 
psychology and how this influences perceptions, of which issues of safety and well being 
can act to both attract or divert people to destinations (Bentley and Page 2001b, p.708); 
something which also reinforces the dangers of looking at the demand for travel in a 
reductionist, hierarchical way, which only focuses on pleasure travel as a discretionary 
spending item. It also reveals that what organisations need to manage may not necessarily 
                                                                                                                                                  
emotive the description the greater the willingness to pay. He noted how probability did affect behaviour, 
having  little or no impact on emotions 
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be any notion of the real risks, but what the clients perceived risks of travel to a 
destination are, as Beirman (2003, p.6) is keen to stress. 
2.4 The post-modern tourist and the new security paradigm 
As tourism continues to grow, seeping into all areas of the globe, based on the simple law 
of averages it would suggest that the likelihood of tourism being affected by political 
events and instability is increased. There are, however, additional trends in tourism that 
suggest other reasons why it is important to understand and assess political risk. Many of 
these trends can be encapsulated in the theory of Poon’s (1993, p.87) ‘post-modern’ 
tourist. The ‘old tourist’ was characterised by having a mass, standardised package, 
which lacked flexibility. Consumers tended to be inexperienced (or travel illiterate), 
seeking sun, with the hotels of a more standard, large type. This old pattern of tourism, 
which boomed after the Second World War, whilst still having markets, is being 
challenged by new tourism patterns of behaviour. Poon’s (1993, p.34) post modern tourist 
is characterised by being more flexible, segmented and socially/ environmentally 
conscious,* with consumers now far more travel literate, having a greater confidence, 
flexibility and the means to book and make up their own travel itineraries. A more 
detailed description of the characteristics of the post-modern tourist is presented in Box 
2.2. Whilst these descriptions are very broad and reductionist, they do help convey some 
of the key trends occurring, which points to a more complex, niche based tourism market. 
The notion of a ‘post-modern tourist’ seems to be reflected in a number of recent tourism 
market research reports. Of particular relevance is the growth in the ‘experiential or 
experienced-based economy’, which has implications for not only tourism, but in all 
aspects of life for people in the developed world. Mintel (2002), the World Tourism 
Organisation (2003a) and Franklin (2003) all emphasise how the industrialised world is 
in transition from a service based economy, to an experienced based economy, which in 
the context of tourism, means creating a better travel experience, with the opportunity for 
travellers seeking something different, and a sense of ‘personal discovery’(Mintel 2002), 
or more optimal experiences. Both Mintel and the WTO predict that it will be the 
                                                 
*
 Weaver (2000, p.176) also makes a comment on the more knowledgeable consumer which means ethics 
will be more important in the future. 
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experience factor, rather than the location factor, which will be the key for many future 
tourism markets. The focus is thus switching to delivering unique experiences that 
personally engage the consumer. In one sense, travel can be understood as returning back 
to its root origin, whereby the word travel is derived from the word travail, which means 
to overcome adversity and hardship, or conduct a hard or agonizing labour (Hall 1994 
p.92). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So far, what can be seen is that tourism is a huge industry and one that is still growing. 
Changes in the figurations* of society mean that people seek more opportunities for 
optimal experiences,* which stretch far beyond a simple holiday on a beach. The  
                                                 
*
 Used here to refer to the complex interaction of economic, social, political and individual forces. 
Box 2.2 Growth of the post-modern tourist? 
The following points are drawn from a diverse range of literature to illustrate the key features of 
post-modern tourism:  
• Proliferation of small, niche service operators, which also reveals the many markets for the 
more obscure types of adventure travel (Mintel 2001). 
• Polarisation of tourists’ tastes, which deliver extreme experiences, ranging from extreme 
luxurious comfort, to risk-laden adventure. 
• The growth in the adventure sector (Swarbrooke et al 2003, p.93 and p.117), with the WTO 
(2001) identifying adventure tourism as a significant niche market for the year 2020. For 
example, Explore, an adventure tour operator, which was established in 1981 saw a 20% 
increase each year for its holidays and now organises over 30,000 holidays around the world 
(Bryne 1997).  
• The growth in physically and mentally demanding holidays, which can make people feel 
fitter, look better and have a sense of self-fulfilment.  
• Travel experiences which can give the individual kudos by being able to tell a good story 
(Mintel 2001). 
• Adventure being segmented into more sophisticated, innovative market segments, such as: 
family adventure, multi-activity holidays, extreme activities (looks at the novel, extreme 
physical challenge), adventure with a purpose (charity or aid tourism,) and the prestige 
traveller (no-expense spared and motivated by the prestige of the destination). 
• Growing cash rich, time poor segments. 
• More tourism services which have a ‘conscience’ and aim to be ethically sound  in relation 
to human rights and the environment. Related to this is the growth in aid tourism, where 
people volunteer, or pay to do community or environmental projects. 
• Growth of ‘serious leisure’.  
All of these issues can be of help when evaluating the risk exposure of tourism organisations.  
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demand for new and varied destinations, where new and more complex or ‘multi-layered’ 
†
 experiences can be obtained, seems set to increase. Mintel argue that: 
‘One of the major determinants for the future destination is the move to a better 
travel or holiday 'experience'. An increasing number of travellers seem to be 
searching for something different. They are looking for the new frontiers, and in a 
world where the media can take you anywhere at the flick of a digital remote 
control, there is a growing need for tourist products that offer a sense of personal 
discovery.’ (Mintel 2002) 
The results of these changes can already be seen, particularly by the growth in the 
adventure tourism sector, which has been one of the most rapidly growing sectors of the 
tourism industry in recent years (Swarbrooke, Beard, Leckie and Pomfret, 2003; Mintel 
2002 and 2003b). In the past, adventure travel and expeditions were once the preserve of 
the few, as dictated by the social and economic figurations of the time. Today, this has 
changed, where many more people have the means to explore the world because of social 
freedoms, cultural acceptance, economic ability and technological developments, which 
helps give an insight into Sonmez et al (1999, p.13) observation of the growth in 
destinations that are more prone to significant natural disasters, or political turmoil. 
The implication of these trends for tourism and political risk management is potentially 
profound. It is of interest that Poole-Robb et al (2002, p.10), as part of the Merchant 
International Group (MIG) noted how the globalization of markets, and the demands for 
profits and returns on shareholders, is encouraging executives to enter new markets, 
often, they note, without due diligence or research. A point which seems particularly 
important for tourism organisations, who in the face of the competitive dynamics of the 
market place, are compelled to develop new tourism destinations, but which may be more 
vulnerable to instances of political change and instability. In relation to the independent 
traveller, a more meaningful experience will be sought which may involve travel to 
                                                                                                                                                  
*
 Csikzentmihalyi’s (1992) work focused on the condition of human happiness and meaningful experiences. 
He argues that growing affluence had not necessarily brought an increase in happiness, noting that 
happiness is not the result of good fortune, or something that happens, but is the cognitive interpretation of 
events, which when it all comes right is described as an Optimal  Flow Experience. 
†
 The idea of the multi-layered experience is the author’s concept, referring to how people may want to 
experience a variety of emotional states, ranging from relaxation, to being thrilled and excited. 
 37 
remote parts of the world, whether it is for a sense of personal discovery, or to get 
involved in more altruistic activities, such as development or aid work.  
What these trends also emphasise is the importance of the notion of the ‘undiscovered’ 
destination or location, which Franklin (2003, p.273)argues are becoming few and far 
between, as in the post-modern world more or less every surface of the globe seems to 
have been rendered consumable in a touristic way. It is a bold statement, which perhaps 
overstates the case too much. On closer examination, not every part of the globe has been 
commodified for the purposes of tourism. There are many countries in the world, which 
have potential for tourism development, but are held back by endemic political and 
security problems. The paradox, perversity even, of conflicts today, is that whilst it is a 
destructive force, in relation to tourism, it can work to preserve a potential destination, 
even adding to its stock of attractions, as people return and visit sites of past conflicts, in 
much the same way thousands visit the Normandy invasion beaches in France. These 
trends also challenge the more traditional pattern of the tourism lifecycle, as illustrated in 
Box 2.3, where instead of an incremental, linear development of tourism infrastructure, it 
can be characterised by its speed and variety. Tourism developments are not steady, 
meandering rivers, following a set course, rather they can emerge with the force of an 
explosive flood river, where there are many courses and much chaos. 
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2.5 Chapter summary 
Tourism is an industry very sensitive to political change. But it is a relationship that must 
not just be examined from the point of view of the simplistic, deterministic, linear, 
inverse relationship, where as political instability increases, demand reduces. Whilst 
much of the literature tends to focus on the impacts of political events, such as terrorist 
attacks on tourists, what is often ignored is that tourism can also show signs of 
Box 2.3 The importance of the independent backpacker 
What adventure tourism constitutes is open to some debate, with some of the adventure package tours 
perhaps being more of an exercise in re-branding, rather than offering a real adventure. The growth of 
this sector reflects the growing desire to gain more from the holiday experience. Mintel (2001) also 
highlight the parallel growth of a smaller number of independent back-packers, which they describe a 
little simplistically as the hippy backpacker. As Pryer (1997) indicates, this sector of the independent 
backpacker can be as complex and sophisticated as any other tourism niche, with segments ranging 
from the more stereo-typical ‘hippy backpacker’, or a gap-year student, to a the ‘plastic card 
travellers’ and the mature adventurists. Pryer says: 
‘Whilst it is impossible to quantify the size of the group at present, the fact that travelling 
emerged in the 1960’s and for many mature adventurists it is a life-time activity, suggests it 
this is a significant group. The mature adventurists is therefore well-equipped and motivated 
to go where few visitors have gone before. Such a group is motivated by their own prestige, 
self-fulfilment and the need for authenticity with their experience giving them greater insight 
into what is and is not authentic.’ (Pryer, 1997, p..231)  
The independent back packer playing a vital role in opening up new destinations has long been 
recognised. A cycle that involves: discovery, local responses, visitor growth and then external 
investment (Pryer 1997, p..228). Plog (1973) used personality traits based on psychographic types to 
try and understand the role of the traveller in opening up destinations, identifying the allocentric 
(people who seek more novel experiences and risk), mid-centric and psychocentrics (people who are 
risk averse, conservative and seek safety and prefer the familiar). Cohen (1972) developed a useful, if 
dated tourism typology, which distinguished between the organised tourists and the non-institutional 
tourists, comprising of ‘explorers’ and ‘drifters’. The explorer, whilst they want to get off the beaten 
track, seeks an established superstructure, such as reliable transportation. The drifter, by contrast 
shuns the organised travel, adapting to indigenous ways. The slightly derogatory term of drifter, lead 
Vogt (1976) to use the term wanderer. Pryer (1997, p.227) expands on these typologies, to give the 
most sophisticated overview of the independent traveller segment of the tourism industry, commenting 
how the psychological barriers of discovering, or rediscovering, new destinations does not hold any 
fears for a growing group of people, usually young, where they see it as a ‘rite-of-passage’ testing 
their adult competence by embarking on the trip. Furthermore, Pryer explains the critical role of the 
traveller as pioneers for the countless others who will follow. The implication of these trends is again 
very important as the destinations which are travelled to may be existing or former war zones, where 
the kidnapping and execution of travellers in Cambodia in the late 1990s, illustrating the dangers of 
this travel. 
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remarkable resilience, where demand is usually diverted, not stopped after crisis events, 
together with tourism being capable of returning to unstable destinations remarkably 
quickly. Furthermore, to view tourists as a homogeneous group, is to ignore the 
complexities of the different niches or segments and how they interpret and react to 
political events. 
Into the complex global political milieu goes the growth of the post-modern tourist and 
the experiential economy, which can place greater demand on perceived untouched 
destinations. The result is that travel and tourism is increasingly likely to bisect or interact 
with global political events, which further stresses the vital importance of monitoring the 
political environment to ensure existing services and clients are safe, or new opportunities 
are seized. All of these things have important implications when analysing the value of 
existing models, as discussed in Chapter 6, or developing new models, as discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 3 
 The babel of risk management: clarifying the 
language and culture of risk 
3. 1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, it was noted that risk and risk management could be understood as both a 
culture and as a practical management process. This chapter primarily concentrates on 
the former point, with Chapter 4 focusing on the practical process elements. Literature is 
drawn from the different subject fields identified in Chapter 1, in order to conduct a 
critical comparative review of the different ways that risk, political risk and political 
instability can be defined, understood and utilised in the construction of risk cultures and 
paradigms.  
The rationale for this approach is its importance to a number of the thesis objectives. The 
first relates to the objective of identifying the core concepts of risk management in order 
to help establish a consistent vocabulary of risk management. The second is based on the 
objective of identifying examples of good and bad practice from the different fields. The 
third relates to how understanding risk paradigms can help unlock the workings of many 
political risk models, as it influences what is viewed as a risk, which in turn shapes what 
is analysed, assessed and controlled. By attempting to achieve these objectives, it has the 
cumulative effect of making an important contribution to clarifying a confusing language 
of risk, or the babel, which can conspire against the effective communication of risk, the 
failure of which can make the whole risk management process sterile. It also has the 
added benefit of helping to clarify an appropriate culture or belief system, which, as 
Allinson (1993, p.3) notes, can be so vital in giving the risk management process 
direction and purpose. 
This chapter begins by examining a variety of more generic risk definitions, highlighting 
the core concepts and descriptors used. These are then compared and contrasted with the 
specific political risk definitions, whereby some striking differences are highlighted. Just 
what exactly constitutes a political risk is also intimately explored, drawing a sharp 
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distinction between the more general notions of political instability and the many 
possible political hazardous events, triggers and risk impacts. 
3.2 Exploring general risk definitions and paradigms  
There are no shortage of writers who note the many inherent ambiguities in risk 
definitions, such as Klinke and Renn (2001, p.159), Maule (2004, p.19), or Callow (1998, 
p.4). Considering the diversity of literature examined, and the different levels of 
management for which it is written, this perhaps comes as no surprise. Using the Oxford 
Online Reference system (2007) revealed over 1,000 hits,* which also helped show the 
ubiquity of usage. Interestingly, however, the pattern that emerges is that variations are 
not necessarily between the different subject fields or disciplines, but are more likely to 
reflect the cultural and temporal context that the work is written in. In short, the notion of 
risk can be understood as a social construction and a portmanteau word † (Moore 1983, 
p.3) hence highly malleable and open to disagreement (Adams 1995, p.3; Brown 1999, 
p.274; Maule 2004, p.19; Klinke et al 2001, p.159) and so constantly evolving (Mythen 
2004, p.13).  
In Table 3.1, a sample of risk definitions are given, based on a content analysis of the 
many risk definitions discovered and examined, which were drawn from a variety of 
subject fields. The sample highlighted here is used to help illustrate conceptual variety, 
rather than frequency of usage. From this table, two key distinguishing properties emerge 
in relation to the notion of risk. The first relates to what can variously be described as 
either the probability (Brown 1999, p 274; Glaesser 2003, p. 43), or likelihood (such as 
Klinke et al, 2001, p.161), or chance (Moore 1983, p3), or even frequency (Smissen et al, 
1999, p.286), although strictly speaking, as Grainger-Jones (1999, p.197) and 
Jablonowski (2001, p.33) note, the notion of frequency is not the same as likelihood, as it 
simply refers to the number of times an event or situation occurs, which can then be used 
to help formulate the probability of occurrence. The second concept relates to the notion 
                                                 
*
 These ranged from the fields of art and architecture, biology and sciences, computing, earth and 
environmental sciences, economics and business, encyclopaedia, English dictionaries, history, law, 
medicine, military history, names and places, physical sciences and mathematics, politics and social 
sciences, science, and religion and philosophy. 
†
 This refers to the idea that it is blended together from various sources and cultures. 
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of a severity of outcome, or magnitude (Royal Society 1992, p.4), or level of threat 
(Howell 2001, p.3), or the gain or loss value pay-off (Moore 1983, p.3). Whilst the 
likelihood tends to have a quantitative dimension, the severity often has a more 
qualitative dimension. Whatever the descriptors used, it is clear that the notion of 
probability and severity of outcome, are core concepts, which Klinke et al (2001, p.161) 
describe as the two ‘central categories’ of risk. 
Table 3.1 Sample definitions of risk 
Definition Subject  
Field 
Type 
‘Risk is sometimes taken as synonymous with hazard but risk has the additional 
implication of the chance of a particular hazard actually occurring. Hazard is best 
viewed as naturally occurring or a human induced process, or event, which has the 
potential to create loss. That is the source of danger. Risk is the actual exposure of 
something of human value to a hazard and is often regarded as the product of 
probability and loss.’ (Smith 2004, p.12). 
Environmen
tal hazard 
and risk 
management 
Asymmetric 
‘Risk is the potential to lose something of value, or simply the potential accident’ 
(Brown 1999, p.274). 
Adventure 
management 
Asymmetric 
‘…Risk (is) the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated 
period of time, or results from a particular challenge. As probability in the sense of 
statistical theory, risk obeys the formal laws of combining probabilities. Explicitly 
or implicitly, it must always relate to the ‘risk of (a specific event or set of events)’ 
and where appropriate must refer to a hazard specified in terms of its amount or 
intensity, time of starting or duration.’ (Royal Society 1992, p.3).  
General risk 
management  
Asymmetric 
‘All projects involve risk; the zero risk project is not worth pursuing…. Risk 
involves both threat and opportunity.’ Chapman et al (1997, p.xiii).  
Project 
management  
Symmetric 
‘Risk management is a rational approach to the problem of dealing with the risks 
faced by a business. It is about managing or optimising risks; it is not necessarily 
about eliminating them, because risk is inherent in adventure activities – and should 
remain so.’ (Cloutier 2002, p.241).  
Adventure Symmetric 
‘We often speak of the “risk of fraud” or the “risk of getting run over.” Sometimes 
we use the word quantitatively; for example, we might say that there is a 20% risk 
of losing our money in a particular situation…In these examples we are using the 
word “risk” in the sense of an undesirable outcomes. This is often referred as 
“downside risks”.  However, investments might also have an upside potential.’ 
(Lewin 2001, p.36).  
General 
business 
management  
Symmetric. 
‘Risk management can be defined as the process of anticipating, preventing, or 
minimising potential costs, losses, or problems for the event, organisation, partners 
and guests. Risks occur in terms of finance, organisational viability, safety and 
health. Risks occur naturally and cannot be ignored, and events are prone to 
particular types of risk.’(Getz 1997, p.241).  
Events 
management 
Asymmetric 
‘Risk can be considered as a frame that creates contexts which bring together an 
“object of risk” (a hazard or source of potential harm), an “object at risk” (a target 
of potential harm) and an evaluation (implicit or explicit) of human consequences. 
Risk is therefore a relational order through which connections between people and 
‘things’ are constituted and guide their actions.’(Mairal 2008, p.42) 
General 
management 
Asymmetric 
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One important theme to emerge is the distinction between the notion of risk with 
uncertainty, particularly in the field of economics and statistics. The distinction is made 
between risk and uncertainty, whereby if the outcome of a project or event is not known, 
or highly subjective, then this can be categorised as uncertainty. If, on the other hand the 
outcome can be given some degree of assessment as to its probability or likelihood, then 
this is classified as a risk. Equally, if something approaches 100% probability, it becomes 
a reality rather than a risk (Irwin 1998, p.61). Whilst risk can be understood as a product 
of uncertainty (Klinke et al, 2001, p.163; Swarbrooke et al, 2003, p.12), many argue that 
it should not be regarded as the same thing.* This conceptual distinction is one articulated 
in Knight’s 1921 book Risk, uncertainty and profit; a key text that has helped frame 
many subsequent discussions on the notions of risk (as noted by Boyne 2003, p.2; 
Michaels 1996,p.25; Mythen 2004, p.13; Bouchet et al 2003, p.3). 
Whilst this conceptual difference between risk and uncertainty are easy to appreciate, 
Michaels (1996) and Mythen (2004, p.13) make the comment that this distinction has 
perhaps become received wisdom, whereby in reality such clarity between the two 
concepts may not be so easy to draw (Mythen 2004, p.14; Bouchet et al 2003, p.3). 
Viscusi et al (2003, p.100) also comment that in relation to terrorism, the risks are highly 
imprecise and difficult to predict, which means one is dealing with uncertainty, or even 
ignorance, because of the difficulty of attaching statistical probability. Heng (2006, p.44) 
makes this criticism in relation to political forecasting, arguing that to truly distinguish 
between risk and uncertainty is near impossible, as the probability rating will always have 
an element of arbitrariness about it. This question is returned to in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Also evident in a number of the definitions is the notion of a hazard (such as the Royal 
Society 1992; Smith 2004, p.12; Sadgrove 1997, p.4; and Poole-Robb et a, 2002, p.3).  A 
risk whilst intimately related to the concept of a hazard, can be regarded as a distinct 
concept, even though as many writers note (such as Smith 2004, p.14; Mythen 2004, 
p.13), a hazard may be used as a synonym for risk.† Whilst many definitions do not make 
                                                 
*
 Klinke et al (2001, p.164) expand on this idea of uncertainty and introduce the concept of ‘incertitude’, 
which refers to the degree which reliable predictions can be made.  
†
  Heng (2006, p.48) comments that Beck is a key writer who has ‘muddied’ the waters between the two 
concepts as he tends to use them as synonyms. 
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reference to the concept of a hazard, its importance should not be ignored. For example, 
in the Royal Society’s 1992 influential report on risk, it places clear conceptual 
distinction between the two terms, referring to a hazard as any property, situation or 
indeed anything which has the potential to cause harm, which Sadgrove (1997, p.4) says 
can range from a trailing wire, toxic chemicals or excessive financial borrowing. In the 
Royal Society’s report, the hazard essentially refers to the object, or conditions that could 
cause harm, defined as the ‘loss to a human being or population’ (Royal Society 1992, 
p.30), which can become ‘realised’ under certain conditions (Royal Society 1992, pp.2 -
3). Ritchie and Marshall (1993, p.144) give another possible dimension to the concept of 
a hazard, noting that some may define the hazard as the actual potential outcome, with the 
term risk regarded as the subjective interpretation of these outcomes.  
The concepts of hazard and risk are intimately linked by the extent that risk events can 
emerge from different hazards. Here there is ambiguity in the extent that the hazard is 
understood as the source of the risk, or is the actual cause of the risk, together with 
whether the hazard automatically equates with harm and loss. For example, Smith (2004, 
p.12) makes the distinction between a hazard and a risk (see Figure 3.2), referring to the 
hazard as the cause of the risk.* Haddock (1993, p.8) in the field of adventure also cites 
the hazard as relating to the causal or contributing factors to incidents and ‘undesired 
events which result in loss.’ The British Mountaineering Council (2001, p.15) using the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) guidelines use the term hazard to simply indicate 
anything that can cause harm (such as a rock fall, bad weather), whilst the risk (such as 
the rock fall hitting people, or  bad weather causing hypothermia) is the chance that it will 
do so. Others take a slightly different view of the hazard, such as Hewitt (1997, p.25), 
who stresses that the hazard is the source of an event, change or accident, not necessarily 
the initiator or cause. This view of a hazard is to see it as the ‘objective conditions, agent 
or event’ (Hewitt 1997, p.25) which may lead to a negative event, or, crucially, could also 
lead to opportunities. In this sense, the hazard is understood in a more neutral way, with 
Ritchie et al (1993, p.144) noting that the hazard will occur irrespective of the risks 
                                                 
*
 Smith (2004, p.12) cites Okrent’s (1980) analogy of two people crossing an ocean to illustrate the 
difference between a risk and a hazard. The hazard is the deep water and large waves, which create the 
danger of drowning. If one was to cross the ocean in a rowing boat, and one in a ship, then the risk or 
probability of drowning would vary between the two. 
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perceived. Chapman et al (1997, p.8) writing from a project risk management 
perspective, further illustrates this point with an example of how both good or bad  
weather (the hazard) can mean the installation of an oil rig can go over or under schedule, 
with subsequent cost reductions or increases. 
From the subject field of environmental hazard and risk management, Smith (2004) 
identifies the notion of the importance of recognising the point of interaction between 
people and a potential hazard. In essence the idea refers to risks only being created when 
people impinge on, or meet with a hazardous situation. For example, simply put, severe 
weather conditions are hazards that will always occur, but if they do not bisect human 
settlements, then no risks are generated. Mairal (2008) discusses particularly well this 
notion of relationships between hazardous objects and notions of risk. He illustrates this 
by saying: 
‘I can say a tsunami is very dangerous but I never say that a tsunami is risky. 
Nevertheless, I can describe my proximity to the tsunami as risk. So risk is not 
derived from the object but from my relationship to the object.’ (Mairal 2008, 
p.48) 
Mairal’s point is particularly useful, as he notes that objects can be at risk, or there can be 
objects of risk. It is an interesting point and perhaps a little surprising it is not more 
frequently referred to by other subject fields. Whilst variations have been found, the 
notion of a hazard existing as an objective condition from where risks can emerge, 
dependent on the point of interaction with tourist activity, seems to be of most value, and 
is explored in more depth in Section 3.5.3 in relation to political risk events. 
Another striking feature about the definitions given in Table 3.1 is how one can 
distinguish between the risk definitions that are symmetric or asymmetric in their focus, 
with the latter having the additional strong association with notions of danger or perils. 
Generally, definitions of risk tend to veer towards the asymmetrical, which means the 
primary focus is given to a notion of loss and its avoidance. What is noticeable is that 
there are an increasing number of symmetric definitions, whereby risk events are regarded 
as not only creating loss, but also opportunities, or upsides as Burmester (2000, p.250), 
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Czinkota, Ronkainen, Moffett and Moynihan (1998, p.237), Reinhardt (2001, p.255) and 
Tchankova (2002, p.290) all note. The fact that this symmetrical skew can appear across 
the subject fields, helps illustrate the argument noted earlier that risk paradigms are not so 
much defined from the subject field written for, but perhaps more the time and context 
they are written in. * 
The symmetric way of understanding risk can be understood as reflecting a newer 
paradigm of risk management, which is sometimes labelled as the third or fourth age of 
risk management, as illustrated by writers such as Chapman et al (1997, p.8), Sadgrove 
(1997, pp.1-2) and Tarlow (2002, pp.202-209) † and was raised in Chapter 1, Box 1.1. 
How new it actually is can be open to some debate, as the notions of the symmetrical 
impacts from risk events can be found in the literature going back many years. The key 
difference now, however, is that it has become more clearly articulated, by more writers 
and adopted by more organisations, so it certainly can seem new. At its most basic level 
Bernstein (1998, p.12) and Ford, Blanchard and Blanchard (1992) argue that to take risks 
is to be human. In relation to adventure management, many, such as Cloutier (2002, 
p.241), Swarbrooke et al (2003, p.171), Priest and Glass (1997, p.123) and Haddock 
(1993, p.7) state that to remove all risk is to destroy the essence of the activity, with Ryan 
(1994) arguing that it plays an important part in framing the travel experience, and Ewert 
(1989, pp 2-5) illustrating its importance in creating learning opportunities. In the area of 
business management, this new paradigm is reflected by the view that uncertainty is seen 
as a ‘friend’ rather than the adversary that must be battled (Bernstein 2001, p.9), as it is 
from uncertainty and hazards where both market threats and opportunities are created. In 
this sense, risks are viewed as inevitable and inherent in all human activities (Chapman et 
al 1996, p.xii; Moore 1983, p.ix), which is vital in the process of change and economic 
development (Moore 1983, p.1; Burke 1999, p.230). Waite (2001, p.3) states this more 
bluntly by saying that without risk there is no profit. Also, very importantly, in this 
                                                 
*
 Exceptions can always be found, such as Daniel (2004, p.45) who although recognises the more neutral 
and opportunistic aspect of risk, still prefers to focus on the negative aspects as he argues this reflects the 
‘common sense’ understanding of risk; another example  is Withers (1988) in relation to industrial hazards. 
†
 Tarlow uses Alvin Toffler’s book The Third Way (1981), who discusses how the world was going through 
a socioeconomic paradigm shift, with the first wave being pre-industrialisation, followed by the second 
wave of industrialisations, with the new paradigm shift occurring in the 1970s, where goods are mass 
produced, but with greater consideration to aspects of quality and individualisation. Postmodernism refines 
these notions further. 
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paradigm, control measures are seen as a trade-off and balancing between the good and 
bad risks (Swarbrooke et al, 2003, p.171; Clarke et al 1999). The World Economic 
Forum (2007, p.6 ), illustrate this paradigm and the ‘idiosyncratic’ nature of risk, noting 
how problems of climate change (referred to as a driver of change), whilst seen as a 
problem for many big businesses, may ultimately improve their resilience to oil price 
shocks as they strive for energy efficiencies. 
3.3 The confusion between the many types of risk 
When examining the literature on risk management, a bewildering vocabulary is 
discovered, not only between different risk subject fields, but also within the fields 
themselves. This confusing vocabulary is a problem a number of writers have noted, with 
periodic attempts to review the literature on risk descriptors in order to try to develop 
some conceptual clarity, such as Frosdick’s (1997) journal paper, which is one of the 
better, more comprehensive attempts, but is by no means definitive. This confusing 
language clearly has important implications for the effective communication of risk, 
therefore it must be explored further. To help convey this confusing vocabulary, Figure 
3.1 illustrates the messy palette of risk-related terms and descriptors that were found 
during the review of literature. 
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The many terms used in Figure 3.1 is far from exhaustive. It does however show the 
variety of terms that can be used, some of which can refer to discrete concepts, whilst 
others, as illustrated in previous sections, are used as synonyms, along with examples of 
the different terms having ‘bled’ into each other in relation to their conceptual meaning, 
all of which only adds to the confusion when trying to understand risk management. In 
order to deal with this perplexing vocabulary, it can be helpful to develop a typology with 
which to classify these many different terms, whereby the encompassing terms of risk 
types, categories, dimensions, levels and even textures,  are used in more precise ways, 
rather than interchangeably as often occurs in the literature. In all, four key generic 
 
Figure 3.1The messy palette of risk 
 
Source: Author 
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categories are developed for this work, which relates to: the dimensions of risk; the levels 
of risk; the sources of risk; and the impacts of risk. The many different risk descriptors 
identified in Figure 3.1 are organised into these categories, and presented in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2 Typology of risk types  
Category of 
risk type 
Description Key risk related 
concepts 
Dimensions of 
risk  
The dimensions of risk is a category designed to classify the 
many different types of risk which relate to how risk may 
be measured, or a particular property it has.  
Objective risks, Perceived 
risks, Real risk, Subjective 
real risk, Objective real risk, 
Acceptable risk, Individual, 
Community, Societal risk, 
Inherent risks, Contours of 
risk, Dread risk. 
Environmental 
levels 
This refers to the different environmental levels within a 
country or organisation that the hazards either emerge from, 
or impact upon. In the literature, which includes political 
risk literature, there are numerous ways that they can be 
identified, with the terms often used interchangeably, such 
as with the use of the macro and micro terms.  
Macro/micro, 
Operational/strategic, 
Internal/intermediate/external, 
Global/international/national/ 
regional/local/organisation.  
Sources of risk 
(hazardous 
categories) 
Clearly, the sources of risk are intimately related to the 
levels of risk, but can be given further sophistication by 
considering more specific categories within each layer. The 
importance of this is that it helps put political risk in 
context of the many other possible sources of risk. 
Political, Economic, Social 
Technological, Legal 
Environmental/ecological, 
Sectoral, Aesthetics, 
Customer, Business 
 Financial, Compliance,  
operational, Suppliers,  
Internal. 
Impacts of risk The notion of a risk impact is not a generic risk category 
referred to in the literature, but has been developed here to 
help organise certain risk terms and concepts. The notion of 
impact risk is used to refer to the different ways a 
hazardous event may affect or impact upon an organisation, 
which also can convey what parts of the organisation are 
exposed to the risk event. This category is also intimately 
related to the environmental levels of risk management. 
What is of particular importance is to recognise how non-
tangible aspects of the organisation need to be considered, 
such as reputation and brand. As Regester and Larkin 
(2005, p.2) note, a brand that may have taken years to build 
can be destroyed in days, even hours. 
Physical assets, Financial 
assets, Reputation, Ethical 
concerns,  People (physical 
and emotional), Operational 
processes, Strategic plans, 
Legal and regulatory 
compliance. 
 
Source: Author 
What must be noted from Table 3.2 is that it does not necessarily solve the problem of 
different conceptual risk currencies, by establishing one language of risk. There is little 
doubt that the categories developed here may jar against other peoples’ understanding of 
the terms and what should be included. Merna and Al-Thani (2005, p.11) for example use 
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the basic categories of the ‘Dimensions of risk’ (used to refer to what was previously 
described as the ‘core pillars’ of risks, which relates to the notions probability and 
consequences of an event taking place), the ‘Sources of Risk’ and ‘Typical Risks’ (which 
mixes up the risk impacts and the dimensions of risk). The purpose of this table is to 
therefore enable clarification of the core concepts in risk management and to develop a 
lexicon to help translate the many different descriptors of risk given in the literature. This 
is returned to and given further clarification in Section 3.6. 
3.4 A comparative analysis of political risk definitions 
The review of risk definitions and paradigms has consciously kept the discussion separate 
between the subject field of political risk and the other fields. This is done to reveal more 
sharply the similarities and differences between the fields. When comparing political risk 
definitions with other subject fields, one is often given the impression that the literature 
on political risk has sometimes operated within its own risk debate cul-de-sac, whereby 
there is not only a lack of a consistent definition of political risk within the subject field - 
as Brummersted (1988, p.78) and  Monti-Belkaoui et al (1998, p.76) point out - but also 
in comparison with many other risk definitions, such as those discussed in relation to 
business management. 
In Table 3.3 a sample of political risk definitions are given, drawn from a content 
analysis conducted on a larger sample. As before, the main focus of the analysis was not 
necessarily the frequency of conceptual usage, but rather to look at the similarities and 
differences. If these political risk definitions are compared with the previous definitions 
of risk in Table 3.2, some interesting points can be noted. Most striking is that the three 
core concepts of probability, severity and a hazard are not applied in any consistent 
manner. One interesting illustrative example is Zonis and Wilkins’ (2001, p.177) 
definition, which was the only one to refer to a concept of a hazard, which they say refers 
to specific political events, such as an act of expropriation, whilst the more general notion 
of political instability is cited as the risk. In fact, if framed from the earlier conceptual 
understanding of a hazard and risk, it is evident that they are poorly applied as political 
instability can be viewed as a broader hazard category, whilst political violence is a more 
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specific one, and so can both be regarded as hazards, whilst elements such as contract 
frustration is much closer to a risk, rather than the hazard. There is also no reference to 
any notion of probability or severity. This example is far from unique in terms of the 
conceptual messiness in which terms are applied. 
Table 3.3 Sample political risk definitions 
Definition Type 
‘Political risk is a phenomenon that characterises an unfriendly human climate in 
both developed and developing countries. A high crime rate or an upsurge of 
violent unrest, even in highly developed countries, qualifies such countries for the 
dubious title of “political risk”. Political risk essentially refers to the potential 
economic losses arising as a result of governmental measures or special situations 
that may either limit or prohibit the multi-national activities of a firm.’ (Monti-
Belkaoui et al 1998, p.75) 
Asymmetric 
‘Political risk refers to unwanted events resulting from government policies or 
actions, and political risk assessment (PRA) is a broad review of the influences of 
government policies and actions on selected industries or corporations.’(Tsai and 
Su 2002, p 374)   
Asymmetric 
‘Much of the business literature defines international political risk narrowly as risks 
to company resources because of political decisions. Growing awareness that 
political systems are interdependent with other national systems led to recognition 
that political risk includes social as well as political decisions, events, or conditions 
that could cause investors to lose money’ (Parker 1998, p.434) 
Asymmetric 
‘A political risk event is one that threatens a firm with financial, strategic or 
personnel loss due to non-market forces. A political event itself does not 
necessarily constitute a risk to business. Even revolution as the most dramatic form 
of “political instability is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for changes in 
policy relevant to foreign investment. In fact political instability can present 
opportunities as well as risks to business.’ (Kennedy 1987, p.5) 
Symmetric 
‘Political risk is the uncertainty that stems, in whole or in part, from the exercise of 
power by governmental and non-governmental actors. Political instability and 
politicised government policy pose the best-known political risks. Political 
violence, expropriation and creeping expropriation, contract frustration, and 
currency inconvertibility are amongst typical hazards.’ (Zonis et al 2001, p.177)  
Asymmetric 
What is also striking about the definitions was the strong asymmetric outlook, focusing 
on possible losses which may occur as a consequence of a political act or event - 
particularly those associated to the notion of political instability, as Monti-Belkaoui et al 
(1998, p.77), Parker’s (1998, p.434), Tsai et al (2002, p.373) and Rugman and Hodgetts’s 
(1995, p.356) definitions all illustrate. There are a number of factors that can help explain 
this strong asymmetric skew of political risk definitions and understandings. Bouchet et 
al (2003, p.11) comment that one of the reasons for this approach has been because of 
computational difficulties of modelling upside/opportunity risks. Another factor is given 
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by Howell (2001, p.12), who notes that the painful experiences and financial losses which 
businesses experienced in the past have influenced the mindset and models developed for 
the present, which are designed to prevent such losses occurring again in the future, such 
as acts of expropriation.  
These differences in the definitions, and the apparent grounding in an older risk 
paradigm, raised the question of whether there were some subject field necessities for 
having these variations in descriptors and concepts utilised in political risk management? 
From literature reviewed, it seems that this is not the case, as it was always possible to 
find approaches utilising the more familiar risk concepts, frameworks and third age risk 
paradigms in relation to political and country risk. For example the World Economic 
Forum (2007, p.8) in its global risk assessment approach, shows how it is possible to 
utilise the concepts of probability and severity of impacts, with its assessment of 
instability being plotted on a graph in relation to likelihood and a severity scale related to 
the number of deaths. Similarly, Bouchet et al (2003, p.10), and Kennedy (1987, p.5) also 
illustrate a more symmetrical understanding of political risk with their referral to notions 
of opportunities, gain or upsides.*  
The impression one is left with is that  many of the political risk approaches seem to be 
based on received practice and literature for the particular subject field, having changed 
only incrementally over time, resulting in some of the approaches failing to reflect how 
the conceptual understanding and the type of political risk events have changed. Wells 
(1998, p.15), Moran (1998, p. 8), Markwick (1998, p.44) and Stapenhurst (1992, p.64) for 
example make such a comment, noting the preponderance of models which can simply 
focus on notions of political instability, or expropriation; events which have perhaps been 
super-ceded in terms of importance by aspects of global terrorism, state failure and 
corruption,† but which may need different methods and approaches in order to be 
properly analysed and assessed. A variation of this criticism is Prideaux, Laws and 
                                                 
*
 Sometimes it was also found that there may not be an explicit recognition in the formal definitions, but 
notions of upsides were implicit with some of the models, such as the ICRG model (Howell 2001, p.34). 
†
 Moran ( 1998, p.8), Wells (1998, p.15) and Markwick (1998, p.44), for example, point out that  part of the 
literature on political risk assessment is outdated because of its strong focus on expropriation and 
nationalisation, but which have declined in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1975, for example, there were 83 cases 
of expropriation, yet in 1981 to 1992 there were no
 53 
Faulkner’s (2003, p.476) critique of crisis models that are based on the analysis of 
systems in peaceful and tranquil times, rather than the more complex, dynamic business 
environment that has developed. This is critically examined further in Chapter 6. 
3.5 What constitutes a political risk? 
The previous sample of political risk definitions begins to hint at what events may be 
viewed and understood as a political risk, as so many of them are defined in relation to 
acts or events, such as government policies and particularly notions of instability. Kobrin, 
(1979, p.76), cited by Stapenhurst, (1992, p.65) also noted the frequency that political 
risk can sometimes be used as something of a synonym for political instability and the 
negative impacts it can generate, but this is an approach raising a number of problems. 
 It is therefore important to explore further just what can be understood as a political risk 
event and notions of political instability. 
3.5.1 Examining the conceptual differences between political instability, 
democracy and political risk 
Arriving at a definitive definition of political instability/stability seems near impossible, 
as it can vary considerably, depending on the ideological or theoretical perspective it is 
viewed from. A problem that has led some, such as Calvert (2002, p248) to describe the 
concept as being the least clear in political science, or Theocharous (2002) arguing it has 
almost become meaningless through indiscriminate use, or simply too quickly associated 
with violence (Theocharous, 2002). This does not mean, however, that what is 
understood as political instability does not need to be examined. 
In relation to the literature concerning tourism and the political environment, Hall’s 1994 
and 1996 works have been particularly influential in setting the conceptual parameters of 
political instability in this subject field. The definition he provides of political instability 
is relatively clear and direct, defining political instability as: 
‘…a situation in which conditions and mechanisms of governance and rule are 
challenged as to their political legitimacy by elements operating from outside of 
the normal operations of the political system. When challenges occur from within 
 54 
a political system and the system is able to adapt and change to meet demands on 
it, it can be said to be stable. When forces for change are unable to be satisfied 
from within a political system and then use such non-legitimate activities as 
protest, violence, or even civil war to seek change, then a political system can be 
said to be unstable.’ (Hall et al 1996, p.106) 
Sonmez (1998, p.422) using Cook’s (1990, p.14) definition describes instability in a 
similar vein, defining political instability as a situation where a government has been 
toppled, or is controlled by factions following a coup, or where basic functional pre-
requisites for social order and maintenance are unstable and periodically disrupted. Hall 
(1994, p.93) citing Lea & Small (1988) goes onto identify five dimensions of political 
violence associated with instability, which are: demonstrations, strikes, terrorism, civil 
war, external war, which are of relevance to the next section on the more specific political 
risk events. 
Other writers focus more on the notion of stability, rather than instability, such as Calvert, 
(2002, p.248) who argues that a stable political system is ‘one not easily adjusted, altered 
or destroyed,’ but noting that a key to government survival must still be a constant 
adjustment or ‘adaptive to change.’* Wilson (1995, p.25) also focuses on notions of 
stability, observing that if the regime is ‘durable,’ violence and turmoil are limited, and 
the leadership can stay in office for several years. What is particularly worthwhile noting 
is Poirier’s (1997, p.679) point that political risks are not just generated from weak 
governments, but also strong ones, as they can often have the confidence to tackle 
organisations and deal with key issues. 
Whilst these definitions have their uses, there are many problems with them. For 
example, Smith (2003, p.220) makes the important point that outside a Marxist tradition, 
instability is often seen as dangerous and deviant. The notion of instability, he notes, is 
very much in the eye of the beholder, saying: 
                                                 
*
 Calvert (2002, p.249) utilises the concept of system maintenance referring to how a government holds 
onto power, relating to resource controls, interest arbitration and political socialisation. 
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‘…stability is a highly normative concept. What is instability for one person 
might well constitute the welcome overthrow of a detestable regime for another. 
(Many in the West welcomed the instability in Communist Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union). The USA has long been actively engaged in destabilizing 
regimes that it does not like. One person’s stability is another person’s 
repression.’ (Smith 2003, p.220) 
Therefore to focus on instability may simply indicate a preference of one regime type 
over another; or, to put it another way, is it reflecting a concern with stable governments 
or stable democratic governments?  
What is certainly evident in much of the early writing on political stability is how the 
notion of democracy and stability were intimately entwined, such as in Lipset’s 1959 
work, Political Man (cited in Lane and Ersson 1994, p.18), where the conditions which 
create stability focus on explaining democratic liberal systems, more specifically 
American, and the notions of pluralism and civic cultures. The result of this bias or skew 
can mean that non-democratic governments are viewed as more unstable, and therefore 
more risky, whilst democratic, liberal systems are viewed as more stable, and therefore 
less risky. Howell et al (1994, p.76) makes a similar point noting the common conceptual 
confusion between authoritarianism and instability, whereby they are often mistakenly 
seen as synonymous. Adopting such notions are simplistic, deterministic and a potentially 
dangerous for an organisation to hold, as it can mean that they can become ‘blinded’ to 
the risks posed in democratic systems. Cothran and Cothran (1997, p.478) for example 
note how countries such as Mexico or Columbia * can be defined as democratic, yet have 
severe problems in relation to criminality and drugs which pose many threats to the 
tourist. Smith (2003, p.222) gives a further insight into some of the simplistic 
assumptions about democracy and stability, arguing that failure of democracy should not 
be equated with a breakdown of stability, as he illustrates using the examples of 
Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius. Equally, Paris (2004, p.5) argues the thesis that the 
gaining of liberal democracy is not a panacea for establishing state viability and stability, 
as the experience of Yugoslavia and many other countries reveal. Democracy, then, does 
                                                 
*
 Also labelled a narco-democracy 
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not guard against turbulence, political volatility, proper representation of people and 
giving legitimacy (McNutt 1996, p.78), and so by implication generating fewer risks, as 
Box 3.1 also shows. It is also important to note that the examples of tourism growth in 
Cuba under Castro,* or Spain under Franco, illustrate that authoritarianism is not a barrier 
for tourism, although, in view of the new business dynamic of the post-modern tourist, 
discussed in Chapter 2, there could be many other risks, particularly in relation to 
aspects of reputation and ethics which need to be considered.† This is reappraised in 
Chapter 6. 
                                                 
*
 It is interesting to note that Cuba’s political system can be seen as part of the attraction, almost being 
presented as an exotic animal, with people viewing a visit as the ‘last chance to see’ something which will 
soon be lost to the world. 
†
 It is perhaps also worthwhile noting that the author has observed an apparent higher degree of tolerance 
for left-wing regimes, as opposed to right-wing regimes as Myanmar illustrates. This has not been properly 
tested, but is  noted as it is an interesting area to explore further in future research. 
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Bernard Crick (2000) in his eloquent essay, In Defence of Politics, first published in 
1962, provides a useful discussion on the nature of politics and democracy, drawing on 
Box 3.1 Political risk in democratic developed countries 
It is vital that one does not skew the analysis of political risks to just notions of political instability 
as they relate to developing authoritarian countries. In the first instance, such concepts are full of 
vagaries, and in the second, it can mean many political hazards and risks are missed. Indeed, 
Moran (1998, p.8) and Wells (1998, p.22) note how the ‘spread of democracy’ poses many new 
risks, ranging from more powerful local governments taking on foreign enterprises, and the 
significant impact pressure groups can play in affecting operational activities. The following 
examples illustrate how developed, democratic countries can generate a variety of political risks: 
• In the USA, since September 11th there has been increased regulation and bureaucratic 
requirements for people travelling to the USA, such as the need to stipulate the first nights 
accommodation (failure to do so risks a $1,900 fine, or expulsion, for which the airlines 
would be responsible), and passports needing to be machine readable or have an 
integrated micro-chip.  
• In the USA the travel restrictions on US citizens travelling to Cuba remind one that a 
fundamental ingredient of tourism is the right to freedom of movement, which any 
government has the capacity to deny.  
• In February 2000, Joeg Haider, leader of the far right Freedom Party won the Austrian 
election and assumed power. The result was immediate and dramatic. The EU placed a 
number of sanctions on Austria, there were protests from Israel and many others, and the 
US expressed ‘deep concern’ with many bilateral talks stopped. The result damaged 
Austria’s reputation abroad and even had repercussions on tourism flows  
• The racial riots that occurred in France, beginning in Paris, and then spreading to other 
cities in November 2005 had many significant disruptions on travel. Later, in Sydney, 
Australia in December 2005, racial riots also took place which generated many risks, such 
as Cronulla beach becoming a no go area, particularly at night. Both illustrate that 
democratic countries can have marginalized groups that can vent frustrations through 
more violent means. 
• Actions of Christian fundamentalist groups in America, such as the Oklahoma bombing, 
or the Atlanta bombing during the Olympic games, or the election of Poland’s 
conservative, staunchly Catholic government elected in 2005, which then launched its 
‘moral revolution’ (focusing on Sunday trading, homosexuality and backing the death 
penalty) show that religious forces are not only important in relation to Islamic countries. 
• The increased terrorist threat at election times, even if it is only a perceived threat, means 
that this needs to be considered for the risk they may generate, as the Madrid train bomb 
illustrates. 
Whilst the nature and scale of the political risks for democratic developed countries are not on the 
same frequency developing countries, they are not immune from the sort of political risks more 
strongly associated from those developing countries, such as riots, the election of extreme, 
controversial governments, terrorist activity during election time, restrictions on freedom of 
movement and the impact of religious forces. 
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many key political philosophers, ranging from Aristotle, Hobbes, Mills and Marx. Crick 
is keen to stress that the essence of politics relates to collaborative decision-making, 
resource allocation and compromise, and can be contrasted with alternative approaches 
such as the tyrannical rule of a single absolute individual. Politics, he argues, is a process 
of discussion, and discussion demands in the original Greek sense a ‘dialectic’, which if it 
is to be genuine and fruitful will need opposite or contrary views (Crick 2000, p.33). 
What is of particular relevancy is Crick’s argument that democracy is not a synonym of 
politics; indeed, democracy can be the enemy of politics. He draws on a variety of 
arguments, such as in J.S. Mill’s work and the tyranny of the majority, which he notes 
does not mean minority consent, and who may have their views ignored or expiated from 
political discourses. It is intimately tied in with notions of populism and what this can 
bring, such as for example Hitler coming to power by democratic means and the 
subsequent corruption of political processes.  
What Crick’s essay also suggests is that tensions can be regarded as an inherent part of 
political processes; a view which is accentuated if one understands politics as intimately 
involved with the allocation of resources (succinctly summarised by Sydney Hillman’s 
often cited quotation that politics is the science of ‘who gets what, when, where and 
how’), or if one views the political environment as a system, whereby there are inputs, 
processes and outputs, such as in the approach adopted by Daniels, Radebaugh, and 
Sullivan’s (1998, p.104). Hague and Harrop (2001, p.121) comment that as part of this 
political process the use of violence is often presented as an aberration when orthodox 
political processes break down; in fact, he argues that this is too simplistic a view, as the 
use of violence is not just used by so called ‘fanatics,’ as it can be a feature in stable 
states (see also Box 3.1), and so can be considered as part of the political process, 
particularly if one recognises that all states rule through a mixture of force and consent. 
To talk of true notions of political stability then, can be something of a misnomer, 
because, as Delury (1987, p.xvii) notes, the study of politics is a study of conflict; a 
comment that should not be seen as a pejorative criticism, but as a way to view a political 
system and very useful in framing one’s cultural mindset in political risk analysis.  
Marxist, Neo Marxist and Structuralist perspectives take these inherent notions of 
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tensions in politics much further. Marx’s dialectic approach to history and politics, based 
on class conflict propelling societies forward, until a communist state is achieved, gives a 
provocative approach in relation to understanding political change throughout history. 
Even if one does not accept the determinism of Marxist theory and class conflict driving 
change, the basic premise of the inevitability of conflict still has relevance, as depicts 
politics as a dynamic process (Calvert 2001 p.270), with political systems constantly 
moving between relative periods of stability and instability (Lane and Ersson 2000, 
p.294).  
So from both a Liberalist and a Marxist perspective, the notion of political systems 
having different groups that create tension and drive change as inevitable processes 
provides some important imagery of how politics should be viewed. Whilst the sources of 
these tensions creates disagreements between the perspectives (for example, is it class 
conflicts which drives change?), together with what is the direction that political systems 
may be drawn towards (such as Hobbes arguing that the tendency of people is to be 
drawn to war, hence the need for a strong state), one can still accept a more vibrant, 
dynamic view of politics. To take such an approach fits in much better with a fourth age 
risk paradigm, or a Complexity/Chaos theory paradigm (discussed in Chapter 5), where 
political change is seen as a constant, not an aberration, and so has important implications 
in relation to developing relevant risk cultures which in turn can help drive the actual risk 
process, as is illustrated in Chapters 4 and 7. 
3.5.2 The anatomy of political risks 
Poirier (1997, p.677) citing Kobrin (1979) makes a key conceptual distinction between 
political risk and instability, stating that instability is a feature of the environment, whilst 
political risk is something which directly affects an organisation. This is an important 
differentiation, with Poirier (1997, p.678) using it to critique many political risk models 
as they are applied in an abstract, macro generalist sense, rather than focusing on the 
more specific conditions as they relate to an organisation; as Poirier (1997, p.680) citing 
Chermak (1992, p.168) notes: ‘it is not the event which is important but rather the effect 
the event has on a firm’s operating conditions.’ This is a crucial point as it relates back to 
the idea that it is the point of interaction that can turn a hazardous event into a risk for an 
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organisation, or Mairal’s (2008, p.42) notion of objects at risk and objects of risk, 
discussed earlier. 
When examining in more detail what various writers and models identify as political 
risks, one can observe more conceptual vagaries and confusion, whereby political risk 
can in fact be used to refer to a mix of specific events, or the impacts of the events on an 
organisation, and even notions of causation. Monti-Belkaoui et al (1998, p.78)  are some 
of the few writers who discuss these conceptual distinctions between the political risk 
events, the influencing causation factors and the outcomes of these events. Despite some 
limitations, such as a lack of articulation as to just what exactly the outcomes refer to, 
these conceptual constructs provide a useful foundation with which to continue to explore 
the many different elements of political risk. These constructs therefore act as a basis for 
the elements which form the anatomy of political risk; a term used here far more 
specifically in comparisons with Vertberger’s (1998, p.17) use of the terms. 
Four key constructs are developed for this work, which go to form the anatomy of 
political risk, and is based on a systems theory approach. The four key elements are: 
• Underlying conditions (Inputs): This relates to the idea that different situational 
factors (such as economic or social conditions) generate, drive or cause certain 
political hazardous events. Interestingly, Burton, Kates and White (1993, p.249) 
note how one can make further conceptual distinctions between the underlying 
causes, immediate causes and the direct consequences. These are explored in 
more detail in Chapters 4 and 6. 
• Political system modifiers (Process): One of the elements that some models 
note, such as the Political Risk Service (PRS) model, is how the nature, or 
processes of the political system, such as whether it is a democracy or an 
authoritarian regime, affects the degree of risk. This is explored in more detail in 
Chapter 6. 
• Hazardous political events (Outputs): These relate to the key events generated 
from the political environment, which are understood here as the political hazards, 
as they do not automatically equate to risks for an organisation. This is a different 
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conceptual understanding in comparison with many political risk models, which 
would just label these events as political risks. This is explored in more detail in 
the next section and Chapters 6 and 7. 
• Spark or catalyst events (Trigger): This relates to the idea that for a hazardous 
event to occur, something may need to initiate it, hence the notion of a triggering 
event (Testas, 2004), which has a number of variations in the descriptors used in 
the literature, such as a spark, catalyst, flashpoint, or shock event (PMSU 2005, 
p.2; Prideaux et al 2003, p.477), or the slightly more complex STINGS* produced 
by the Fund for Peace (2007). This is explored in more detail in the next section 
and Chapter 7. 
• Organisational impacts (Risks): The notion of impacts has already been 
highlighted in relation to Table 3.2 and the typology of risks. The key point to 
appreciate is that the hazardous event generates risks when the organisation 
interacts with the event in some way, which can relate to various physical, ethical 
and financial impacts. This is explored in more detail in Chapter 7. 
These conceptual elements and their relationship to each other can be further illustrated 
by using two different analogies. The first relates to the risk of a forest fire. The 
underlying hazardous causation conditions or factors can be a long, dry summer, drying 
out the forest, creating large amounts of combustible materials that create the hazardous 
conditions. The catalyst, trigger or spark could be a lightening strike, or a dropped 
cigarette, with the consequence that a hazardous event occurs: the actual forest fire. The 
modifying factors could relate to such things as the nature of controls put in place, such as 
the park authority’s policy on how to deal with fires (Do they let them burn? Have they 
placed fire breaks to help minimise the potential damage?). In terms of the risk, this 
relates to when some specified element, such as people who may live in, or near the 
forest (the point of interaction) are considered in relation to the hazardous event. It is here 
that the hazardous event can be analysed in terms of potential likelihood of occurrence, 
                                                 
*
 Which is an acronym standing for: Surprise (e.g. currency collapse); Triggers (e.g. assassination, coup 
d’etats); Idiosyncrasies (e.g. Non-contiguous territory); National Temperaments (e.g. cultural or religious 
perspectives); Spoilers (e.g. disgruntled followers). 
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and assessed in terms of severity of impact, which in this case could relate to the cost of a 
home being burnt down, or the physical dangers presented to individuals.  
A political analogy could run like this. A country could have a variety of hazardous 
conditions, or underpinning causation factors, such as high levels of poverty, be 
ethnically diverse and have poor to no welfare structures, which can contribute to feelings 
of anger and frustration. The political system itself can act as a modifying factor, in the 
sense that if it is an authoritarian regime, then there may be few or no legitimate means of 
expressing grievance, so if these frustrations are unleashed, they can be marked by the 
scale of demonstrations and a greater chance that they could turn into violence. The 
trigger that could unleash these pent up frustrations could be events such as an economic 
crisis, or a death of a key individual. What could then happen is a variety of hazardous 
events, such as demonstrations, riots, changes in government, or even a revolution. These 
hazardous events become the risks once they are contextualised to specific industries and 
organisations and how they may bisect the events. The risk of these events is placed 
within a notion of probability of occurrence, together with an assessment of the impacts 
they have on the tourism organisation, such as cancellations of tours, the risk of physical 
injury to individuals, or even the possibility that these events lead to political reforms, 
which in turn can mean the destination may become a more attractive destination. 
 
3.5.3 Clarifying the key hazardous events, impacts and trigger events 
It is worthwhile developing some further conceptual clarity between the hazardous 
events, impacts and triggers, as this helps to better understand the mechanics of different 
models, or for developing any new model. It also allows for the development of a number 
of useful, synthesised reference tables that are utilised later in this work, particularly in 
Chapters 6 and 7. The reason why the causation anatomy element is not discussed in 
more detail in this chapter is because this needs to be explored more thoroughly in 
Chapter 4, as it is crucial in terms of the practical process elements of risk management.  
When scrutinising the literature on political risk, a large number of political risks can be 
identified, some of which relate to quite specific events, such as a terrorist bomb attack or 
acts of expropriation, whilst others refer to more general notions or categories of risks, 
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such as sovereign risks, which tends to focus on financial losses to a firm. Furthermore, 
as noted earlier in Section 3.4, it is rare for the political risk literature to refer to the 
concept of a hazard, which can be contrasted with other subject areas usage of the 
concept, with the reasons for some of these differences seemingly representing the 
different research trajectories and received practices developed, rather than any necessary 
subject field imperative. This commonality in usage in other subject fields, whilst at the 
same time not finding any serious impediment as to why it cannot be used in the area of 
political risk management, are key reasons why a concept of using a political hazard is 
utilised in this work. 
In terms of developing broader typologies to help categorise the many events that can be 
generated there are a number of classifications that could be used. Goldstone, Bates, 
Gurr, Lustik, Marshall, Ulfelder and Woodward (2005, p.4) for example, in their 
comprehensive review of the major political instability events since 1955, developed four 
key ‘severe types’: Revolutionary wars, Ethnic wars, Adverse Regime Changes and 
genocide and politicides.* The problem with this typology is that it focuses too much on 
notions of instability as it relates to conflict, and ignores many other hazardous events 
that could generate risks to an organisation, such as new policies, or corruption. These 
many limitations and the desire to develop some sharper conceptual clarity between the 
different anatomy constructs, means that a new typology is developed for this work, 
which allows for more specific events, or actions to be categorised. The categories 
developed are given more detail in Appendix A, but can be summarised here as:  
• Structural workings of government: This relates to the hazards that can emerge 
from the day-to-day workings of government, such as taxation changes, 
infrastructure initiatives, passport controls and dealing with bureaucracies.  
• Regime change: This relates to a whole political system being changed, such as 
the move from a democratic system, to an authoritarian one, or vice versa. 
• Government change: This refers to where the government alters in some way, 
whether it relates to changes in leadership, or changes in the parties holding the 
                                                 
*
 Between 1955 to 2003, they identified: 111 adverse regime changes; 74 ethnic wars; 62 revolutionary 
wars; 40 genocides/politicides.  
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reigns of power. Whilst there may be little radical change, there can be numerous 
micro impacts, such as tourism taxes, particularly at a local level. 
• Security and conflict events: This refers to some of the key events often focused 
on in political risk models, relating to war, politicide, terrorism, riots, 
demonstrations and strikes, which can emerge from the political environment, 
often when there is a failure of politics, rather than because of politics.  
• Natural/disease events: For many years the impact of the natural environment 
has tended to be ignored in many environmental risk-scanning models. In relation 
to politics, it is increasingly recognised that what happens in the natural 
environment can have profound impacts on the political environment, particularly 
in relation to the response from the political environment to these events. 
• International interaction events: This relates to the idea that events beyond a 
country’s border, or the relations they have with other states, can generate many 
political hazards. 
A number of comments need to be made about these categories. In the first instance some 
of the events identified have very tangible properties to them, such as a terrorist act, 
whilst others less so, such as corruption, which is why it can be more useful to refer to a 
concept of an output, identified in Section 3.5.2, rather than be too dogmatic about a 
specific event. The events also vary in terms of their speed and scale, where some events, 
such as a terrorist attack can have a dramatic impact on tourism, whilst policy changes 
can develop more incrementally. Finally, there can be the temptation to look at the events 
and place them on a severity scale, but as has already been highlighted, the event/risk 
relationship can be more complex, as the hazardous events, such as war, do not 
necessarily mean there are more risks to a tourism organisation, as will be explored and 
discussed in Chapter 6. What the speed and scale of the event can however indicate is 
whether it can be classified as a crisis event and what the appropriate actions should be, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
These output events also overlap with the notion of a trigger event, which is presented as 
a separate anatomy stage. The notion of a trigger or spark event is not the same as saying 
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they directly cause the changes or crisis (although they can have causal attributes); * 
these, as Elliot (2004, p.416) points out, are more likely to be rooted in more complex 
and deeper socio-economic-political-environmental conditions of a country. What they 
can however illustrate is that certain events are portentous of future crises, or act as the 
marker points of times of great change. Whilst the use of trigger events is not a concept 
commonly referred to in risk literature, it is interesting that many more recent risk models 
that have been developed, such as the Failed State Index (FSI), or the PMSU (2005, p.2), 
both refer to the concept.†  The fact that the notion of a trigger event is not utilised more 
widely in models tends to reinforce the bias of many of the models towards the strategic 
level, which can make them appear more static when considering operational risks. Table 
3.4 presents some sample key triggering events identified from the literature, which helps 
act as a useful reference table, and is used in the later scenario analysis conducted in 
Chapter 7. 
The use of the trigger concept is not without its problems. For some political situations 
the decline or improvement can be more incremental, with no visible, dramatic single 
event that marks the period of change. Zimbabwe is a good case in point. There is also 
the danger that too much significance may be attached to these events, particularly as 
they can be highly emotive at the time they are witnessed or experienced, which can 
distort any objective analysis of situation, such as being too optimistic or pessimistic of 
situations. Despite these problems, the advantage of having a concept of a trigger event is 
that it provides some useful imagery when scanning news sources, particularly if one 
frames the concept within a context of a weak signal, discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
                                                 
*
 For example, the Wall Street crash did not cause the great depression of the 1930s. It was however  
an event which marked the turning point in a downward trend in the USA and global economy. The  
causes of the great depression went back many years, with the crash the visible manifestation of these 
underlying problem and a key, tangible marker event when the economy began to unravel. 
†
 In the Royal Society’s influential 1992 report they illustrate the concept of a spark event with Nelson’s 
Column. The column represents the objective hazard, with the risks being the possibilities of pieces of the 
column falling off onto people below, which is likely to have a severe outcome. What the Royal Society 
recognised was that there may need to be some event to initiate or spark these harmful risks (described as 
the adverse event), such as severe weather conditions (e.g. lightening and wind), which can mean the risk 
of pieces falling off could increase (Royal Society 1992, p.3).   
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Table 3.4 Trigger event typology 
Event Description 
Key political 
leader dies 
This may be through natural causes, an accident or assassination. How 
they die can affect the outcome and people’s response, whether it may 
be a public demonstration of grief, or a violent reaction of others. The 
type of political system also can affect how much change may be 
initiated. For example, in Western democratic societies, the change 
initiated may simply be a change in policy direction, whilst for an 
authoritarian system it may a more radical regime transformation.  
Key political 
leader 
removed from 
power 
Sometimes political leaders can stand down, be ousted or forcefully 
removed. 
Death of 
significant 
‘other’ 
Can be the leader of the opposition or a pressure group, or even an 
ordinary person who can become significant by the symbolism placed on 
them 
Key 
statements 
and actions of 
politicians 
This represents the important area where certain statements or actions 
made can initiate a wide variety responses from other governments or 
people. It can result in demonstrations (peaceful and violent), riots and 
boycotts of goods and services. 
Terrorist acts Acts of terrorism are designed to shock, and are being marked by their 
increased lethality and strategic use, such as targeting terrorists. 
Natural 
disasters 
The scale of natural disasters can initiate a change in tone of political 
relations, sometimes fostering feelings of corporation and good will in 
the face of suffering, although they seem to be short-term benefits. 
Elections Elections are not the panacea for stability that is sometimes portrayed. 
They can indeed play a vital role in creating a sense of legitimacy and so 
ensure more long term stability, but the events themselves can mean 
volatile times. The important point to recognise is that it puts into 
perspective the notion of democracy reducing violence/political risks. 
Other The important point to appreciate is that one should never underestimate 
the power of what can initially seem unimportant events, as they can 
soon escalate into bigger problems; a process that is accentuated by 
globalisation and the speed of communications. 
Source: Author 
All these conceptual anatomy strands are drawn together in Diagram 3.1. One of the 
important features to recognise from this approach is that it is embedded in a systems 
theory approach (discussed in Chapter 5). From the previous discussion on instability the 
importance of appreciating the dynamic nature of political systems was highlighted, 
therefore to try and reflect this dynamism, writers such as Hauss (2001, p.36), utilise 
systems theory in order to avoid the tendency to present institutions as being regular and 
predictable. It is an approach adopted here, whereby one can begin to show how the 
different anatomy elements relate to notions of inputs, outputs and processes. 
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Diagram 3.1 An overview of the key risk factors for analysing political hazards and risk 
 
Source: Author 
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What the diagram perhaps does not fully convey is the interplay of forces and notions of 
complexity theory. Simply put, political hazards can beget more political hazards. 
Furthermore, the discussion on what is meant by political stability illustrated that a notion 
of stability is perhaps a misnomer, as systems are constantly changing. Chapman et al 
(1997, p.4) for example talks of the ‘roots of uncertainty’, which he argues depends on 
the complex interaction of the ‘who, what, when, where, how and why’. The notion of 
interaction drivers is also raised by Zonis et al (2001, p.178), although their focus is more 
on the key actors or agents of change, rather than the more expansive notion of how this 
can also extend to the events themselves. Despite this weakness, it does at least illustrate 
the key conceptual constructs which provide a key foundation for discussions conducted 
in subsequent chapters of this work. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter illustrates how it is possible to develop a language and culture of political 
risk management that is commensurate with other areas of risk management. This has 
vital implications in relation to the communication and practical utilisation of risk 
management practices, as will be illustrated in the next chapter. The utilisation of the 
concept of a political hazard is particularly illustrative here, showing that despite the fact 
that it is rarely used, does not mean it cannot be used.  
A crucial aspect of risk management, regardless of the subject field utilised, is that the 
cultural paradigm one adopts can have profound effects as to how risk is viewed and 
understood. This in turn has implications when conducting the practical process of risk 
analysis, assessment and developing control measures, which are considered in the next 
chapter. For this work, the cultural risk paradigm that seems to be the most appropriate, 
relates to the fourth age of risk. This paradigm views change as inevitable, with political 
change and events being rooted in complex systems, generating both opportunities and 
threats to an organisation, together with encouraging sharper conceptual clarity between 
the concept of a hazard and a risk.  
In relation to the notion of political stability, whilst it is an initially attractive concept, it 
reveals itself to have many limitations. The tendency in the literature can be to focus on 
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notions of instability and the losses this may cause. It may therefore be better to accept 
that the notion of instability is in fact a constant factor, reflecting the inherent dynamics 
of political systems. Framed in this way, a cultural paradigm can be developed which 
further underpins the notion that change is inevitable, but one where these changes can 
vary in their frequency, speed, scale and severity of impacts. Viewed from this 
perspective, it can help to avoid simplistic assumptions, such as viewing democratic 
systems as stable, and risk free, whilst non-democratic systems are unstable and risky. 
The real challenge is to try and understand why these hazardous outputs or events may 
occur, determining their likelihood, then assessing what aspects of the organisation will 
be exposed to the hazard and impacted upon. These are the issues that are critically 
examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Clarifying the ‘essential’ and ‘non-essentials’ in 
political risk management processes 
4.1 Introduction 
Macdonald (1993, p 224) highlights a fundamental difficulty for decision makers, 
whereby it is increasingly difficult to separate the ‘important’ and ‘unimportant’ 
information needed to analyse and assess the political environment; a point which he 
illustrates by referring to President Kennedy expressing his frustration in relation to his 
analysis over Southeast Asia, stating ‘I don’t know what the essential and non-essential 
areas are.’ This problem is intensified in the modern age by the huge amounts of data 
which can be accessed via the internet, together with the many different theories and 
perspectives which can be applied, and the numerous models or tools which can be 
utilised. Whilst in Chapter 3 a key focus was on what can be understood as a political 
hazard and risk, this chapter focuses on the practical process of data collection, analysis 
and assessment, paying attention to what factors should be examined. This chapter begins 
by illustrating the diversity of methods that can be used to analyse and assess political 
risk, particularly the differences between the formal, structured deductive and inductive 
risk processes, compared with the more ad hoc, intuitive methods that seem to be the 
norm for many tourism organisations. The rest of the chapter focuses on the key process 
stages involved in risk management, with a key feature of the discussion aiming to draw 
out and clarify just what should be the ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ elements are in a 
political risk process relevant for tourism. 
As in Chapter 3, the same comparative approach is used to critically review the 
literature. This approach is particularly relevant in relation to the thesis objectives of 
clarifying the language of risk, and looking for instances of good and bad practice which 
can help in the development, or refinement of a political risk model relevant for tourism. 
Very importantly, it utilises a number of the conceptual frameworks developed in 
Chapter 3, particularly in relation to the anatomy of political risks, to inform the review 
of literature in this Chapter. 
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4.2 Identifying and categorising the many methods of political risk 
assessment  
In essence, the rationale of conducting a political risk assessment is to generate information 
to help inform decisions and plans. A straightforward notion, but one that can be fulfilled in 
numerous ways, which vary in their complexity and resources employed. Data and 
information, for example, may be collected for the purposes of making immediate, short- 
term operational decisions, or more long-term, strategic plans, which then move the 
assessment into another discrete subject area of forecasting. The methods used to collect 
data and information can also vary. An organisation can for example use ready-made 
political risk assessments to inform operational and strategic decision-making, such as 
government advice, or one of the commercial consultancies, such as those offered by the 
PRS group. Alternatively, and of particular interest for this work, there is always the 
possibility for an organisation to conduct an in-house political risk assessment, where it 
collects relevant raw data in order to conduct its own analysis and assessment of the 
political risks. Interestingly, Brummersted (1980, p.80) makes the observation that the 
method of risk assessment ultimately used can depend very much on certain organisational, 
or parochial objectives. 
The tendency in the literature on political risk management is to focus on models and 
methods which have structured methodological approaches, but which may vary in 
relation to the variables focused on. In the PRS Handbook on Political Risk, Howell 
(2001) for example, reviews twelve different political, country or credit rating* 
methodologies are examined in some detail; something which makes it a rare and 
particularly useful book. These twelve models are also amongst the more commonly cited 
in the literature, as further illustrated by Brink’s (2004, Chapter 3) and Bouchet et al 
(2003, Chapters 3 to 7) discussion of these models. Whilst all these books offer a good 
                                                 
*
 It should be appreciated that whilst there is a degree of overlap between these types of risk assessment, 
there are conceptual differences. Howell (2001, p.4) gives a useful distinction saying ‘ Country risk is of a 
larger scale (to political risk), incorporating economic and financial characteristics of a system, along with 
the political and social, in the same effort to forecast situations in which foreign investors will find 
problems in a specific national environment.’ Credit risk models essentially focus on the risk of repayment 
failure for a country.  
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range of methods and models that can be used for examining political risk, they are by no 
means comprehensive in covering all the possible organisations, or models which could 
be used. The database offered by COUNTRYRISK.COM (2006) – an online magazine 
which focuses on country risk analysis -  graphically illustrates this, listing and 
categorising forty-five different organisations that are involved in political and country 
risk management. Yet even here, wide-ranging as they are, this database still does not 
convey the full global picture of the possible methods and organisations that could be 
used. To show this breadth, the key methods and organisations that have been referred to 
in this work are organised into a simple, three group classification and presented Table 
4.1. The models placed in the Commercial Organisation section of Table 4.1 are the ones 
which tend to be given most discussion in political risk literature, with the models in the 
other two sections receiving little or no discussion, hence the reason they are examined 
more closely in this work, many of which are returned to in Chapter 6. 
Table 4.1 Sample selection of the methods/organisations used for review and 
comparative risk factor analysis 
Category Methods/Organisations Reviewed 
Commercial 
Organisations & 
Consultancies * 
1. A.M BEST. 2. A.T Kearney Globalisation Index. 3. Bank of America.  
4. BERI. 5. Coface. 6. CRG. 7. Economists. 8. EKNN. 9. Euromoney. 
10. Fitch. 11. General Motors. 12. Institutional Investor. 13. HIS Energy 
Group’s Political Risk Rating Index. 14. ICRG. 15. MIG. 16. Moody’s. 
17. Nord Sud Export (NSU). 18. ONDD. 19. PRS. 20. Rund & 
Associates. 21. Standard and Poor’s Rating Group. 
Academic Universal 
Approaches 
1. Bouchet et al (2003). 2. Brummersfield (1988) conceptual 
frameworks. 3. Brink (2004). 4. Bunn & Mustafaoglu (1978). 5. Crick 
(2000). 6. Kennedy’s (1987) Conceptual Framework. 7. Jodice (1984) 
key Criteria/ factor analysis. 8. Monti-Belkaoui et al (1998) Key factor 
analysis. 
Government/Agency 
Based (Research) 
1. Country Indicators of Foreign Affairs (CIFP). 2. Fund for peace. 3. 
PMSU (2005). 4. Polity IV. 5. Freedom House. 6. World Economic 
Forum Global Competitiveness Reports. 7. Government travel advice. 
Source: Author 
What this table begins to reveal is that political risk approaches can vary according to: 
• who is used; 
                                                 
*
 Even here, it should still be noted that there were a number of commercial consultancies not utilised 
because of the difficulty of accessing data, such as  for Country metrics (more geared for financial risks), 
Deloitte & Touche Country (provide more of a country profile focused on financial risk), Frost & Sullivan 
(no structured model available) or the IMD. 
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• what data is used; 
•  what variables/factors can be focused on;  
• when they can be used;  
•  how they can be classified; 
• and which methodological theories and tools are applied. 
It is a complexity that is not always fully conveyed in the literature on political risk. 
Whilst over the past twenty years, a number of writers have attempted to review and 
classify the many methods that can be used for political risk management, such as Monti-
Belkaoui et al (1998, pp.78-89), Kennedy (1987, p.9), Howell (2001, pp.8-9) and 
Stapenhurst (1992, pp.19-20), the key difficulty is that they still do not necessarily 
convey the full range of possible methods and organisations that can be utilised in 
political risk analysis and assessment. Indeed, one can even end up classifying the 
classifications themselves in order to try to make sense of them. To illustrate the diversity 
and complexity of political risk methods, Table 4.2 maps out the variety of approaches 
which can be utilised to analyse and assess risk using the categorisations of who, what, 
when, which and how with a more detailed table appearing in Appendix B. These are not 
rigid, single casements, as different models can be categorised in different ways and 
appear in more than one category. For example, the International Country Risk Group 
(ICRG) model, explained in Box 4.1, is highlighted by the shaded area in Table 4.2, to 
show that it can be classified as an example of a commercial consultancy, which produces 
a macro country status profile, more suitable for strategic assessment, which uses a 
Delphi type approach in the forecasting method, and attempts to quantify the risk, having 
a more deductive, empirical approach in its methodology.  
This table is important as it acts as a reminder that risk assessments relevant to tourism 
organisations can extend beyond the commonly cited methodologies in the literature on 
political risk, such as recognising the role of ad hoc methods, government advice, or even 
the use of various analytical tools, such as trend extrapolation or scenario writing, a number 
of which are examined in more detail in Chapter 7. The table also reveals that political risk 
analysis and assessment can be conducted within existing managerial processes and 
planning practices – such as with the familiar PEST (LE) and SWOT environmental 
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scanning frameworks. The implication of this is potentially vital. It hints that it is possible 
to embed the analysis and assessment of political hazards and risks into existing 
management models and practices, with the implication that it does not necessarily have to 
be something new, or addition to, rather it can represent a simple refinement of existing 
processes. What cannot be gauged is any sense of relative accuracy, and so this is 
scrutinised in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
Box 4.1 An example of a structured, deductive country risk methodology (ICRG) 
Table 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the variety of methods that can be used to analyse and assess political risk. 
The ICRG is an example of a structured model that is commonly cited in the literature on political risk. 
The ICRG produces an overall country risk rating which is derived from developing assessments based 
on a composite score derived from an economic, political and financial country assessment. The rating 
is based on a percentage score that is categorised on a five-point scale, which, in theory, conveys the 
country risk. Hence a percentage rating score of 0.0 – 49.9% is deemed as very high risk, whilst a score 
of 80-100% is deemed as very low risk. This is derived from the formulae:  
• Country x  rating = 0.5 Political Rating +Financial Rating +Economic Rating. 
This percentage rating is derived from the percentage values obtained from the economic, political and 
financial categories, which are weighted accordingly: 
• Political = 100 points, Economic=50, Financial = 50. 
Each of these three categories has a number of sub-criteria (twenty-two in all). In relation only to the 
political category, the following sub-criteria and point scores are used: 
 
Government stability = 12 points 
Socio-economic conditions=12 points 
Investment profile = 12 points 
Internal conflict = 12 points 
External conflict = 12 points 
Corruption = 6 points 
Military in Politics = 6 points 
Religious tensions= 6 
Law and order = 6 points 
Ethnic tension = 6 points 
Democratic accountability = 6 Points 
Bureaucratic quality = 4 points 
One of the points of interest about the ICRG assessment risk scores is that is uses a lower value to 
indicate a higher risk (e.g. 0 – 49% relating to a very high risk category), where as with most other 
models the reverse is true, such as the EIU model.  
If one compares it to the anatomy of risk model developed in Chapter 3, one can clearly see the 
conceptual confusion of the many elements, whereby input, process and output data are all mixed in 
together, with little conceptual notion of a hazard, or the risks which could be posed. The limitations of 
the model are further discussed in Chapter 6.  
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Table 4.2 Categorising political risk approaches/methodologies  
Who is used  
 
What data can be 
used? 
 
What is focused on (level and 
variables/factors)? 
 
When are they 
used? 
How the methods or 
approaches can be 
classified 
Which analytical 
tools/methods 
can be used 
1. 
Consultancies/agencies 
(e.g. Coface, BERI, 
PRS) 
 
2. News agencies (e.g. 
BBC, Reuters) 
 
3. Government (e.g. 
USA State Department)    
 
4. In-house  
assessments (e.g. local 
in country contacts)                                   
 
5. Other (e.g. Travel 
Guide books) 
 
   
 
1. Country 
status/Input data 
(e.g. inflation rates, 
GDP per Capita) 
 
2. Incident/Output  
data (e.g. terrorist 
attacks, crime 
rates) 
 
3. Advice data 
(e.g. UK FCO, 
Travel Guides) 
  
4.Ethical data (e.g. 
Amnesty 
International, 
Freedom House) 
 
5. The 
qualitative/quantit
ative mix (e.g. 
pressure group 
opinion versus 
economic statistical 
data) 
6. Political system 
classification 
(e.g. democracy, 
authoritarian) 
1. The level of analysis (e.g. 
global, national, regional, local, 
macro, micro) 
 
2. Actor/source approach (e.g. 
governments, pressure groups) 
 
3. Structural conditions 
approach (e.g. economic, social 
conditions) 
 
4. Relative deprivation  
approach (e.g. frustration gap 
theory) 
 
5. Government/regime type 
approach (e.g. democracy versus 
authoritarianism) 
 
6. The value systems (e.g. 
political ideologies, religion, 
nationalism) 
 
7. Systems theory/institutions 
(e.g. division of powers, 
institution types) 
 
 
1. Short-term 
operational decision 
making (e.g. tour 
cancellation) 
 
2. Medium, to long 
term strategic 
decisions making 
and planning (e.g. 
Capital projects) 
 
3. The type/scale of 
assets at risk (e.g. 
use of builders, 
client profiles) 
 
 
1. Intuitive, deductive 
or inductive, adapting 
Frosdick (1997) (e.g. 
deductive, theory 
construction based on 
input data analysis) 
 
2  Degree of 
methodological 
structure (e.g. Old 
Hands, intuitive type  
approach) 
 
3. Country, political or 
credit risk 
categorisations (e.g. 
country risk assessment 
looking at economic, 
social and political 
conditions together) 
 
 
1. Intuitive 
assessments (e.g. 
creative thinking 
exercises) 
 
2. Scanning 
approaches (e.g. 
PESTLE, SWOT) 
 
3. Forecasting 
tools/methods 
used (e.g. Trend 
analysis, Delphi 
techniques) 
 
4. Analytical 
tools used (e.g. 
Scenario writing, 
HAZOPS) 
 
. 
Source: Author (see Appendix B for the more detailed table)
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4.3 Identifying the process stages of political risk management 
In relation to the more systematic, structured methods of risk and political risk 
management, disaggregating the practical process elements, or stages, is complex 
owing to the many variations in the approaches taken. A difficulty that is 
compounded by: a) the conceptual confusion of the descriptors used to convey the 
different process stages; and b) the lack of explicit discussion on the actual risk 
process stages in the context of political risk literature. To help deal with these two 
key issues, the following short discussion seeks to develop some conceptual clarity 
with what can be understood as the key process stages and the descriptors used to 
convey them.  
One of the more immediate difficulties is the confusion between what is understood 
as risk analysis, risk assessment and risk management. When examining the literature 
from across the subject fields one can find many instances where these terms are used 
inter-changeably, the opposite way round, or even ignored;* differences, it should be 
stressed that are not necessarily dependent on the subject field from which they are 
written. Howell (2001) and Sadgrove, (1997) for example, give definitions of risk 
analysis and risk assessment, arguing that risk analysis essentially involves examining 
the origins, or causes of the threats (Howell 2001, p.3), or the background factors to 
the risks (Sadgrove 1997, p. 20). Risk assessment, however, according to their 
definitions, relates to considering the level of probability of a risk happening and the 
severity of impacts that may occur, which often involves ascribing some measure or 
value to the risk. Howell (2001, p.3) stresses that these differences between analysis 
and assessment whilst small, are none-the-less important, commenting that for many 
organisations what they most want or need, is the political risk assessment; yet it is in 
the analysis element of the risks where the most important work takes place, as this 
forms the foundation of any risk assessment and forecast. Although alternative 
definitions to analysis and assessment can be taken, such as with Nickson and Siddens 
(1997, p.41) and Hahn (1996, p.71), or the terms used the opposite way round, such as 
                                                 
*
 Frosdick (1997b) provides a useful article (but far from perfect) on clarifying the language of risk, 
highlighting the many differences and controversies, particularly with the difference between scientists 
and managers. He comments that in some disciplines the word analysis is used in a more encompassing 
way, rather than referring to a particular stage of risk management, or notes how the term risk 
estimation is used in the field of engineering, in order to quantify risk. 
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in Keeling (2000, p.40), it is the Howell and Sadgrove conceptual understanding of 
analysis and assessment that is felt most appropriate for this work, particularly as their 
understanding aligns with many dictionary definitions of these concepts.  
The term risk management can also be confusing. It is often referred to as a separate 
process stage from the analysis and assessment stages, focusing on the development 
of actions and control measures to deal with the risks identified; the Royal Society’s, 
(1992, p.3) work is an example, highlighted here as it has informed a great deal of the 
writing on risk management. This, however, seems a limited way of understanding the 
concept of management, as a number of writers note, such as Tarlow (2002, p.207). 
Frosdick (1997, p.167) also comments on this ambiguity, noting the duality of its 
usage, whereby it can either refer to an encompassing process, or one specific process 
stage. To overcome this confusion, he notes that one can distinguish between risk 
management, used to refer to the control of risks, and the management of risks (MoR), 
used to refer to the whole risk process. The Office of Government Commerce (OGC) 
(2002) is an important exponent of this distinction, using the term MoR to refer to the 
encompassing risk process. Although it is useful to recognise these distinctions, the 
preference in this work is to still use the simpler term of management to refer to the 
whole process, and the term control as the process stage dealing with the actions 
taken to deal with hazards and risks.  
These basic process elements can be broken down further according to the number of 
sub or ‘nested’ processes (Ritzman and Krajewski 2001, p.2) they have. Again, one 
can find numerous variations in the approaches taken. To try to make sense of these 
differences a comparative content analysis was conducted (see Appendix C for the 
comparative table), which helped to distil the key process stages common to most of 
the models, which are presented in Table 4.3. In all, five key stages were identified, 
together with their important nested processes. Whilst it is not presented as a 
definitive answer to what the key process stages should be, the table’s value is in 
acting as another lexicon to help understand the language of risk.   
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Table 4.3 Overview of the risk management process  
Risk Management  Process (Encompassing) 
 
 1. Risk Context Process Stage (Nested) 
 
 What is the purpose of the organisation? 
 
 Who are the key stakeholders/clients? 
 
 Identifying what in the organisation is exposed to risk and 
the manner of its exposure. 
 2.Risk Analysis Process Stage (Nested) 
 
 Identification or discovery of the key political hazards and 
risks. 
 
 Identifying the factors that create or cause the political 
risks. 
 
 Analysis of suitable indicators of causation and the critical 
paths indicated for events/scenarios. 
 3.Risk Assessment Process Stage (Nested) 
 
 Record data in appropriate formats to help in assessment. 
 
 Categorise key political risks. 
 
 Ascribe a value to the political risk based on severity and 
likelihood. 
 4.Risk Control Process Stage (Nested) 
 
 Categorise risks into basic control matrix. 
 
 Develop risk plan. 
 
 Develop crisis plan for extreme risks. 
 
 Implement plan at a strategic and operational level. 
 
 Communicate plan throughout all levels of the 
organisation. 
 
 Reappraise risks in light of any new control measures. 
 5.Risk Monitoring Process Stage (Nested) 
 
 Continue to monitor and update records. 
 
 Amend assessments and control measures as appropriate. 
Source: Author*   
What there is very little indication of in the literature is the balance, or the mixture of 
resources that should be employed at each stage. One of the few insights discerned 
from the literature was from the field of project risk management, which suggests that 
more resources should be spent on the early research and development project phases, 
as opposed to the actual completion of a project in order to avoid more costly 
mistakes. Marks (1988) echoes this sentiment, arguing that more time should be spent 
on collecting good quality data (about 70% on this research phase), and less time on 
the analysis.  How accurate a ratio this is, is far from clear, but it offers an interesting 
idea to explore and is returned to in Chapter 7. 
                                                 
*
 This table synthesises a variety of approaches from different subject fields (See Appendix C for more details), 
with the format style, not the content, adapting an approach used by the British Standards Institute (2002). 
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A number of additional comments should be made. The first is that there could be a 
danger of viewing these process stages in a too linear and deterministic way, which 
may underplay the inherent dynamism of the risk phenomena studied. These process 
stages must therefore be viewed in a cyclical, dynamic sense that are constantly 
conducted, as stressed in Chapter 3, and by writers such as Tchankova (2002, p.292) 
and O’Hara, Dickety and Wymanl (2003, p.38); as Richter (1999, p.41) stresses, just 
as political problems rarely suddenly emerge, so too do they rarely suddenly 
disappear. This gives further impetus for the use of complexity theory, which is 
discussed in more depth in Chapter 5. 
4.4 Exploring process stage 1: context considerations 
Developing a clarification of the process stages is of immeasurable benefit for 
structuring the rest of the literature review. The subsequent discussion is therefore 
based around exploring and discussing the key process stages identified in Table 4.3. 
It begins with the contextualisation stage in relation to the organisation itself. 
Although the context process stage is not referred to by all writers, those that do have 
a great deal of credibility, such as Turnbull (1999, p.6), Patel, (2001, p.14), Carey and 
Turnbull (2001, p.11) and Wheelan (2000, p.67). Many writers who identify this stage 
tend to focus on having a clear understanding of the organisation’s aims, objectives or 
operational ethos which subsequently helps to frame both what assets may be at risk, 
as noted by Meulbroek (2001, p.67), Zonis et al (2001, p.177) and Howell (2001, 
p.10), together with how they may be at risk. Hawkins (2006 p.125) illustrates these 
points, emphasising how the risks generated depends on the industry, with Frynas and 
Mellahi, (2002, p.541), going further by showing how it can be firm specific, using 
the case study of Nigeria and the oil industry and how political problems affected oil 
companies differently in the country. 
The notion of risk exposure is not a concept commonly referred to in the literature on 
risk, although attributes of it are. That is to say, whilst it may not be addressed as a 
direct, distinct concept, singular attributes of the concept risk exposure may be 
highlighted, such as how the length of time a project has been in operation can affect 
the degree of risk. The approach developed for this work is to represent the notion of 
risk exposure on two dimensions, both of which are presented in Diagram 4.1. The 
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first dimension relates to how different additional external dimensions can affect the 
degree of risk, such as time, type of assets and type of clients (the outlying elements 
in Diagram 4.1). These elements are then considered in relation to what internal 
aspects of the organisation can be impacted upon, which were highlighted earlier in 
Table 3.2, in Chapter 3, and relates to areas such as physical, emotional, financial, 
ethical and reputational impacts (the centre circle in Diagram 4.1). 
Diagram 4.1 The dimensions of risk exposure  
Source: Author 
 
This two dimensional approach is unique to this work, as the two conceptual 
constructs are either blurred in the literature, such as with Howell (2001, p.10), or 
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simply presented as a disjointed list, such as Burns-Howell, Cordier and Erickson 
(2003, p21) method of just listing physical assets which could be exposed to risk. The 
advantage of the two-dimensional approach developed for this work is that it 
synthesised a variety of points drawn from the many subject fields, and helps in the 
contextualisation of the risk management process.  
One of the factors in Diagram 4.1 that needs particular attention relates to who is at 
risk. Customers and clients are at the heart of tourism services, therefore they must be 
given priority in consideration, but as highlighted in Chapter 2, the degree of risk 
exposure can vary differently depending on the type of client. The importance of this 
means it is explored in more depth in Chapters 6 and 7. A number of illustrative 
examples in Box 4.2 highlights further how this has become a more important element 
in relation to understanding the risk exposure of the organisation.  
Box 4.2 Your Government’s actions can affect your reputation and risk 
exposure! 
In 1985 Green Peace had been active in protesting about the French nuclear tests on a Pacific 
Atoll. In response, the French Secret Service planted a bomb on the Green Peace boat, the 
Rainbow Warrior, whilst it was in a New Zealand harbour. The subsequent sinking and death 
of one of the activists resulted in such a sense of outrage that the demand for French imports 
and goods disappeared in New Zealand (Burmester 2000, p.263). Subsequent nuclear tests 
only served to intensify this boycott of French goods. Although not directly tourism related, 
the scale of the commercial repercussions graphically illustrate how the business environment 
had changed in relation to consumers. It also shows the speed that businesses can disappear in 
response to government policies, actions or comments. The publishing of the Danish cartoons 
of the prophet Muhammad, in 2006, further illustrates this in relation to the speed that opinion 
was inflamed in the Islamic world, and the immediate impact it had on many organisations, 
with the Danish government issuing messages of caution to Danish travellers to certain 
countries. 
Harmon (2001, p 138) and Hall et al, (1996, p.115) have all noted how who you are affects 
the degree of risk. In the past, waving a British or American passport may have been regarded 
as a means of reducing risk; today, it can increase the risk, with some advice saying that 
passports should be hidden as they have been used in instances of kidnapping and execution 
(as kidnaps in Iraq have illustrated, where Italian and French hostages were released, whilst a 
number of American and UK people were executed). Other examples include the attack on the 
Hotel in Kenya in 2001, which was frequented by Israeli travellers; or the aid workers 
kidnapped in Sri Lanka in 1999 who were working for Save the Children, a Norwegian based 
Charity, the government of which was attempting to broker a peace deal in Sri Lanka at the 
time. Cummings (1991, p316) presents the issue from a slightly different angle by stressing 
that whilst a business traveller is a key target, he says it is often not who you are, but what you 
represent which makes you a target. 
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4.5 Exploring process stage 2: risk analysis 
The analysis stage of the risk management process can be regarded as the most 
intricate and difficult of all the process stages. It is in this stage that the business 
environment is scanned and analysed in order to identify (or discover) the key 
political hazards, why they may occur, and the risks to the organisation. Considering 
the complexity of this stage, this section is broken down into two further sub-sections 
focusing on clarifying the language of analysis (Section 4.5.1), followed by a more 
detailed review of some of the key factors and indicators utilised in various models 
and literature (Section 4.5.2) 
4.5.1 Clarifying the language of analysis 
When looking at the many models which can be used to analyse and assess political 
risks the familiar difficulty of different descriptors used to refer to various concepts 
emerges. Rightly or wrongly, in relation to the structured methods of political risk 
assessment, there is often a positivistic skew in the approach, which can mean there 
are inherent notions of an x (independent) and y (influencing) variable, with some 
giving further subtlety by adding a notion of an intervening variable. These 
descriptors of x and y variables whilst not always directly referred to, are often an 
implicit part of many models, but may be variously described as risk factors, risk 
components, risk indicators, risk variables or risk criteria. For example, the ICRG 
refer to risk components and sub-components, with the value attributed to each 
component being described as a risk indicator; BERI uses the terms of criteria, 
causes, and a notion of symptoms (such as societal conflict) and a risk index 
(essentially an indicator); EIU use the terms risk categories, with each category value 
being constructed by examining a variety of risk factors; and the Office of 
Government Commerce (2002, p.106) notes how a risk indicator can sometimes be a 
risk factor, which they state can be best expressed in terms of cost. To convey this 
variety, Table 4.4 highlights which models tend to use which descriptors.  
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Table 4.4 Who uses what terms (factors, indicators and variables)  
Descriptor Who 
Risk Criteria  Jodice 1984. Fitch. PRS (17 Variables, with each variable 
followed by more specific sub-criteria). BERI (causal criteria). 
Risk Factors  PMSU (2005, p.2). Brink (2004). Rund & Associates.   Monti-
Belkaoui et al (1998). General Motors. NSU. ICRG.EIU. 
Risk Variables  Brummersted (1988).  BERI. Euromoney. PRS. Institutional 
Investor. Moody. ICRG (12 weighted variables). 
Risk Component  ICRG           
Political sub 
category 
Economist (2 subcategories of political risk, with each having a 
number of risk factors); 
Risk Indicators EIU (make reference to specific data in reports, but not the 
models) 
Other BERI Symptoms’. 
Source: Author 
The simple question raised here is to what extent are these terms used as synonyms, or 
are they referring to different conceptual constructs? Brink (2004) helps to give some 
clarification as to what some of the differences are between a risk factor and an 
indicator, stating: 
‘Risk factors should be relatively easy to understand, and should reflect 
something measurable, believed important or significant in its own right, or 
should reflect or represent something important beyond what the factor itself 
is a measure of. This constitutes an actual factor indicator, rather than just a 
figure or a statement.’ (Brink 2004, p.77) 
Michaels (1996), writing in a more generic risk management context, also highlights 
some crucial conceptual distinctions between a causation variable and an indicator, 
saying:  
‘…effective risk management depends on the ability to differentiate risk 
causes from risk indicators, quantify risk consequences, set priorities for 
combating risks, and take preventative measures in a timely fashion.’ 
(Michaels 1996, p.20) 
In all, hundreds of the different factors, indicators and variables were scrutinised and 
compared from all the models highlighted in Table 4.1. From this analysis a number 
of comments can be made, which are:  
• Factors offered by the many models often have a composite component to 
them, in the sense that they may involve interpreting a number of more 
specific variables, to help formulate an assessment. The ICRG for example 
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have a Political Risk Component, which in turn has twelve variable categories, 
with one of these relating to political stability, * which is given a grade score 
between 1 to 12. This variable, as they describe it, is considered in relation to a 
number of additional factors, such as war, or terrorism. 
• A smaller number of models prefer to utilise specific pieces of data as the 
factor for analysis, such as Rundd & Associates who use the term Domestic 
Economic Factor to refer to some quite specific pieces of data, such as GDP 
growth rates. Interestingly, Rundd and Associates use the concept of variables 
as a subset of an indicator, when others will utilise it the opposite way round, 
which again is another example of the conceptual vagaries in the risk 
literature. 
• The different models and factors focused on can often reflect the temporal 
context that the models were produced in. For example, older models such as 
the ICRG, EIU, Euromoney, MIG and Moody tend to ignore environmental 
factors in their structured analysis, whilst newer models, such as the PMSU 
(2005), the FSI and more recently the World Economic Forum (2007, p.15), 
all highlight environmental factors, such as climate change as a key driver of 
change and a generator of risk. 
• They can be heavily skewed towards focusing on notions of political 
instability and the risks of credit payment failure, which is too narrow an 
approach in relation to the needs of the tourism industry. 
• Despite the attempts to use more objective criteria, these will always be the 
product of subjective interpretation, particularly when developing or 
producing an assessment value for a composite risk factor. 
• There is little clarity about the difference between input and output factors and 
indicators: a useful conceptual distinction highlighted earlier Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5.2, in relation to understanding the anatomy of political risk. 
To help deal with this conceptual confusion, the Oxford Referencing Online database 
(2007) was used to clarify the key features of the terms or concepts. In the context of 
                                                 
*
 In Theocharous’s (2002) research project for example, he simply lists forty-two risk events as the 
indicators of stability. Whilst there will be many instances when a causation variable and the data used 
to indicate it will be blurred, it is important to stress that they can also be very different concepts, 
which has many important implications when evaluating the accuracy of any model. 
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this work the following points try to develop some conceptual clarity between the 
different terms:  
• Risk Factors: This refers to a broad theoretical component, such as a notion 
of political effectiveness (or lack of), which can help analyse and assess what 
may drive certain political hazardous outputs or events. Factors can have a 
composite quality to them in that they can utilise a variety of pieces of data to 
act as measures or indicators of the factor. 
• Indicators: Although Bryman et al (2003, p.73) distinguishes between an 
indicator and a measure, with the latter being relatively unambiguous and 
usually quantifiable, whilst indicators are ways to tap concepts that are less 
quantifiable, and so are used to stand in for a concept, in practice the 
difference can be more ambiguous. Therefore, the indicator will be used to 
refer to the pieces of data that are used to measure the variables or factors, 
which can be both qualitative and quantitative in its basis. For example, the 
risk factor of political effectiveness mentioned above, can use qualitative 
indicators, such as critiques made by the human rights group Amnesty 
International, or more precise qualitative indicators, such as the corruption 
score given by Transparency International (TI). 
• Risk Variables: These are used in a traditional sense, referring to an attribute 
(Bryman and Bell 2003, p.34) of some sort which can be dependent, 
independent or an intervening variable. For example, Goldstone et al (2005, 
pp.4-8) identify the onset of political instability as their independent variable, 
with infant mortality, calories consumed per capita examples of their 
dependent variables, and the nature of the political system an example of an 
intervening variable. It is worthwhile noting however, that the methodological 
philosophical position of this work, discussed in Chapter 5, which is not 
framed in a positivistic framework, means these terms are used less frequently 
in comparison with the other two concepts. 
4.5.2 Examining the key political risk factors, variables and indicators. 
If developing some conceptual clarity in the political risk analysis process raises many 
problems, the next stage of identifying, or ‘isolating’ (Brink 2004, p.25) what factors, 
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variables or drivers* entwine to generate the critical paths of political events 
(Vertzberger, 1998) is far more challenging. It is also here that the notion of 
‘essentials’ and ‘non-essentials’ used to open this chapter, are explored at a more 
intimate level.  
To convey the scale of the challenge, in Chapter 3 numerous political hazardous 
events were identified, ranging from acts of terrorism to corruption, each of which 
could easily form the basis of a research project in its own right. Yet in the context of 
this work, one does not have the luxury of pick and mixing which hazards should be 
focused on, as to do so is to increase the negative risk exposure to an organisation, or 
opportunities are missed. It should also be appreciated that a wide range of literature 
was examined for this work, which gave many useful insights into political change 
and conflict, such as Huntingdon’s (1996) clash of civilisations thesis, or Bellamy, 
Williams and Griffin’s (2004) work on peacekeeping operations. The problem with 
these works is that they do not always lend themselves to practical application in the 
risk analysis process, therefore the decision taken was to primarily focus on models 
and theories which provide more precise information on factors and indicators. 
Initially, when many of the risk models highlighted in Table 4.1 were examined, the 
criticism made by writers, such as Brink (2004, p.56), that they lack transparency in 
their methodology seemed a little strange, as on an initial reading they can seem quite 
detailed. On closer inspection, it soon becomes evident that for many of the models 
there are ambiguities over what data † is used, where the data is sourced from, and 
who does the interpretation of that data to produce an assessment value. A similar 
problem can be levelled at the variety of theories developed to understand political 
change and conflict. For example Garrison (2007, p.128) gives a useful discussion on 
the onsets of civil war, reviewing the literature and developing a critique of a number 
existing theories used to explain conflict escalation. He expands on some of the 
existing risk factors that are used for understanding conflict (such as notions that 
weak states typically respond with repression when challenged), developing a model 
                                                 
*
  Zonis et al (2001, p.178) give another variation by noting the difference between external drivers 
(such as political instability), interaction drivers (relationships to companies and governments) and 
internal drivers (aims of the business). 
†
 Brink (2004, p.37) notes that the difference between information and data is that data plus 
interpretation equals information, whilst intelligence is information which has been collated, 
corroborated, analysed and applied to a set of circumstances 
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based on regime and challenger interactions. Whilst presenting the model as an 
equation, it can still be hard to fathom just what actual information should be used and 
from where it can be obtained. In short, it is far from clear how it can be made 
operational in more mainstream management practices.   
A key difficulty raised in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2, was the conceptual confusion 
between the many different elements involved with political risk. To help clarify the 
concepts, Diagram 3.1 was produced, which was developed using a systems theory 
approach, with the conceptual distinction made between input, output and process 
factors. These concepts are used here to analyse further the huge number of factors 
and indicators that are utilised in existing risk models, in order to help gauge their 
relevance and value. 
Output factors and indicators, primarily relate to the hazardous political events 
identified in Chapter 3. Whilst there can be many references to output factors, in 
terms of more specific output indicators, there is less detail. For example, whilst 
terrorism may be one of the factors cited in the EIU model, in relation to their 
political risk category assessment, little indication is given as to what aspects or data 
is used to actually measure it. In theory, output indicators such as the number of acts 
of terrorism, number of fatalities, or who was targeted could be used, but whether 
they are in the EIU model is not made clear, hence the issue about the many 
ambiguities inherent in the models.  
This lack of explicit referral to an output indicator is perhaps a little surprising in the 
area of political risk. In terms of other fields of risk management this frequency-based 
approach can be a key method for making probability assessments and quantifying 
risks, as Stutely (2002, p.224) illustrates. To help in this assessment, the notion of 
Heinrich’s et al (1980) ratio triangle* (cited by Wharton 1996; p.9; Parry 2004, p.223) 
is sometimes referred to in risk literature, which states that for every major incident, 
there are a large number of minor incidents, and perhaps a larger number of near 
misses. There are certainly many advocates of this approach in relation to adventure 
tourism, such as Brown (1999, p.275) and Wharton (1996, p.9), although their focus 
tends to be at an operational level, focusing on activity accidents. Clearly this is 
skewed towards a more positivistic paradigm, but is not an approach where any 
                                                 
*
 Which is based on his work published as far back as 1931. 
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explicit references were found in the literature or models on political risks. This 
approach offers some intriguing possibilities in relation to political risk management, 
despite its lack of explicit referral in the literature, and so is returned to in Chapters 6 
and 7 in order to gauge more clearly the value of the approach. 
The process factors and indicators are used refer to the political system and its 
institutions. It is very common in databases that provide a country profile to classify 
the political system in some manner, such as whether it is a democratic or 
authoritarian system. There seems to be an intuitive sense that the type of political 
system is important, but just how is not made clear. Certainly, one can gain a sense in 
some of the literature that democratic systems are less risky; an argument that was 
shown in Chapter 3 to be very simplistic. It terms of the structured political risk 
models, the political system classification and the quality of institutions tends to 
receive relatively modest consideration in comparison with other factors, although a 
simple descriptor is often offered as part of a country profile. It is of interest, 
however, that more recent research has attempted to examine the nature of the 
political system, or government in a more critical manner, highlighting that the type 
of the political system can affect the occurrence of certain hazardous events. One of 
the most crucial pieces of  research produced has been from the Political Instability 
Task Force (PITF) project, which was set up in 1994 as part of a comprehensive 
research project designed to understand why states fail, and was funded by the CIA. A 
number of the key findings were presented by Goldstone et al (2005, p.12) where one 
of the important factors which could affect risk of state failure, related to the type of 
political system. The work produced by the PITF has subsequently influenced many 
other models, such as the PMSU (2005) approach, and plays an important part in 
Chapter 6. 
Input measures primarily relate to trying to gain an understanding of some of the 
variables that may drive, or cause change and political risk events. For example, 
social and economic inequalities are often cited as a factor which can generate 
political tensions and conflicts, and is evident in a number of models, such as with the 
ICRG or BERI models. These factors can in turn be reflected by a variety of 
indicators, such as GDP per Capita, levels of poverty, economic polarization, or an 
ethnic group’s economic position. To help give some sense to the numerous possible 
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factors and indicators offered by the models, one can develop some broad input 
categories, which also help structure the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. The key 
categories are: 
• Economic factors: Whilst some models will use economic factors as part of 
the political analysis, other models will reserve the analysis of economic 
factors for what they may label as a country risk analysis. There are numerous 
possible factors and indicators, many of which can be quantifiable, which adds 
to their appeal. Economic indicators can be further organised into the broad 
categories of: economic stability, economic growth, debt and trade indicators.  
• Social factors: These are usually part of the discrete political risk models, 
often presented as socio-political factors. These various indicators can be 
organised into two further categories: welfare indicators, such as education or 
mortality rates; and divisions in society, such as the number of ethnic or 
religious groups in society.  
• Environmental factors: These have grown in usage, with a key area focusing 
on how resource scarcity and competition can drive conflict; factors which do 
not always appear in older, structured risk models. 
• International interaction factors: This manifests itself in a variety of ways, 
with perhaps the most important factor relating to the notion of how bad 
neighbours can act to destabilise another country, or ruin its market 
attractiveness to travellers.  
• Actor factors: These factors relate to both individuals and groups and how 
they interact with each other and drive political events. Who, or what, is 
classed, as an actor can be quite broad, ranging from the military, pressure 
groups, foreign governments and individual heads of government. The notion 
of actors can be something of a grey area when one attempts to examine more 
specific indicators, such as data relating to key trading partners, or military 
expenditure, which can overlap with some of the other input indicator 
categories. The key point is to try and make sure they are considered 
somewhere in the analysis process and can be important in relation to triggers. 
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Over time, there have been periodic attempts to try to distil the core risk factors 
needed to conduct political risk analysis, which can loosely be described as a 
universal approach. Some writers, such as Graham (1988, p.73) and Brummersted, 
(1988, p.78), citing Doyle (1982), present arguments that developing universal models 
will always be limited, chiefly because: they are skewed for the needs of particular 
industry; they are developed in a particular time; they reflect many cultural biases; 
they are too limited in the variables focused on; and they ignore certain types of 
political risk. Although Simon (2002) argues there is no perfect model, in order to 
make them better, he advocates a mixed approach, such as using a mix of quantitative 
and qualitative data, as does Brummersted (1988, p.87).  
 In the context of this work, Brink’s (2004) approach was of particular interest, as it 
illustrates a recent attempt at a mixed, universal approach, whereby the core risk 
factors from the most frequently used structured country and political risk models are 
distilled and utilised. * The model produced is, on first appearance at least, 
comprehensive and offers some interesting attempts to weight different risk factors 
for the purpose of producing an overall risk assessment value. Whilst a number of 
problems may be identified with Brink’s approach – such as being less relevant for 
more immediate operational risk assessments for tourism organisations, with some 
risk factors being more ‘measurable’ than others, †– its relative recentness, breadth 
and the synthesis of many key models, means it is a useful model to refer to when 
benchmarking different possible political risk factors. 
The research that has been conducted into testing the accuracy of the assessments 
produced by various risk models in comparison with the actual hazards and risks 
generated, although scarce, are of interest here. Howell and Chaddick’s (1994, p.71) 
study is worth noting as they attempt to replicate the methodologies of three political 
risk models (Economist, BERI and PRS) in order to test the accuracy of their risk 
predictions. They offer a number of important criticisms, such as the lack of 
theoretical underpinnings in some of the models, and note that their predictive power 
is mixed (with the PRS producing some of the better results, but by no means 
significant, in terms of risk accuracy), concluding that certain individual factors may 
                                                 
*
 Although Bouchet et al (2003) also discuss a comprehensive range of factors, the difference with their 
work is that they do not develop it into a coherent, whole working model as Brink (2004) does. 
†
 For example ‘political terrorism,’ compared with ‘legitimacy issues’ factor. 
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act as a better indicator of risk, than the cumulative power of the factors and the 
composite indexes derived from them. Linder and Santiso (2002, p.2) also test the 
predictive power of the country ratings and governance indicators for four different 
crisis events experienced in Argentina (political and social), Brazil (economic), and 
Peru (electoral political). In their study ICRG again produced mixed results. For 
example, for Brazil there was a high degree of risk in the same month the devaluation 
took place in 1999, but with the composite indicator not dropping to the high-risk 
category until a few months after. For Argentina no significant crisis risk was 
indicated. They conclude the composite indicators, such as those produced by the 
ICRG lacked subtlety and were blunt indicators of the crises that developed and the 
impacts they had.  
Bouchet et al (2003, p.105) cite Cantor and Packer’s (1996) study, who noted that 
perhaps surprisingly many of the credit models they focused on were quite accurate, 
with a number of key variables acting as the best indicators. Bouchet et al (2003, 
p.105) also cite Monfort and Mulder (2000), who emphasise the importance of certain 
key indicators, such as current account over GDP, terms of trade, export growth rate, 
and investment over GDP. As a more general observation, Bouchet et al (2003, p.110) 
note that in relation to creditworthiness of a government, the risk values produced at 
the two extremes of high and low risk, most models work quite well; the real problem 
relates to the countries that receive more intermediate values, or the borderline cases 
between values, which is of interest and worth reflecting on in this work. In relation to 
tourism, Poirier (1997, p.678) offers one of the few papers which deals directly with 
the issue of political risk and tourism, and cites the studies by Dichtl and Koglmayr 
(1986), which also pointed out that BERI and other models were a poor guide for 
Multi National Enterprises (MNEs) and political risk. Little else is given in relation to 
the value of the existing models. 
Other areas of research can be particularly helpful in relation to the more specific 
factors that should be focused on in any risk model. Aspects of the research conducted 
by PITF, presented by Goldstone et al (2005) have already been mentioned in relation 
to the process indicators. Exploring this work more deeply gives further critical 
insights into the key factors and indicators that can be focused on.  They tested a huge 
range of theories and variables in both single and multi-variant analysis, together with 
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a variety of analytical tools, such as stepwise regression and neural networks. This 
exhaustive study produced some very interesting results in relation to looking for 
some of the best variables which can give an indication of state failure. They note:  
‘It was to our considerable surprise that these expectations (that a complex 
model would be needed) turned out to be wrong. The Task Force’s analysis 
has identified some differences across regions and types of instability, but 
these differences have generally proved minor. Even more surprising, we have 
found that relatively simple models, involving just a handful of variables and 
no complex interactions, accurately classify 80% or more of the instability 
onsets and stable countries in the historical data’ Goldstone et al (2005, p.10)  
As they observe themselves, they were ‘considerably surprised’ because the factors 
and methods which gave some of the best correlations and indicators of state failure 
and instability were not complex, nor reliant on many independent variables and their 
interactions. Instead they were remarkably simple, whereby a handful of variables 
could accurately classify 80% or more of the instability onsets and stable countries. It 
is also of interest how the came back to some very familiar themes, such as Alexis de 
Toqueville’s work in the 1850s and his conclusion that ‘grievances patiently endured 
become intolerable once the possibility of brighter future crosses the populations 
mind’ (cited in Hague et al 2001, p.124), which is also an important feature of Gurr 
and Lickbach (1986) work and their theories of relative deprivation and revolution. * 
What these various pieces of work all begin to highlight is that the more factors and 
data that are analysed does not necessarily mean a more accurate risk assessment is 
produced. It was a proposition raised by Monti-Belkaoui et al (1998, p.13), who 
compared a limited range of key ratios with a the more complex ICRG, but found 
similar results (Monti-Belkaoui et al 1998, p.124). Indeed, some models, such as the 
PMSU, seem to adopt an approach of focusing on fewer variables in order to try and 
better capture the inherent dynamism of political systems, together with reflecting the 
need to make decisions within relatively short spaces of time because of the speed that 
events move and interact with each other in the global environment. This clearly has 
some profound implications for this study, and may suggest that much simpler 
                                                 
*
 The theory of the J-Curve produced by Davies (1962, cited in Hague et al 2001, p.125 ) is also 
relevant here in relation to revolutions, frustrations gaps and relative deprivation. 
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approaches for assessing political risk can be adopted in comparison with Brink’s 
comprehensive universal model. 
So where does this leave the attempt to try and help clarify what should be the key 
essential and non-essential elements? It shows that there are many different 
approaches to the type of data one can collect in order to analyse the political 
environment, but they can vary considerably in terms of their worth as an indicator. It 
also hints at the potential problem of reducing risk analysis into a single, composite 
assessment. It does, however, provide a platform for structuring the analysis and 
discussion in Chapters 6 and 7, revealing the direction of analysis, the theories which 
can be utilised (such as systems and complexity theory, discussed in Chapter 5), and 
identifying the indicators which should be given particular consideration in terms of 
analysis, of which Diagram 3.1 developed in Chapter 3 gives an overview of.  
4.6 Exploring process stage 3: political risk assessment 
Whilst the analysis stage is the most complex of the process element, it is in the 
assessment (some use the term evaluation) where the analysis is turned into something 
more tangible to aid decision making. Its purpose is not, as Howell (2001, p.11) 
stresses, to offer a prediction of the future, but a forecast of possible futures, which 
can then allow for individuals and organisations to develop plans and control 
measures. It is through the assessment process stage that the information generated 
from the analysis can be put into some form of perspective and context, which can 
then be used to inform what resources should be employed for trying to control or 
mitigate the risks. 
Perhaps the most common approach is to present the risks in a scale of some sort, 
which may represent a notion of probability of occurrence, the severity of impact, or a 
combination of the two. One can again perceive the influence of the positivistic 
scientific approaches (Frosdick 1999, p.34), where the assessment is driven by 
categorising risk and reducing it down to a more digestible form, which usually means 
it is turned into a numeric value. The Office of Government and Commerce (2002, 
p.22) give some useful examples of the descriptors and numerical values that can be 
used to ascribe a probability of a risk event occurring. The Office of Government and 
Commerce (2002, p.104) also illustrate that these probability and impact grids can be 
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combined in various ways, such as producing probability/impact risk maps and grids. 
These are all useful examples, which represent a synthesis of a variety of approaches, 
but by no means provide a definitive answer as to which methods are the most 
appropriate.  
In Box 4.3 four sample scales are presented to illustrate the many variations that can 
be taken. Looking at the BERI model in that box, a single risk rating is given, with the 
higher percentage value referring to a more political stable country, with the corollary 
being that the risks are fewer. In contrast, the ICRG model uses the scales the 
opposite way round, with a high percentage indicating a low risk environment. What 
is also of interest is that for political/country risk model examples, the composite risk 
values are not articulated using the twin risk pillars of severity and probability, 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
Box 4.3 Examples of risk scales 
Example 1: Health & Safety Guidelines  
Potential Severity Rating (PSR)   
1.Negligible injury (e.g. bruise)  
2 Minor cut (e.g. cut, sprain)      
3 Major injury (e.g. fracture)     
4 Fatal injury (e.g. drowning)      
5 Multiple fatality (e.g. flume collapse)  
6. Catastrophic fatality (e.g. Hillsborough)  
Probable Likelihood Rating (PLR) 
1.Highly improbable   
2.Minor cut (e.g. cut, sprain)  
3.Occasional                       
4.Fairly frequent                     
5.Regular                                
6.Almost a certainty              
A calculation can then be done, called the Risk Rating 
Number (RRN): 
                         RRN = PSR x PLR. 
Note: any RRN of 7+ needs immediate structured 
management intervention. 
Example 2: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
Band A – (0 – 20 points). No problems financing debt 
and trade activities.  
Band B – (21 – 40 points) No significant foreign 
exchange controls, but the economic policies may give 
cause for concern.  
Band C – (41-60) Record of periodic foreign exchange 
crisis and political problems.  
Band D (61 –80) Countries suffering serious economic 
and political problems. Arrears debt rescheduling and 
restricted access to official lending are common 
characteristics  
E – Highest risk (81 –100) High and rising arrears and 
severe fiscal imbalances and hyperinflation. Scarce 
foreign exchange and relations with multinational lenders 
severely strained. 
 
Example 3:  International Control Risk Group 
(ICRG)  
 
Political Risk range           % range 
Very High Risk                0.0 -49,9 
High risk                          50-59.9 
Moderate Risk                 60-69.9% 
Low Risk                         70 -79.9% 
Very Low Risk                80-100% 
Example 4:  Business environment risk  
intelligence (BERI) political risk index (PRI)  
 
1.Stable environment/low risk/advanced industrial 
country (65-100%) 
2.Moderate risk, with complications in day-to-day 
operations (50-64%) 
3.High-risk for foreign investors (40-54%) 
4.Unacceptable conditions for foreign-owned businesses             
(0-39) 
Source: ICRG, BERI and EIU (Howell, 2001) 
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What this comparison of scales also illustrates is the notion that risk is a social 
construct, whereby the ascribing of a value will almost inevitably go through 
numerous cultural filters, which then leads to questions about how truly ‘objective’ 
and accurate the values are; an argument which many writers highlight, such as 
Adams (1995, p.10), Maule (2004, p.20) and Nicholas (2001, p.312). In the context of 
assigning probabilities, Jablonowski makes a more blunt observation: 
‘Face it: most operational risk managers could not come up with a credible 
probability for an event even if they wanted to. What is more, they can do a 
perfectly adequate job of dealing with the domain of hazard risks without 
being able to.’ (Jablonowski 2001, p.34) 
A comment that is just as applicable to the assessment of severity, particularly once 
one moves beyond the financial impact domain of an organisation’s operations, to 
more esoteric areas, such as reputation and ethics. This complexity of making an 
assessment of a risk is affected by a number of additional factors. Daniell (2004, p.95) 
notes that the assessment should be made not only in relation to the scale of harm and 
the likelihood of occurrence, but also by the extent it can be responded to, with the 
assessment value then reappraised in light of these control mechanisms.  
What these variations in assessments also illustrate is that there is no single correct set 
of assessment values associated with a particular subject field. It seems that the 
variations are not down to logic, or subject field need, but are more likely to reflect 
different temporal developmental trajectories in the subject fields. This lack of clarity 
means it is important to explore the scales further in both Chapters 6 and 7. 
4.7 Exploring process stages 4 & 5: controlling and monitoring risks  
A full discussion of the control measures would entail a whole chapter in itself. All 
that can be done here, important as it is, is to give recognition of the importance of 
understanding the development of proper measures and plans to control the risks, 
because if they are not controlled, then the previous analysis and assessment can be 
worthless exercise. As Bernstein says: 
‘Knowing how to risk manage is just the beginning. Knowing how to use these 
tools is the introduction to wisdom.’ (Bernstein 2001, p.7) 
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 Ultimately, what all this analysis and assessment should lead to is information which 
can be used as a guide for decision making and planning; a process stage which can 
be described as the control stage of the risk management process. In essence, this 
process stage should endeavour to ensure risk exposure avoidance (Cloutier 2000, 
p.98), exposure reduction (Wilks and Davis, 2000, p. 595; Meulbroek 2001, p.67), 
opportunity maximisation, or even target revision (Chapman et al 1997, p.10), 
depending on the risk paradigm adopted. It can also be on the strength of the control 
measures, particularly in relation to crisis situations, which can then determine the 
speed and smoothness of the ‘glide path of recovery’ (Elliot 2004, p416, citing 
Fitzgerald, 1995).* 
In a number of risk subject fields – with the notable exception again of the political 
risk methods – the key control measures are often placed on a broad matrix of key 
actions, dependent on the level of risk. Wilks et al (2000, p 595) and Patel (2001, p15) 
give examples of a 2 x 2 matrix approach, where risks can be mapped out, based on 
their probability and severity. Wilks et al’s (2000) matrix is relatively representative 
of this approach, and is represented in Figure 4.1, with the key control measures 
based on either reducing, avoiding, retaining or transferring the risks. This approach 
Haddock (1993, pp.25-26) argues is designed to try to manage risks to an acceptable 
level, whereby risks in the Hi Freq/Hi Sev should be avoided all together. Although 
this matrix approach is common, it is perhaps more suited to second age risk 
paradigm, as it does not give sufficient considerations to how one could map out the 
upside risks. There are many variations, but a synthesised table based on the literature 
drawn from all the subject fields is produced, and can be found in Appendix D. 
                                                 
*
 The analogy is used of how an aircraft can vary their ability to glide based on a variety of  factors and 
conditions and be able to continue with their operations for a short period of time. 
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Figure 4.1 Basic risk matrix for control measures 
High frequency/low severity  (Hi 
Freq/Lo Sev) 
Reduce  
High frequency/high severity (Hi 
Freq/Hi Sev)  
Avoid 
Low frequency/low severity (Lo 
Freq/Lo Sev) 
Retain 
Low frequency/high severity (Lo 
Fre/Hi Sev) 
Transfer 
Source: Wilks and Davis (2000) 
A number of important considerations need to be taken into account in relation to 
control measures. Of particular importance is the recognition of the dynamic nature of 
developing controls to help manage the risk generated from political events. In the 
first instance, decisions taken can help modify the risk assessment value, such as 
contracting work out, or entering into more local partnerships. The second is noting 
that zero risk trade-offs are near impossible, and may simply result in another set of 
risk being generated elsewhere;*a process described  as the ‘boomerang effect’ (by 
(Heng 2006, p54  citing Beck, but no reference given), where control measures create 
a completely new set of risks. This is particularly important when considering 
appropriate marketing strategies, as Beirman (2003) illustrates in relation to 
rebuilding a destination’s image after a crisis. The other implication is that it is 
essential that the risk management process is viewed as a cyclical process and 
monitoring is a constant action, with amendments taken accordingly, which as 
Haddock (1993, p.26) stresses, should involve developing measures which both 
prevent risks occurring, or if they do occur, having measures to deal with the risks to 
reduce their impacts. What cannot be answered here is how frequently the monitoring 
and review process should take place.  
The final point to consider is that in the monitoring stage not only must new risks be 
scanned for, but also existing hazards and risks must be reappraised in view of the 
                                                 
*
 For example Viscusi et al (2003) examines the civil liberties and terrorism trade-off and how far 
people are willing to compromise. 
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control measures put in place; a slightly obvious point perhaps, but one that is rarely 
highlighted in the literature. It is an approach that also has many practical resource 
implications, such as the time spent reviewing, or even rewriting risk plans. How 
control measures, or acts of intervention affect risk should also be understood, 
whereby there may be a failure to appreciate how a particular action reduced a risk, 
which means that in the future it becomes viewed as an unimportant. Macdonald 
(1993, p.230) made a similar point in the context of the critique often levelled at 
America’s foreign policy being dictated by the Domino Theory, whereby critics argue 
that because other countries did not fall to communism, then this empirical 
observation nullifies the theory. Macdonald makes the simple point that because of 
American intervention (costly and tragic in human terms as it often was), the domino 
effect may in fact have been prevented: playing the game, he says, alters the 
outcomes. Controversial perhaps, but a principle relevant to consider here when trying 
to place control measures into some form of perspective. 
4.8 Chapter summary 
What of the essential and non-essential factors? Significant clarification was made as 
to some of the key factors and pieces of data that could act as indicators, but it is far 
from complete. What is needed is a deeper exploration of these different factors, 
indicators, and particularly the sources of data, along with some of the analytical tools 
which can be used. It is a challenging task, which because of the breadth of political 
hazards which need to be considered means that any model developed can perhaps 
never be comprehensive enough. Despite this challenge it will, nevertheless, be 
attempted in Chapters 6 and 7, after further reflection and refinement of the possible 
approach is given in the next chapter on methodology. 
What emerged from this review of the practical process elements of political risk 
management is again how divorced the literature and models for political risk are in 
relation to other areas of risk management. The logical response to this may be that 
these variations can be explained because of the different needs of analysing and 
assessing different types of risk. This has validity to a point, but what it also shows is 
how political risk methods have become trapped in their own risk paradigm and do 
not always seem to appreciate developments which have taken place elsewhere, 
particularly in relation to the more general work on business risk management. 
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Frequency of use does not automatically mean relevancy of use, rather that the work 
operates on received wisdom based on political risks from different times. 
Furthermore, these difficulties are compounded by the lack of transparency, or a clear 
rationale for the factors focused on, or the weightings given for certain variables, 
along with the lack of conceptual clarity between independent, influencing and 
causation variables and the data which is used as an indicator of these factors, which 
can all conspire against the effective communication of risks.
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Chapter 5 
Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The epistemological position of this work has been shaped from many years of 
experience teaching leisure, sports and tourism management. These subject fields are 
multi-disciplinary, combining literature, theories and concepts from sociology, 
politics, psychology, international studies and business management. Using such 
diverse materials frequently reveals areas of overlap in the way concepts are utilised 
in an attempt to understand the world, whilst at other times it reveals crucial gaps in 
knowledge in certain fields, resulting in rationality becoming bounded. This chapter 
reflects on these important issues, giving consideration to some of the key theories 
and paradigms that have helped inform the design and construction of the methods 
used for collecting data, the discussion of the results and ultimately the model 
developed in Chapter 7. This chapter has three core themes that are: 
• Reflecting on the literature in order to help clarify the key issues and 
paradigms that have informed the methods of data collection (Section 
5.3). 
• Providing a critical reflection of the key ontological and 
epistemological positions used in this work (Section 5.4). 
• Explaining the methods of data collection, analysis and a reviewing 
the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches adopted and the 
ethical implications generated (Section 5.5). 
5.2 Reflecting on the literature and the key issues raised  
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, the review of literature was crucial in clarifying the language 
and practical process elements involved in risk management. As such, these chapters 
make a significant contribution to the achievement of a number of the thesis 
objectives set, and give an insight into many of the assertions raised in Chapter 1.  
The formulation of a number of reference tables and frameworks offer evidence of the 
inroads made, acting as important building blocks for the work conducted in 
Chapters 6 and 7.  
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In relation to the preliminary assertions made in Chapter 1, nothing in the literature 
review has served to dissuade one of their relevance; that current political risk models 
do not seem sufficiently contextualised; the literature is skewed for particular 
industries; and risk has become more important in a complex world. The two 
assertions where less insight has been gained relate to the relevancy of government 
travel advice in the risk management process, and whether the methods of political 
risk assessment conducted by tourism organisations are ad hoc, and unstructured in 
their nature. These areas will therefore be given particular attention in the 
construction of the methods for data collection. 
What the review of literature also raised was a number of additional questions that 
need examination. These are: 
• Is any political risk model developed prone to becoming a country risk model 
because of the variety of factors and indicators that could be taken into 
account? 
• Are composite indicators, such as the Human Development Index (HDI) better 
than single indicators of risk? 
• Which are the key databases from where the indicators for risk factors can be 
drawn? 
• How can political risk be made more dynamic and operationally focused in 
order to reflect the inherent dynamism of the political environment? 
• Does the number of risk factors utilised affect the accuracy of the assessment 
made? 
• Just what is the best direction of the analysis? Should it take an inductive or 
deductive approach? 
These questions will be given further consideration in relation to the discussion of 
the results in Chapters 6 and 7, and reflected upon in the conclusion.  
5.3 Research philosophy and theoretical underpinnings  
What the comparative review of literature from the different subject fields and 
disciplines revealed was the plethora of theories and paradigms that can be utilised in 
risk management. Despite the aspiration by many to develop a method in the 
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positivist, empirical scientific tradition, for the area of political risk management and 
assessment, this can prove an unattainable goal. It is therefore necessary to explore 
more deeply the ontological and epistemological positions of this work, as this can 
help the reader understand and appreciate how the data collected and the model 
developed has been shaped. Furthermore, and very importantly, what this discussion 
also does is to illustrate how it is possible, even necessary to adopt mixed ontological 
and epistemological positions for a piece of research which seeks to both understand 
and describe political risk management as it relates to tourism, and then develop a 
practical risk model; a little contentious perhaps and so one which needs a more 
measured discussion.  
 5.3.1 Background discussion 
Clarifying the research philosophical position for some types of research can be 
arrived at relatively quickly. Not so in this work. The discussion of literature in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 revealed a number of important themes and issues which have 
played a crucial role in shaping how this work progressed. The problem is that many 
of these theories, concepts and arguments cited as influencing this thesis can reveal 
some contrasting epistemological and ontological positions. Before these are 
discussed in more detail, it can be helpful to briefly examine the definitions of  
ontology, epistemology and the various positions which can be adopted, which are 
used later to frame the discussion in this work. 
Ontology refers to what objects or entities exist and how they relate to each other, 
which combine to influence what is viewed, or considered as the ‘nature’ (Guba 1990, 
p.18) of reality, with Gray (2009, p.17) describing it simply as the ‘study of being.’ 
Epistemology on the other hand relates to the theory of knowledge, which considers 
such questions as what is knowledge, how it should be acquired, and what do we 
know? Bryman et al (2003, p.13) adds that epistemology concerns the question of 
what is or should be regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline. The 
importance of understanding this, as Gray notes (2003, p.17), is that it provides a 
philosophical background for deciding what kinds of knowledge are legitimate and 
adequate, together with clarifying the relationship between the ‘knower (the inquirer) 
and the known’ (Guba 1990, p.18). The relationship of the two concepts, simply put, 
is that the whilst the ontological position adopted shapes what is viewed as existing 
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and can be studied, epistemology can clarify the research process and the design of 
the methods adopted for the actual collecting of data which will be used for analysis 
and discussion. In relation to both of these concepts, one can find various positions, 
which can be described and labelled in different ways depending on the subject area 
or discipline literature utilised. 
In terms of ontology, Bryman et al (2003, p.19) states that there are two key 
fundamental differences or positions: objectivism, which adopts the position that 
social phenomenon present themselves as external facts, which can be identified and 
measured, and are independent of social actors; and constructivism, which views 
social phenomenon and their meaning as being continuously shaped by social actors 
through their interactions with each other. Gray (2009, p.17) places these two 
fundamental differences within a historical context, with the two opposing traditions 
between the Greek philosophers of Heraclitus, who emphasised notions of a changing 
and an emergent world (reflecting notions of becoming), which formed the basis of 
constructivism and hermeneutics, and Parmenides, who emphasised an unchanging 
and permanent reality (reflecting notions of being), which forms a key platform for 
objectivism. Blaikie (1993, p.202) offers another categorisation of ontological 
positions to social enquiry, stating that they can be divided into the two groups of 
being either realists (the idea that there is a reality which exists and can be observed 
in some manner), or constructivists (the idea that what is viewed as reality is 
constantly reconstructed between the interaction of different actors). The point of 
highlighting these differences is to illustrate the various ways that positions can be 
labelled, of which there can be many other variations found; * however, these are the 
terms which are utilised to discuss this work’s research position. 
In terms of epistemology, having the same ontological underpinnings does not 
necessarily lead to neat and unitary epistemological positions (Gray, 2009, p.14). 
Bryman et al (2003, p.1) distils the essence of the debate as relating to the extent that 
the social world can and should be studied according to the principles and ethos of the 
                                                 
*For example, in relation to International Relations, Steans et al (2005, p.49) identifies the key 
epistemological and ontological positions as based around liberalism (or sometimes the optimists), 
realism (usually presented as the dominant position), and critical theory (which has strong roots in the 
Marxist tradition, but can also include feminist perspectives). Although these positions are not utilised 
in this work, they are highlighted to illustrate other alternative ways that one could frame the discussion 
in relation to research philosophy.  
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natural sciences. Marsh et al (2001, p 529) gives a variation on this difference, 
describing it as the difference between the scientific (or positivist) tradition and the 
hermeneutic (or interpretivist) position. In terms of positivism, this is characterised by 
seeing the world as objective and tangible, where predictions about the world can be 
made and causality can be identified, with the researcher and the subject separate 
(Solomon et al 1999, p.23-24; Gratton et al 2004, pp.15-16), with the emphasis on 
trying to identify the causes of social behaviour, with the use of rigorous scientific 
methods allowing the construction of laws, similar to natural scientific laws. 
Alternatively, the positions of realism and critical realism,* whilst sharing with the 
positivist school aspects of a foundatalist based ontology † (Marsh et al 2001, p.529), 
it does have a number of important distinctions, particularly in terms of the critical 
realist position. Whilst they might share the view that there is an external reality 
which can be studied (Bryman et al 2003, p.15), the critical realists do not share the 
same certainty that the variables observed and analysed are a direct reflection of 
reality, believing that there can be deep structural relationships between social 
phenomenon which cannot always be directly measured or observed (Marsh et al 
2001, p.529), and so alternative pieces of data must stand in for them to act as 
indicators.  
In terms of epistemological positions which are based on the ontological position of 
constructivism, these can be described as interpretative, and again have a variety of 
strands (Gray 2009, p18). In essence, this position is characterised by focusing on the 
meaning of behaviour, whereby social reality is produced and reproduced by social 
actors, which can produce multiple realities (Blaikie 1993, p.202). As part of this 
position the world is often seen as complex, context dependent and focusing more on 
understanding the world, rather than predicting it. Within this broad perspective, the 
number of more specific positions cited can vary according to the literature used. 
Hence (Gray 2009, p.21) identifies the interpretivist strands of symbolic interactions, 
phenomenology, realism, hermeneutics and naturalistic enquiry.  
                                                 
*
 The critical element is derived from the ‘generative mechanisms’ (Bryman et al 2003, p.15) which 
offer the prospect that certain key institutes which may be observed, have the capacity to change and 
transform the world. Steans et al (2005 p.49) adds that realism is highly nuanced and can perhaps be 
sometimes regarded as an area of debate rather than a specific position. 
†
 This refers to the idea that there is a real world or ‘external reality’ (Bryman et al 2003, p.15) out 
there which can be observed and studied (Blaikie 1993, p.202) and which is independent of agents 
knowledge (Marsh et al 2001, p.529). The opposite position of this is stated by Marsh et al (2003, p.15) 
as anti- foundatalist who see the world as socially constructed. 
    105 
5.3.2 Clarifying the ontological and epistemological positions of this work 
The previous brief background discussion to the broad ontological and 
epistemological positions which can be adopted can now be used to frame the 
discussion on this work’s philosophical research position, together with where it sits 
in comparison with the broader body of literature on risk management. The crucial 
point to appreciate is how the need to understand the culture of risk (discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3), and the desire to construct a practical risk model (discussed in 
Chapter 4) can lead to possible tensions in the ontological and epistemological 
positions adopted. This is elaborated on in the following discussion, where particular 
attention is given to highlighting how certain key theories and concepts have helped 
shape this works position. 
Russell and Faulkner (1999, p.413) argue that it has been the older, more traditional 
positivist paradigm (which they refer to as the Newtonian/Cartesian paradigm), which 
have tended to dominate the field of tourism research, stating that the implication of 
this method is: 
‘..although it is arguable that this (the positivist)  approach has served us well 
in terms of advancing knowledge in tourism, it has also created some blind 
spots which have resulted in certain aspects of tourism being poorly 
understood. In particular, conventional approaches to tourism research are 
more attuned to the analysis of relatively stable systems, resulting in large 
gaps in the understanding of turbulent phases in tourism development and the 
underlying dynamics of change.’ (Russell et al, 1999, p.413) 
This positivist bias in tourism research gives an additional insight into why the 
relationship between tourism and political change can sometimes focus on a rather 
simplistic, inverse relationship between political instability and tourism flows: as 
instability increases, tourism decreases, as discussed in Chapter 2. Indeed, the theme 
of avoiding simple linear patterns and connections constantly emerged in the risk 
management related literature. For example, Bentley and Page (2001b, p.711) citing 
Petersen’s accident causation model, where accidents are represented as going 
through five stages and operating like a domino effect, are criticised as too simplistic. 
Allinson (1993, p.3) also argues powerfully that causation does not operate in 
‘splendid isolation’ from other causes and offers a useful critique of how after a crisis, 
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the demand to find fault means that it can encourage the focus on mono-causality, 
such as the often heard ‘human error’ factor (see also Box 1.1, in Chapter 1, and the 
arguments about the limitations of legislation by crisis). 
In Chapters 2 and 3, the literature reviewed further revealed the highly malleable 
nature of risk, illustrating how it is constantly being shaped and changed in the face of 
a more complex world. In terms of shaping the methodology and the model developed 
to analyse and assess political risk, it was emphasised how useful it is to adopt a 4th 
age risk paradigm, defined in Chapter 1 (Box 1.1), and discussed in Chapter 3. This 
paradigm, simply put, focuses on viewing risks as being able to create both 
opportunities and threats, which are generated by the complex interaction of many 
factors, with the interpretation of these risks being highly subjective. A position which 
was revealed to be marked by a strong degree of consensus in business risk 
management related literature. The political environment in particular stood out as a 
layer of the business environment that is characterised by dynamism, complexity and, 
crucially for this discussion, the notion of inter-dependence of forces.  
Other theories give additional insights into the development of a number of risk 
practices and cultural outlooks. Chaos and complexity theories, for example, are 
particularly important in this work. These theories, as already noted, tend to be more 
interpretivist in their scientific approach, and are characterised by seeing the world as 
socially constructed, inherently complex, context dependent and focus more on 
understanding, rather than predicting, and so stand in marked contrast to the positivist 
approach. Bernstein (1998, p.332) adds that adherents of chaos theory reject the 
symmetry of the bell curve as a description of reality, as argued by positivists. 
Instead, greater emphasis is placed on understanding the wider conditions of the 
business environment, stressing the interconnection of forces, and the non-linearity of 
how systems operate, where small changes can initiate profound chain reactions 
(Faulkner et al 2001b, p.331): hence the common referral to Edward Lorenz’s 
(1993)‘butterfly effect’, whereby he illustrated through computer simulations on 
weather conditions how a butterfly fluttering its wings in Beijing, can initiate a 
cyclone in Florida, USA (Faulkner et al, 2001b, p.331).* What is also of relevance is 
how chaos is not only seen as a destructive force, but also a creative one, such as how 
                                                 
*
 There are many variations such as MacDonald (1993, p235) referring to Brazil as the origin. 
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a crisis event actually enters the consciousness of potential travellers to reveal a new 
potential destination to them (Faulkner and Vikulov 2001a, p.333; Beirman 2003, 
p.16), together with systems often represented as operating on the edge of chaos, or in 
‘tenuous equilibrium’ (Russell et al, 1999, p 415). 
Aspects of complexity theory can also be found in elements of systems theory which 
also proved helpful in this work. Indeed, some authors, such as Sherwood (2002) 
make a quite explicit link. He says: 
‘The essence of systems thinking is that the complexity of the real world can 
be best tamed by seeing things in the round, as a whole. Only by taking a 
broad view can we avoid the twin dangers of a silo mentality … and 
organisational myopia – in which a fix “now” gives rise to a bigger problem to 
fix “later”.’ (Sherwood 2002, p.1) 
The value of using systems theory was highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4, with the 
system designed for this work encapsulated in Diagram 3.1, and was constructed to 
try and help make sense of the confusing language and processes involved in risk 
management. The use of systems theory is an approach with many advocates from 
different subject fields, such as Almond et al (2000) in relation to comparative 
politics, or Merna et al (2005, p.41) for risk management. This theory was essentially 
developed by Easton (1953, cited by Heywood, 2000, p.108), having links in 
behaviouralism and biological theoretical models that seek understanding of one 
element by understanding its relationship to a whole system. In relation to politics and 
international affairs, systems theory seeks to explain the entire political system, with 
all its key components, political actors and systems. Hauss’s (2001, p.36) work was 
found to be particularly useful here, whereby he attempts to use the approach for the 
study of international relations and conflict theory. He views change as dynamic and 
constantly producing both positive and negative impacts, but instead of using the 
language of risk, Hauss (2001, p.36) frames his discussion using crisis management 
theory. This theory is often encapsulated by referring to the Chinese character for 
crisis representing not only danger, but also opportunity (Hauss, 2001, p37); a notion, 
incidentally which Mair (2005) argues is based on a widespread misconception of the 
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character and based on a ‘spurious proverb.’*  Whatever the truth, it has come to 
represent a conceptual convenience to show complexity, the interaction of forces and 
how political systems can both grow and decay.  
From the subject field of international studies, it is also of interest to note the 
criticisms made of some of the older linear, deterministic models, such as the 
prisoner’s dilemma conflict model, which can present international politics as a 
simple framework of winners and losers. Instead, Hauss (2001, p.17) states it is a 
more complex set of winners and losers, which is constantly changing† (the previous 
discussion in Chapter 4, Section 4.7 illustrates this in relation to the ‘boomerang 
effect’). Interestingly, systems theory, as presented by Hauss (2001, p.17) and many 
others, also draws out some of the key themes from the realist and the pluralist 
theorists, which can be blended together to help generate a better understanding of 
political situations, not only in the context of how conflicts may begin, but also of 
how they are resolved. It is of interest how some writers, such as Tarlow (2002, p.16) 
can still find aspects of conflict theory useful in their risk approach, such as in helping 
to recognise how conflicts can be generated by different groups in a community, and 
so act as another useful cultural mindset with which to approach projects. The crucial 
point of highlighting these writers approach is to illustrate how it can be possible to 
blend epistemological positions, depending on the nature of the subject being studied. 
This will be returned to again towards the end of this section. 
The subject field of the sociology of risk offers other insights into relevant risk 
management paradigms. In this field, there are some relevant connections with 
figurational sociology perspectives (Horne and Jarey 2004, p.146). The idea is that a 
figuration is a relational theory where individuals, groups and social structures 
influence each other, thus stressing a notion of interaction and interplay of forces. 
Elias’s very influential work The Civilizing Process: The history of manners (1978, 
cited in Horne et al 2004, p.147) used game models, rather than game theory, to 
                                                 
*
 Mair (2005, p.1) notes how the formal Crisis+ Danger + Opportunity whilst ‘catchy’ is, never-the-
less, based on wishful thinking, being “peddled by many Western management book.” He goes onto 
give a detailed analysis of the symbols saying that whilst one part of the symbol does signify danger, 
the other more likely refers to an “incipient moment” or crucial point. 
†
 He notes that for the realists, wars arise when states cannot otherwise adjust to changes in the balance 
of power among the leading states, therefore the focus is on the balance of power. A pattern, which 
Hauss (2001, p.17) notes can work quite well until we reach the wars in the 1990s, where the 
arguments are less suitable. 
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understand the figurations. The useful element in Elias’s work is that he is critical of 
scholars from many subject fields, such as sociology, biology and psychology and the 
attempts to preserve the autonomy of their fields, which can lead to a myopic view of 
the world – the point made at the very beginning of this work with the quote by Levi. 
Elias argues ‘these subjects must recognise their “relative autonomy” as 
interdependent phenomena if a more advanced understanding of human society is to 
be gained’ (Elias 1978, p.96, in Horne et al 2004, p.149). Another useful aspect of his 
work is that he includes many humanistic/behavioural elements. The difficulty often 
cited with this figurational approach is that it tends to remain descriptive and 
untestable, which ultimately can mean it explains little (Horne et al, 2004, p155). 
Such theories are therefore better used as an approximation of the world rather than a 
theory that attempts to predict it. It is perhaps also of interest how more traditional 
sociological theories, such as Functionalism, have been revived in areas of risk 
management, as Tarlow (2002, p.14) illustrates, finding it useful to show how the 
tourism components are interlinked.* 
It is for these reasons that aspects of this works methodology can have an 
interpretivist basis, in order to give more focus to the understanding of complexity 
and the interconnections of variables, together with recognising that tourism, sport 
and leisure are ‘social phenomena’ (Gratton et al 2004, p.19), which cannot be 
reduced down to simplistic deterministic relationships.† The influence of this can be 
seen in how parts of the methodology were designed, as discussed in Section 5.5. In 
the first instance, the preference was to focus on collecting qualitative data of people’s 
experience of events which could give greater understanding into how risk 
perceptions were constructed, together with how existing risk assessments are 
interpreted. In the second, it shaped many parts of the political risk model developed 
in this work, discussed in Chapter 7, which encouraged looking at a variety of factors 
and how they may interplay with each other, together with adopting a cultural outlook 
that the risks generated are constantly changing, highly subjective, and dependent on 
                                                 
*
 Faulkner et al (2001b, p.332) consider this in relation to crisis management theory and the ‘lock in 
effect’, using tourism systems as an example, show how historical developments, such as rail links, 
create dependencies with other parts of the tourist system, such as hotels and attractions. 
†
 The challenge, as Bernstein notes is that ‘practitioners have managed to cup the butterfly in their 
hands, but they have not managed to trace all the airflows impelled by the fluttering of its wings, but 
they are trying’ (Bernstein 1998, p.333).  
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the clients background (with this latter point discussed in detail in Chapter 2) and can 
generate both opportunities and threats. 
Yet there was a problem with trying to maintain a pure interpretivist position 
throughout all the parts of the methodology. Whilst in terms of how one views risks 
and the political environment, this work is placed more firmly in an interpretivist 
camp (as this fits much better with notions of complexity theory and the highly 
subjective way people can construct their perception of risk), when it came to the 
actual practical process of constructing a political risk model, this can draw the work 
to a different epistemological position.  
When scrutinising the literature in Chapter 4 which focuses on reviewing a variety of 
existing risk models, it soon became evident that their design can have a much 
stronger skew towards the positions of positivism and critical realism. This is perhaps 
not that surprising considering that a great deal of the thinking about risk is grounded 
in such fields as engineering, whereby the desire is to always try to measure and 
quantify risks in quite specific terms. It was also evident in the various political risk 
models reviewed, many of which originate in the USA, where there has always been a 
very strong tradition of approaching political science from a foundationalist 
ontological position, which manifests itself in both positivistic, but mostly critical 
realist positions. Examples of this can be found in Text Box 4.1, or the influential 
work conducted by the PITF, discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2.  
In terms of the actual model developed for this thesis, as the research progressed it 
was found that in order to develop a practical model for analysing and assessing the 
risks the political environment can generate, the epistemological position would 
perhaps be better categorised as one of critical realism, which some, such as Marsh et 
al (2001, p.528), would distinguish from interpretivist based epistemologies. This 
critical realist position is one which recognises that the world cannot always be 
directly be observed, therefore alternative pieces of data need to be used and 
interpreted, whilst also recognising that aspects of world are socially constructed 
(Marsh et al 2001, p.530). In this sense a greater mixture of quantitative and 
qualitative data can be used, rather than (simply put) just the quantitative for the 
positivist, or qualitative for the interpretivist. In Chapter 4 it was highlighted how 
important it is to not only know what variables should be examined, but just what data 
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can actually be used and where it can be found. A problem given more detailed 
analysis and discussion in Chapter 6. In those Chapters it is stressed how vital it is 
find data which can act as an indicator of potential political hazardous events. This is 
not the same as believing the factor observed has a direct causal relationship to the 
event rather that it offers a means to tap into the problem to help try and observe and 
understand it. An example of this is how GDP data is used in the model developed 
(See Chapter 7), whereby it is not argued that a low GDP causes political turmoil, 
rather that it can give a clue or indicate a political system which could be vulnerable 
to turmoil, depending on a variety of other factors.  
It is also worthwhile highlighting the influence of literature based on another 
contrasting epistemological position, but which was still found to be helpful. Marxist, 
Neo-Marxist and Structuralist work was sometimes found to be useful not because of 
agreement with the perspectives, but because they can often take such a provocative 
stance in how the world is viewed. The notions of conflict, dialectics, and theories of 
political stability (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5 for the Marxist discussion of political 
stability) in Marxist thinking can still have resonance, which in turn can be useful in 
understanding and developing a culture of risk management. One area in particular, 
where work generated from a Marxist perspective encourages some critical analysis, 
relates to the degree that the people in the third world are exploited by those in the 
first world. This is an issue of particular importance considering the number of third 
world locations used as tourist destinations, and the notion of the post-modern tourist, 
whereby some very provocative questions are raised in relation to the ethics of travel 
to these destinations 
Is the use of work from these different positions and how they are used to help design 
the methodology irreconcilable? This work argues it is not. Hauss’s work (2001) 
highlighted earlier gave a clue how it can be possible to mix positions. Blaikie (1993, 
p.201) also argues it is possible to adopt a pragmatic position and try and match the 
strategy to the nature of the research problem. It also recognises, as Marsh et al (2001, 
p.530) argues the ontological, epistemological and methodological plurality of 
political science, with no one position able to reign supreme. This is why in this work 
a sharper distinction is made between notions of risk culture and practical processes, 
in comparison with other works. The cultural outlook influences how one sees the 
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world, with aspects of chaos theory helping to frame ones perceptions of change and 
how it is a constant factor to consider in decision making: yet to make the model 
practical, one has to simplify the universe, which paradoxically can move one away 
from complexity. In this work, it was not a case of looking at various positions and 
realising that was the one which would underpin this work, rather the position was 
shaped by the difficulty of recognising the malleable nature of risk, but how it was 
also important for an individual and organisation to understand and develop its risk 
culture, whilst also having the need to try and develop some quite clear and specific 
practical process steps to make a political risk model relevant for tourism, operational.  
If one did want to attach a specific label to this works ontological position, then it is 
perhaps best described as a constructivist realist (Cupchik, 2001), or a realist 
constructivist (Barkin, 2003, p. 325). The lack of consistency of the terms illustrates 
again the fluidity of the debate and how it can vary depending on the subject field 
approached from (Barkin is writing in relation to international relations, whilst 
Cupchik’s work is based more on sociology). This realist constructivist position 
means that this work does believe in a reality existing, but which cannot always be 
directly be observed, with the researcher also transforming that reality as they interact 
with it. This position does allow for a more mixed epistemological position which 
utilises a variety of methods to collect data, depending on the nature of the problem 
being examined. 
What there is not in this work then is any commitment to single ‘grand theory’ 
(Bryman et al, 2003, p.7), or position. To have done so would certainly have made 
this work a lot easy, but it would have compromised the integrity of the aim of this 
work. The extent that these differences are seen as a problem can depend on the 
importance attached to ontological and epistemology purity. For some, this can be 
viewed as wrong, which can undermine the validity of the data and the conclusions 
produced. For others who are more familiar with the needs of management decision 
making, it represents an operational reality, where one needs to constantly reflect and 
try different techniques to collect and analyse data in order to make a decision, all of 
which seems intimately entwined with how that data arouses us, or makes us feel in 
terms of emotion. This work goes with the latter position, desiring flexibility, rather 
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than purity, hence the development of a model, which synthesises many approaches 
and work. 
 5.3.2 Clarifying the inductive, deductive and intuitive mix of this work 
The other important question to reflect upon is the inductive/deductive mix which 
helps in the design of a research strategy. When examining books on research 
methodology, the inductive/deductive process stages can be presented in seductively 
simple terms, with the approaches often being more strongly associated with 
particular epistemological positions (such as positivism having a stronger skew 
towards deduction, whilst interpretivism can be more focused on induction). In 
practice, in any large scale research project, the boundaries between induction and 
deduction can in fact become more blurred, particularly in relation to developing a 
model which strives for applicability to working environments. When looking at the 
completed management model in Chapter 7, on one level one could generalise and 
say it is perhaps more inductive than deductive, as it encourages the looking at data in 
order to formulate opinions and ideas in order to make a decision, such as whether to 
send a tour group to a country or not. In this sense the inductive process is not used to 
construct a theory or hypothesis, but to actually make a decision. 
Yet it is more complex then this. Whilst this work was not about testing theories of 
causation (essentially a deductive approach), it is still possible to discern a many 
deductive strands. It is a point that Gray (2009, p.15) also makes, noting inductive and 
deductive processes are in fact not mutually exclusive. Hence, the model developed in 
this thesis, in relation to the input stage of the model (see Diagram 3.1), draws 
heavily upon the theories of relative deprivation and how this can lead to political 
turmoil, with the work of the PITF being used in terms of the key data that can be 
used to indicate deprivation and potential problems. For other parts of the model, such 
as the output analysis stage, whereby the focus is on the incidence of past events, this 
too is often characterised as being deductive in nature, having a clear grounding in the 
models rooted in a positivist paradigm. Yet other parts of the model are better labelled 
as inductive in their nature, such as the use of cause and affect tools, such as Event 
Tree analysis, which can be found in Chapter 7 (Diagram 7.2). 
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Into this inductive/deductive mix should also be thrown notions of intuition.* In 
theory, intuition – the idea that people use their instincts, gut reactions or rule of 
thumb measures -  should have little place in a doctoral thesis, but what was of 
interest in this study were the glimmers of information which began to reveal just how 
important intuition actually is in relation to making any risk management model work. 
This was distilled from both the literature reviewed (see Chapter 4) and in the later 
analysis conducted in Chapters 6 and 7, whereby it was observed how emotions can  
play a vital role in decision making. It is worthwhile noting that whilst traditionally, 
sharp distinctions would be made between rational, objective management decision 
making being more effective than emotional based, subjective decision making, in 
fact more recent research is increasingly showing how the two are in fact intimately 
entwined. As Lehrer (2009) illustrates through out his book, good decision making 
requires an analysis of information, which sometimes needs a control of ones 
emotions, whilst at others it requires giving in to ones emotions. This area was an 
interesting one opened up in this research project, but it was beyond its scope to 
examine in more detail, hence its indication as an important area of future research 
highlighted in Chapter 8.  
The key point to appreciate is that the risk model developed in this work is designed 
to help in the decision making process. As such it meanders between the inductive 
and deductive approaches, using different types of data to try and build up a picture of 
the risks to an organisation and so help in decision making, which ultimately  seems 
to be interpreted with the decision makers own intuition and heuristics. In terms of the 
inductive/deductive process and the analysis of the qualitative data collected from 
various tour organisations, this is discussed in more detail in Section 5.5. 
5.4 Why primacy is given to the political environment in the analysis 
for change and assessment of risks 
What this reflection of the different positions and theories leads to is the adoption of a 
more pragmatic inter-paradigmal stance where merits or truths are seen from many 
perspectives (Bayliss et al 2001, p.5), which has similarities with Hauss’s (2001) 
approach to international relations. It does however have strong leanings towards 
                                                 
*
 Interestingly Blaikie (1993 p.205) adds another dimension with his notion of abduction as an 
alternative to deduction and induction, but is was not found relevant in this work. 
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certain areas, particularly in relation to systems and complexity theory. Why then, the 
legitimate question can be raised, is there so much apparent primacy given to the 
political environment, which can be understood as just one layer, or aspect of a 
complex, inter-connected world? To give such primacy could result in a study which 
is myopic and contradicts the paradigms it purports to adhere. This needs a more 
measured discussion.  
The reasons for concentrating on political risks are many. Some, such as Cartwright 
(2001, p.63), actually go as far as to emphasise the relative importance of the political 
environment in relation to the other external environment categories, arguing that 
there is no greater effect on individuals and organisations than the political process, as 
it is from this arena that the key legislative and economic determinants are derived. 
Monti-Belkaoui et al (1998) and Brink (2004, p.75) also stress the relative importance 
of the political environment, with Monti-Belkaoui et al’s arguing: 
‘The most serious risk faced by multinational corporations is political risk, as 
it can result in various negative host government actions that include among 
others confiscation, expropriation, nationalization, and creeping expropriation. 
Management of multi-national corporations need to understand the real nature 
of political risk, using forecasting models to estimate it, and develop 
alternative measures to manage it.’ (Monti-Belkaoui et al 1998, p.xi)  
Whilst there is no doubt that changes in the political environment can have a profound 
effect on the fortunes of an organisation, whether it is the most important area which 
generates risk for an organisation is difficult to establish, if not, indeed, a little 
pointless. Recognising its importance, not its ranking, is perhaps what is most crucial.  
In relation to the actual factors of analysis, the extent to which these should be 
confined to just the political environment, or extended to other areas is also open to 
some debate. When examining models of political risk assessment, it is rare to find a 
writer who focuses just on political variables to understand political hazards and risk, 
as highlighted in Chapter 4. Most models will attempt to put the political analysis 
into a bigger framework, such as Kennedy (1987, p.6), or Monti-Belkaoui et al (1998, 
p.57), who go onto stress the importance of integrating economic and political 
analysis together, and cite Overholt’s (1982) comment that: 
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‘…the division of academic curricula into distinct disciplines creates the false 
illusion that politics can be separated from economics….in fact most of 
politics is a struggle over economic decisions.’ (Monti-Belkaoui et al 1998, 
p.57)   
A point also echoed by Hobden and Jones, who state: 
‘..one of the main weaknesses of mainstream approaches to the study of world 
politics is that they tend to draw on utterly misleading distinctions between 
politics and economics. By concentrating on politics in isolation from 
economics, such approaches generate a hopelessly skewed understanding of 
reality.’ (Hobden et al 1997, p.134)  
In Monti-Belkaoui et als (1998, p.57) work they therefore attempt to present an 
empirical link between economic growth and political risks, focusing on such 
variables as inflation, terms of trade and GNP. The key criticism of this work and 
many similar models, is not that it is wrong to examine economic variables and their 
link to political change, but rather why stop at the economic variables? What emerged 
in Chapter 4 was the breadth of factors that can be used in risk analysis and 
assessment, which again emphasised aspects of multi-causality and complexity in the 
factors that drive political events. Even considering the SWOT and PESTLE 
frameworks, which limited as they are, act as reminders of the need not to be too 
restrictive in one’s analysis. Indeed, this is one of the real weaknesses of using a 
systems theory approach; whilst analogies are often made with living organisms, these 
have the problems of simplifying the theory too much, because in relation to a 
political system, just what exactly constitutes a system is far from clear and not as 
defined as an organic body.  
In order to address these issues, the approach developed in this study is to use the 
political environment as the hub of the system used for analysis, represented in 
Diagram 3.1, whereby the key focus is given to the range of political hazardous 
events raised in Chapter 3. One can then work backwards in terms of trying to 
understand the many factors that can help indicate the likelihood of these events 
occurring and the possible risks generated. It is an approach which is again perhaps 
more deductive than inductive, but one which is grounded in an operational reality for 
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many tourism organisations. This is because there may not be the resources available 
to conduct a complex, inductive analysis of numerous economic, social and 
environmental factors, and to consider how these may act to drive certain hazardous 
events. The issue of resource constraints is one of the reasons Howell et al (1994, 
p.72) recommends initially focusing on the key losses (an asymmetric view) that 
could be experienced by the organisations. Clearly there is a danger that weak signals, 
or the ‘hidden risks’ (Poole-Robb et al 2002, p.1) may be missed, which could 
otherwise be picked up in a more expansive, deductive scanning approach, but 
recognising resource limitations and developing workable model is equally as 
compelling, and it is far from clear if a more inductive approach produces results any 
more accurately as discussed in Chapter 4. 
5.5 Overview of the methods used for collecting data  
The early assertions made about risk and tourism for this work were founded on a 
number of empirical observations based on many years of working in and studying 
different tourism organisations. The only difficulty with such observations is that they 
lack structure in terms of how these observations were recorded and the episodic time 
periods over which they were viewed, which means the reliability and validity of any 
conclusions drawn will be questionable. The opportunity in this work was to produce 
a coherent, structured methodology, with which to make proper observations in order 
to develop an appropriate model and clearer conclusions.  
For this research project, there were three key stages in relation to data collection, 
which have been informed by the literature reviewed, the key theoretical paradigms 
discussed, the objectives to be achieved, and the assertions to be examined. The three 
stages were: 
• Stage 1 - conducting a comparative examination of the relationship between 
tourism demand patterns and political risk values, factors and quantifiable 
indicators used in existing models in thirty case study countries. 
• Stage 2 - collecting primary data from tourism organisations,  in order to gain 
an insight into existing risk management practices, and to help inform the 
most appropriate descriptors and values, or the appropriate language and 
culture of risk. 
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• Stage 3 - developing a synthesised risk model that is applied to a single 
organisation and case study country. 
This three stage data collection process also allowed for a form of triangulation, via 
the use of multiple methods of data collection to help analyse and assess political 
risks. In theory this can help with reliability, but it is also recognised, as Gratton et al 
(2004, p.108) argue, that errors can simply be reinforced with this method, which are 
discussed in Sections 5.5.2 to 5.5.5. Before however this is discussed in more detail, it 
is important to explain in more detail the comparative method highlighted in Stage 1, 
as it played a useful role in both the analysis and the country case study selection. 
5.5.1 Clarifying the comparative method 
Many books (such as Almond et al 2000, p.33) on comparative politics state how 
fundamental comparison is to human thought. Indeed, it is not too difficult to argue 
that most research will involve comparison of some type, with Mackie et al (1995, 
p.173) arguing that it reflects the basic nature of social science research. Traditionally, 
comparative politics would compare different political institutions of government, 
usually founded on the classic divisions of power, based around the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary. Over time, the basis for the comparison has been greatly 
extended, such as comparing political cultures, electoral systems and the media. 
The need for a comparative approach was governed to an extent by the inter-
disciplinary nature of the phenomena studied (discussed in Chapter 1), whereby to 
understand the phenomena of risk as it relates to tourism, it required using literature 
from a variety of disciplines and subject fields; hence the early analysis and 
comparison of literature and definitions in the previous chapters, where concepts and 
descriptors of risk and risk processes were compared and contrasted. Furthermore, the 
need to use a comparative method was defined to an extent by the objectives set at the 
beginning of this work, such as the clarification of the language of risk from the 
different subject fields, or the examination of the relevance of existing political or 
country risk models in relation to the tourism industry. It was also found useful when 
examining the consistency that risk values or system classifications were given to 
countries by different organisations. Indeed, it was because the comparative method 
was used in relation to a diverse range of case study countries, that this helped nurture 
the black swan analogy used in Chapter 6, whereby it was always possible to find a 
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country which did not fit in with the general pattern of findings, such as a country 
experiencing a violent conflict did not necessarily mean that tourism could not 
continue to grow, as discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1. 
There were two further factors for the use of a comparative method. The first relates 
to the argument (Mackie et al 1995, p174) that the use of the comparative method can 
help guard against ethnocentricity, which is discussed in more detail later in this 
Chapter, in Section 5.6. The second was that the basic methods of comparative 
analysis which can be used were of benefit in selecting the sample case study 
countries. The key methods of comparative analysis used in this work related to the 
adoption of the three common classification of the comparative approach (Mackie et 
al 1995, pp.177-180), which are:  
• Statistical global comparisons –This involves looking at all countries based 
around analysing key statistical data. 
• Focused or systematic comparison – This narrows the countries used for 
comparison to a smaller number of countries. 
• Case study comparisons – This essentially involves studying one or a few 
countries in more detail, but within a comparative framework, which is to say 
the analysis has been informed by analysis drawn from other countries. 
The methods where used in the following ways. Statistical comparison was of help in 
the selection of a number of case study countries, as discussed in Section 5.5.2, such 
as scrutinising some key statistical data, such as the HDI data produced by the UN, 
which was of help in terms of reducing the number of countries which could be 
utilised for the focused comparison. In turn, the focused comparison of thirty 
countries, allowed for a more detailed analysis of the key factors, indicators and 
databases. The analysis conducted on these countries is discussed in Chapter 6. The 
case study countries selected were used to both examine further the relevancy of 
certain factors that offer theoretical indicators of risk, together with highlighting any 
countries which seemed to go against, or deviate (Mackie et al 1995, p.177), against 
the more general trends (later described as the black swans in Chapter 6). 
The finals analysis was to focus on a single case study (Ethiopia). Although it may 
seem on first perusal that a single case study cannot form part of a comparative 
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analysis, in fact the comparative element is still relevant here, as it is using key factors 
and data drawn from the previous focused comparison, together with looking at 
Ethiopia’s neighbours. The use of this case study was much more in the vein of a test 
case study, whereby the risk model developed for this work could be examined more 
closely.  
5.5.2 Data collection stage 1: method and rationale for comparing risk 
assessments, factors and indicators with tourism demand 
One of the thesis objectives was to examine a variety of existing political risk models 
to ascertain their relevance, and in so doing, establish whether the assertion made that 
they were not relevant held any validity. This would also help satisfy the objective 
related to identifying good and bad practices in risk management approaches. The 
early intention was to replicate or adapt studies, such Howell’s et al (1994, p.71) 
work, which examined the accuracy of past composite risk values and forecasts 
produced by three different models, compared with the actual political events that 
occurred, and the subsequent losses that were accrued by an organisation (an 
approach replicated to a degree by Linder et al 2002, p.3). For this work, the study is 
expanded to not only focus on the idea of loss, but also gains, which are measured by 
tourism arrival patterns. 
It was soon realised that this type of postdictive* analysis had a number of problems 
which would need to be dealt with. One of the difficulties relates to the number of 
models that are produced by commercial consultancies, as highlighted in Chapter 4.  
The first critical issue related to simple issues of copyright, where many of the models 
are protected and care must be taken in how they are utilised; this is also examined in 
the later section on ethics. The second related to the problem that many models could 
have numerous ambiguities in exactly what data is being interpreted, along with 
where it is sourced. To deal with these problems the decision was made to select the 
assessments that were ‘open’ or free, and could readily be accessed by tourism 
organisations. There were two exceptions to this open selection category; the ICRG 
and the PRS models, which are both now part of the PRS Group. The simple reason 
for this was: a) they are widely utilised by organisations (not necessarily tourism 
                                                 
*
 The term used by Howell et al (1994) to refer to the idea of looking at the causes behind the risk 
events and comparing  the risk assessments scores which were given at the time and the losses accrued. 
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related) and often discussed in political risk literature; and b) they produce data rich 
reports that are easy to access to enable a hindsight review. Into this open, ready made 
assessments category was placed the governmental travel advice, whereby the key 
English language sites were examined (USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand) and a content analysis conducted focusing on three themes: advice, 
assessment of hazards, and specific hazardous events identified. Using all these 
criteria, the following databases were selected for analysis:  
• Open assessment databases: Coface, ONDD, EKNN, FH, FSI, Polity 
IV, CIDCM, CIA World Fact Book. 
• Open English language based government travel advice sites: UK, 
USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
• Non-open databases used: PRS and ICRG. 
In addition to the summative assessments produced by these databases, a wide variety 
of more specific factors, and perhaps more importantly, the specific pieces of data that 
could be used to indicate or measure them, were examined. The selection of these 
factors and indicators were the ones distilled from various literature and models, 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Whilst writers such as Brink (2004, p.77) argue that 
once the analyst knows what to look for, the issue of where to look for it becomes 
slightly less complicated, in fact, it was found that this belies just what ‘less 
complicated’ means. Deciding on the key risk factors was certainly difficult, but so 
too was clarifying just what specific pieces of data were actually needed, and from 
where they could be obtained. Indeed, one of the revelatory aspects of this study was 
just how vital the accessing of information via the internet has become, which in turn 
transformed the methodological process, as so many of these databases needed to be 
examined to assess their relevance and potential use in any risk model.  
The strength of the internet is the speed that one can access data: its weakness is that 
one can become overwhelmed by the quantity of data which can be found, some of it 
being of variable (sometimes dubious) quality. This difficulty could often be 
exacerbated by the fact that websites provide links to others sites, resulting in a 
tangled web of confusing data, and could lead to what Tarlow (2002, p.6) describes as 
‘selective ignorance.’ To help deal with this overwhelming amount of data, some 
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simple criteria were used to help categorise and form an assessment of the databases, 
based on what type of data could be collected, who generated it, the cost and the 
time/frequency that the data was updated, followed by an attempt at ranking the 
databases using a simple three point scale, which was:  
• Ranking 1 – Essential consultation for building up a risk profile.  
• Ranking 2 – Useful to consult this website for more specialist information, or 
for triangulation of other materials. 
• Ranking 3 – Limited value, often having a high degree of subjectivity, or 
reinterprets data that can be obtained form other sources. 
After hundreds of databases were examined, it was realised that for many of them, 
particularly in relation to input related data, the number of key databases were in fact 
far fewer than initially expected. Although data could often be presented in a variety 
of ways, such as the many organisations that offer a country profile, they often draw 
their data from the CIA World Fact Book, which in turn uses data from the World 
Bank, the UN or the IMF. As a result the following key databases were focused on in 
terms of the analysis conducted in Chapters 6 and 7, based around the adoption of a 
systems theory approach discussed earlier: 
• Key output databases: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT), PITF, Uppsala Conflict Database (UCDB), Minorities at Risk 
(MAR), English language government advice sites, travel blogs and various 
news agencies such as the BBC.  
• Key process databases: Polity IV, Freedom House, Failed State Index, 
Transparency International, World Bank, CIA World Fact Book. 
• Key input databases: World Bank, IMF, UN, CIA World Fact Book. 
In terms of the time period over which the data was examined, this primarily ranged 
from 1997 to 2005, which gave a good sense of the trends occurring and how political 
hazardous events could affect tourism flows. At times, particularly in relation to the 
tourism trends, data was looked at as far back as 1994 to help put certain events into 
perspective (beyond this period, tourism data becomes more fragmentary and harder 
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to utilise in a proper comparative analysis). In relation to a number of the open, ready-
made assessment databases, data was often limited where information was not 
available before 2006/2007 (one of the weaknesses of the open databases can be 
accessing past data in order to conduct a longitudinal study). Despite these problems, 
it did offer the advantage of replicating the operational conditions many practitioners 
would face, where there would always be gaps in the information wanted.  
The analysis and reflection of all this comparative data was initially carried out 
through the focused comparison (see Section 5.5.1) of thirty case study countries.  
The number of thirty was not arrived at by mathematical formulation; rather it 
emerged from the key criteria set, which strived for comparing contrasting political 
systems and conditions. The following main criteria were initially used: 
• Countries which have experienced profound political events such as having 
emerged from war, or experienced a significant regime change.  
• Countries which were currently in a process of political volatility such as an 
endemic insurgency problem. 
• Countries which are regarded as politically stable and of low risk, to act as a 
benchmark for other countries. 
• Uniqueness of political system. 
• Significant attacks on tourists. 
In addition to these main criteria were a number of sub-criteria which helped further 
refine the selection of countries. These included having countries from: a variety of 
global regions; inclusion in Mintel’s (2003a and 2004) fastest growing tourism 
destinations; the scale and strength of their tourism resource; whether the country has 
any internal conflicts/terrorist problems; where the country sits in relation to the HDI 
*; how the political system was classified; and having a number of neighbouring 
clusters so the notion of bad neighbours and conflict zones could be examined. The 
detailed application of both the main and sub-criteria and the countries selected can be 
found in Appendix G, which also includes the countries selected. 
                                                 
*
 The HDI is a composite measure, combining life expectancy, literacy rates, education and standards 
of living, allowing easy comparison between countries and gives a measure of well being and welfare. 
    124 
Although a great deal of literature was drawn upon in relation to the field of 
comparative politics, there were also a number of adaptations. Whereas in the field of 
comparative politics, the main focus can be on comparing the key institutions of 
government, such as the executive, legislature or the judiciary system, this was found 
to be too limited in relation to designing a practical risk model. Instead, whilst the key 
institutions were compared, this was but one part of the factors used in the 
comparative analysis (Diagram 3.1 can be used to gain a better sense of the variety of 
factors that were ultimately used in the comparative analysis). The need to do this 
relates to the discussion about complexity and the use of systems theory highlighted 
in the previous sections. 
In terms of this section, the final point to consider is how the data was analysed and 
why certain methods were rejected. In Chapter 4, the review of the literature 
highlighted a number of studies which were conducted which compared risk values, 
with financial losses, post-political events, such as Howell’s et al (1994) useful paper. 
In the earlier stages of this research project it was anticipated that the key existing 
political risk models would be scrutinised in relation to past risk assessment values 
given, which would then be compared with actual political events and how these 
impacted on tourism. It was an approach more rooted in a positivistic paradigm, 
where a strong focus on statistical analysis would be conducted in order to compare 
data and looking for correlations in order to see which numeric risk assessments were 
of most value.  
This was moved away from for a number of reasons. The first related to the difficulty 
with accessing the risk assessment scores for many of the models. Yet even for those 
models where past risk assessment scores could be accessed, this also proved of 
limited value. Even with the most basic of statistical analysis it was revealed that 
correlations could be proved or disproved depending on the countries selected, or the 
time periods that data was used. In short, this type of statistical analysis gave little 
insight into the value of the models. The final nail in the coffin for this quantitative 
type of analysis was as a result of a more detailed review of the literature which 
revealed highly malleable nature of risk assessments. 
This was not to say that the collection and analysis of quantitative data was rejected 
altogether. What was found particularly useful was to look at the rhythms of tourism 
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demand in relation to risk assessment values (see Table 6.5 for an example of this 
method), qualitative descriptions of government, or actual specific political events, 
such as wars or acts of terrorism. These are illustrated through out Chapter 6, via 
series of Figures, which illustrate the complex relationship between these factors. As 
stated in Chapter 6, what ultimately proved most interesting were often the unique 
variations in tourism patterns in response to events, or existing assessments, rather 
than any broader generalisation that could be formed. 
The analysis of the databases also involved collecting a great deal of qualitative 
related data, particularly in relation to the government travel advice sites. The content 
analysis of these key databases involved gaining a snapshot of the advice, which was 
done by collecting the advice issued for June and October 2007 and which focused on 
four key themes, which were (see Table 6.2 and Appendix J for more detailed 
examples):  
• the assessment scales used (if at all);  
• the opening first sentence (and sometimes second if it helps clarify the first 
sentence) of the travel advice section; 
•  to identify all the listed hazards/risks;  
• and to note any additional advice on travel. 
The rationale for this approach was that one wanted to conduct a comparative analysis 
between the categorisations and descriptions given of a country by the different sites, 
together with further scrutinising how the data could be built into an existing model. 
This is elaborated and explored in more detail in Chapter 6. It is also important to try 
and gain an insight into how both operators and their clients interpreted these various 
risk assessments of travel, political or country risk, which formed an important 
underpinning for the second key stage of the data collection process, discussed in the 
next section. 
5.5.4 Data collection process stage 2: primary data collection and 
rationale 
When collecting data from tourism organisations, a crucial objective in this project 
related to clarifying some of the risk vocabulary used by operators, together with 
trying to place political hazards into some sense of perspective in relation to the risks 
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these could pose to organisations. An underlying difficulty with attempting to 
examine existing risk management practises was that in terms of analysing the 
political environment, tourism organisations would do this on an ad hoc basis, rather 
than having some formal risk method. The challenge was therefore not only how to 
select the tourism organisations, but also what information should be asked for.  
In terms of selecting organisations, the initial intention was to contact organisations 
that operated in a variety of supply sectors, ranging from accommodation, 
transportation and package holiday companies. This proved too difficult because of 
the scale of the industry and finding an appropriate means of contacting relevant 
individuals in the organisation. After searching for a variety of ways to obtain a good 
sample, a much simpler selection technique emerged. The decision taken was to focus 
on the variety of travel and adventure shows that take place each year in London and 
Birmingham. This strategy allowed for direct contact to be made in person, rather 
than a cold call, which could then be followed up with additional questions sent via 
email. Over a five-year period, the following shows were attended: 
• The Times Destinations Holiday and Travel Show, Earls Court, 31 Jan -3 
February 2008. 
• The Ordnance Survey Outdoors Show 16-18 March Birmingham 2007, NEC. 
• The Times Destinations Holiday and Travel Show, Earls Court, 1-4 February 
2007. 
• The Daily Telegraph Adventure Travel Show 12-14 January 2007, Olympia. 
• The Ordnance Survey Outdoors Show 17-19 March Birmingham 2006, NEC. 
• The Ordnance Survey Outdoors Show 16-18 March Birmingham 2005, NEC. 
• Metro Outdoor Adventure show, Olympia, 19th February 2005. 
An immediate, obvious observation which can be made is that the shows have a 
strong leaning towards the adventure tourism sector. It is however important to note 
that despite this skew towards a particular sector, the desire was to not frame the 
analysis within a narrow discussion of adventure tourism. Instead the intention was 
for them to represent any small to medium size tourism operation, examining how 
they interact with political hazards around the world. Indeed, the size of the 
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organisation, rather than the sector operated in was felt to be more important, as one 
of the contentions in this work is that many existing political risk models are too 
focused on the needs of particular traditional industries; something which singularly 
fails to acknowledge that small organisations operate in the global arena just as much 
as large ones. Furthermore, in Chapter 2, the diversity of the tourism industry and 
how it has become more complex and niche based was highlighted, of which just one 
of those growth elements happens to be the adventure sector; yet what was also 
illustrated was that the problems and challenges of scanning and assessing the 
political environment are common to all organisations. The operators used then, were 
to give insights into any organisation operating overseas, not just adventure ones.  
For the first show attended, a pilot questionnaire was designed to structure the 
interviews. * The limitations of some of the questions and approach soon became 
apparent. The shows were often too hectic to conduct a proper structured interview, 
together with certain questions revealing very little, such as those relating to what the 
operators understood by risk. What was of interest however was that people were 
generally happy to reflect on personal experience, and offer additional anecdotal 
experiences. As a result, this transformed the method adopted, whereby a direct 
contact would be made at the shows and various questions asked about their 
operations. This informal interview would then be followed up via an email message 
that requested a sample risk assessment (if one was done), which in theory would also 
provide a better indication of the vocabulary of risk used. In addition, three simple 
questions were also asked, which were: 
• What events since 2001 have had the biggest impact on your operations? 
• How useful do you find the UK FCO travel advice? 
• Do you use any other advice site? 
                                                 
*
 The pilot questionnaire designed had three key sections. The first section introduced the interviewer 
and asked a series of qualitative questions on what is understood by risks, political risks and the most 
common risks that affect the organisation. By beginning with open, generic questions on risk, the hope 
was that political risks could be placed into some sort of perspective. The second part of the 
questionnaire (part B) continued with aspects of the vocabulary used, but focused much more on 
examining instances of good and bad practice. The final part (part C) of the questionnaire finished with 
relatively straightforward questions which profile the organisation in relation to its size, structure and 
purpose. 
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These simple questions meant that the organisations were not being overburdened 
with requests for information, which it was hoped would ensure a better response rate. 
It should also be noted that the questions did not ask specifically about political risks 
and hazards, as the intention was to try to give a sense of perspective in relation to all 
risks. Whilst for some operators this approach revealed relatively little, for others 
some rich qualitative data was collected which was very useful for this study. Over 
the five year period, individual or representatives from 93 organisations were spoken 
to at the various shows. Of these, 77 were followed up with a request for information 
in relation to the questions and a request for a sample risks assessment. In turn, 41 of 
these organisations replied, with the quality of the responses varying considerably. Of 
this sample, 20 were able to supply a sample risk assessment. 
The analysis of the qualitative data took a variety of forms. When examining 
qualitative data, it is possible to adopt a deductive approach, whereby one, as Gray 
(2009, p.501), notes can establish the criteria for selection of the types of data which 
would be focused on; alternatively, an inductive the approach is also possible, 
whereby no rules are set (an approach usually labelled as grounded theory) and one 
waits to see what emerges as important or interesting. In this work, the analysis of 
data collected from the operators did utilise a number of basic criteria in terms of 
what was being looked for, such as the key events that had affected their operations 
and the qualitative description given to the value of the travel advice, with a summary 
of the data appearing Appendix E, and discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1. It 
should be noted that generally the data in that appendix is a summary, with some of 
the organisational responses left in more detail if they were made reference to in 
Chapter 6. The frequency that certain events and descriptions were recalled where 
then highlighted in order to try and gain a sense of where political risk fitted into the 
broader picture of risks, together with the perceived value of government travel 
advice.  
The real value of the approach, however, was the additional pieces of information, 
descriptions and stories which some operators gave, as these pieces of information 
helped shine a light on the nature of the problems they were experiencing. As stated 
earlier, the adoption of this method came about after a more structured approach to 
interviewing was tried, which revealed little, but where the additional asides the 
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operators gave were often more interesting than what was being formally recorded. 
The use of this data, whereby it is left up to the operators to decide what additional 
pieces of information to give, which could then be used to both describe or illuminate 
the impact political events can have on operators (utilised throughout Chapter 6), can 
in theory be seen as more inductive in its nature, which again illustrates some of the 
ambiguities which can occur between the notions of induction and deduction. It was 
also from some of these descriptive pieces of information collected from 
organisations, whereby an insight could be found into aspects of causation, such as 
why one operator could experience a decline in demand in response to an event, 
whilst another could maintain their demand (this again illustrates the problems of 
being too prescriptive in the categorisation of what certain methodological approaches 
and types of data can and can not do). 
In terms of analysis of the risk forms collected, a similar deductive approach was 
taken, whereby a structured set of criteria were applied to analyse the forms and the 
language of risk. The content analysis of this data can be seen in Appendix F, and 
discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.5. The criteria selected were based on the 
comparison and discussion of risk definitions discussed in Chapter 3, where 
particular attention is given to whether the use of a hazard is given, the types of scales 
or descriptors used to assess the risks, and the risk culture adopted. Although a 
frequency profile of certain scales was built up, the most crucial point to illustrate was 
not their similarities, but just how diverse the approaches were in terms of the 
practical application of risk management.  
When scrutinising the content analysis in Appendix E, the data collected from the 
third question is not discussed in any length. The reason for this is that it revealed 
little useful information. The initial reason for asking this question was that it was 
hoped that some new risk model relevant for tourism might be discovered. In fact, the 
responses just gave some general additional advice sites, or crisis management 
organisations, which whilst useful for the construction of practical control measures 
or new sites to refer to, it did not provide much good quality information that could be 
subjected to more detailed scrutiny.  
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5.5.5 Stage 3: synthesis, application and case study selection rationale 
The final research phase involved the development of a model for political risk 
assessment based on the findings of Chapter 6. This was then applied to a single case 
study organisation and country, which offered the advantage of a more holistic, 
intimate, analysis and testing of the model in a real life setting (Kitchin and Tate, 
2000; Yin 1994), in order to gauge its value, how it should be refined and to conduct a 
further evaluation of the indicators and databases which could be used. It should be 
stressed that because of the time scales involved in writing up the work, it was not a 
question of doing the risk assessment for the organisation, but rather doing it in 
parallel with their existing risk assessment. The reason for this was based on a 
mixture of logistical practicalities, such as the length of time it would take to write up 
the data collected, and the issue of ethics, which is discussed in Section 5.8. 
The organisation chosen was XCL expeditions, who were planning an adventure 
expedition to Ethiopia. XCL is small organisation that has a number of strands to their 
business, ranging from leadership training, consultancy and expedition planning. They 
are run by a husband and wife team, who bring in additional staff, or volunteers for 
different projects. Previous not-for-profit expeditions include destinations such as 
Guyana, India and Uganda.  
The rationale for their selection was partly dependent on some pragmatic criteria, 
which Denscombe (1998, p.34) recognizes can be an important part of the case study 
selection process, but should not be the only criteria. The criteria for the case study 
selection was therefore based on: 
• The expedition took place in Ethiopia, which emerged as one of the more 
interesting case studies in the earlier focused comparison. 
• It was a specified project, which made the case study analysis more tangible. 
• They agreed to take part and the timing was right. 
The expedition taking place Ethiopia was a particularly important criteria for 
selection. When looking at Ethiopia’s pattern of tourism, the travel advice given and 
the main pieces of data which can be collected, illustrated throughout Chapter 6, it 
soon became evident that Ethiopia would prove a very useful country for a more 
detailed case study analysis. In particular, it should be noted how the countries has 
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many ambiguities, where so many measures examined in Chapter 6 reveal a country 
which has many political hazards and could generate many risks to tourism 
organisations; yet paradoxically, there are still many attractive features about 
traveling to the country, where tourism has continued to grow in spite of the many 
problems the country faces. It was therefore felt that this complex, paradoxical 
relationship would give a more rigorous test of the model developed and discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
Collecting the data involved attending one of the training weekends, where the group 
were observed and engaged with via informal discussions and a self-completed 
questionnaire distributed. This questionnaire focused on collecting data about 
themselves and their perceptions of the travel risks to Ethiopia. In addition, the 
organisation was used to help contextualise the risk exposure, which is discussed in 
Chapter 7. As in the previous analysis of operators experiences of risk, the desire was 
for the participants to write down what they felt was important, with the content 
analysed in relation to identifying the key events and descriptors used, which can be 
found in Appendix K. 
5.6 Evaluation of methods and the degree of ethnocentricity 
Although an overall evaluation on the methods is conducted in the conclusion, it is 
worthwhile giving some preliminary reflections. What this cross subject comparative 
analysis revealed were the many inherent weaknesses that can be found in any risk 
management process. The point of this evaluation is, as Frosdick (1997, p.176) 
argues, that knowing the weakness of a method does not necessarily undermine its 
value; the challenge is to try and understand what are the tolerable thresholds of 
inaccuracy that are acceptable by society, the media, staff and customers.  
The notion of bounded rationality perhaps encapsulates many of these key problems, 
where resource constraints will always place limits on the amount of data that can be 
collected for any analysis. Intimately linked with this limitation, is that any risk 
management process will always have an element of subjective interpretation 
involved. Whilst these inherent weaknesses can never be fully removed, they can at 
least be ameliorated. This was done primarily by utilising a large range of case study 
countries and organisations. This in turn was underpinned by utilising a variety of 
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databases, working along the principle of triangulation, partly to help verify the 
conclusions drawn from the analysis, but primarily to help build up richer, holistic 
pictures of the nature of the hazards and risks. 
It is vital to appreciate that the number of databases, case studies and organisations 
utilised was not necessarily to prove or disprove assertions based on statistical 
significance testing, as it was found early on in this study that this could distract from 
some of the more interesting findings in relation to risk management (this is 
encapsulated in the problem of induction and the black swan analogy, which is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). This move away from a positivistic type 
approach was also influenced by the growing belief that, as Merna et al (2005, p.2) 
describes it, risk management is more of an art than a science. The World Economic 
Forum Report, (2007) illustrates this by noting that many problems are compounded 
by increasing global complexity, and that decisions are more dependent on 
approximations of the world, or rule of thumb practices and intuitive experiences 
(heuristics).   
 Instead, a great deal of focus was given to highlighting these differences, and using 
qualitative anecdotal evidence from operators to gain an insight into issues. This 
approach of using anecdotal qualitative data, as Ryan (2007, p.5) notes can became a 
theoretical as it does not allow for easy generalisations and lacks rigour in terms of 
scientific enquiry; but Ryan goes onto say that this ignores the strength of this 
approach, saying: 
‘…it can be objected that of necessity in order to communicate there must be 
shared understandings, and the speficities of given places and times are 
transferable to illuminate other places and times – and it is in the aggregation 
of constructed stories that themes emerge, which are testable in the ways 
required of post-positivistic enquiry.’ (Ryan 2007, p.5) 
This is an important point and acts as a key rationale for the methods utilised, and was 
a factor observed after the pilot study, whereby a single comment or anecdote was far 
more illuminating about the problems operators were experiencing, or how they 
approached risk. 
    133 
The other important consideration is to reflect on the degree that the work is 
ethnocentrically based. It was noted earlier in Section 5.5.1 that one of the cited 
strengths of using comparative analysis is that it can guard against ones 
ethnocentricity (Mackie et al 1995, p.174). This was why a contrasting range of 
countries were chosen for comparative analysis in Chapter 6. Despite this approach, 
one must still recognise that the model developed in this work, and discussed in 
Chapter 7, is still very much ground in an English speaking, Western cultural 
context, which is developed for the needs of tourism organisations, whose key client 
base tends to come from the developed world. 
Perhaps of more concern relates to the nature of the organisations who provide the 
data for the databases which were found useful in the process of political risk analysis 
and assessment, many of which are American organisations who have a particular 
agenda or bias (many of which are highlighted throughout Chapter 6). To try and 
deal with this problem and to always try and place the data collected in some sort of 
context, it is rare that a single database is used for a particular stage of the model 
developed in Chapter 7. Indeed, the model developed has a number of process stages, 
any of which can stand alone in terms of political risk assessment, but which allows 
for each model process stage to be compared and contrasted with each other. This 
means that not only are different databases used, but so are different types of data 
utilised and contrasted. Finally, it is also emphasised that it is important to explore the 
nature of the organisation who provide the data to constantly try and put the 
information into a proper perspective.  
The notion of ethnocentricity is often cited or couched in negative terms, but it is 
possible to try and flip the perspective to see how a degree of ethnocentricity can be 
an advantage to a business organisation. The crucial first stage of a risk process is 
highlighted in Chapter 4, was the need to contextualise the process in relation to the 
organisation itself and their key clients. In relation to the latter point, this also relates 
to aspects of marketing, which is not about advertising, but about designing goods and 
services which meet client needs and wants (discussed in Chapter 2). To recognise 
aspects of how the model may be ethnocentric, means it is can help an operator get 
into the mind set of their clients and how they may perceive the risks of travel to a 
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destination. This is not a justification for ignorance, rather that operators should try 
and understand clients perceptions. 
5.7 Ethical considerations 
Although this section on ethics is relatively brief, this should not detract from its 
importance, as a number of ethical issues helped shape the methods utilised. One 
particularly important issue related to aspects of copyright for the many commercial 
risk assessments and databases utilised. Initially this was seen as a problem, as the 
intention was to replicate these models to test their accuracy. In the end however, this 
proved less of an issue, as a deeper exploration of the models revealed many 
ambiguities which would conspire against their effective application, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. The result is that the direction of analysis switched from using the variety 
of commercial, closed models, to using open databases which provide form of risk 
assessment.  
The other key ethical tension set up in this work primarily related to what was said to 
the organisations and respecting the confidentiality of the information they provided. 
To do this every endeavour was made to explain what was being asked for and why. 
If any of the data was used from the organisation then permission was sought to use 
their comments in this work.  
Perhaps the most important ethical issue related to the work done with XCL.  It was 
not the intention to do the risk assessment for XCL, rather that a parallel form of 
assessment was conducted, with XCL maintaining the responsibility for conducting 
its own assessment. There was still the possibility that as part of my early analysis, 
information could be found which could be of help to the organisation. The question 
was whether this should be passed on? On the one hand it could affect the 
comparative analysis of my approach compared with that of XCL, as I may have 
influenced it. There is also the problem that I could expose myself to issues of liability 
if I gave them poor advice. The stance taken was that if additional information was 
found which could reduce negative risks to the people and organisation, then this 
would be passed on, but it would not be framed as advice, or any specific 
recommendations. This was done a number of times, such as providing them with 
some data and links on terrorism, or informing them of the value subscribing to the 
    135 
various bulletin services provided by the different governments, not only for Ethiopia, 
but also for its neighbours. This seemed an appropriate moral choice, as not wanting 
the expedition to come to any harm outweighed the need for a truly objective 
comparative analysis. 
5.8 Chapter summary 
The key paradigm and theoretical perspectives taken in this work can be understood 
as falling into the inter-paradigm debate where merits or truths are seen in all the 
many perspectives which can be used to understand global politics and risk 
management. The desire is not to be too hemmed in by a particular paradigm  for 
understanding world politics and risk; for this study it is felt better to have a plurality 
of perspectives. This may sound as a compromise and one that lacks clarity of vision, 
but it is developed for good reason. It is felt necessary for the development of a model 
that strives for practicality and utility in relation to decision making, that there must 
always be a degree of fluidity and openness to new ideas and methods, hence the 
inter-paradigm stance taken.  
The purpose of using many of the theories is to initiate cognition of potential risks and 
how they should be dealt with. By adopting a more neutral position between different 
theories, which accepts a wide variety of divergent schools of thought - such as 
Marxist theory – can mean that the weak signals of change, may be more easily 
identified. In this sense this work takes to heart Tarlow’s (2002, p.211) argument that 
we need to be flexible and be ‘walking academics’ where multiple methods and 
disciplines are constantly used to help act as a guide to a managers actions. As he 
says, it is important to recognise that ‘today’s correct analysis may be tomorrow’s 
incorrect conclusion’ (Tarlow 2002, p.211). The problem of course is that this can 
lead to possible ontological and epistemological contradictions with the work possibly 
not being clearly directed, but at least this problem is recognised, with attempts made 
to manage this issue, such as having stronger leanings in relation to certain theories, 
particularly notions of complexity theory, systems theory and which can have a strong 
skew towards a constructivist ontology, but needs a critical realist epistemology in 
terms of making any risk model operational. 
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In the context of this body of work, the political environment is therefore used as the 
hub of analysis, rather than the only variable examined. Frequently, the analysis of the 
variables used to explain change and what can create political hazards may, on the 
face of it, have seemingly little to do with the political environment; however, it is 
within the spirit of the more creative, expansive ways of understanding risks, that an 
open mind is kept as to the causality of events. The attempt will therefore be made to 
develop a more contemporary risk political model relevant for tourism, which 
considers the many variables and their interconnectedness. This is examined in the 
next two chapters. 
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Chapter 6 
Too many black swans? Findings, analysis and 
discussion of existing political risk models, 
indicators and databases  
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter has two crucial elements. In the first instance it examines the experience 
of various adventure tour operators and the value of using a number of established 
political risk models and databases in the risk management process (Section 6.2). In 
the second, the work focuses on the factors, indicators and databases that can be 
utilised when analysing and assessing political hazards and risks. This part of the 
Chapter, in turn has three key sub-sections based around the categorisation of output 
(Section 6.3), process (Section 6.4) and input (Section 6.5) factors and indicators. 
This categorisation is based on the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4, whereby the 
anatomy of political risk was clarified by adapting a systems theory approach (see 
also Diagram 3.1). 
Having all these sections means that this is a long chapter, as there is so much data to 
reflect upon, but which is crucial in the achievement of a number of the thesis 
objectives, examining the assertions raised and the fulfilment of the aim. It does this 
by acting as a key platform for the model developed in Chapter 7. In order to make 
this chapter more ‘digestible’, each of the key sections identified will be treated as 
separate papers, whereby the findings will be highlighted, analysed and the 
implications discussed. Interspersed throughout this discussion are a number of 
figures, based on the thirty case study countries examined, which highlight the key 
tourism trends, events and the political system classification. When looking at these 
patterns of tourism it should be appreciated that it is the patterns, or the rhythm of 
arrivals in response to political events that is of most interest, rather than the relative 
size of the markets. 
When reading this chapter, it is also worthwhile reflecting on the work of Taleb. In his 
book Fooled by Randomness (2004), he gives a very readable account of a 
fundamental problem with financial speculation on the stock markets: the over-
reliance on complex models based on the statistical analysis of past events. To help 
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illustrate the difficulty, Taleb uses J.S. Mill’s black swan analogy, which was 
developed to try and encapsulate Hume’s theory on the problem with induction: that 
no amount of observations of white swans can allow the inference that all swans are 
white, but the observation of a single black swan is sufficient to refute the conclusion. 
(Taleb 2004, p.117). Simply put, the over-reliance on past observations often resulted 
in people and organisations being caught out by the unexpected event – the black 
swan if you like – which had not been previously observed. There are two reasons for 
highlighting this. The first is that it reminds one of the dangers of being too 
deterministic in utilising theories, or models in making management decisions. The 
second relates to the problems found when observing tourism patterns and looking for 
connections, correlations and possible factors of causation in political events and their 
impact on tourism flows. The difficulty was that just as a generalization was being 
constructed between variables and indicators, then one of those analogous black swan 
would come steaming into the gaze of the observer. To begin with this was 
frustrating. On longer reflection what became clear was that it was these differences 
that are of such importance to this study. When reading the results then, it is of 
interest to note the case study countries that assume the role of the black swan and 
confound one’s expectations. 
6.2 Examining the value of existing risk practices, political risk 
assessments and databases: findings, analysis and discussion  
This section focuses on the value of the many existing political/country risk models 
and databases identified in Chapter 4, Section 4.2, which can, in theory, provide a 
ready made assessment of a variety of political and country risks. The need for this 
was clarified in Chapter 1, whereby a key thesis objective was to assess the value of 
existing political risk models and assessments, along with the assertions that many 
existing political risk assessments are not sufficiently contextualised for the needs of 
tourism. Although many government travel advice sites – with the exception of New 
Zealand – do not explicitly use a language of risk, what they provide in terms of 
advice and analysis is clearly a form of risk assessment, hence their inclusion and 
discussion with the more widely recognised existing risk assessments. This also 
means that the assertion made that they lack subtlety can be critically analysed. 
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6.2.1 Analysing the operators’ experience of political hazards  
In Chapter 5, Section 5.5, it was highlighted that the method which evolved for 
collecting data from tourism operators was relatively simple, being based around 
talking to operators at various adventure travel shows, then following this up with 
three simple questions sent via email and a request for a sample risk assessment, if, of 
course, one had been carried out (the content analysis on the risk assessments is 
discussed in Section 6.2.3). In Table 6.1 a summary of the content analysis based on 
two of the questions is presented.  
Table 6 .1 Content analysis summary of responses to questions 
 Number of references to key events affecting 
operations 
Number of references made 
to foreign office usefulness 
Content  
Analysis 
Summary 
Terrorism (15 references, with 11 specific 
mentions of 9/11); War and instability (12 
references focusing on Iraq, Ethiopia, Nepal, 
India and Pakistan); Disease and natural disasters 
references (10 references including the Tsunami, 
foot and mouth, bird flu and SARS); government  
policies and regulation references (5 references 
including USA/UK Foreign policy and the war on 
terrorism); Fuel prices  (2  references); 
Assassination (1 reference); Kidnapping (1 
reference); political problems (1 reference). 
Don’t use it (8 references); 
Very useful (2 references); 
Limited use (7 references); 
Not useful (4 references); 
Consultation and adherence 
necessary for insurance (4 
references); Alarmist (2 
references); Too general/not 
region specific (1 references). 
Source: Primary data collected by the author (see Appendix E for the summary of the content 
analysis) 
The first comment to make is that it tends to be more significant events, such as war, 
acts of terrorism, disease, natural disasters and policy initiatives, which are recorded 
by the organisations as having the biggest impact on their operations. This is perhaps 
not that surprising, as it tends to be the more dramatic events that are easiest to recall 
first. What was of far more interest were the small additional ‘slithers’ of qualitative 
information, or incidental details given by many of the organisations (a rationale for 
the method), as this often gave a far greater insight into the problems experienced by 
operators and notions of complexity theory, particularly in relation to the issue of 
conflict overspill. 
In Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2, Howell et al (1994, p.79) and Goldstone et al (2005, 
p.22) highlighted the critical importance of the ‘bad neighbours’ factor and how 
conflicts and problems can spill over a country’s borders. Obviously, this can result in 
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many hazards, such as border incursions, land mines or displaced people, but in 
relation to tourism demand, what can be more devastating is how one country’s 
problems are projected onto another (also discussed in Chapter 2), which can have 
little grounding on the actual reality of the risks posed. There were many examples 
found to illustrate this problem. Travelpak for example, commented on how they felt 
the media would blur the Afghanistan conflict with Pakistan, which they said skews 
people’s perceptions of the risks of travel to Pakistan. Panoramic Journeys 
commented on how their tours to Mongolia seemed to be affected by the 2003 SARS 
outbreak in other Asian countries, which is also illustrated by Figure 6.1, even though 
the disease did not directly affect Mongolia.  
Figure 6.1 Tourism trends and key events for Mongolia 
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Source: WTO (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006) 
Freedom 
House 
Classification 
2005–Free 
2004–Free 
2003–Free 
2002–Free 
2001–Free 
2000–Free 
1999–Free 
1998–Free 
1997–Free 
 
 
 
Key events 
1993 First direct presidential elections. 
1996 No significant events seem to explain the drop in tourism. Parliamentary elections. 
1997 Presidential elections. 
2000 Parliamentary elections (MRP won 72 of 76 seats) May 2001 presidential elections. Problems 
with drought, poverty, famine and corruption helped MPRP win landslide election. 
2001 IMF low interest loan to tackle poverty.  
2003 No significant events within Mongolia, but SARS and Bali bomb seemed to affect tourism. 
2004 New parliament marred by allegations of violations and irregularities. Coalition government 
formed.  
2005 Protests in capital demanding resignation of government and an end to poverty. 
Other operators, such as BOAB (Africa based) and Imaginative Traveller (tours to all 
continents), commented that in 2002 the growing threat of the war in Iraq seemed to 
be a key factor holding down demand for that year, but adding that once the war 
actually started, this seemed to reduce uncertainty, with more people willing to book 
tours again, resulting in 2003 being one of their busiest years. A more complex form 
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of overspill is illustrated by Icicle Mountaineering, who noted that although many of 
their operations are overseas, such as their tours to the Alps, the 2003 UK Foot and 
Mouth crisis affected them as it meant that they could not organise the climbing 
training weekends in the UK national parks, because of the Government’s decision to 
restrict access to the countryside.   
The other key finding was how the type of organisation and clients can affect the risk 
exposure; a theme previously raised in Chapters 2 and 4. For example, the political 
problems in Nepal over the years meant that a number of operators, such as Spirit of 
Adventure, Wilderness Journeys and Across the Divide, were forced to cancel trips 
and expeditions. Others, such as Himalayan Kingdom and The Walking and Trekking 
Company, who are specialist companies to the region, still managed to maintain their 
demand (sometimes increase it) despite many political problems and travel warnings. 
Looking at Figure 6.2 one can clearly see tourism demand fluctuate in response to 
both internal difficulties, such as riots, demonstrations, terrorist activity and external 
events, such as SARS and the Bali bomb, but tourism by no mean collapses. For some 
companies, such as The Walking and Trekking Company and Himalayan Kingdoms, 
their ability to maintain demand illustrates that their clients exhibit greater resilience, 
or inelasticity, to events. * The fact that demand does fluctuate in relation to events 
also helps illustrate the value of a fourth age paradigm, whereby both negative and 
positive political events are scanned for; something both Spirit of Adventure and 
Himalaya Kingdom noted in relation to the perceived improvement in the political 
situation in 2007 which resulted in many more enquiries about trips. 
Another interesting illustration of the type of client responding differently to events 
was found with Across the Divide, who noted that 9/11 resulted in many trip 
cancellations, with the exception of their charity events, which was probably a 
reflection of the different stake (see Diagram 2.1, in Chapter 2) invested by these 
clients in relation to both physical resources and emotional commitment. Finally, 
Wilderness Journeys commentated how instability in the Himalayan region seemed to 
lead to a significant increase in their South American trekking and climbing 
                                                 
*
 One comment given as an aside by a visitor at one of the adventure shows, whilst interviewing a tour 
operator, was that if they had paid ‘30,000 bucks’ to climb Everest, then it would take more than a 
curfew to deter them from travelling. Whilst this comment was not recorded as part of a formal 
interview, it can be these more spontaneous comments or asides that can be far more revealing about 
demand and motivation. 
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destinations, which illustrates that demand for travel is not necessarily reduced, but 
often just diverted elsewhere. 
 Figure 6.2 Tourism trends and key events for Nepal 
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Source: WTO (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006) 
Freedom House 
Classification  
2005-Not free 
2004-Not free 
2003-Partly free 
2002-Partly free 
2001-Partly free 
2000-Partly free 
1999-Partly free 
1998-Partly free 
1997-Partly free 
 
Key events 
1994 New elections and communist government formed. 
1995 Communist government dissolved. 
1997 PM loses vote of no confidence. 
2000 GP Koirala returns as Prime Minister. 
2001 King and family killed by Crown Prince. Maoist end truce/step up campaign. State of emergency. 
2002 Parliament dissolved and new elections postponed. 
2003 Rebels declare ceasefire. Everest anniversary. 
2004 Prime Minister resigns. 
2005 King assumes direct power/state of emergency lifted. 
2006 Parliament votes to curtail King’s power. Talks with Maoists. Peace deal signed. 
2007 Maoist join govt. 3 bomb attacks in Katmandu. 
 
6.2.2 The experience of operators with governmental travel advice  
To help test the assertion made that government travel advice lacked subtlety as an 
indicator of risk, operators were asked a simple, open question about how useful they 
found it. The results of their basic responses can be found in Table 6.1, in the 
previous section. Those operators who responded by saying that they did not use it, 
stated this because either their operations may have been predominantly based in the 
UK, or they were operating in perceived safe destinations, such as Whale Watching in 
the Azores, or Panoramic Journeys (Mongolia based). Most operators, however, seem 
to recognise the importance of consulting and adhering to governmental advice, as 
ignoring it can negate insurance policies, or expose an organisation, or individual to 
litigation and reputational risks. Kumulka and Ontdek also comment on the advice 
having profound affects on demand, such as their experience in Kenya in 2003, after a 
terrorist attack, which the UK FCO responded to by advising against all travel to the 
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country. The operators felt this advice was disproportionate to the actual risks of 
future terrorist attacks. Go See Kenya (GSK) also commented on this lack of 
proportion in advice for the problems in Kenya in 2007, whereby they felt the advice 
was issued for the whole country, whilst they believed the problems were 
geographically concentrated, with their operations located in areas unaffected by the 
troubles. 
This problem of the advice distorting the level of risk by being too broad was also 
noted by a number of other operators, such as Bushmasters, Himalayan Kingdom, 
TravelPak and Wild Rose Adventures.* Indeed, Hinterland Travel, a small tour 
operator that has years of experience running tours to Iraq and Afghanistan 
commented that the travel advice is just that – advice. As a consequence they have 
found themselves in a position whereby they have chosen to ignore the advice, feeling 
that their own assessments of the risks of travel to particular areas is more refined than 
the government’s. Another interesting comment made by two of the operators (Travel 
Pak and Great Walks) was that whilst the advice can be updated very quickly in 
response to events, in relation to reducing the travel warning status, this can seem to 
take much longer, even though the crisis may have passed.†   
An insight into why some of the problems are experienced by operators can be found 
by looking at the advice methodology by the UK FCO. Jack Straw (2004) presenting a 
review to Parliament on government Travel Advice, explained that the advice tries to 
strike a balance between information on travel risks, issuing warnings (such as for 
terrorism) and actually proscribing travel actions. Whilst the information has a basic, 
broad standard format, how the warnings and proscriptions on travel are arrived at 
have many normative elements to them. As Straw (2004, p.27) notes, the assessments 
constructed are not an exact science, but judgements based on incomplete 
information, which is informed by a variety of organisations, such as the Joint 
Terrorism, Analysis Centre (JTAC), the Counter Terrorism Policy Department 
(CPTD), and the individual consulates. It is then down to individual consulates to 
                                                 
*
 What cannot be conveyed here was the palpable sense of frustration evident with people when they 
were being interviewed, with some of the aside comments made suggesting it could be alarmist or was 
scaremongering. 
†
 This may reflect the principle of CYA! Madeleine Albright (2001) the former US Secretary of State 
to Clinton, used the term CYA principle, which is an acronym for Cover Your Ass, and means that 
governmental departments will err on the side of caution. 
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update and present the information, which, even though there is a broad template, can 
still mean many variations can appear in some areas, as will be illustrated in more 
detail in the next section. Despite these problems, and the frustrations which may be 
generated, consultation of government travel advice is essential, gaining further 
importance by being one of the stipulations in the BS 8848: 2007 standard (British 
Standards Institute 2007) for overseas expeditions. 
6.2.3 Comparative analysis of government travel advice 
Whilst the previous section findings of the operators’ experiences seem to lend 
support to the preliminary assertion made in Chapter 1, that government travel advice 
lacks subtlety, this still requires further scrutiny. Care must be taken in interpreting 
these results from the operators, as they may not present a properly balanced picture 
of the advice given. This could be because of sample selection bias, or even that the 
organisations may simply not be properly interpreting the advice. Furthermore, the 
organisations were asked primarily about the UK FCO as a majority of the operators 
selected were UK based operations – the implication of this is that one cannot 
necessarily say that all government sites are ‘blunt’ tools in the assessment of risks, 
rather that it may just be the UK. 
In order to put the operators’ comments of the value of the UK FCO advice into a 
better sense of perspective it is useful to examine in more detail the information 
offered by the key English language governmental advice sites identified in Chapter 
5 (UK FCO, the USA SD, ADFA, CFAIT and the NZMFA), which give guidance for 
actions, assessments of various hazards, or specific information on actual incidents.  
As stated in Chapter 5, this was done by taking a snapshot of the advice issued for 
June and October 2007 and conducting a content analysis that focused on four key 
themes, which were:   
• the assessment scales used (if at all);  
• the opening first sentence (and sometimes second if it helps clarify the first 
sentence) of the travel advice section; 
•  to identify all the listed hazards/risks;  
• and to note any additional advice on travel. 
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A summary of the categorisation of the advice issued by the different governments for 
the case study countries is presented Table 6.2. Despite the variations in scales used, 
one can discern four key areas of risk advice which are essentially based around: 
• Advising against all travel to all parts of a country; 
•  or advising against non-essential travel to all parts of a country 
• advising against all travel to parts of a country; 
•  or advising against non-essential travel to parts of a country. 
When examining and comparing the advice, insights were soon gained as to why 
some operators could become frustrated. Often, the sites can issue advice that 
becomes very standardised and formulaic, with the result that after repeated exposure 
to the advice for different countries, they are soon robbed of their power to convey a 
proper sense of the risks. The Australian site can be particularly prone to this, as the 
generic advice given on watching wildlife illustrates, saying:  
“Australians are strongly advised to maintain a safe and legal distance when 
observing wildlife. You should use only reputable and professional guides or 
tour operators and closely follow park regulations and warden’s advice.” 
(ADFA 2007) 
This advice is the same for such environmentally diverse countries as Cambodia, 
Egypt, Cuba, Iraq *and Zimbabwe.
                                                 
*
 Which does at least have the additional statement of saying ‘Iraq is not suitable for tourism.’ 
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Table 6.2 Comparing government assessment scales and travel advice (June 
2007) for case study countries 
 1  2 3 4 5 
U
K
 
 
No Travel Warning 
Bulgaria, Cambodia 
Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, 
Burma, Mongolia,  
Nepal, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, 
Cambodia, Turkey, 
South Africa. 
Advice against all 
travel  but essential 
travel to parts of the 
country 
  India, Indonesia, 
Libya, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Israel. 
Advice against all but 
essential travel 
Afghanistan (Kabul), 
Haiti, Lebanon. 
Advice against all 
travel to parts of the 
country 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, Iran, India, 
Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka. 
Advice against all 
travel to country 
 
Somalia only country 
listed. 
U
SA
 
 
 
No Travel Warning 
Bulgaria, 
Cambodia 
Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Cuba (Note 
restrictions), Ethiopia, 
India, 
Libya 
Burma, New Zealand, 
Norway, Turkey, 
Thailand. 
Public 
Announcements   
Venezuela, South 
Africa, Zimbabwe.  
Travel warnings 
Lebanon, Iran, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, 
Afghanistan, Israel 
Left Bank and Gaza, 
Haiti, Pakistan, Iraq, 
Indonesia. 
  
A
u
st
ra
lia
 
Be alert to own 
security 
Bulgaria, 
Croatia, New Zealand, 
Norway. 
Exercise caution 
Cambodia, 
Cuba, Libya, Burma,  
Mongolia. 
High degree of 
caution 
Egypt, India, Iran,  
Israel, Nepal, South 
Africa, Turkey, Burma. 
Reconsider 
the need to travel 
Haiti, Indonesia, 
Lebanon, Sri Lanka, 
Ethiopia, Pakistan. 
 
Regional: Egypt, 
India, and Turkey.  
Strongly advise not to 
travel 
Afghanistan, India 
Regional: 
Burma, Iran, Iraq, 
Ethiopia, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Venezuela, India, 
Indonesia. 
N
ew
 
 
Ze
al
an
d 
 
No Travel Warning 
Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cuba 
Libya, 
Mongolia, Nepal, New 
Zealand, Norway. 
Some Risk – 
Countries or parts of 
countries we advise 
caution 
Cambodia, Costa Rica, 
Egypt, Ethiopia (Addis 
Abada), Zimbabwe, 
Egypt, Pakistan, South 
Africa, Afghanistan, 
Zimbabwe, Israel, 
Spain, Turkey, UK, 
Burma. 
High Risk  
Advice against non-
essential travel or 
parts of…  
Libya border areas 
with Chad Niger & 
Sudan, Turkey border 
areas with Iraq, 
Lebanon. 
Extreme Risk -  
Advise against all 
travel to country or 
parts of… 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia 
border areas with 
Eritrea, Somalia, 
Gambella region, Iraq, 
Israel (Gaza & West 
Bank), Haiti, Iran 
border areas, Lebanon, 
India (regions), 
Indonesia, Iran region. 
 
 
Ca
n
ad
a 
No official warning: 
Exercise normal 
security precautions 
Bulgaria, 
Cambodia 
Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Cuba, Egypt 
Mongolia, New 
Zealand, Norway. 
 
Exercise high degree 
of caution (to all 
country or region) 
Ethiopia, Thailand, 
Libya.  
Avoid non-essential 
travel 
(to all country or 
region) 
Haiti, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Haiti, Lebanon. 
Avoid all travel 
(to all country or 
region) 
Iraq, Afghanistan 
 
Specified Regions: 
Indonesia, Israel (West 
Bank & Gaza), Sri 
Lanka, Ethiopia, 
Burma, Haiti, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Israel 
West Bank, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, Thailand, 
Venezuela. 
 
Source: UK FCO (2007), USA SD (2007), ADFA (2007), NZ MFA (2007) and CFAIT ( 2007).       
In relation to the level of warnings given on travelling to different countries, there are 
some interesting, subtle variations. One example is Afghanistan, where the advice 
given by Australia, Canada, and New Zealand is to avoid all travel to country, whilst 
the UK is more refined in that it uses this category only for parts of the country, with 
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the advice to Kabul being related to the lower risk classification of essential travel. 
This type of variation in advice is also evident for Iraq. For other countries, they may 
receive no travel warning classification with the UK, USA* and Canadian sites, but 
receive a slightly higher warning categorisation from Australia and New Zealand, as 
illustrated by advice given for Cambodia, Egypt and Indonesia. Indeed Indonesia is 
particularly interesting, as the advice is notably more cautious from Australia and 
New Zealand, advising that all travel should be reconsidered, or recommended 
against travelling, which extends to Bali, whilst for the UK and Canada they advise 
against travelling only to specified regions, which is perhaps a reflection of the high 
number of Australian and New Zealand casualties suffered in the Bali bomb of 2002.  
This type of bias or skew sometimes seems to be more a direct reflection of the state 
of political relations. The USA SD and the advice and descriptions given on Cuba is 
one of the most striking examples, where more emotive language is often used, 
opening with the statement of ‘Cuba is a totalitarian police state;’ a descriptor that not 
even North Korea or Myanmar are given. Another interesting example relates to 
Nepal, where the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand removed, or lowered their 
travel warning assessments in 2007, whilst for the USA the Travel Warning remained 
in place, commenting that violence, exhortation and abductions were continuing and 
advising to ‘avoid non-essential travel.’ This may perhaps reflect the mixed influence 
of the War on Terrorism policy and the history of fighting the old, traditional 
communist enemy which dominated American foreign policy for decades.  
Inconsistencies with the travel advice are observable in other areas. For example, for 
Mongolia and Bulgaria, the opening advice summary section begins with the generic 
statement of the ‘underlying threat from terrorism,’ yet these countries have hardly 
experienced any form of terrorism over the years. In contrast, for Israel, which has 
experienced numerous acts of terrorism, the opening statement is ‘Most visits to Israel 
are trouble free.’ (See Section 6.5 for a more detailed discussion on terrorism). Why 
this is the case is far from clear, but it can have important implications in the 
perceptions of the travel risks to a country. 
                                                 
*
 The USA SD approach to framing travel advice is perhaps the least refined and formulaic, often 
having a stronger narrative element, and having only two basic travel warning categories; Travel 
Warnings and Public Announcements, with Public Announcements often reflecting particular 
hazardous events which emerge, such as hurricanes or disease outbreaks, but which do not necessarily 
affect the overall risk of travelling to the country. 
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Although many operators may complain about the UK FCO advice being over 
cautious, it is interesting to note that it is often not as cautious in comparison with 
other advice sites. Furthermore, although the assertion made that government advice 
can be broad, often too generic, and so lack subtlety, does have some validity, perhaps 
what is not always appreciated by some operators are the strengths of the sites. Yes 
the sites do suffer from a prudential type approach, where the advice can become 
insipid and lack any geographic connection; yet they also offer a very useful bulletin 
service, allowing for organisations to be constantly updated with changes in advice 
and events, which are particularly important when building a frequency profile of 
hazardous events (see Section 6.5). The limitations can also be ameliorated by 
consulting and subscribing to all the bulletin services, which can allow for a process 
of triangulation of the occurrence of hazardous events, which can, indeed should, 
extend to getting the bulletins for neighbouring countries. 
6.2.4 Comparing non-open and open political and country risk         
assessments with tourism patterns  
One of the stated objectives of this work was to examine a range of existing political 
risk models and their relevance to tourism. Part of the answer was already anticipated 
with the assertion made at the beginning of the study that these models do not seem 
sufficiently contextualised; a view that is readily accepted by many involved in the 
industry, such as by Howell (2001, p.10), who stresses how different models can 
combine different techniques, use different variables and data, which can produce 
different forecasts, relevant for different industries. Clearly this anticipates the 
findings, but it is still important to explore some of the structured models in more 
detail to examine the validity of this claim.   
The risk models examined here were primarily ‘open’ with the exception of the fee 
paying ICRG and the PRS models, with the rationale for selection discussed in 
Chapter 5. These are scrutinised first. PRS was established in 1979, with the ICRG 
approach launched in 1980, initially as a competitor to the PRS group, but later 
merging into the same group (the PRS Group). The PRS approach adopts more of a 
micro, actor-source method of assessment, focusing primarily on three different 
regime scenarios used for both an eighteen month and five year forecast. These 
scenarios are then considered in relation to the impact they could have on a variety of 
factors such as turmoil, or economic growth. In contrast, the ICRG approach (used in 
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Box 4.1 in Chapter 4) is a macro, positivistic type model, whereby twelve composite 
factors are rated, which contributes to a summative political risk value. This political 
risk score itself is one of the four factors which are used for an overall country risk 
assessment. For the ICRG data a ‘snapshot’ value was obtained by taking the political 
risk score for the month of January over a number of years (the scores are up-dated 
every month which is one of the strengths of the services). The limitation was that not 
all the case study countries have risk data compiled for them (hence Afghanistan and 
Cambodia’s exclusion), whilst for the PRS model, this lack of availability also 
extended to Croatia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Mongolia and Nepal. 
In Table 6.3 the average risk values produced by the ICRG between the dates of 
2000-2005, are compared with the average percentage change in tourism arrivals for 
the same period, with a small number having to use data just for 2000-2004 because 
of the lack of available data. The expectation was that countries in a ‘high’ or ‘very 
high’ risk category would have experienced a decline in demand. In fact this is true 
only to a point, such as with Haiti or Zimbabwe, whereby the high risk score is 
reflected in the roller coaster patterns of tourism, further illustrated in Figures 6.3 and 
6.4.    
Table 6.3 Comparing the average ICRG risk scores with average tourism growth 
(2000 to 2005) 
Risk Rating Average Annual Tourism 
Growth 
Average Annual Tourism 
Decline 
Very High Risk 
(0.0 – 49.9) 
Pakistan (2000-04 - 3.9%), Myanmar, 
(2000-04 - 3.9%), Indonesia (2000-04 
- 1.2% ). 
Haiti (2000-04 - 9.0 %), Iraq 
(no tourism data), Zimbabwe 
(200-05 - 4.5%). 
High Risk (50-
59.9) 
Ethiopia (2000-05 -17% ), India 
(2000-04 - 6.9% growth), Iran ( 2000-
04 - 5.4% ), Sri Lanka (2000-04 -
9.1% ), Venezuela (2000-04 - 1.2%). 
 
Moderate Risk 
(60-69.9) 
Cuba (2000-04 - 3.7%), Egypt (2000-
05 - 10% growth), Lebanon (2000-05 
- 9%), Libya (2000 -05 - 2%), South 
Africa (2000-05 - 4.6%), Turkey 
(2000-05 16.2 %). 
Israel (2000-05 - 4.7). 
Low Risk (70-
79.9) 
Bulgaria (2000-05 11.7% ), Costa 
Rica (2000-04 - 7.5% ), Croatia 
(2000-05 - 7.7%), Thailand (2000-04 
- 5.2% ). 
 
Very Low Risk 
(80-100)  
New Zealand (2000-04 - 7.1%), 
Norway (2000-05 - 4.5%), UK (2000-
05 - 3.5 % ), Spain  (2000-05 - 3% ). 
 
Source: PRS Group (2007) and average annual growth rates for tourism from WTO (2006). 
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In other instances, one can see countries (the black swans if you like) that can still 
continue to experience growth, such as Ethiopia (See also Chapter 7) or India (see 
the later Figure 6.10), despite appearing in a high-risk category. There are also 
instances where there is an inverse pattern of the risk scores and tourism arrivals. For 
example, Pakistan (see Figure 6.5) whilst its tourism declined in 2001, with respect to 
2000 levels, it then dramatically increased in 2004 and 2005. Yet throughout this 
period it was placed in the very high-risk category, albeit with a borderline score of 50 
in 2004. The link between the risk values and tourism patterns is variable to say the 
least.  
Figure 6.3 Tourism trends and key events for Haiti 
Haiti
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
Year
Ar
riv
al
s
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2000–Partly Free 
1999–Partly Free 
1998–Partly Free 
1997–Partly Free 
 
 
 
Key events 
1994 Military relinquish power. 
1995 UN peacekeepers replace US troops. 
1996 Preval becomes president. 
1997 Government in deadlock. 
1999 Preval rules by decree. 
2000 Astride elected for 2nd term. 
2001 Coup attempt. 
2004 Rebels seize town. Severe floods. UN peacekeepers arrive/ More floods thousands die. Rising violence 
2005 Rebel leader killed. Hurricane Dennis. 
2006 General elections Preval wins. New government.  
2007 UN launch campaign to control violence. 
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Figure 6.4 Tourism trends and key events for Zimbabwe 
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Key events 
 1998 Economic crisis. 
1999 Economic crisis persists. 
2000 Squatters seize white farms. Elections and flight of opposition parties. 
2001 Defence Minister dies in a car crash. 
2002 Laws restricting media freedom. Mugabe re-elected. Severe floods. Farmers forced to leave farms. Land grab. 
2003 General strike. Opposition leaders attacked.  
2004 More attacks on opposition leaders. 
2005 Rigged elections/ Shanty dwellings destroyed. Zanu-PF party wins. 
2006 Riot police disrupt anti government fans. 
2007 Rallies banned. Power cuts. 
 Figure 6.5 Tourism trends and key events for Pakistan 
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Source: WTO (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006) 
Freedom House 
Classification: 
2005 –Not Free 
2004 –Not Free 
2003–Not Free 
2002–Not Free 
2001–Not Free 
2000–Not Free 
1999–Partly Free 
1998–Partly Free 
1997–Partly Free 
 
Key events 
1996 President Leghari dismisses Bhutto. 
1997 Sharif returns as PM. 
1998 Nuclear tests. 
1999 India clash in Kargil. Military coup. 
2000 Sharif sentenced to life imprisonment – goes into exile. 
2001 Musharraf names himself as president. Summit with India. Supports USA who lifts sanctions. Fighting in 
Kashmir. Tensions increase after Indian parliament bombed. 
2002 Elections announced. Suicide bombings in Karachi. Missile tests. Tensions with India. 2003 Senate elections. 
Kashmir ceasefire. 
2004 Creation of military Security council. Readmitted to Commonwealth. Military offensive in Afghanistan.  
2005.Improved Kashmir relationships. Earthquake in Kashmir. 
2006 Suicide bombings. Raid on Islamic seminary. Test firing of missiles. 
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With the PRS approach, the expectation was that countries experiencing high turmoil 
would see patterns of decline, or stagnation. In fact the picture is again mixed. The 
PRS assessments for a number of case study countries can be found in Appendix H. 
Countries such as Israel (see also Figure 6. 8), Haiti (see also Figure 6.3), Venezuela 
and Zimbabwe (see also Figure 6.4) all receive high turmoil ratings which matched 
with the rollercoaster pattern of decline and fall. Yet there are again exceptions to this 
pattern. For India and Pakistan, both the 18-month and 5 year forecast received ‘high 
turmoil ratings’, but despite some tourism downturns, they still experienced overall 
tourism growth. Iran (also see Figure 6. 6) is another interesting example, whereby its 
high turmoil rating score, since 2002, is not reflected in the tourism pattern of steady 
growth. Despite the mixed results, the advantage of using the PRS model is that it 
gives a different view of the hazards and risk that the political environment can 
generate. For example, for Cuba (See figure 6.7), whilst the ICRG places it in the 
high end of a modest risk category, in terms of the turmoil rating, for the 
corresponding period it tends to be given a low turmoil rating.   
 Figure 6.6 Tourism trends and key events for Iran 
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Key events 
1995 US oil and trade sanctions. 
1997 Mohammad Khatami wins presidential election (reformist). 
1998 Tensions with Afghanistan. 
1999 Pro democracy student demonstrations. 
2000 Liberals win control of parliament. Press restrictions. 
2001 Khatami re-elected as president. 
2002 Declared part of the axis of evil. 
2003 Student protests. 
2004 Conservatives regain control. 
2005 Nuclear crisis.  
2006 Bomb attacks Nuclear crisis continues. 
2007 Protests erupt as government imposes fuel rationing More USA sanctions. 
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In addition to these fee paying databases there are a number of useful open databases, 
which provide political and country risk assessments. Whilst a wide variety were 
scrutinised, as highlighted in Chapter 4, Section 4.2 and Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1,  
the following databases are the only ones discussed as many of the others proved to be 
of little relevancy:  
• Coface: This was set up by the French government in 1946 to deal with credit 
trading risk for all industries. As part of the credit insurance service they 
provide a country risk rating and assessment report based on a 7-point scale, 
with 1 (low risk) to 7 (high risk), which also uses letters to reflect the risks. 
• Office National  Ducroire-Delcredere Country Risks (ONDD): This agency 
is a Belgium based NGO which focuses on providing country risk assessments 
and insurance cover relating to credit risks.  
• EKN: This is the Swedish based agency (equivalent to ONND) designed to 
provide insurance cover for export transactions. They produce short and long 
term summative country risk assessment using a 7 point scale.  
• Centre for International Development and Conflict Management 
(CIDCM): This organisation produces the Peace and Conflict Reports, which 
gives an assessment of global conflicts, providing an interesting forecast on 
the risk of future turmoil for individual countries. 
Table 6.5 presents the summative assessment scores from the different organisational 
databases for the case study countries, together with any travel warning issued by 
governments (also see Section 6.3.1), and the general direction of tourism arrivals 
(velocity) based on the 2000 to 2005 average growth/decline rates. Whilst for some 
countries the high-risk rating matches up with tourism patterns, such as with 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti, for many others the picture is far less consistent. For 
example Mongolia (see the earlier Figure 6.1) receives some very high risk ratings by 
the ONDD, with the political risk (PMT) score of seven (the highest and most severe 
risk rating); a similar high score is given in the EKNN short and long term 
assessment, whilst for Coface the C score indicates a high risk category. In contrast, 
Mongolia receives no travel warnings, is given a L = Low Risk instability forecast by 
the CIDCM, and has experienced significant tourism growth of over 20% for the 
period, appearing in Mintel’s (2004) top ten fastest growing destinations. Cuba (also 
see Figure 6.7) is another interesting example, where it is given many high risk 
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scores, yet, with the exception of the USA travel advice, there appears no significant 
travel risks, experiencing a steady increase in tourism over the years. In contrast, 
Israel (see Figure 6.8) emerges as a relatively low risk according to these many 
measures, yet this fails to properly convey any sense of how the destination 
attractiveness is affected by both internal and external conflicts. 
 Figure 6.7 Tourism trends and key events for Cuba 
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Key events 
1996 USA embargos permanent. 
1998 Pope John visits. 
1999 Cuban child Elian case. 
2000 USA Congress allows food and medicine to be sold. 
2001 9/11 & Hurricane Michelle. USA exports food to Cuba for first time.  
2002 Last Russian based closed. Constitutional amendment. 
2003 Crackdown on dissidents and EU criticisms of human rights. 
2004 USA further US-Cuba family visit/cash remittances restrictions 
2005 EU resume diplomatic contacts. 
2006 Hurricane Dennis. Castro hospitalized. 
2007 Castro not present at revolution day celebrations. 
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 Table 6.4 Comparison of summative risk assessments for selected risk databases  
(June 2007) 
Country ONDD Coface 
 
EKN ICRG 
2006 
 
CIDCM 
2008 
forecast 
Any 
Travel 
Warnin
gs? 
Tourism 
Velocity 
trends 
(2000-
2005) 
 PST PMT ST War Ex T CR C. R. R C 
ST 
C 
LT 
    
Afghanistan 6 7 6 3 3 6 C D 7  7 NA H Yes, NA 
Bulgaria  1 3 2 1 1 3 C A4 3 3 73 L No  Growth 
Cambodia 6 7 6 3 3 6 C D 7 7 NA H No  Growth 
Costa Rica 2 3 2 1 3 3 B B 3 3 71 L No  Growth 
Croatia 3 4 3 1 1 4 A A4 ? ? 74.5 L No  Growth 
Cuba 6 7 6 4 6 7 C D 7 7 59.5 L Yes 
(USA 
only) 
Growth 
Egypt 2 4 2 3 4 3 C B 4 4 63 M Yes Growth 
Ethiopia 6 7 6 6 5 7 C C 7 7 51 H Yes Growth 
Haiti 6 7 6 6 6 7 C D 3 3 38 H Yes Static 
India  1 3 2 2 3 3 B A3 3 3 64.5 H Yes Growth 
Indonesia 2 5 3 2 5 4 C B 4 4 58 M Yes, Decline 
Iran 4 5 4 5 6 4 C C 4 4 62 L Yes Growth 
Iraq 6 7 6 7 7 7 C D 7 7 35.5 H Yes NA 
Israel 3 3 3 3 2 3 B A4 2 2 64 L Yes Decline 
Lebanon 4 7 5 5 5 7 C C ?  58.5 H Yes Growth 
Libya 2 6 3 3 4 5 C C 5 6 66.6 M No Growth 
Myanmanr 5 7 6 6 6 7 C D 7  7 46.5 M Yes Static 
Mongolia 3 7 4 2 3 6 C C 7 7 na L No Growth 
Nepal 3 7 4 6 4 6 C D 7 7 na M Yes Decline 
New 
Zealand 
1 1 1 1 1 1 B A1 0 0 87.5 L No  Growth 
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 A A1 0 0 89.5 L No  Growth 
Pakistan 2 6 3 5 4 5 C C 5 5 46.5 M Yes Growth 
South 
Africa 
3 3 3 2 2 3 B A3 3 3 70 M Yes Growth 
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 A A1 0 0 79.5 L No  Growth 
Sri Lanka 4 5 4 4 3 4 C B 5 5 53 M Yes Growth 
Turkey 3 5 3 2 2 1 C B 4 5 68 M No  Growth 
Thailand 1 3 1 3 4 2 A A3 3 3 60.5 L Yes Growth 
UK 1 1 1 1 1 1 A A1 0 0 81.5 L No Growth 
Venezuela 4 6 4 4 7 5 C C 6 6 53.5 L Yes Decline 
Zimbabwe 7 7 7 6 7 7 C D 7 7 45 M Yes Decline 
Source: ONDD (2007), Coface (2007), EKN (2007), ICRG (2007), CIDCM sourced from Hewitt et 
al (2008); Lonely Planet sourced from Phillips and Carillet (2006) and  WTO (2006). 
Key: For  ONDD : PST – Political Short Term; PMT – Political medium/long term: ST -Special Transactions; Ex – 
Expropriation; T – Transfer risk; CR – Credit Risks. Green = Normal risk assessment There are no predetermined restrictions on 
the risk assessment or the conditions on which it is based; For EKN - Yellow = Restrictive risk practices   The transaction has to 
satisfy more stringent conditions in EKN’s risk assessment for EKN to guarantee it. Red – Off the cover. Coface CRR – Credit 
Risk Rating. 
One of the weaknesses that appear with all the models is that the assessments 
produced are based on data for the previous year, which can mean the assessments can 
lag behind current developments in a country. * Related to this problem are the risk 
scores sometimes having a retrospective feel to them, whereby they are adjusted to a 
higher/lower risk category after political events. For example, in January 1997 in 
Indonesia, the ICRG risk score was 67, placing it in the Moderate Risk category and 
Suharto still in power, yet later in the year the regime and economy collapsed, 
                                                 
*
 This problem is not quite as evident with the ICRG approach as the scores are updated, but it is 
costly: for an annual subscription to get the monthly ICRG updates for all their selected countries can 
cost between $4,000 to $5,000, but it means a huge database can be accessed. 
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creating political turmoil, resulting in a decline in tourism in 1998. It was only after 
these events that the risk score increases to a higher risk category. Another example 
was Musharraf seizing power in 1999 in Pakistan, after which the risk values changed 
to a higher category in many of the models. This retrospective issue is perhaps not 
quite as problematic in the PRS approach. For example, in relation to Pakistan, 
although they only gave a 10% chance of a military government, or 35% of a 
military/civilian government for time when the Musharraf coup took place, what is 
perhaps just as important is that they at least highlighted it as a possibility, thus acting 
as a useful warning signal. 
 Figure 6.8 Tourism trends and key events for Israel 
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Source: WTO (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006) 
Freedom House 
Classification: 
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Key events 
1995 Rabin assassinated in November stalling peace process. 
1996 Tunnel riots in Old city of Jerusalem. 
1998 No confidence vote for PM Netanyahu. 
2000 Sharon visits Temple Mount and helps ignite riots and violence. 
2001 Sharon forms coalition government. 9/11 had significant impact. 
2002 Coalition collapses. Threat of war in Iraq. 
2003 Talks with PLO and Gaza troop withdrawal (road map) agreed. Sharon wins election. 
2004 Security wall begins construction. Arafat succeeded by Mabu Mazen. 
2005 New elections called/troop withdrawal. 
2006 Soldiers abducted/war in Lebanon re-ignited. Hamas win elections in Palestine. 
What all the models are weak in is reflecting hazards that are generated beyond the 
country’s borders. Israel illustrates this in 2001 and 2002 (see also Figure 6.8) where 
tourism is affected by the conflicts beyond its borders. Bulgaria is another good 
example whereby its tourism patterns were not affected by domestic political events, 
but by the conflict taking place in neighbouring Yugoslavia, as illustrated in Figure 
6.9; yet both countries received low risk scores from the various assessments. This is 
a crucial limitation that needs to be addressed, and which is returned to in Chapter 7. 
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Figure 6.9 Tourism trends and key events for Bulgaria 
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Source: WTO (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2006) 
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Key events 
1996 Economic turmoil. 
1997 Conflict in Yugoslavia. 
2001 King Simeon II wins parliamentary elections. 
2004 Government loses its majority. Admitted into NATO. 
2005 Nationalist party does well in elections. 
6.2.5 Comparing risk assessment scales between existing risk models and 
operator methods 
As part of the project objective on clarifying the language of risk, requests were made 
to operators for sample risk assessments. These were then compared with the variety 
of political risk models identified in Chapter 4. In Table 6.6 the risk assessment 
scales utilised by the various political risk models and operators are presented. 
Although there are clear clusters of favourite scales, what is of more interest is their 
variety and how they are not necessarily restricted to particular subject areas; 
something that again seems to reaffirm the social construction of risk, reflecting how 
scales and descriptors used do not always reflect a vital necessity of the subject field, 
rather received practice and precedents. *   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*
 The various political/country risk models that use the seven point scale, sometimes conveyed as a 
letter grade, reflects the agreement made by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) with which most credit risk agencies adhere. 
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Table 6.5 Frequency of scales used by political risk models and adventure 
operators 
Scale Government and 
consultancies 
Scales 
Operators scales  Pros and Cons of the scales 
No scale  Different Travel, IM Travel, 
Outward Bound, Travel Trek, 
Travel Pak, World Expeditions, 
Wild Earth Adventures 
Pros -Focuses on issues and 
problems not scales.  
Cons - Problem with prioritising. 
1-3 EKN For specific 
factors, NZ MFA, 
CIFP, 
Africa Conservation, Crystal 
Active, Bushmasters, Global 
Visions, Walking and Climbing 
Company, Whale and Dolphin, 
Wilderness Adventures, XCL, 
Oasis overland. 
Pros - Simple and easy to use 
which can be adapted to various 
methods, and commonly utilised. 
Cons – Too simplistic and lacks 
subtlety, with the OGC (2002), 
warning that if too small a scale 
is used, such as a three-point 
scale, it may be difficult to 
decide which are the most 
significant risks which need 
attention. 
1-4  BERI, GM, PRS, 
WFB 
 
Adventure Bound, GSK. Pros – More refined categories. 
Cons – less common than other 
scales and so may not be so 
readily adaptable. 
1-5 AM Best, CRG, 
Economist, PRS 
Across  the Divide,* Adventure 
Experiences 
Pros - Another scale which is 
popular in the literature and is 
easily adapted into various 
scales/descriptors. 
Cons – Temptation for the 
middle scale. 
1-6 HIS, Standard 
 
 Pros – A number of interesting 
scales that can give some 
subtlety to assessment.  
Cons – Not widely used so may 
affect the ability to communicate 
the risks. 
1-7 Coface, NORD, 
SUD, ONDD, EKN 
for Country 
Assessment. 
 Pros – Widely used in the credit 
risk industry so has some good 
transferable conceptual currency. 
Cons – No examples found by 
practitioners. 
1-10 Fitch, PRS 
(Economic) 
 Pros – Lends itself to be more 
easily converted into percentages 
and ratios scales that people can 
easily interpret. 
Cons – too much focus on 
numbers and the problem with 
borderline figures. 
Source: Compiled by the author (See appendix F for detailed content analysis of forms) 
A more detailed analysis of the scales revealed a number of other important points. In 
relation to the twenty-two operator forms scrutinised, it was striking that even with 
such a small sample, there was a huge variation in the actual design of the forms. 
There was some commonality, but not consistency, in the use of certain concepts, 
                                                 
*
 Across the Divide use the unusual values of 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 in their scale. 
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such as the use of the term hazard, and the risks framed within a notion of a likelihood 
and severity. The political risk models, in contrast, and as noted in Chapter 3, rarely 
make a conceptual distinction between severity and likelihood, or utilise a concept of 
a hazard. For example, the CRG illustrate a common approach in political and country 
risk assessments whereby different types of political hazard and risk events are placed 
on a continuum of severity, such as with the security category, which has crime at the 
low end of the scale, terrorism as high risk, and war as extreme risk. In terms of the 
likelihood, this varies in each category, using descriptions like ‘occasional’ or 
‘imminent.’* The fundamental weakness with this approach is that it fails to recognise 
that a demonstration or strike could represent a far greater risk to a tourism 
organisation, in comparison with a war taking place in a remote part of a country. One 
final important contrast is that many of the operators give attention to ‘who’ is at risk, 
with some extending it to ‘what’ is at risk, † whilst the political and country risk 
models rarely have such subtlety. 
What still cannot be resolved is just which is the most appropriate scale to use is? To 
decide by the simple basis of the most frequently utilised from the sample scales 
examined in this study is of limited validity, as it can suffer from sampling bias, 
whereby a different selection would illustrate a different pattern. Indeed, the fact that 
some operators do not use any scale raises some interesting questions as to the actual 
value of using scales. It is because of this lack of clarity that the strengths and 
weaknesses column in Table 6. 6 are included, which is of help when this issue is 
returned to in Chapter 7. 
6.2.6 Discussion of findings on the value of ‘ready made’ risk assessments  
Whilst government advice was revealed to have many limitations, it still must form an 
integral part of any political, or country risk assessment conducted by an operator.  
Not only is this so regulations are complied with, and insurance validated, but also 
because it provides an easily accessible pool of data which can be used in other areas 
of risk analysis. Furthermore, although the limitations were highlighted, it was also 
pointed out that sometimes their strengths were perhaps not always appreciated, such 
                                                 
*
 A similar, conceptual mixed approach is taken by the PRS scale. 
†
 It was also interesting that some forms adjust the assessments after control measures have been put in 
place, which seems to recognise the inherent dynamism is risk management. 
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as a variety of sites for the purposes of triangulation, together with their very useful 
bulletin services. 
For the many open and fee paying risk assessments which can be accessed, these 
proved of limited worth. The key strengths of these databases is that they are an 
additional useful source of data,* particularly for more strategic assessments, with the 
reduction of the assessment down to a single composite score or index, making a 
quick comparative analysis between countries relatively easy. But there are also some 
fundamental weaknesses. Whilst the reduction down to one, or a few numeric values 
to convey a sense of risk is attractive, it was shown to give little indication, or 
reflection of a destination’s attractiveness to travellers. It reaffirmed the assertion that 
because they are clearly designed for different industries, they cannot fully address the 
needs of the tourism sector, as illustrated by the many ‘black swan’ countries which 
experienced healthy tourism growth, despite being given some high risk scores (or 
vice versa). This ‘ bundling’ up of a whole variety of hazardous events into a single 
composite score also has the effect of ignoring the vital importance of the point 
interaction, or the tourism organisation needing to bisect the event in some way (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2) for the risks to occur. Finally, there is the problem that 
these models underplay the geographic component of hazards and risks, but which is 
such a fundamental part of tourism. 
What these points emphasise is the vital necessity to always contextualise the risk 
process to the organisation itself and its clients. This was again illustrated by the 
organisations whose clients assume the role of the analogous black swans, whereby 
they did not adhere to the expected pattern of decline and fall in response to negative 
political events or travel advice. The importance of this issue means it is explored 
more intimately in Chapter 7, Section 7.3, whereby the heuristic model formulated in 
Chapter 2 is applied to a single individual case study organisation. To this need for 
contextualising is the necessity to appreciate what is happening beyond a country’s 
borders, as there were numerous instances where the events that affected tourism 
demand the most, were external to the country. This is something which also reaffirms 
the use of a systems theory approach, which includes and analyses country neighbours 
as part of the ‘system’ for analysis. This too is examined in more detail in Chapter 7. 
                                                 
*
 This can be for both qualitative data and quantifiable data, although this in itself has often been drawn 
from the IMF, World Bank or UN, which can be sourced first hand. 
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6.3 Output factors, indicators and databases: findings, analysis and 
discussion. 
This is the first part of the second key discrete area of study, which focuses on the 
variety of indicators and databases which can be used in the analysis and assessment 
of political risk. In Chapter 4, the crucial distinction was made between risk factors 
and indicators and the overwhelming range of data which could be accessed to reflect 
these elements, hence the use of Kennedy’s ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ dilemma. 
To deal with this breadth, a systems theory approach was adapted with which to 
categorise the factors and indicators according to whether they were output (this 
section), process (Section 6.4) or input (Section 6.5) related indicators and factors, 
and which were summarised and presented in Diagram 3.1. In this section, the output 
indicators are explored in more detail in relation to how they relate to frequency based 
methods of risk assessment and the key databases which can be accessed for the 
relevant data. 
In essence, the output approach involves identifying  the occurrence of various 
hazardous events (as identified in Chapter 3) – hard facts if you like - in order to 
build up a frequency profile, which Klinke et al (2001, p.164) notes can help to 
develop confidence intervals based on empirical distributions. In Chapter 4, Section 
4.5.2, it was noted that the frequency output type risk assessment method was 
common in many areas of risk management, but rarely explicitly stated in the area of 
political risk. It was not clear whether this was because it could not be done, or 
whether it was an approach that had not been considered, hence the reason why it is 
explored in this section.  
In essence the political output measures relate to the variety of political hazards 
identified from the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.3. In that section, 
four broad output categories were identified, which were;  
• Structural workings of governments 
• Conflict and security 
• Political change 
• International interaction events 
• Natural disasters and disease 
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In terms of the focused comparison in this section only the conflict and security 
related output indicators are examined. This does not mean that the other output 
categories are less important, rather that the analysis either produced little of any 
significance, or it was too difficult to find appropriate data which lent itself to a 
proper focused comparative analysis with the case study countries. These other output 
indicators are more easily examined and explored in relation to a single case study 
analysis, which is done in Chapter 7. 
6.3.1 War, insurgency and conflict output indicators 
Contemporary wars can be much harder to define, as the distinction between war, 
terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla campaigns and even at times, criminality, seems to be 
increasingly blurred. It is because of this problem that alternative terms are often used, 
such as the term ‘conflict’. For this work what is perhaps of most importance is not 
necessarily the precise definitions of these terms, but the linking strand of violence 
and the impact it has on tourist perceptions. When analysing and assessing conflict, a 
wide number of databases were looked at,* with two databases standing out in terms 
of the data produced, which were:  
• Centre for Systematic Peace (CSP)  
• Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
These databases define conflict utilising different conceptual parameters, together 
with variations in how they present the information, with the result that whilst overall 
the broad picture painted can be similar, one can still find some interesting 
differences, which can give a much richer picture when utilised together.  
In relation to the CSP data this produces invaluable information on past and current 
wars. It categorises and defines ‘conflict’ in relation to their episode type (civil-
intrastate, ethnic-intrastate and international event-interstate ), their magnitude (which 
is a composite factor based on many variables such as conflict intensity, or 
displacement, and is measured on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being the most severe), 
and their location and time period. What they also highlight are the conflicts which 
are either still ongoing, have diminished in intensity, or are at high risk of returning to 
conflict. Whilst there can be an element of subjective interpretation of the conflicts, it 
                                                 
*
 Such as the CIA World Fact Book and its International Dispute section. 
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is an invaluable database, which forces one to reflect critically on older, more 
traditional concepts of war and terrorism.  
In Table 6.7, the case study countries which are recorded on the conflict database are 
highlighted in relation to the years that they are in conflict, and, if available, whether 
they experienced tourism growth or decline based on the previous year. One of the 
first observations to make is the high number of case study countries that appear on 
the database for the selected time period. In all of the thirty case study countries 
selected, only Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Costa Rica, UK, Venezuela, 
Zimbabwe and Bulgaria do not appear for the selected period.  
 
  
  
164 
Table 6.6 CSP database and case study countries  
Year Countries Experiencing Conflict 
Year Tourism Growth Tourism Decline No Data 
2005 1 Pakistan (EV, M1, A, TG); 2 Pakistan (EV, M1, A, 
TG); 3. Pakistan (EV, M1, D, TG); 1.Turkey (EV, 
M1,L. TG); Haiti (CV, M1, A, TG);1. India (CV, 
M1, A, TG)1. India (CV, M1, A, TG); 5. India (EW, 
M3, A, TG); 6 India (EW, M2, A, TG); 5. Indonesia 
(EV, M1, HR,  C 3,000, TG); 2  Israel (EW, M2, A, 
TD) 
Thailand (EV, M1, L, TD) 
Nepal (CW, M2, TD) 
Sri Lanka (EW, M5, A, TG) 
 
Afghanistan (IW, M3. A, NA) 
1.Iraq (IW, M6, A, NA) Myanmar 
(EW, M 4, A, NA) 
2004 1 Pakistan (EV, M1, A, TG);3. Pakistan (EV, M1, D, 
TG); Turkey (EV, M1,L, TG)  
1.Thailand (EV, M1, L, TG); 1 India (CV, M1, A, 
TD) ; 5. India (EW, M3, A, TG); 6 India (EW, M2, 
A, TD)5. Indonesia (EV, M1,  TG); Nepal (CW, M2, 
TG); Sri Lanka (EW, M5, A, TG); 2 Israel (EW, M2, 
A, TG); Myanmar (EW, M 4, A, TG) 
Haiti (CV, M1, A, TD) Afghanistan (IW, M3. A, 
NA);1.Iraq (IW, M6, A, NA) 
2003 3. Pakistan (EV, M1, D, TG) 
1. India (CV, M1, A, TG); 5. India (EW, M3, A, 
TG); 6 India (EW, M2, A, TG)5. Indonesia (EV, M1, 
TD); Nepal (CW, M2, TG); 2 Israel (EW, M2, A, 
TG) 
2. Thailand (CV, M1, F, C2,500,  TD); 
Myanmar (EW, M 4, A, TG) 
 
Afghanistan (IW, M3. A, NA); 1 
Iraq (IW, M6, A, NA); 2.Iraq (IV, 
M1, F, C, 1000, NA)  
2002 Sri Lanka (EW, M5, A, TG); Myanmar (EW, M 4, A, 
TG) 
3. Pakistan (EV, M1, D, TD); 1. India 
(CV, M1, A, TD); 4.India (EV, M2, C 
3,500, TD) 5. India (EW, M3, A, TG); 
6 India (EW, M2, A, TD); 2.Indonesia 
(EV, M1, C 3,500, F, TD); 5.Indonesia 
(EV, M1, TD) Nepal (CW, M2, TG); 
2 Israel (EW, M2, A, TD) 
Afghanistan (IW, M3. A, NA); 2. 
Iraq (IV, M1, A, NA) 
 
 
2001 1. Indonesia (EV, M1, C 1,000, F, TG) 
2. Indonesia (EV, M1, A, TG) 
5. Indonesia (EV, M1, , TG) 
 
3. Pakistan (EV, M1, D, TD);1. India 
(CV, M1, A, TD); 4.India (EV, M2, 
TD) ; 5. India (EW, M3, A, TG); 6 
India (EW, M2, A, TD) Nepal (CW, 
M2, TD); Sri Lanka (EW, M5, A, TG) 
2 Israel (EW, M2, A, TD); Myanmar 
(EW, M 4, A, TD) 
Afghanistan (IW, M3. A, NA); 2. 
Iraq (IV, M1, A, NA 
 
 
2000 2.Ethiopia (EW, M1, F, C 2000, TG) 
2. Indonesia (EV, M1, A, TG) 
3. Ethiopia (IW, M5, C100,000, F,  TG) 
5. Indonesia (EV, M1, TG); 4.India (EV, M2, TG); 5. 
India (EW, M3, A, TG); 6 India (EW, M2, A, TG); 2 
Israel (EW, M2, A, TG); Myanmar (EW, M 4, A, 
TG) 
Nepal (CW, M2, TD); Sri Lanka (EW, 
M5, A, TG) 
Afghanistan (IW, M3. A, NA); 2. 
Iraq (IV, M1, A, NA) 
 
 
1999 2.Ethiopia (EW, M1, A, TG) 
2. Indonesia (EV, M1, A, TG) 
3. Indonesia (CV, M2, F, 3,000, TG) 
5. Indonesia (EV, M1, HR, TG) 
Nepal (CW, M2, TG); Egypt (CV, M1, C 2000, A, 
TG); Sri Lanka (EW, M5, A, TG); 2. Turkey ( EW, 
M3, A,C 4000, TG); 2 Israel (EW, M2, A, TG) 
2. India (IV, M1, F, C 1500, TD); 
4.India (EV, M2, TD 1,500, TD); 5. 
India (EW, M3, A, TD); 6 India (EW, 
M2, A, TD);3. Ethiopia (IW, M5, A, 
TD; Myanmar (EW, M 4, A, TD) 
2. Iraq (IV, M1, A, NA) 
 
1998 Nepal (CW, M2, TG) 
Sri Lanka (EW, M5, A, TG) 4. Pakistan (EV, M1, F, 
C5,000, TD) Myanmar (EW, M 4, A, TG) 
4. Indonesia (CV, M2, C 2000, F, TD) 
5. Indonesia (EV, M1, TD); Egypt 
(CV, M1, A, TD); 4.India (EV, M2, 
TD); 5. India (EW, M3, A, TD; 6 
India (EW, M2, A, TD); 2. Turkey ( 
EW, M3, A, NA); 2. Turkey (EW, 
M3, A, NA); 2 Israel (EW, M2, A, 
TD) 
2.Iraq (IV, M1, A, NA) 
3. Iraq (EW, M1,C 2000, NA) 
1997 5. Indonesia (EV, M1,TG) 
3. India (EW, M1, C not available, TG); 4.India (EV, 
M2, NA); 5. India (EW, M3, A, TG); 6 India (EW, 
M2, A, TG); Egypt (CV, M1, A, TG); 4.India (EV, 
M2, TG); 4. Pakistan (EV, M1, F, TD); Myanmar 
(EW, M 4, A, TG) 
Egypt (CV, M1, A, TD); Cambodia 
(CW, M2, F, C 5000, TD); 2 Israel 
(EW, M2, A, TD) 
3. Iraq (EW, M1, NA) 
Sri Lanka (EW, M5, A, NA); 2. 
Turkey ( EW, M3, A, NA) 
Source: CSP (2007) 
Key: EV = Ethnic Violence; EW = Ethnic War; IV = Interstate Violence; CV = Civil Violence; IW = Interstate War; CW – Civil 
War; M = magnitude and scale; C = number of casualties, which is only recorded in the last date of conflict as it is a summative 
value; HR = means high risk of conflict returning; A = means the conflict is still live or active; D = means the conflict has 
diminished in intensity; F = Finished;. TG = Tourism Growth; TD= Tourism Decline; ND= No Data. 
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What is evident are the high numbers of countries that can have a conflict yet still 
register tourism growth, particularly where these conflicts have taken place for a 
number of years, or operate in remote geographic areas. One can refine the analysis 
by considering the magnitude score (the M in the bracketed information, whereby 1 is 
the least severe and 10 the most) to see if this alters the picture. The countries where 
the magnitude is more than 1 are underlined in the table. Again, no clear pattern 
emerges as countries with a higher magnitude rating can still experience tourism 
growth. India is of particular interest here because of the number of registered 
conflicts it has (the highest amongst the case study countries) with their magnitude 
rating being much higher in comparison with many other countries. Looking at the 
pattern of tourism arrivals for India over the years in Figure 6.10, it is evident that 
tourism in India is significant in its scale and for being able to sustain tourism growth 
whilst experiencing many conflicts. Whilst the fall in arrivals to India in 2002 was 
intimately related to the escalations in tensions with Pakistan, particularly with the 
threat of a nuclear conflict, this is not really reflected in the CSP scores as it only 
receives a low M2 rating. It is also of interest how India has continued to develop 
economically, despite all these conflicts. 
The CSP data is also weak on conveying a sense of the rhythm of the conflict and how 
its intensity has varied over time (the same magnitude scale is used for all the years 
that it is defined as active). The database which is better at conveying the peaks and 
troughs of violence is the UCDB. Their definition of conflict is: 
‘An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility which concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths.’ (UCDB 2007) 
Whilst this definition can mean it can often overlap with notions of terrorism, this 
makes it all the stronger in terms of assessing potential risks. The 25 battle-related 
deaths is also useful, as it gives a more accurate marker point for conflicts beginning 
and ending, hence the intermittent appearance of conflicts over the years (but where 
the CSP would just have them as continuing). In relation to the case study countries, 
the same countries appear, with the additional inclusion of the UK until 1998 when 
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the peace process in Northern Ireland had become more firmly bedded down. As in 
Table 6.7, the case study countries are mapped out in terms of tourism growth, or 
decline, with the data presented in Table 6.8.  
 Figure 6.10 Tourism trends and key events for India 
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Key events 
1996 Congress party suffers worst electoral defeat to Hindu BJP 
1998 Nuclear tests and international condemnation 
1999 Vajpayee and historic trip to Pakistan to sign bilateral peace deal. War in Kashmir. Cyclones 
devastate Eastern Orissa (10,000 dead) 
2001 Massive earthquake in western Gujarea (30,000 dead), Border clash with Bangladesh. High powered 
rocket launched. Vajpayee has summit meeting with Musharraf. BJP and political scandals. Pakistan talks 
break down. Kashmir tensions rise. Suicide attack on parliament. Troop mobilization on Pakistan border. 
Fear of war.  
2002 Inter-religious bloodshed after 59 Hindu pilgrims die on a train. More nuclear tests. UK and USA 
advise people to leave. 
2003 Kashmir ceasefire declared. 
2004 Congress party win surprise victory. Troop withdrawal from Kashmir. Asian Tsunami. 
2005 New India – Pakistan bus service starts. 1,000 killed in floods. Bomb kills 62 in Delhi. 
2006 35 Hindus killed in Kashmir. 180 killed on a rush hour train bomb attack. Mosques bomb attacks. 
2007 68 die on train attack, most are from Pakistan. New agreement to reduce threat of nuclear war. 
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Table 6.7 UCDB database and case study countries 
Year Tourism Growth Tourism Decline No tourism Data 
Available 
2005 5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, 
M); 4 India (T, Intra, M) 5. India (T, Intra, M); 
6 India (T, Intra, M);8 India (T, Intra, M). 9 
India (G, Intra, M); 1 Israel (T, Intra, M); 3 
Pakistan (T, Intra, M); 2 Turkey (T. Intra, M); 1 
Turkey (G. Intra, M); 2 Turkey (T. Intra, M) 
1 Indonesia (T, Intra, M, Terminated);Nepal 
(G, Intra, W); Sri Lanka (T, Intra, W); 1 
Thailand (T, Intra, M) 
1 Afghanistan (GPS, W 
Intensity); Iraq (G, Inter, 
W): 2 Myanmar (T, Intra, 
M); 4 Myanmar (T, Intra, 
M) 5 Myanmar (T, Intra, 
M);  
2004 5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, 
M); 1.Indonesia (T, Intra, M,); Iran (T, Intra, 
M); 1 Israel (T, Intra, M); 5 Myanmar (T, Intra, 
M); Nepal (G, Intra, W); 3 Pakistan (T, Intra, 
M); 1 Thailand (T, Intra, M); 1 Turkey (G. 
Intra, M) 
Haiti (G, Intra, M); 2. India (T, Intra,  M); 4 
India (T, Intra, M) 5. India (T, Intra, M); 6 
India (T, Intra, M);7 India (T, Intra, M);8 
India (T, Intra, M). 9 India (G, Intra, M) 
Afghanistan (GPS, W 
Intensity): Iraq (G, Inter, 
W) 
2003 5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, 
M); 1. India (T, Inter, M); 2 India (T, Intra,  M); 
5. India (T, Intra, M); 6 India (T, Intra, M);7 . 
India (T, Intra, M);8 India (T, Intra, M). 9 India 
(G, Intra, M); 1 Israel (T, Intra, M); 2  
Myanmar (T, Intra, M); 5 Myanmar (T, Intra, 
M); Nepal (G, Intra, W); 3 Pakistan (T, Intra, 
M); Sri Lanka (T, Intra, M) ; 2 Turkey (T. Intra, 
M); 3 Pakistan (T, Intra, M 
1.Indonesia (T, Intra, M,); 2 Myanmar (T, 
Intra, M); 5 Myanmar (T, Intra, M); 1 
Thailand (T, Intra, M) 
1 Afghanistan (GPS, W 
Intensity); Iraq (G, Inter, 
W) 
2002 5. Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, 
M); Sri Lanka (T, Intra, M); 2 Turkey (T. Intra, 
M) 
1 India (T, Inter, M);2. India (T, Intra,  M); 5 
India (T, Intra, M); 6 India (T, Intra, M);7 
India (T, Intra, M);8 India (T, Intra, M). 9 
India (G, Intra, M); 1.Indonesia (T, Intra, M,); 
1 Israel (T, Intra, M); 2 Myanmar (T, Intra, 
M); 5 Myanmar (T, Intra, M); Nepal (G, 
Intra, W); 1 Pakistan (T, Intra, M) 
1 Afghanistan (GPS, W 
Intensity): 
2001 5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, 
M); 2 Turkey (T. Intra, M) 
1 India (T, Inter, M);2 India (T, Intra,  M); 5 
India (T, Intra, M); 6 India (T, Intra, M); 7 
India (T, Intra, M); 8 India (T, Intra, M); 9 
India (G, Intra, M); 1.Indonesia (T, Intra, M,); 
1. Israel (T, Intra, M); 2  Myanmar (T, Intra, 
M); 5 Myanmar (T, Intra, M); Nepal (G, 
Intra, M) 3 Pakistan (T, Intra, M); Sri Lanka 
(T, Intra, W); 1 Pakistan (T, Intra, M) 
1 Afghanistan (GPS, W 
Intensity): 
2000 5. Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, 
M); 6  Ethiopia (T, Inter, W, Terminated); 1  
India (T, Inter, M); 2 India (T, Intra,  M); 5. 
India (T, Intra, M); 6 India (T, Intra, M);7 India 
(T, Intra, M);8 India (T, Intra, M). 9 India (G, 
Intra, M); 1 Indonesia (T, Intra, M,); 1 Israel (T, 
Intra, M); 2  Myanmar (T, Intra, M); 5 
Myanmar (T, Intra, M); 1 Pakistan (T, Intra, 
M); 2 Turkey (T. Intra, M) 
Nepal (G, Intra, M); Sri Lanka (T, Intra, W) 1 Afghanistan (GPS, W 
Intensity): 
1999 Cambodia  Conflict 1 (G, Intra, M terminated,); 
1 Indonesia (T, Intra, M,); 1 Israel (T, Intra, M); 
Nepal (G, Intra, M); 1 Pakistan (T, Intra, W); 
Sri Lanka (T, Intra, W) 
5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, 
M); 6 Ethiopia (T, Intra, M); 1. India (T, 
Inter, W); 2 India (T, Intra, M); 5 India (T, 
Intra, M); 6 India (T, Intra, M);7 India (T, 
Intra, M); 8 India (T, Intra, M). 9 India (G, 
Intra, M); 2  Myanmar (T, Intra, M); 5 
Myanmar (T, Intra, M); 2 Turkey (T. Intra, 
M) 
Afghanistan (GPS, W 
Intensity): 
1998 Cambodia  (G, Intra, M); Egypt (G, Intra, M 
terminated); 2 Myanmar (T, Intra, M); 5 
Myanmar (T, Intra, M); Nepal (G, Intra, M); 1 
Pakistan (T, Intra, M); Sri Lanka (T, Intra, W); 
UK (T, Intra, M) 
5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, 
M); 6 Ethiopia (T, Inter, W); 1 India (T, Inter, 
M); 2 India (T, Intra,  M); 5. India (T, Intra, 
M); 6 India (T, Intra, M); 7 India (T, Intra, 
M); 8 India (T, Intra, M). 9 India (G, Intra, 
M); 2.Indonesia (T, Intra, M,); 1 Israel (T, 
Intra, M); 2 Turkey (T. Intra, M) 
Afghanistan (GPS, W 
Intensity): 
1997 5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, 
M); 6 Ethiopia (T, Intra, M); 1 India (T, Inter, 
M) 2. India (T, Intra,  M); 5 India (T, Intra, M); 
6 India (T, Intra, M);7 India (T, Intra, M); 8 
India (T, Intra, M). 9 India (G, Intra, M); 
2.Indonesia (T, Intra, M,) 1 Myanmar (T, Intra, 
M); 2  Myanmar (T, Intra, M); 5 Myanmar (T, 
Intra, M); Nepal (G, Intra, M); 3 Pakistan (T, 
Intra, M); 2 Turkey (T, Intra,W) 
Cambodia  (G, Inter, M); Egypt (G, Intra, M); 
1 Israel (T, Intra, M); 
Afghanistan (GPS, W 
Intensity): Sri Lanka (T, 
Intra, W) 
Source: UCDB (2007) 
Key: Type of incompatibility: G= Government; T = Territory; Dimension: Intra = Intrastate; Inter = Interstate; Conflict Intensity: 
W = War (1,000 deaths or  more); M = Minor (more than 25 battle related deaths, but less than a 1,000) 
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There are some interesting differences from the CSP table. Here one can see how the 
conflict in Nepal (shaded in grey) escalated from a ‘Minor’ classification to a ‘War’ 
classification in 2000 (see also the earlier Figure 6.2). A similar pattern emerges for 
the conflict with India and Pakistan where one can see that it escalates from Minor to 
War in 1999. Other interesting examples which can be tracked in terms of monitoring 
the changing intensity relate to Sri Lanka (see also Figure 6.11), and Turkey (see also 
Figure 6. 12). What is of interest is how the UCDB helps indicate a greater range of 
conflicts over the time periods, together with revealing how the conflicts remain 
active for much longer in comparison with the CSP, such as in the case of Ethiopia, 
where the CSP highlights only two conflicts, whilst UCDP has five (see also Chapter 
7). One can again see that tourism can continue to grow whilst also having a War 
classification, as Sri Lanka, Ethiopia or Turkey all illustrate. 
 Figure 6.11 Tourism trends and key events for Sri Lanka 
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Key events 
1994 Two decades of UNO rule end by SLFP victory. 
1995 War escalates and wages for the next few years.  
2000 Tourists attacked. 
2001 Airport attacked. Tensions between PM and President. Norway broker peace deal. 
2002 Two armed insurrections. Tamil leadership fracture. Peace process crisis. 
2003 Worst ever floods. 
2004 Tsunami (30,000 estimated to have died). Suicide bomb in Colombo. 
2005 Elections. Increased violence and peace talks fail. 
2006 Ceasefire but violence continues. 
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Figure 6.12 Tourism trends and key events for Turkey 
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Key events 
1995 Pro Islamic parties perform well. Major military offensive against Kurds. 
1996 Coalition fails. 
1997 Military and a ‘post-modern coup’ by forcing PM to resign. 
1999 PKK leader captured. Devastating earthquakes. 
2001 Pro-Islamic party banned. 
2002 Turkish/Greek agreement on gas pipeline. Islamist based party wins election. 
2004 Twenty soldiers killed as ceasefire ends. 
2005 Banning of head scarves and secular demonstrations in support of ban. 
2006 Fifteen killed in riots. PKK ceasefire declared. 
2007 Journalist killed, Elections. 
6.3.2 Terrorism output indicators 
Although aspects of terrorism are covered in the previous databases, there remains a 
rich source of output-related data that allows for a more detailed exploration of the 
terrorism hazards. The key database found in relation to tracking terrorist incidents is 
the American based NGO, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT). The MIPT database has tighter conceptual definition parameters, and allows 
for terrorism to be explored on numerous levels, ranging from incidents in countries, 
the location of attacks, the groups involved, who were the key targets, and the 
methods of attack. The availability of this data means that one can look at terrorism 
and tourism using a similar method to Pizam (1999) in his study relating to 
criminality and the impacts on tourism, where he recorded the number of attacks, who 
was involved and the consequences of the act, for the State of Florida. 
Although graphs were produced for all the case study countries, in relation to the 
number of attacks, fatalities and injuries, these are not all reproduced here. Instead a 
smaller number of illustrative graphs are presented in Figure 6.13 to help in the 
comparative analysis of terrorism related indicators.  
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Figure 6.13 Terrorism incidents and fatalities 
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Figure 6.13 Terrorism incidents and fatalities (continued) 
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Figure 6.13 Terrorism incidents and fatalities (continued) 
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One of the relationships expected was to see a strong link between the number of 
incidents between terrorism and tourism arrivals, such as an increase in terrorist 
incidents being marked by a downturn in tourism. In fact, as in previous sections, the 
picture is again mixed. Clearly, the number of incidents, fatalities and injuries for 
Afghanistan and Iraq give a good indication of the level of turmoil in the country, and 
the lack of data on tourism is therefore not surprising. Similarly, looking at the pattern 
of terrorist attacks from Nepal, one can cross relate it to the political events at the time 
and the roller coaster pattern of tourism arrivals. These spikes are also evident with 
other countries, such as Ethiopia in 1997, which marks a time of war and a downturn 
in the number of tourists. 
Other countries assume the black swan position, revealing a surprising picture.  
Turkey (see also Figure 6.12), India (see also Figure 6.10), and Pakistan (see also 
Figure 6.5) often managed to maintain periods of tourism growth, yet had many 
terrorist attacks taking place, with high spikes often occurring in certain years, which 
in the case of India and Pakistan is reflected in wider political events and conflicts 
occurring. For India, when combined and reflected upon with the conflict database, it 
is again surprising the scale of conflict and acts of terrorism, which, incidentally, the 
graph excludes the number of attacks in Kashmir (appearing separately next to the 
India graph). For Turkey, the pattern of terrorism attacks, are relatively high in 
comparison with the other case study countries, yet it still manages to maintain a very 
robust pattern of tourism growth. It is also interesting to reflect back to Section 6.3.2 
and how on the ICRG score was improving for Turkey, whilst the number of terrorist 
attacks seemed to be increasing.  
In terms of specific attacks on tourists, the pattern that emerges is that attacks are 
relatively rare.* One of the exceptions to this pattern is Egypt, not only in terms of the 
number of attacks on tourists, but also in relation to their lethality, which is why the 
number of attacks on tourists is also shown in the graph which appears in Figure 6.13.  
If one was to go back before 1994, to 1993 and 1992, one sees a pattern of an 
increasing number of attacks, injuries and fatalities, which culminated in the horrific 
attack in Luxor in 1997, with the impact on tourism shown in Figure 6.14.   
                                                 
*Although not part of the case study analysis it was of interest that both Spain and France record a high 
number of incidents of terrorist attacks on tourism, but are low in terms of the number of injuries.  
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 Figure 6.14 Tourism trends and key events for Egypt 
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Key events 
1992 Tourist killed. 
1993 Tourist killed. 
1994 Tourist killed. 
1995 Assassination attempt on Mubarak. Tourist killed. 
1996 Eighteen killed in terrorist attack. 
1997 Luxor terrorist attacks, with over 80 people killed. 
1999 Mubarak 4th term 
2001 9/11 
2002 Train fire 
2003 Sinai bomb 
2004 Bomb attack in Sinai on Israel tourists 
2005 Sharm al-Sheik tourist resort attack. Anti government demonstrations. Mubarak 5th term. 
2006 Ferry disaster. Bomb attacks in red sea resort. Arrests of Muslim brotherhood.  
In this instance, the pattern of the past data would point to a warning signal that a 
more devastating attack was always possible – an observation of course which is 
made with the benefit of hindsight, but it can show the value of the data in making 
one aware of hazards and their trends. The robustness of the tourism industry in 
relation to these events also again stresses how important it is to contextualize the risk 
assessments, as the strength of the attractions can influence the degree of elasticity of 
demand, as Dimanche et al (1999, p.23) also argued, based on their study on New 
Orleans managing to maintain robust tourism growth despite suffering higher levels of 
violence in comparison with many other American cities. 
6.3.3 Discussion of the relevancy of the output frequency method for risk 
assessment 
Whilst this section does not examine all the possible key output events, the findings 
do highlight a number of important points. Although the notion of developing 
frequency profiles is quite attractive in theory, in practice one should always be 
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cautious when making current assessments based on past incidents. The central 
weakness relates to the opening points made in this Chapter, where simply because an 
event has happened in the past, it does not mean that a similar pattern of events will 
continue in the future; or because it has not happened in the past, it does not mean it 
could not occur in the future. Whilst for Egypt looking at past terrorist attacks one 
could see many warning signals for the Luxor attack in 1997; the subsequent years 
where there were no attacks until 2004, did not signify that the problem of terrorism 
had been solved. For Indonesia, the devastating Bali bomb had little precedent within 
the country, but not, it should be observed, internationally, which again serves to 
illustrate that one needs to scan for hazards and risks beyond a country’s borders. The 
9/11 attacks are also illustrative of this problem of using past precedents for current, 
or future assessments. Viscusi et al (2003, p.100) noted that there was little evidence 
with which to statistically estimate the probability of such attacks, but which is not 
quite the same as saying there were no warning signals to the possibility of such 
attacks. * 
One of the methods also attempted in this area of output analysis and assessment, was 
to assess probability in terms of terrorist attacks and casualties, in relation to the 
number of tourism arrivals, such as using Moore’s (1983, p.148) Fatal Accident 
Frequency Rate (FAFR). In practice this proved of limited value and potentially 
misleading, because, as discussed in Chapter 2, people tend to make decisions more 
on severity of outcome rather than probability. Furthermore, as Adams (1995, p.22) 
and many others, are quick to point out, one can question the extent that clear 
confidence intervals can be developed over a period of time, as what will not be 
known are all the near misses, particularly if the information is sensitive and kept 
secret by the security services.  
So does this mean that the output method of analysis and assessment is too limited 
and therefore of no use? Not quite. If one uses the method less dogmatically one can 
soon appreciate the strengths of the approach and how it can be used in a risk 
assessment method. What was of interest is how tourism can continue, despite a 
country experiencing a variety of conflicts and terrorism attacks, as Turkey and India 
illustrate. There is no denying that certain, more dramatic conflict events which 
                                                 
*
 There had been previous attempts to fly aircraft into strategic targets in Israel, or  previous terrorists 
attacks on the World Trade Centre. 
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receive widespread media attention do impact on traveller’s short term behaviour, but 
it is also evident over a longer period, how conflicts can become ‘background noise’ 
in travellers perceptions, which they can block out when making travel decisions. 
What the output method is perhaps best at is not so much revealing the statistical 
likelihood of a political hazard occurring, but rather its simple identification; a factor 
which is so vital in the risk management process. This process can be made much 
richer if conducted with some comparative analysis of neighbouring countries. Whilst 
the notion of the incident triangle (raised in Chapter 4, Section 4.1) and statistical 
analysis is of limited use, providing at best only a loose fit (as with Egypt), it is of 
interest when it is adapted as a cultural mindset in relation to looking at past incidents, 
which can be regarded as the potential ‘weak signals,’ and useful when attempting to 
weave future scenarios. 
What an exploration of past incidents also gives is a sense of history, offering clues to 
potential future conflicts. A recent history of past conflicts was cited by the PITF 
(Goldstone et al 2005, p.30) as an important factor influencing the likelihood of 
conflict breaking out again.* It can also give clues to the future players, or actors who 
may be of importance in the political system. Wilkinson (2001, p.2) in his work on 
terrorism, notes how different insurgent groups can evolve and initiate different forms 
of instability, which may begin with strikes, or demonstrations, then develop into 
terrorism, then a guerrilla campaign, and even develop into a full scale civil war, as 
illustrated by the Bolsheviks in Russia during World War I, the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, or the Communists in Nepal. 
6.4 Political system process factors, indicators and databases: 
findings, analysis and discussion  
This is the second key section related to the area of study which focuses on the variety 
of indicators and databases which can be used in the analysis and assessment of 
political risks. It focuses on the notion that the type of political system through which 
all the various inputs are processed, can influence the type of political hazardous 
output events, and so affect the degree of risk to which a tourism organisation may be 
exposed to. This premise that the type of political system and government affects the 
                                                 
*
 Sometimes labeled as the legacy of vengeance, as with the FSI. 
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degree of risk would certainly seem to be important judging from the ubiquity that 
systems are classified in some way as part of a country profile, such as being defined 
as a republic or democracy, or numerous other possible descriptors. The simple 
question to ask is just how useful such descriptions are in the analysis and assessment 
of risk? As has been stated before frequency of use does not necessarily equate with 
actual usefulness, rather following a pattern of received practice. Furthermore, the 
often cited truism, noted by Morrison (2006, p.267), that democratic systems can be 
deemed as less risky and better for business, also needs further scrutiny (aspects of 
this have already been raised in Chapter 3, Section 3). 
6.4.1 Political system and government classifications  
How a system is defined or categorised can be approached in many ways. An initial 
logical starting point was to look at various political systems or government 
typologies which can be found from the subject area of comparative politics, which 
were later expanded to more practically based databases, such as the CIA World Fact 
Book. All were quickly found to be of limited value because of the difficulty in 
applying consistent, meaningful criteria for classification (see Appendix I for some of 
the examples looked at).  
The next obvious system classifications database to explore were the ones offered by 
various government travel sites. Here a more detailed content analysis was conducted 
on the government sites, which can be found in Appendix J. In relation to the USA 
and UK they have a similar format and tend to use classifications/descriptors for the 
‘Type of Government.’ Canada, on first perusal, seems to be a slightly more refined, 
distinguishing between the ‘Type of State’ and the ‘Type of Government.’ The results 
of the content analysis soon revealed numerous inconsistencies, conceptual vagaries, 
evidence of political bias, and conveyed little sense of the quality of the system. To 
illustrate some of the problems here are just a few examples which are drawn from the 
Table in Appendix J:  
• Examples of conceptual vagueness and inconsistencies in application: The 
term ‘republic’ is frequently used by the different sites, but Canada sometimes use 
it to describe the ‘Type of state’, as with the Lebanon, with its ‘Type of 
Government’ defined as a Unicameral Legislature, whilst for Cuba the term 
‘republic’ is used for the ‘Type of Government’, but the ‘Type of State’ is defined 
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as ‘Communist.’ There are numerous other examples of these conceptual 
inconsistencies,* with a country like Libya defying any neat categorisation by the 
sites.  
• Examples of political bias: It is apparent when important strategic allies are 
classified, or political tensions exist, that the language used to describe/classify the 
government can vary, such as Egypt being simply described as a Republic by the 
UK and USA, or with the USA classifying Cuba a ‘Totalitarian communist 
regime.’ 
• Examples of how they fail to convey any sense of quality and risk: Some of 
the most striking examples are USA’s description of ‘parliamentary democracy’ 
for Iraq and Pakistan, whilst for Zimbabwe the variation is given of ‘parliamentary 
constitution’; labels also given to Israel and  New Zealand, but whose systems 
clearly vary in quality.  
The scale of the conceptual ‘messiness’ of government and system classifications by 
these databases was one of the real surprises in this work. The descriptors or 
classifications given by governments often seem to reflect an ad hoc, incremental 
approach, with an inconsistent use of conceptual criteria, using a pick and mix 
application of terms and concepts from political science. Furthermore, the fact that so 
many of these sites, particularly the USA database, are referred to and used for the 
basis of many country profiles, such as for PRS, Country Information Books and 
MIPT, raises certain questions as to how much these organisations have reflected 
upon these descriptors and categorisations, where the presentation of a government 
system simply reflects a received wisdom, rather than any real evaluation or 
assessment. 
These limitations mean that alternatives needed to be sought. A wide variety of 
databases were consulted, with the following emerging as the most useful as they 
utilised a more consistent set of criteria to categorise governments and countries: 
• Centre for International Development and Conflict Management 
(CIDCM): From this site one can gain access to invaluable data which helps 
                                                 
*
 Examples include the UK naming the party in power under the Government heading, as with Israel 
being described as ‘Coalition led by Kadmia with Labour’, whilst for the Lebanon the Government 
classification just receives the term ‘Republic.’. 
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classify political governments and systems, particularly in relation to the 
Polity IV project, and Goldstone et al (2005, p.17) later adaptation of the 
data.  
• Fund for Peace (FfP): From this site the Failed State Index (FSI) is 
produced, which gives a useful composite assessment that can help gauge 
the quality and effectiveness of the regime. 
• Freedom House: This is an NGO which produces a country profile and a 
classification of the degree of freedom in the country. 
The CIDCM, based at Maryland University, acts as the home for much of the work 
produced by the PITF, discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2. As part of the work, the 
Polity IV project was developed, which categorises a country’s polity* utilising a 
comprehensive range of criteria, with all the data available on an open database. The 
mechanics of the classification are not discussed here, but a detailed explanation can 
be found in Appendix S, in relation to a single case study. For the purpose of this 
study, simply the most recent Polity scores were utilised (2005), compared and 
presented in Table 6.9. 
                                                 
*
 The use of the term polity refers to the political organisation or government that presides over the 
state.  
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Table 6.8 Comparing polity scores with average tourism changes 
 Tourism Average Growth (2000-2005) Tourism Average Decline or no data 
available (2000 to 2005)  
Unchanged 
values – 
Democratic 
scale (2000-
2005) 
Costa Rica  has had an unchanged Polity code of 10 
Ethiopia has had an unchanged Polity code of 1. 
India has had an unchanged Polity s code of 9 which 
has existed since 1994. 
 New Zealand has had an unchanged Polity code of 10. 
 Norway has had an unchanged Polity code of 10. 
Mongolia has had an unchanged Polity code of 10; 
tourism average between 2000-2005. 
Spain has had an unchanged Polity code of 10. 
Thailand has had an unchanged Polity code of 9 (Note 
military coup in 2006). 
South Africa has had an unchanged Polity code of 9. 
Turkey has had an unchanged Polity code of 7. UK 
has had an unchanged Polity code of 10.  
 
Unchanged 
values – 
Autocratic 
scale (2000-
2005) 
Cuba’s Polity code has stayed at –7 (very autocratic) 
where one has to go back to 1960 to see any change in 
score. 
Libya’s The Polity code stayed – 7 (very autocratic). 
                                                                                                 
Unchanged 
transitional 
(2000-2005) 
Lebanon has stayed as a transitional polity code of – 
66. 
                                                                                                
Changed 
values – 
moving 
towards 
autocracy/less 
democracy 
(2000-2005) 
Iran’s Polity code moved from 3 (a democratic scale 
score) to –-6 in 2004 and 2005. 
Myanmar’s Polity code moved from – 7 (autocratic) 
in 2003 to – 8 in 2004 and 2005.  
Pakistan’s Polity code moved from 7 (democratic) in 
1999 to – 6 (autocratic) in 2000, reducing down to –5 
in 2002 to 2005. 
Sri Lanka’s Polity code moved from 6 (democratic) 
down to 5 in 2004 and 2005, which is still on the 
democratic scale. 
Venezuela’s Polity code moved from 8  (democratic) 
down to 7 then 6 between 2001 and 2005. 
Haiti’s  Polity code has moved from 7 (a 
democratic score) to –2 in 2001, then becoming 
transitional in 2004 and 2005 with a score code 
of –88.                                                                                                                      
Nepal’s Polity code moved from 6  
(democratic) in 2001 to – 6 from 2002 to 2005; 
tourism average between 2000-2004  decreased 
by –4.6 %.  
Zimbabwe’s Polity code moved from 6  down 
to – 4 in 2004.  
Changed 
values – 
moving 
towards 
democracy/less 
autocracy 
(2000-2005) 
Bulgaria has increasingly moved towards democracy 
since 1997, where it went from a score of 8 to 9, where 
it has since stayed the same. Cambodia’s Polity code 
moved from –7 (very autocratic) to 2 in 1998 where it 
has stayed the same  
Croatia’s Polity code moved from –5 (very autocratic) 
to 7, then 8 and then 9 in 2005 –  
Egypt’s Polity code moved from –6 (autocratic) to -3, 
which is still regarded as autocratic 
 Indonesia’s Polity code moved from – 7 (autocratic) 
in 1997 to –5 in 1998, then to 7 and finally in 2004 and 
2005 a score of 8 (democratic);  
Afghanistan Since 1997 has moved from 
authoritarianism s code of – 7 in 1988 to – 66 
transitional codification– N/A available.    
Iraq’s Polity code moved from -9 ( a very 
autocratic score) to –66 transitional score code 
in 2003; tourism average between 2000-2005 
N/A . 
 Israel’s Polity code moved from 9 in 1998 to 
10 where it has stayed ever since, so it is a very 
subtle change. 
Source: WTO (2006) and Polity IV (2007) 
This Polity code is derived from making an assessment of the degree of 
institutionalised autocracy and democracy in the political system (each given a 
respective score), with the autocracy score subtracted from the democracy score, 
resulting in the Polity score. The score can then range from 10+ to -10, with the closer 
to 0, or less, indicating an autocracy, whilst 8 and above indicates a democracy. For 
countries that are in a period of political transition, this is indicated by the code of –66 
or -88, as illustrated by Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Haiti.  
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It was anticipated that a clear pattern would emerge between tourism growth and 
authoritarian patterns, particularly if one reflects on the theory of the post-modern 
ethically driven tourists, highlighted in Chapter 2. Whilst it is possible to make some 
links – as with Haiti or Nepal, which moved towards greater autocracy and 
experienced average tourism decline for the same period – other countries (the black 
swans) suggest a more complex relationship. For example, Iran or Pakistan became 
more authoritarian, yet they still experienced an average increase in tourism. For 
countries such Cuba, which has an unchanged but high autocratic code, tourism also 
grew. The pattern in relation to becoming more democratic and increasing tourism 
does seem much stronger, as illustrated by countries such as Cambodia (see Figure 
6.15), Croatia (see Figure 6.16) and Indonesia (see Figure 6.17).  
 Figure 6.15 Tourism trends and key events for Cambodia 
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Key events 
1991 Peace agreement. 
1993 First election. 
1994 Amnesty declared for Khmer Rouge guerillas. 
1996 Ieng Sary forms new party . 
1997 July Coup by Hun Sen. 
1998 New coalition government. 
2001 9/11. 
2002 First multiparty elections. SARS. Bali bomb. 
2003 Diplomatic incident with Thailand. Hun Sen wins election.  Incident of SARS. 
2004 Hun Sen reelected. Join WTO. King Sihanouk resigns. Assassinations occur on opposition members. 
2005 Opposition leader leaves Cambodia. 
2006 Royalist Funcinpec drop Prince Norodom as party leader. 
2007 Court tribunals against Khmer Rouge. 
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Figure 6.16 Tourism trends and key events for Croatia  
Croatia
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Key events 
1995 Dayton peace accord. 
1996 Diplomatic relations restored with Yugoslavia- 
1998 Yugoslavia/Kosovo conflict. 
1999 President Franjo Tudjman dies.  
2000 Tudjman’s HDZ party lose power. 
2001 Arrests for war crimes/Hague tribunals. 
2003 Elections. Applies for EU membership. 
2005 Arrests for war crimes. 
The other useful feature about this database is that it better conveys the quality of the 
regime in comparison with the country profiles offered by the various government 
databases. For example, the descriptor for both Indonesia and Haiti by the various 
government sites was the vague term ‘Republic’, but looking at the Polity score one 
can tell that Haiti is in a period of transition with its code of –88, and so suggests a 
degree of political turmoil;  whilst for Indonesia, one can see its polity scores 
reflecting a move towards greater democracy, as indicated by its score of 8, and by the 
improved Freedom House classification, as can be seen in Figure 6.17. 
Goldstone et al (2005, p.12) as part of the PITF, presented some further reflections on 
what factors and data act as the best indicators of state failure. They make a clear 
assertion that the regime type is an overwhelmingly dominant factor behind 
revolutions, ethnic wars, and adverse regime change, but, they stress, this is not a 
simple function of the degree of democracy or autocracy, rather, certain kinds of 
autocracies and democracies are much more vulnerable than others, depending on the 
patterns of executive recruitment and political participation. Of particular interest is 
how they refine the regime classifications using parts of the Polity IV datasets. What 
they found was that rather than characterising the regimes on the Polity IV three key 
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dimensions (Executive Recruitment, Executive Constraints and Political Competition) 
they found that using just two of the measures - executive recruitment (EXREC) and 
the competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP) – would give a far better 
indication of vulnerability to instability.  
Figure 6.17 Tourism trends and key events for Indonesia 
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Key events 
1997 Asian economic crisis. 
1998 Suharto regime collapses. 
1998 Elections. 
1999 Tensions continue in Aceh.Free elections held. East Timor votes for independence. 
2001 Ethnic violence in Kalimantan. Megawati sworn into office. 
2002 Bali bomb in October. 202 people die. Peace treaty signed for Aceh. 
2003 Peace talks break downs. Car bomb of a hotel. 
2004 First open presidential elections. Car bombs. Tsunami. 
2005 Ethnic tensions. Suicide bombs in Bali in October killing 23. 
2006 Earthquake in Java kills thousands. First provincial elections in Aceh. 
Using the Polity IV EXREC and PARCOMP scores allows one to place the case study 
countries (plus China and North Korea to help act as two further benchmark 
countries) on a regime classification grid, which can be seen in Table 6.9. This colour 
codes (part of their colour coding, not the author’s) four key polity classifications: 
pure democracies (dark blue); pure autocracies (dark orange); partial democracies 
(light blue); and partial autocracies (yellow). What is so useful about this table is that 
it helps move the system classification debate beyond simple notions of democracy 
equating with stability, as they note there are many shades or types of democracies 
and autocracies. Of particular interest is their argument that regimes classified as pure 
democracy, or autocracies, can be relatively stable, with the countries appearing in the 
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‘grey zones’* - which can variously be described as ‘annocracies,’ ‘partial 
democracies,’ or ‘illiberal democracies,’ (Goldstone et al 2005, p.16, citing Carothers 
2002) - emerging as the most vulnerable.  
In terms of Table 6.10 some interesting observations can be made as to the value of 
this classification as an indicator of political hazards and risks. In the first instance, 
the simple placement of a country can act as a quick indicator of vulnerability, but 
caution is still required in terms of simplistic, deterministic relationships. For example 
Israel appears in the Pure Democracies (dark blue zone) category, placing it as less 
vulnerable to certain aspects of political instability, however, Israel’s tourism industry 
has been profoundly affected by other political hazards, such as terrorism and various 
regional conflicts.  For many other countries it does give a useful signal of the 
vulnerability of the political system. The strength of the simple four-system 
classification and colour chart is to suggest a general propensity for full democracy 
can indicate a lower risk of state failure. Full autocracies can also be marked by 
relative stability, but with the proviso that full autocracies can be more vulnerable to 
sudden, dramatic changes, which can generate many risks. 
 Table 6.9 PITF case study categorisation 
Characterisation of political regimes for analysis of vulnerability to instability 
 Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP) 
Executive 
Recruitment 
(EXREC) 
Repressed (1) Suppressed 
(2) 
Unregulated 
(0) 
Factional (3) Transitional 
(4) 
Competitive 
(5) 
(1) Ascription       
(2) Ascription 
+ Designation 
   Nepal   
(3) 
Designation 
Burma, North 
Korea, China 
Iran  Egypt, 
Zimbabwe 
  
(4) Self-
Selection 
Libya      
(5) Transition 
from self 
selection 
Cuba Pakistan   Cambodia  
(6) Ascription 
+ Election 
      
(7) 
Transitional 
or Restricted 
Elec. 
   Ethiopia   
 
(8) 
Competitive 
election 
   Lebanon, Sri 
Lanka, Turkey, 
Venezuela  
Bulgaria,  
Croatia, India, 
Indonesia, 
Thailand, 
South Africa, 
Costa Rica, 
Israel, 
Mongolia, 
Norway, New 
Zealand, UK, 
Spain,  
Source: PARCOMP and EXREC scores obtained from Polity IV (2007), but excluding Haiti, 
Afghanistan and Iraq as they only received transition codes on the Polity IV database. 
                                                 
*
 In terms of these ‘grey zones’ this relates to countries with a Polity IV score of 7. 
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Another useful database that gives an indication of the quality of the political system 
is Freedom House. This is an American based NGO and presents itself as a non-
partisan, non-profit organisation and is designed to promote freedom and civil 
liberties around the globe. In relation to this analysis of political systems and 
governments they conduct a useful World Audit on Democracy, which gives scores as 
far back as 1973. The audit focuses on seven key categories: democracy; political 
rights; economic freedom; civil liberties; press freedom; corruption and rule of law 
and corruption. From the point of view of this analysis, however, the Freedom, Civil 
Liberties* and Political Rights† scores were focused on in relation to the trends for the 
selected case study countries and how these two factors are combined to produce an 
overall freedom rating, which can be classified as Free, Partially Free or Not Free.  
Reflecting on the various illustrative case studies which have been presented as 
Figures, it is perhaps a little surprising how inconsistent the relationship between the 
classification of freedom and patterns of tourism growth are. Countries which are not 
classed as Free can exhibit tourism growth, such as with Egypt (see Figure 6.14) and 
Cuba (see Figure 6.15), with Pakistan (see Figure 6.5) illustrating how a move from 
Partly Free, to Not Free also does not ultimately prevent growth. This decidedly 
mixed picture begins to raise some important issues in relation to the notion of the 
post-modern tourist, discussed in Chapter 2, and the importance of ethics and human 
rights issues for shaping travel decisions; this is not to say it has no influence, as it can 
affect the overall market size, but just that it did not emerge as strongly as was 
anticipated. Despite the mixed results of the FH indicators, they still have value in 
conveying a broad impression of the quality of the regime and the possible hazards, as 
long as they are used in addition to the other indicators, not in isolation. 
The final key database and indicators to examine relates to the Fund for Peace (FfP) 
and the Failed State Index (FSI). The FfP organisation was established in 1957 with 
the prime remit to prevent war and promote peace. The FSI, first published in 2005, is 
one of the more recent developments resulting from this activity and is a joint project 
with the Foreign Policy Magazine, which is designed to assess political risk and 
                                                 
*
 ‘Civil Liberties’ refers to the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law. 
†
 ‘Political Rights’ refers to the rights of people to participate freely in the political process, including 
the right to vote, compete for public office, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on 
public policies and are accountable to the electorate 
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stability, using a variety of economic, social and political measures. In producing the 
FSI, it uses twelve indicators, four of which are related to social conditions, two for 
economic conditions and six for political conditions. In terms of the analysis in this 
section, only the FSI composite score is examined, which can range from 0 to 120, 
with the higher the score, the greater the chance of instability and state failure, the key 
data is presented in Table 6.11. 
 Table 6.10 FSI case study categorisation 
Risk Rating  Countries and tourism growth patterns 
Alert Zone (120-
90) 
No tourism data: Afghanistan (102 – 1997; 99.8 – 2006); Iraq (111.4 – 2007; 109 
– 2006; 103.2 – 2005); 
Average decrease in tourism: Haiti (100.9 – 2007; 104.6 – 2006; 99.2 – 2005 
Average increase tourism: Ethiopia (95.5 – 2007; 91.9 – 2006; 90.9 – 2005); 
Lebanon (92.4 – 2007; 80.5 – 2006; 88. 9 – 2005); Myanmar (97 – 2007; 96.5 – 
2006; 93.4 – 2005); Nepal (93.6 – 2007; 95.4 – 2006; 89 – 2005); Pakistan (100.1 – 
2007; 100.1 – 2006; 89.4 – 2005); Sri Lanka (93.1 – 2007; 92.4 – 2006); 
Zimbabwe (110.1 – 2007; 108.9 – 2006; 94.3 – 2005)  
Warning Zone 
(89.9- 60) 
Average increase tourism Bulgaria (60 2007; 62.3 -2006); Cambodia (85.7 – 
2007; 85- 2006); Cuba (78.6 – 2007; 81.9 – 2006; 83.7 2005); Croatia (60.5 – 
2007; 61.9 – 2006); Egypt (89.2 – 2007; 89.5 – 2006; 88.8 – 2005); India (70.8 – 
2007; 70.5 – 2006; 69.5 – 2005); Libya (69.3 – 2007; 68.5 – 2006; 80.7 – 2005); 
Turkey (76 – 2007; 74.6 – 2006; 86.1 – 2005); Thailand (76 – 2007; 74.9 – 2006; 
77.4 – 2005); Iran (82.4 -2007; 84 – 2006; 83.4 – 2005); 
Average decrease in tourism  Indonesia (84.4 – 2007; 89.2 – 2006; 87 – 2005); 
Israel ( 79.6 – 2007; 79.5 – 2006); Venezuela (79.8 – 2007; 81.2 – 2006; 93.5 – 
2005) 
Monitoring Zone 
(59.9-30) 
Average increase tourism Costa Rica (50.5 -2007; 49.5 – 2006); Mongolia (58.4 – 
2007; 58.4 – 2006); South Africa (57.4 – 2007; 55.7 – 2006; ); Spain (39.2 – 2007; 
37. 4 – 2006) ; UK (34.2 – 2007; 34.2 – 2006)  
Sustainable Zone 
(below 30) 
Average increase tourism :New Zealand (20.5 – 2007; 19.4 – 2006); Norway 
(17.1 – 2007; 16.8 – 2006); 
Source: Fund for Peace (2007) * Note: colour coding is the one used by the FSI. 
In Table 6.10, the FSI scores and their warning level (their colour coding, not the 
author’s) does offer another interesting dimension in assessing the quality of the 
regime. One can observe that a Full Democracy, such as Israel, can be placed in the 
Warning Zone, bordering on the Alert Zone. Of the Full Autocracies/Not Free 
                                                 
*
 If one goes to the Foreign Policy magazine the colour coding and risk categorisation varies slightly 
from the FfP presentation, as it has a five stage colour coding: Critical (red ); In Danger (orange); 
Borderline (yellow); Stable (light green for scores between 30 and 59.9); Most stable (dark green for 
lower than 30). 
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countries which appeared in Table 6.9, two appear in the Alert zone (Myanmar and 
Pakistan), whilst Cuba and Libya appear in the Warning Zone. Interestingly, all the 
partial democracies, with the exception of South Africa, appear in the Warning Zone 
category, which for many countries may give them a higher perceived risk than one 
may have expected. In terms of the Monitoring Zone, all the states are Full 
Democracies and classed as Free. One of the observed difficulties with the FSI Risk 
Rating relates to borderline countries. Egypt for example in 2007 scores 89.2, which 
is near the borderline with the alert category. Also, Egypt is in the same category as 
Bulgaria (scoring 60.3 in 2007) and one would seriously question whether the same 
level of political hazards and risks exist for tourism operators in those countries. 
6.4.2 Political system and institutional effectiveness 
Clearly, the previous political classifications can begin to give a sense of the quality 
of the system, but it still has its limitations; as Morrison (2006, p.235) observes, two 
political systems may be classified the same, but they can vary considerably in terms 
of their attractiveness for investment. What is of interest here is to explore aspects of 
government effectiveness through closer scrutiny of the key institutions. It is a 
concept which a number of models utilise, such as the BERI model, where attention is 
given to factors such as the quality of the bureaucracy, the degree of corruption, or the 
impartiality of the legal system; other models, such as the PMSU or the CIFP, offer a 
different perspective by looking at institutions and how they can act to further 
stabilise/destabilise a political system, which Brink (2004, p.84) notes can influence 
consumer confidence and the ability of the system to deal with crisis events.  
The immediate question raised is what are the key institutions that should be 
examined? In relation to identifying the key branches of government, many sites and 
databases follow the classic division of power based on a legislature, executive and 
judiciary. Such a basic distinction is used to inform many country profiles, 
particularly the CIA World Fact Book.* The problem with these sites, as with the more 
general government classification, is that they can be near to meaningless in 
conveying any sense of quality or effectiveness; after all, just because a country may 
be cited as having a parliament, does not mean it is elected by open and fair elections. 
They are also limited in the sense that they do not always reflect the full dimensions 
                                                 
*
 So regarded as very culture bound to the USA’s political system. 
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of modern government, such as recognising the importance of the media, whereby it is 
sometimes described as the fourth branch of government (Morgan 1987).  
If this exploration of institutions is to have any worth, alternative databases and 
indicators needed to be found. Many sites were explored, with some databases 
offering critical comment on the institutions themselves, such as FH. Other databases, 
offered a particularly rich range of data that could be used as potential indicators of 
the effectiveness of government and institutions, particularly the World Bank,* where 
one can collect data on consistency of regulations, quality of bureaucracy, time to set 
up a business, corruption, taxation and many, many more. Although these were all 
looked at and data collected and examined in various comparative tables, they are not 
discussed here because of the inconsistencies in the data for comparative analysis, or 
again simply failing to reveal anything of interest, although a number are returned to 
in Chapter 7. The final result was that just two databases generated some points of 
interest in the context of this comparative analysis of government effectiveness, which 
where: 
• The FfP and their FSI and their evaluation and classification of the key 
government institutions (Strength of leadership, Judiciary, Police, Military and Civil 
Service). 
• Transparency International (TI) corruption indicators.  
In Table 6.12 a comparison table of the FSI assessment of institutions is presented. 
Although the FSI does not cover all countries at present, for those which it does, it 
gives a useful assessment of the institutions which can act to weaken or strengthen the 
political system, along with offering some useful clues as to why a country can 
experience many hazardous events, in particular acts of terrorism, but the political 
system can remain strong and tourism continues. Sri Lanka is of interest here, 
whereby it appears in the Alert category of the FSI (see Table 6.10), yet in 
comparison with many other states in this category, its institutions appear relatively 
strong, such as the leadership, military and civil service which are all classified as 
                                                 
*
 The World Bank (2007) database, via its World Economic Indicators and the key section on Global 
Links, which produces a whole range of possible indicators based around: integration with the global 
economy; growth of merchandise trade; high income trade with low/middle-income economies; 
primary commodity prices; regional trade blocs; global private financial flows; net financial flows/aid 
flows; aid dependency; distribution of aid; financial flows; movement of people; travel and tourism. 
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Good; this factor may go some way to explaining how it has managed to maintain its 
attractiveness and make its political system more ‘resilient’ (Brink 2005). As usual, 
however, one can see exceptions, such as the number of countries which have 
experienced rapid tourism growth, but can still have relatively weak institutions, as 
Cambodia illustrates particularly well.  
Table 6.11 FSI assessment of the five key state institutions 
 Good Moderate Poor Weak 
Leadership Croatia (2006); Indonesia 
(2006); Sri Lanka (2006) 
Cambodia (2006); Egypt 
(2006); Ethiopia (2006); 
Pakistan (2006); Thailand 
(2006)  
Myanmar (2006); Nepal 
(2006) 
Afghanistan (2006); Iran 
(2006); Iraq (2006); 
Lebanon (2006) 
Military Egypt (2006); Pakistan 
(2006); Sri Lanka (2006); 
Thailand (2006) 
Afghanistan (2006); Croatia 
(2006); Indonesia (2006); 
Iran (2006) 
 Cambodia (2006);  Ethiopia 
(2006), Iraq (2006); 
Lebanon (2006); Myanmar 
(2006); Nepal (2006) 
Police  Croatia (2006), Egypt 
(2006); Pakistan (2006); Sri 
Lanka (2006) 
Afghanistan (2006); 
Ethiopia (2006); Iraq 
(2006) 
Cambodia (2006); 
Indonesia (2006); Iran 
(2006); Lebanon (2006); 
Myanmar (2006); Nepal 
(2006); Thailand (2006) 
Judiciary Thailand (2006) Lebanon (2006); Nepal 
(2006); Pakistan (2006); Sri 
Lanka (2006) 
Afghanistan (2006); Croatia 
(2006); Egypt (2006); 
Ethiopia (2006); Myanmar 
(2006) 
Cambodia (2006); 
Indonesia (2006); Iran 
(2006); Iraq (2006) 
Civil 
Service 
Iran (2006); Lebanon 
(2006); Sri Lanka (2006) 
Croatia (2006); Egypt 
(2006); Nepal (2006); 
Pakistan (2006); Thailand 
(2006) 
Afghanistan (2006); Iraq 
(2006); Myanmar (2006) 
Cambodia (2006); Ethiopia 
(2006); Indonesia (2006) 
Source: Fund for Peace (2007)* 
The other useful database to examine is the data provided by TI and its corruption 
data. It should be noted that data on corruption could just as easily be utilised in the 
output section, but is applied here as so many organisations use it as a proxy indicator 
of effectiveness, particularly in relation to the bureaucracy, which the PMSU (2005, 
p.20) argues plays a critical role in stability. Corruption is also considered by some 
writers, such as Markwick (1998, p.46), or Nichols (2001, p.187), as one of the key 
political hazards businesses must deal with†; the only problem is finding suitable 
indicators and databases. Although there are a variety of databases which can be used 
to collect data on potential indicators (such as the World Bank), for this discussion 
just TI database will be utilised because: a) they are the most comprehensive covering 
most countries, thus allowing better comparative analysis; and b) because of the 
                                                 
*
 Institutional assessments in 2006 were not available for: Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Cuba,  Haiti, India, Israel, Libya, 
Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa,  Spain, Turkey, UK, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
†
 Many organisations interviewed gave anecdotal reflections on incidents of corruption. Travel and Trek for 
example noted how ‘local taxes’ or ‘donations’ (the euphemisms adopted  for the bribe fees which allows the 
trekking group to continue walking) have sometimes had to be paid to Maoist rebel groups in Nepal. For Operation 
Raleigh they commented how one tourist group who were stopped by a young teenager with a gun demanding 
money, then asked to have their photos have taken with the young Maoist. 
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frequency that many organisations use the data in their own assessments, such as the 
FH in their country profile assessments. 
TI is essentially an NGO, formed in 1993, with the stated purpose of fighting 
corruption. As part of their work they produce a Corruption Index, which is based on 
conducting surveys which measure the perceptions of public and political corruption 
by non-resident experts and business leaders, which is then used to formulate a 
composite index.* It bases its scores on data over a three year period which is 
essentially averaged out, but can mean that it can be difficult to see wide variations in 
scores, as changes are more likely to come incrementally. The scores can run from 
between 0 to 10, with the lower the score reflecting the more corrupt a country is 
perceived. No risk scales are presented as such, but a ten colour chart is presented of 
countries and the relative corruption scores. The accuracy of the results can always be 
put into perspective as they include the sample size and the standard deviation.  
In Table 6.13, the case study countries are placed in the TI corruption bands.  
Although the link between corruption and tourism growth is again weak or mixed, the 
scores can be used to indicate other political hazards which can be useful in the 
analysis of the political environment. For example, it can be used as one possible 
indicator of legitimacy; something which the FSI does, noting how in countries such 
as Afghanistan, the worsening of corruption erodes at the perceived legitimacy of the 
government. Indeed many other databases often give some qualitative comment on 
issues of corruption and how it can affect the legitimacy and strength of the 
government, such as Polity IV comment on how the President of Costa Rica was 
plagued by accusations of corruption. Indicators related to corruption, can be used as 
both a direct indicator for certain hazards, or an indirect indicator of other factors, 
such as legitimacy which  help in the analysis of a political system, as will be further 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
                                                 
*
 It can therefore be compared and contrasted with the World Bank Enterprise surveys which primarily 
focus on domestic firms perceptions. 
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Table 6.12 TI corruption scores for case study countries 2007 
TI Corruption score 
value 
Case Study Countries 
9.0 -10 New Zealand (9.4 – 2007).  
8 – 8.9 Norway (8.7 – 2007); UK (8.4 – 2007).  
7 – 7.9  
6 - 6.9 Spain (6.7 – 2007); Israel (6.1 – 2007).  
5 – 5.9 South Africa (5.1 – 2007); Costa Rica (5.0 – 2007). 
4 – 4.9 Cuba (4.2 – 2007); Bulgaria (4.1 – 2007) ; Croatia (4.1 – 2007) ; 
3 – 3.9 India (3.5 – 2007); Thailand (3.3 – 2007); Sri-Lanka (3.2 – 2007);  
Lebanon (3.0- 2007); Mongolia (3.0 – 2007).  
2 – 2.9 Egypt (2.9 – 2007); Iran (2.5 – 2007); Libya (2.5 – 2007); Pakistan 
(2.4 – 2007);  Indonesia (2.3 – 2007); Zimbabwe (2.1 – 2007); 
Cambodia (2.0 – 2007) ; Venezuela (2.0 – 2007); Ethiopia (2.4 2006). 
1 -1.9 Afghanistan (1.8 – 2007);Haiti (1.6 – 2007); Iraq (1.5 – 2007); 
Myanmar (1.4 – 2007). 
Source: Transparency International (2008). Note: colour coding is the one used by TI. 
6.4.3 Discussion of the relevancy of the process indicators for political risk 
assessment 
How useful is the scrutinising of a government/system classification and institutional 
effectiveness in relation to assessing risk? In terms of the classifications offered in 
various country profiles, such as those offered by government it can be regarded as 
near meaningless because of the vagueness and conceptual inconsistencies in 
application. In contrast, the databases which apply a more consistent set of criteria to 
classify or assess systems, clearly offer some very useful information, as reflected by 
the ease that one can access the data, and the speed that one can make an assessment 
because of the visual layout of some of the assessments. They are also useful in 
allowing one to easily track political system autocracy/democracy trends. Many 
writers, such as Kegley and Wittkopff (2001, p.418), and most crucially Goldstone et 
al (2005 p.28), all make the observation that newer states are more likely to initiate 
war, or suffer from instability, with the latter also identifying the higher risk bands for 
instability in relation to the years in office by a leader (higher risk being under three 
years and over eight). Of course they are far from perfect measures, particularly in 
relation to the time lags of a year, with the POLITY IV data lagging two years behind.  
One of the more surprising findings to emerge is just how weak the link between 
degrees of freedom and tourism patterns can be. Political freedoms or human rights 
abuses by governments seemed to emerge as less important in destination 
attractiveness than was anticipated, particularly after the discussion of the post-
modern tourist in Chapter 2, with the single exception of Myanmar. FH Freedom, 
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Civil Liberties and Human Rights scores are particularly illustrative here, where 
countries can perform poorly in these areas, yet still experience tourism growth. 
Although, it was not a central part of this study’s data collection process, it was 
always noticeable how many of the operators contacted would make some reference 
to responsible tourism, or issues of sustainability, but issues of human rights abuses 
did not emerge as important. Responsibletravel.com (the travel hub set up by Anita 
Roddick in 2001), and Tourism Concern (the pressure group designed to encourage 
more responsible travel), are key organisations where this disparity can also be 
observed between the environment, fair trade and human rights. This is not say that 
human rights are not considered, rather that they are not considered as explicitly in 
terms of the ethical criteria used, in comparison with other areas, such the 
environmental measures. This raises some interesting implications in relation to the 
ethical risk impact areas which need to be reappraised in the model developed in 
Chapter 7. 
6.5 Input causation factors, indicators and databases: findings, 
analysis and discussion 
Examining the notion of input factors into the political system – the many economic, 
social and environmental elements – represents the third key part of the indicator and 
database discussion, and is the most complex of all. It is complex because this is the 
area where notions of the political hazardous event causation factors are focused on, 
but which have a plethora of possible factors put forward as vital for analysis; yet at 
the same time the theories in which these factors are embedded, can often fail to 
specify what data should act as the indicator, or where it can be accessed from. 
Paradoxically, whilst the internet gives an opportunity to deal with these problems, it 
can also compound the complexity by offering an overwhelming amount of possible 
data and links, and so at times further blurring just what are the ‘essential’ and ‘non-
essential’ factors necessary for analysis.   
As the previous two sections illustrate, it is more than possible to make an assessment 
of political hazards and the risks they pose to an organisation without understanding 
these complex input causation factors. The inherent problem is that whilst it is fine for 
operational based assessments, when it comes to the strategic assessments which can 
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involve a larger capital outlay, a deeper analysis of the underlying economic, social 
and political conditions becomes essential. 
To deal with this complexity, a variety of key factors and indicators were distilled 
from the numerous models examined and literature reviewed in Chapter 4. It by no 
means represented all the possible factors that could be analysed, because, as was 
highlighted in that chapter, an important finding from the literature reviewed is that 
using a smaller number of key indicators could be just as effective as using many. The 
analysis of these factors, indicators and the sources of the data took a considerable 
amount of time, yet often revealed relatively little in terms of the comparative 
analysis. What follows, is a relatively brief discussion of some of the more interesting 
findings, based around the categorisation of factors and indicators developed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. One final point to note is that only a single snapshot view of data 
is given for a single year in order to make the comparative data tables more digestible; 
the problem with this is that it underplays one of the key strengths of quantifiable 
input indicating data, whereby some of the underlying trends occurring in the 
economic and social conditions can be observed over time. 
6.5.1 Economic inputs indicators 
This is not a discussion on the extent to which economic factors determine change. It 
is a long running debate, with writers from a Marxist perspective developing the most 
explicit, deterministic causal link between the economic systems driving the political 
system. Even writers from a liberal perspective, whilst not as deterministic, still place 
a great deal of emphasis on economic factors and their relationship to the political 
environment. Whatever the link, what is clear is that the economic environment 
provides one of the richest pools of quantifiable data and potential indicators. To give 
a flavour of the possible indicators which can be examined, a snapshot comparison of 
some of the more interesting indicators are presented in Table 6.14, which uses the 
factor typology developed in Chapter 4, based on the categories of economic growth, 
stability, debt and trade.  
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Table 6.13 Key economic indicators 
Country 
GDP Per 
Capita $ Country 
Inflation 
(2006)  Country 
Unemployed 
rate % Country 
% pop 
below 
poverty Country 
Current A/C 
(000,000) $ Country 
Public 
Debt % of 
GDP 
Norway 46,300 Israel 2.1 Cuba 1.9 Haiti 80 Norway 55,210 Lebanon 190 
UK 31,800 Norway  2.3 Thailand 2.1 Zimbabwe 68 Venezuela 27,170 Egypt 113.4 
Spain 27,400 UK  2.3 Cambodia 2.5 Afghanistan 53 Iran 16,510 Zimbabwe 96.4 
Israel 26,800 Libya 2.7 UK 2.9 South Africa 50 Libya 12,950 Sri Lanka 93 
New Zealand 26,200 Croatia 3.2 Mongolia 3.3 Iran 40 Indonesia 9,948 Israel 84.9 
Croatia 13,400  New Zealand  3.4 Norway 3.5 Ethiopia 38.7 Israel 7,998 Ethiopia 80 
South Africa 13,300 Spain 3.5 New Zealand 3.8 Venezuela 37.9 Iraq 5,665 India 60 
Costa Rica 12,500 Lebanon  4 Pakistan 6.5 Mongolia 36.1 Thailand 3,231 Turkey 59.8 
Libya 12,300 S.Africa  4.6 Costa Rica 6.6 Cambodia 35 Egypt 2,731 Pakistan 55.1 
Bulgaria 10,700 Thailand 4.6 Sri Lanka 7.6 Nepal 30.9 Cuba 146 Costa Rica 51.8 
Thailand 9,200 Cambodia  4.7 India 7.8 Lebanon 28 Haiti -1 Croatia 46.1 
Turkey 9,100 India  6.2 Venezuela 8.9 India 25 Cambodia -337 UK 42.7 
Iran 8,700 Cuba 6.2 Spain 8.1 Myanmar 25 Zimbabwe -366 Norway 41.2 
Venezuela 7,200 Bulgaria 7.3 Israel 8.4 Pakistan 24 Sri Lanka -1,046 Thailand 41.2 
Lebanon 5,900 Egypt 7.7 Bulgaria 9.6 Sri Lanka 22 Costa Rica -1,077 Spain 39.9 
Sri Lanka 4,700 Pakistan 7.9 Turkey 10.2 Israel 21.6 Lebanon -1,484 Indonesia 38.6 
Egypt 4,200 Nepal 8.6 Burma 10.2 Egypt 20 Ethiopia -1,786 South Africa 33.3 
Cuba 4,100 Mongolia 9.5 Egypt 10.3 Turkey 20 Croatia -3,175 Bulgaria 26.6 
Indonesia 3,900 Turkey 10.5 Indonesia 12.5 Spain 19.8 Bulgaria 5,010 Venezuela 24.3 
India 3,800  Costa Rica  11.5 Iran 15 Costa Rica 18 Pakistan -6,795 Iran 23.6 
Cambodia 2,800 Iran  12.00 Croatia 17.2 Indonesia 17.8 New Zealand -9,373 New Zealand 21.2 
Pakistan 2,500 Haiti  13.10 Lebanon 20 UK 17 India -10,360 Libya 5.4 
Mongolia 2,100 Indonesia  13.10 Iraq (2005) 25 Bulgaria 14.1 South Africa -16,280 Mongolia N/A 
Zimbabwe 2,100 Ethiopia  13.50 South Africa (2005) 25.5 Croatia 11 Turkey -31,760 Nepal N/A 
Iraq 1,900 Sri Lanka  13.70 Libya  (2005) 30 Thailand 10 UK -88,100 Haiti N/A 
Burma 1,800  Venezuela  13.70 Afghanistan (2005) 40 Libya  7.4 Spain -106 Afghanistan N/A 
Haiti 1,800 Afghan  16.3(2005) Nepal  (2004) 42 Cuba NA Mongolia N/A Cuba N/A 
Nepal 1,500 Burma  20 Zimbabwe (2005) 80 Iraq NA Nepal N/A Myanmar N/A 
Ethiopia 1,000 Iraq  53.20 Haiti 
Widespread 
unemployment (2/3) New Zealand NA Afghanistan N/A Cambodia N/A 
Afghanistan 800 Zimbabwe  1,033.5 Ethiopia  N/A Norway NA Myanmar N/A Iraq N/A 
Source: CIA World Fact book (2007). All data is for 2006, unless indicated otherwise by an additional date in brackets.
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The following points of interest can be observed in terms of making some 
generalisations to help interpret the data and pick up on warning signals: 
• One can identify some broad threshold figures of GDP per Capita, where one 
can make some generalisations. Countries in the GDP per Capita band of 
$20,000 (Norway, UK, Spain, New Zealand and Israel), have a strong link 
with democratic systems, classed as ‘free’, have a pattern of tourism growth, 
and receive low risk ratings from the various risk assessment databases. The 
countries that appear between the GDP per Capita band of $10,000 to $20,000 
(Croatia, South Africa, Costa Rica, Libya, Bulgaria) with the exception of 
Libya, are classed as free and democratic, and tend to be in the low risk 
categories on the risk databases. 
• Once a country falls below a GDP per capita of $10,000, it does seem to 
reflect a political system which is more vulnerable to conflict hazards. This is 
in relation to both their frequency and severity. Interestingly, however, it tends 
to be the countries below the $10,000 mark that often experience the most 
rapid increases in tourism growth, such as Cambodia or Mongolia.*   
• Having a high GDP per capita does not preclude violent conflicts taking place, 
as indicated in Table 6.5. 
• For many other countries, such as Venezuela, or Lebanon, the economic 
performance seems to be more of a reflection of political turmoil or events, 
rather than vice versa; a conclusion that the PITF reached (Goldstone et al, 
2005, p.21), stating that political instability creates economic turmoil, rather 
than the other way round. Furthermore, growth should not necessarily be 
equated with lessening political risks, leading to democratisation, nor to 
improvement in other areas of governance. 
• The combination of a low GDP per capita and high levels of poverty seems to 
be particularly potent combination in reflecting potential sources of conflict 
and tension in the political system, as Haiti illustrates. The South Africa data is 
                                                 
*
 This tends to reflect that the other countries tend to have more mature tourism markets, whilst the 
others are in a period of introduction and market growth 
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also of particular interest, as despite receiving some positive indicators 
elsewhere, the level of poverty is very high indeed, which points to a country 
which can be vulnerable to various hazardous events. 
• Looking at the countries with inflation over 10% seems to be a more useful 
threshold level to indicate potential problems. The most startling inflation rates 
relate to Zimbabwe, which if presented in graph form gives a dramatic 
indicator of problems, as illustrated in Figure 6.18, which compares the 
inflation rates with the other case study countries, grouped according to 
different GNP per Capita bands.  
• As an indicator of hazards and risk, what one should look for are the more 
rapid spikes of inflation (or deflation for that matter, as Haiti illustrates), 
which can act as another warning signal of actual or future problems. This can 
be given further refinement by looking at the IMF forecast. 
• Unemployment should be compared in relative, not absolute terms. For the 
developed countries, unemployment rates approaching 5% can have more 
serious implications on the political environment in comparison with lesser 
developed countries. Using a 10% threshold figure can help alert one to 
potentially more serious system tensions, which if accompanied by a youth 
bulge could lead to significant problems. One of the figures which is of 
particular interest is the very high levels of unemployment in South Africa, of 
around 25%, which puts its GDP and GDP per Capita in better perspective. 
• Although many models, albeit mainly credit or country risk models do focus 
on the level of debt and key trade indicators, such as the balance of 
payments, in terms of this analysis little clear pattern emerged. The theories of 
why they are important to examine are easy to appreciate, but in practice, in 
terms of looking at the actual data available, little of any significance was 
observed, despite many variations of the figures examined from the database 
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Figure 6.18 Illustrative comparisons of inflation rates 
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Source: IMF (2007) 
6.5.2 Social input indicators 
Interestingly, many models which are classified as political risk models, will often 
disaggregate the economic data for a separate analysis, whilst various social factors 
% 
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are blended in with the political factors, such as with the BERI, ICRG and Moody’s 
structured assessments. Here a stronger conceptual distinction is maintained between 
the two broad category sets: welfare conditions and the degree/basis of divisions in a 
society. A snapshot view of a variety of welfare indicators are presented in Table 
6.15, with the following key findings: 
• In examining the various mortality rate indicators, it perhaps becomes clearer 
why the PITF stresses that infant mortality rates are one of the best indicators 
of development, welfare and potential instability. * The figure of 157 deaths 
per thousand for Afghanistan is particularly startling. In comparison, the death 
rate and life expectancy, whilst still illustrating some important differences, 
are not as dramatic as the infant mortality data, with the exceptions of South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. 
• In terms of a threshold figure for infant mortality to act as a warning signal, 
the countries which have a rate of 40 deaths per thousand or more - 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Haiti, Nepal, South Africa, Cambodia, 
Zimbabwe, Iraq and Mongolia – with the exception of South Africa and 
Mongolia - have all experienced political turmoil and violence in recent years. 
Countries which see a rate between 10 and 40 deaths seem to have better 
quality welfare structures and institutions, which can act to strengthen the 
political system (the notion of a stabilizer), despite many problems and the 
incidence of conflicts. Countries that go below 10 deaths per thousands tend to 
be the democratic countries, with the exception of Cuba, but all are marked by 
greater degrees of stability in their own ways, but not immune to violence as 
Israel illustrates. 
•  The data on the HIV/Aids related deaths does help put some of the other 
figures in perspective, and point to the problems of Aids in Africa and many 
other developing countries.  
                                                 
*
 According to the Goldstone’s et al (2005, p.23) paper there are a number of additional factors which 
can increase the risk of instability, such as if they are classed as a partial democracy. In terms of the 
bands, they also note that the odds of instability for countries in the 75th percentile global infant 
mortality rates are 4 – 7 times higher than in countries at the 25th percentile. 
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• The indicator used for literacy should be treated with caution. The more 
literate a society becomes does not equate with stability, but can in fact help 
increase certain hazardous events, dependent on other factors, such as an 
increasing educational elite which can articulate and help mobilise groups and 
lead to tensions in the political system. It is a point which Testas (2004, p254) 
makes in relation to terrorism in a number of Middle East countries, where he 
found an interesting correlation between increased education and GDP per 
capita levels, with acts of terrorism. 
• The HDI is composite indicator which draws on three indicators (Life 
expectancy, education and income), and is often presented as a more realistic 
measures of human development, as argued by Monti-Belkaoui et al (1998, 
p115).Yet looking at the table, another mixed picture seems to emerge. Using 
the UN’s colour bands of High, Medium and Low*, one can see stronger links 
between serious levels of conflict hazards and stable systems, but the real 
difficulty is in interpreting the middle band. Looking at the countries, one 
could in fact divide this band further, using the 0.600 figure as a threshold, 
whereby the welfare conditions could contribute to greater stability and the 
capacity of the country to ride out political problems, whilst those countries 
below this level are more vulnerable. 
 
 
                                                 
*
 Which are High HDI (Value of + 0.8 and highlighted in yellow); Medium HDI (Value of + 0.5); and 
Low HDI (Below 0.5 and highlighted in blue). 
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 Table 6.14 Comparative analysis of key welfare indicators 
Country 
Infant 
Mort Country 
Death 
Rate Country 
Life 
Expectancy Country 
HIV/Aids 
Deaths Country 
Literacy 
% Country Population Country HDI (2005) 
Afghanistan  157.43 South Africa 22.45 Afghanistan 43.77 South Africa 370,000 Afghanistan 28% Afghanistan 31,889,923 Norway   0.968 (2005) 
Ethiopia 91.92 Zimbabwe 21.76 Bulgaria 72.57 India 310,000 Bulgaria 98% Bulgaria 7,322,858 Spain   0.949 (2005) 
Pakistan 68.84 Ethiopia 14.67 Cambodia 61.29 Zimbabwe 170,000 Cambodia 73.6 Cambodia 13,995,904 UK   0.946 (2005) 
Haiti 63.83 Bulgaria 14.28 Costa Rica 77.08 Ethiopia 120,000 Costa Rica 96 Costa Rica 4,133,884 
New 
Zealand 
  0.943 (2005) 
Nepal 63.66 Croatia 11.57 Croatia 74.9 Thailand 58,000 Croatia 98.1 Croatia 4,493,312 Israel 0.932 (2005) 
South Africa 59.44 Haiti 10.4 Cuba 77.08 Haiti 24,000 Cuba 99.8 Cuba 11,394,043 Croatia   0.850 (2005) 
Cambodia 58.45 UK 10.09 Egypt 71.57 Myanmar 20,000 Egypt 71.4 Egypt 80,335,036 Costa Rica   0.846 (2005) 
Myanmar 50.68 Spain 9.81 Ethiopia 49.23 Cambodia 15,000 Ethiopia 42.7 Ethiopia 76,511,887 Cuba   0.838(2005) 
Zimbabwe 51.12 Myanmar 9.33 Haiti 57.03 Pakistan 4,900 Haiti 52.9 Haiti 8,706,497 Bulgaria   0.824 
Iraq 47.04 Norway 9.37 India 68.59 Venezuela 4,100 India 61 India 1,129,866,154 Libyan    0.818 
Mongolia 42.65 Nepal 9.14 Indonesia 70.14 Nepal 3,100 Indonesia 90.4 Indonesia 234,693,997 Venezuela    0.792 
Turkey 38.33 Cambodia 8.24 Iran 70.56 Indonesia 2,400 Iran 77 Iran 65,397,521 Thailand   0.781 
Iran 38.12 Pakistan 8 Iraq 69.59 Spain 1,000 Iraq 74.1 Iraq 27,449,638 Turkey   0.775 
India 34.61 New Zealand 7.54 Israel 79.59 Costa Rica 900 Israel 97.1 Israel 6, 426,679 Lebanon   0.772 
Indonesia 32.14 Cuba 7.14 Lebanon 73.15 Iran 800 Lebanon 87.4 Lebanon 3,925,502 Iran    0.759 
Egypt 29.5 Thailand 7.1 Libya 76.88 Egypt 700 Libya  82.6 Libya  6,036,914 Sri Lanka   0.743 
Lebanon 23.39 India 6.58 Mongolia 66.99 UK 500 Mongolia 97.8 Mongolia 2,951,786 Indonesia   0.728 
Libya 22.82 Indonesia 6.25 Myanmar 62.49 Lebanon 200 Myanmar 89.9 Myanmar 47,373,958 Egypt   0.708 
Venezuela 22.52 Mongolia 6.21 Nepal 60.56 New Zealand 200 Nepal 48.6 Nepal 28,901,790 Mongolia   0.700 
Sri Lanka 19.45 Israel 6.17 New Zealand 78.96 Mongolia 200 New Zealand 99 New Zealand 4,115,771 South Africa   0.674 
Bulgaria 19.16 Lebanon 6.1 Norway 79.67 Cuba 200 Norway 100 Norway 4,627,926 India   0.619 
Thailand 18.45 Lebanon 6.1 Pakistan 63.75 Sri Lanka 200 Pakistan 49.9 Pakistan 164,741,924 Cambodia   0.598 
Costa Rica 9.45 Sri Lanka 6.01 South Africa 42.45 Norway 200 South Africa 86.4 South Africa 43,997,828 Myanmar   0.583 
Israel 6.75 Turkey 6 Spain 79.67 Israel 100 Spain 97.7 Spain 40,448,191 Pakistan   0.551 
Croatia 6.6 Iraq 5.26 Sri Lanka 74.8 Bulgaria 100 Sri Lanka 90.7 Sri Lanka 20,926,315 Nepal 0.526  
Cuba 6.04 Egypt 5.11 Thailand 72.55 Croatia 10 Thailand 92.9 Thailand 65,068,148 Zimbabwe 0.505 
New Zealand 5.67 Venezuela 5.08 Turkey 72.88 Afghanistan NA Turkey 87.4 Turkey 71,158,647 Haiti 0.467 (2004) 
UK 5.01 Costa Rica 4.39 UK 78.7 Iraq NA UK 99 UK 60,776,238 Ethiopia 0.367 (2004) 
Spain 4.31 Libya 3.47 Venezuela 73.28 Libya  NA Venezuela 97 Venezuela 26,023,528 Afghanistan N/A  
Norway 3.64 Norway NA Zimbabwe 39.5 Turkey NA Zimbabwe 90.7 Zimbabwe 12,311,143 Iraq N/A  
Source: CIA World Fact Book (2007), UN (2007) and World Bank (2007). All data is for 2006, unless indicated otherwise.
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The second key set of social indicators relates to those which reflect the divisions 
within a society. The basis of the differences can be broadly based around notions of 
ethnicity, language, religion and economic. At its most basic level, the theory is that 
the greater the differences in a society, the greater the potential for a source of conflict 
and schisms, together with its impact on the notion of legitimacy and the 
‘demonstration effect.’ The volume of the data means that it does not lend itself for 
distillation to a single simple table, and so is presented in a more detailed table which 
can be found in Appendix K. From that data a number of points can be observed:  
• One should interpret the percentage distributions of different groups with 
caution. One of the critical factors that can modify the risk relates to the type 
of political system these different groups operate in and the opportunities and 
methods of interest arbitration and representation. When democratic processes 
are introduced to countries, where the political culture is based more on the 
experience of autocracy rather than democracy, then in the short term at least, 
this can lead to a great deal of uncertainty and potential conflict as the politics 
fragment on ethnic or religious lines, the danger of which can be seen in the 
break up of Yugoslavia, or in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
• Groups do not have to be significant in terms of size to generate political 
hazards, such as protests, acts of terrorism or even larger scale violent 
conflicts, or by becoming victims of state persecution and violence. Whilst the 
former can have many impacts in relation to operational risks for the tourism 
operator, the latter can raise some particularly important risks in relation to 
ethics. The MAR (2007) database is particularly useful here as it gives an 
insight into the degrees of tolerance and integration, or groups who may be 
vulnerable to scapegoating * for all countries.  
• When looking at these differences, it is important to not only view them as a 
source of potential conflict, but also in terms of a tourist resource, as the 
seeking of ‘difference’ is a key dynamic in the tourism industry. 
                                                 
*Using qualitative work, such as the reports published by Freedom House, or Amnesty International, 
helps give further corroboration. 
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6.5.3 Environmental indicators 
Whereas for the area of social and economic factors there can be a huge wealth of  
data to act as indicators – too much even – for the area of environmental drivers of 
change, the actual sources of data can be much scarcer, or less tangible. Yet 
environmental factors and how they can drive conflict, with the exception of the 
newer models such as the FSI, or PMSU, emerged as a key gap in many of the older, 
structured models of political and country risk assessment discussed in Chapter 4.  
The essence of the argument relates to how various pressures, such as population 
growth, can place more competition for scarce resources, which can sometimes result 
in conflict, as groups seek to secure resources. Whilst the essence of this argument has 
a long heritage, going back to Malthus’s theory of over-population, it has been greatly 
refined in recent years, such as with the work by Homer-Dixon (1994) or by Baechler, 
Spilmann and Suliman (2002). Whilst there is some disagreement as to the true extent 
that the environment, its degradation and increased competition contributes to conflict 
or state failure, there is wider acceptance that it is still an important factor which 
needs consideration.  
The problem in the context of this work was finding the suitable indicators and 
databases. Population growth and examining youth bulges * is one accessible 
indicator, but it needs to be compared with other measures, such as the key resources 
which may be competed for. The CIA World Fact Book offers some basic, useful 
background information in terms of the environment, ranging from the climate, 
natural hazards and a useful overview key environmental issues and major infectious 
diseases (data, incidentally which is also useful for more general risk assessments). 
The problem is that the data is difficult to compare across the large number of case 
study countries. In theory, a greater range of more quantifiable indicators relating to 
the environment can be found, such as using the World Bank database, which has a 
variety of measures, such as forest area, CO2 emissions, and the percentage of the 
population with improved water access. On closer examination, however, the only 
figure which tends to be more consistently represented relates to deforestation, which 
is one of the reasons why the Peace and Conflict Reports produced by CIFP utilise 
this as one of their six key indicators to forecast instability and conflict. In the context 
of this work however, nothing conclusive was discovered. 
                                                 
*
 MIPT present the UN data in a very accessible manner. 
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6.5.4 Key actor indicators 
 For some political risk models, such as the PRS approach, analysing the key actors 
forms a central part of the method for risk assessment, which adapts the PRINCE 
model.* Other approaches use a less structured approach, such as the PMSU which 
simply offers a range of sample pro-formas with which the key actors can be tracked.  
In terms of the general theory, there can be some discussion as to what extent 
individuals or groups shape events and the political environment, or are the product of 
events and the political environment (or economic conditions if one approaches it 
from a Marxist perspective). The approach taken here is that individuals and groups 
do matter in terms of analysis, but not so concerned with the extent they are drivers of 
change, or are driven themselves by the system. 
Using a focused comparative approach for analysing the key actors was limited, in 
that it could only focus on a number of more indirect indicators, such as the 
percentage of GDP per military expenditure. The analysis was helpful for constructing 
some more refined categories with which to analyse the key actors, which can be used 
later in Chapter 7. These categories were:  
• Leaders of governments 
• Heads of key governmental departments 
• Leaders of parties 
• Political parties 
• Pressure groups 
• Military 
• Heads of governments and political parties of neighbouring countries  
• Heads of governments and political parties of neighbouring countries 
of other influential countries  
• Terrorist/insurgency groups 
• Key trading partners 
In terms of more specific findings from the data collected on some of the key 
indicators presented in Appendix L, only a few points are worth noting. These are:  
                                                 
*
 This model was developed in 1969, with a key part of the method focusing on the key players and 
their position in the political system and how they could influence the type of regime in the future. 
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• In terms of the analysis the CIA (2007) and the World Bank Development 
(2007) indicators were useful in collecting data for some broad measures, but 
limited in terms of the qualitative analysis, as more detailed source materials 
are needed, such as the news related databases. 
• The number of parties can give an indication of the degree of 
instability/stability of the system to a point, such as Afghanistan having 79 
parties, but little can really be discerned in terms of effectiveness, or openness 
(this is where the process measures discussed earlier are useful, such as the 
freedom classification). Iran illustrates this latter point, as it has eight listed 
parties, but the reality is that they are weak institutions and conduits of 
opposition.  
• One can examine the variety of terrorist groups and track their development, 
as groups which may initially appear as insignificant (the weak signal), but 
which can rise to contest power through force, as noted earlier in the 
discussion on terrorism. 
• Examining the key trading partner data from the World Bank (2007), or the 
IMF (2007), can give an indication of how the economy may be tied in and 
dependent on the fortunes of others, which can be useful when considering 
connections to other countries and how changes there may affect the host 
country. 
• The one indicator which did lend itself to a proper, broad comparative analysis 
related to military expenditure as a ratio to a country’s GNP. This is used as an 
indicator by a variety of writers, such as Monti-Bekaoui et al (1998, p.115), 
Brink (2004, p.133), or  models, such as the ICRG, EIU and the CIDCM 
Peace and Conflict models, which  use it to indicate the strength of the 
military in politics. For convenience the data was obtained from the World 
Fact Book (CIA  2007). The country with the highest percentage is Iraq, with 
8.3% which perhaps reflects not only the role of the military, but the high level 
of violence and instability, together with its modest GDP levels. Next is Israel, 
with a value of 7.3%, which also seems to better reflect its heightened security 
situation, rather than the risk of a military coup. Exploring further, one begins 
   205 
to notice more limitations with this indicator. Pakistan and Thailand have 
experienced military coups in recent years, yet they record 3.2% and 1.8% 
respectively, which whilst relatively high, is by no means exceptional, whilst 
the military regime in Myanmar records a level of 2.1%. In terms of a possible 
alert threshold, 3% or more (Cuba, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Pakistan Lebanon, 
Cambodia and Indonesia all record values over 3%), can act as a simple 
warning signal.  
6.5.5 Discussion of the key input indicators and databases 
For some reading this relatively short discussion on input indicators it may seem 
remarkably brief. It should however be re-emphasised that many more factors and 
indicators were looked at, but what is distilled here are the indicators which are 
characterised by their ease of access, and which generated some findings of interest. 
The analogous black swan input indicators stress again the vital necessity not to look 
at indicators in isolation, but in combination, to try and reflect unique complex 
political systems.  
Some examples can be used to illustrate these points. In theory, GDP data gives a 
basic measure of the total economic output of a country in a given year, as such it can 
be used as an initial basic indicator of the level of development of a country. To gain a 
better perspective in terms of the wealth of a country, the GDP data is divided by the 
population (per capita) and sometimes used as an indicator of poverty, or relative 
deprivation; a factor which is cited by various writers as a key driver of either stability 
(Crick 2000, p.174), war (PMSU 2005, p.23), unrest (Calvert 2001, p.299), or 
terrorism (Harmon 2000, p.146). PMSU (2005, p.23) refine this theory further by 
saying that vulnerability can be increased when it is tied in with a history of conflict 
and weak political institutions, along with the state’s ability to arbitrate interest, which 
is intimately related to the type of political system. The problem with this indicator is 
that it gives little indication of the distribution of wealth in a country, hence the use of 
the poverty indicator, as it gives an additional insight into the degree the society is 
stratified. 
South Africa is of interest here, whereby it can have relatively high GNP per Capita, 
but is also marked by significant inequalities as revealed by the poverty and various 
welfare indicators. The fact that it does not have more problems can be partly 
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explained by the nature of its political system and the quality of the institutions, which 
act to stabilise the system. Overall however, despite a lack of occurrence of certain 
hazardous events in the past, it does not mean they are immune to them in the future, 
as many of the input indicators point to a system which can be vulnerable, only 
needing a few precipitous key trigger events to unleash political turmoil and conflict.  
What is also important to appreciate is the role of theory, not necessarily in 
constructing specific, deterministic mathematical models, but in terms of a cultural 
mindset when looking for clues, or warning signals when trying to interpret the data. 
One such theory is the use the J-Curve and the Frustration Gap theory discussed in 
Chapter 4; which is of particular interest when reflecting upon Zimbabwe’s GDP 
growth and inflation rates, where the dramatic spikes in the curves indicating periods 
of growth, stagnation and rampant inflation, and which are of use in the construction 
of scenarios. 
6.6 Chapter discussion and summary  
The four key discussion sections in this Chapter - Section 6.2.6 on ready made 
assessments; Section 6.3.3 on outputs; Section 6.4.3 on processes; and Section 6.5.5 
on inputs - illustrate both the wide variety of data which can be used, and a direction 
for the analysis and assessment. Indeed it can be the issue of resources, such as the 
time available for political risk analysis, which can play a key role in sorting out 
which ‘essentials’ can actually be feasibly be analysed. What is of particular interest 
is that rather than trying to begin political risk process by focusing on the more 
complex input causation factors, as is attempted in many models, it can be better to 
work steadily through a process where this actually comes at the end. Simply put, this 
analysis and discussion of numerous factors, indicators and databases revealed how it 
is more than possible to make an assessment of risk, without understanding what 
causes the hazards and risks. Whilst some may not like this, it should be remembered 
that one of the reasons for conducting a risk assessment, as Rayfield (1988, p.173) 
notes in relation to the General Motors model, is that it is not necessarily about 
predicting political instability or upheaval, but to try to give an indication of the level 
of uncertainty and the potential for change and so act as a guide for management 
decision-making and actions.  
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The key point of using the black swan analogy was to act as a reminder about the 
danger of generalisations, and the potential of the unexpected event. That is why no 
iron laws of determinism that can be perfectly modelled using statistical data are 
developed here. The findings of the operators’ experiences illustrated this complexity 
of systems, where seemingly unconnected events affect demand in both positive and 
negative ways. The example of the company, whose tours to the Alps were affected 
by the UK government’s response of shutting the countryside in response to the Foot 
and Mouth outbreak, is illustrative of this complexity, showing the lack of linearity of 
causation and the vital need to always contextualise risk management processes. It is a 
complexity which is further compounded by the variety of clients who will respond 
differently to events, depending on their available heuristic experiences.  
The notion of the black swans also gives an insight into another problem. It has long 
been recognised in project management that people become committed to projects 
early, resulting in difficulties to dissuade people to change from the initial course of 
action decided, with Wells (1998, p.27) commenting on the number of stories where 
analysts warnings fall on deaf ears with senior managers. If this is the case, then the 
data collection process becomes an exercise to find any pieces of information to 
support what Schwartz (2001, p.43) describes as the ‘collective self-delusion,’ rather 
than a process to help make objective judgements. The implication of the black swan 
is that it will always be possible to find some information to support an action or a 
viewpoint. 
 To help deal with the problem, what emerged was the vital importance of systems 
theory, which encourages collection of data focusing on different parts of the system. 
The principle here is one of triangulation, whereby data is collected from different 
sources, sometimes to verify information, but at other times to simply cast a different 
perspective on the area being analysed. What was also illustrated is how one can add 
to the layers of complexity in the analysis, recognising that it is more than possible to 
make assessments of risk with limited information, or without understanding 
causation, but which reflects an operational reality for many organisations. This was 
an important clarification about the direction of the analysis, as some ambiguity 
emerged about this from the review of the literature in the previous chapters. This 
approach is one certainly not expected at the begin
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anticipated that a more structured, inductive model would be developed. What it does 
however provide is a solid basis for the construction of a model, which is explained 
and utilised in Chapter 7. 
The area where there is still ambiguity relates to the assessment scales which could be 
used, if of course they are relevant at all. For this, a more intimate analysis is needed, 
where these various process elements can be explored for a specific case study, which 
is where the next chapter comes in. What has also not been examined in any real 
detail, are the many tools which can be utilised in analysis and assessments, such as 
trend extrapolation, scenario writing and many other techniques, so these too will be 
returned to in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 
Bringing it all together: model application 
7.1 Introduction 
The comparative analysis and discussion of databases and potential indicators in 
Chapter 6 clarified not only what should be examined, but also the direction of 
analysis and assessment. Using this information, a tourism relevant risk model is 
developed in this Chapter, which is designed to analyse and assesses political hazards, 
and the risks these may generate. It also continues to pay particular attention to the 
objective of clarifying the language and process of risk management, by utilising a 
vocabulary that would be more familiar to tourism operators. This Chapter examines 
this model in relation to a single case study country (Ethiopia) and partly through a 
single adventure organisation (XCL expeditions) to gain a deeper insight of the value 
of the model, the indicators and databases utilised, along with the analytical tools 
applied.  
7.2 Explaining the model 
This section focuses primarily on explaining the model that has been developed, 
focusing on how it has synthesised existing work, together with highlighting some of 
its new, more original features.  
7.2.1 Originality of the model and the assessment results for Ethiopia  
Let’s begin at the end. What is presented in Table 7.1 are some sample extracts of an 
operational and strategic risk of the key political hazards a tourism organisation could 
be exposed to if operating in Ethiopia, based on pre-August 2007 data, which is drawn 
from the more detailed assessment and analysis table, in Appendix M. The reason 
why this work begins with sample extracts of a completed assessment is to show how 
a finished assessment table could look, and then from this, explain how it was 
constructed and what is original about the model and methods used. 
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Table 7.1 August 2007 political risk analysis and assessment (sample extract) 
Possible hazardous 
events/outcomes 
identified 
Likelihood (and 
location if 
appropriate) 
(R) 
Possible risk 
impacts and 
severity rating (S) 
Control measures Qualitative 
comment 
Sample 1 - Changes in government  
Military coup 2 Low  4/5 If cancel trip because of FO 
travel warning 
2/4; If expedition/tour is already 
in Ethiopia it can depend on the 
repercussions, ranging from a 2, 
where the destination image is 
affected, going up to a 4 if 
evacuation is needed.  
 
Ensure details of consulate are held 
and how. 
Regular communication via Satellite 
phone with UK base. 
Although military coups 
having taken place in the past 
there are few indicators in the 
short to medium term this is 
likely to occur again. Issues of 
ethics and reputation may need 
to be considered. The coup in 
Thailand in 2006 illustrates an 
instance where it had 
remarkably little effect on 
tourists. The key impacts can 
relate to demonstrations, riots 
and impositions of curfews. 
Sample 2 -Structural workings of government 
Bribery, corruption 
&  ‘passes’ 
3 dealing with 
government/officials 
2 Failure to pay may prevent 
travel, results in intimidation 
resulting in fear and expedition 
experience affected. 
4  If it is to secure a 
project/contract and it is exposed 
in relation to 
reputation/regulation. 
 
-Avoid key border areas where 
‘fees’ may be ‘requested’ 
-Avoid paying bribes to secure 
projects. 
-Prepare group members that bribes 
may be asked for by government 
officials/police when travelling. 
The risks for more significant 
capital based projects, such as a 
hotel development are much 
higher. 
 
If it is part of an expedition, 
then risks are lower, but 
possible. 
 
 
Sample 3 - Conflicts 
War/border 
incursions & conflict 
Refugees. 
Government 
mobilises troops to 
deal with 
incursions/terrorists/ 
invasion. 
4 border areas with Eritrea 
(Tigray and Afar regions 
highly militarised) 
2 Djibouti 
3 border areas with Sudan 
3 border areas with Sudan 
3 border areas with Somalia 
All these conflicts seem set 
to continue over the next 
five years, with few positive 
signals emerging that things 
will get better.  
3 Travel disruptions, 2 to 4  travel 
restrictions, 4 cancellations,  
4 Ethical risks if travelling to 
areas with refugee populations. 
4/5 victim of violence (injury and 
death). 
3/5 on reputation, depending on 
FCO advice. 
Track news, contact addresses of 
key clients to send updates/deal with 
enquiries.  
Avoid border areas. 
Insurance cover. 
Subscribe to bulletin services by key 
government advice sites for 
Ethiopia and its neighbours. 
The border areas remain highly 
sensitive, particularly as 
conflicts can overspill, such as 
with Somalia and Sudan. 
One of the impacts of conflicts 
are refugees, whereby this can 
raise serious ethical questions 
of travelling to areas. If the 
work has an aid element to it 
this can change aspects of the 
risks. 
Landmines  3 all Border areas with Eritrea and Somalia. 
4/5 Severe injury/death. 
4/5 Reputation, particularly if 
ignored government advice. 
Avoid travelling to these areas. If do 
find these problems, then avoid 
going off road. 
The full extent of the risk is 
difficult to gauge, but here it is 
far better to err on the side of 
caution 
Terrorism:  
Bombings/shootings  
 
 
3 Addis 
3 Jijigi /Ogaden region. 
 
4/5 Group members injured/ 
killed.   
FO Issues Travel Warning 
3 Group making detours 
3 Communication disruptions 
 
 
-Adhere to FCO advice to protect 
reputation. -Validate insurance, 
adhere to regulation. 
-Avoid the open, public spaces 
where foreign nationals congregate. 
Acts of terrorism, although 
relatively infrequent have been 
marked by high severity rating 
in terms of the number killed. 
The key acts recorded relate to 
primarily bombings, 
particularly by hand grenades 
thrown into crowded areas, 
kidnapping and shootings.  
Note that UK FCO class it as a 
‘High Threat’ 
Train 
derailment/sabotage 
3 for the Ethiopia/Djibouti 
route. 
2 Travel disruptions. 
4/5 Injury/death from crash. 
4/5 Reputation if ignored advice. 
Avoid train travel as should not be 
needed as part of the expedition. 
Although the US and Canada 
say train travel should be 
avoided; the low frequency and 
travel blogs can give a different 
perspective. 
Government arrests 
oppositions groups, 
arbitrary arrests, 
summary executions 
Amnesty/Freedom 
House publicise 
abuses 
 
Government 
repression in 
Gambella,  
3 Key towns in Ogeden,  
(rising to 4 at next election) 
3 Gambella (ethnic unrest),  
3 Northern Afar 
3/4 foreign governments’ 
condemnation of human 
rights abuses. 
 
4 Ethical risks in relation to 
human rights abuses 
3 travel restrictions  
3 Reputation. 
2 /4 Travel disruptions. 
 
Consider ethical position and 
articulate policy of how one can 
deal with this issue. This clarifies 
the significance or impact value. 
Inform group and what can be done 
to help (at home not in country, 
such as supporting Amnesty 
International campaigns). 
Increased risk in certain areas 
and time. This is very difficult, 
although in theory it raises 
many serious issues, it is one 
which many can find 
convenient to ignore. The 
question is the extent the 
organisation wishes to deal 
with it. 
Source: Author (see Appendix M  for the more detailed assessment) 
Looking at Table 7.1 one may initially be struck by how unremarkable the 
information looks and how familiar the layout seems. Indeed, in many ways it is 
important that it does have these features, as simplicity of use and regularity of format 
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is a desired objective. In Chapter 4, Section 4.7 it was argued that whilst the analysis 
stage was the most complex, it was the assessment where the analysis needed to be 
turned into something more tangible to aid in decision making. To stay true to this 
principle, the presentation of the assessments should be characterised by a certain 
degree of brevity and familiarity with the concepts and descriptors used to aid 
communication, as without understanding, risk management can be a pointless 
exercise. 
Despite the first impressions of familiarity and being unremarkable, there are in fact a 
number of original features in the approach taken. In the first instance, it should be 
noted that the concept of a political hazard is utilised: a usage highlighted in Chapter 
3, Section 3.4 as rarely referred to in the literature on political risk, but widely used in 
other areas of risk management, particularly in adventure tourism. Having discovered 
no reason why the concept could not be used in political risk management, it seemed 
appropriate to try and utilise the concept, as this would have the advantage of 
developing a single language of risk appropriate for all aspects of an organisation’s 
operational and strategic risk management processes. 
It should also be observed that the concept of the political hazard is intimately related 
to the adaptation of systems theory (Chapter 5, Section 5.3) and adopting a fourth 
age risk paradigm (Chapter 1, Box 1.2 and Chapter 5, Section 5.3), whereby the 
system output events are regarded as having the potential to generate both upside and 
downside risks for an organisation, together with being grounded in complex systems.  
Whilst there can still be a tendency to focus on the negative aspects of risk, the whole 
point of adopting a fourth age paradigm is to act as cognitive prompt, reminding one 
that alternative patterns and opportunities should be considered. It is not always easy, 
but then that is the point of self-consciously utilising a particular paradigm. The fact 
that there are relatively few upside or opportunity risks highlighted for Ethiopia is a 
reflection of the analysis and how the indicators did not always point to many 
opportunities. 
There are a number of other more general points that mark out the model developed 
here as more distinct in comparison with other political risk assessments. Unlike a 
number of the structured political risk models, discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2, 
no attempt is made to reduce the assessment values to a single composite score, as this 
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was highlighted in Chapter 6, Section 6.3 as often being of limited value, because it 
fails to properly consider how the political hazards only become a risk when an 
organisations operations bisect, or interact with the event in some way (the point of 
interaction discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2). Such composite approaches are 
particularly poor in conveying how the hazards and risks vary according to geography 
and time. In relation to Table 7.1 it should be observed how the risks are adjusted 
according to geography, particularly the border areas, and in relation to time, where 
certain hazards increase in likelihood, such as when the 2010 election approaches. 
In Table 7.1 the key control measures are also identified and are presented using the 
familiar framework identified in Chapter 4, Section 4.8. The purpose of this is to 
illustrate how one can refine the presentation of information to aid in the process of 
communication, by using a framework many tourist operators would be familiar with, 
and to help focus attention on the control measures. What is vital to underline is that 
although it clearly emerges from Table 7.1 that Ethiopia has many political hazards 
that could generate numerous risks for a tourism organisation, it does not mean no 
travel should take place, rather that the control measures need to be given careful 
consideration, which can often relate to avoiding certain areas, at certain times. To 
ignore these control measures means that if an incident was to occur, no matter how 
remote in probability terms, it could have profound implications for the organisation. 
7.2.3 Explaining the scales used 
When looking at the data produced in Table 7.1 a five-point risk scale is used in 
relation to a notion of probability and severity of outcome. It was one of the 
unresolved issues from Chapter 6 as to what should be the most appropriate scale and 
descriptions to use. The decision taken after reflecting on and comparing the different 
scales was to try to utilise a five-point scale. The rationale for this was simple. 
Although in relation to the operators, the three-point scale was the most popular, the 
Office of Government Commerce (2002) comment that if too small a scale is used, 
then it can be difficult to identify the most significant risks that need attention. 
Equally, in relation to the commonly used seven point scale for some of the 
country/political risk models, this was rarely used by operators, together with few 
examples found of how they can be utilised for both a likelihood and severity scale. A 
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compromise scale, which can be found in all subject fields, was to try and utilise a 
five-point scale.   
This scale also focuses on the hazard, and the likelihood of risks and the potential 
severity of their outcome. An approach, it should be emphasised, rarely utilised in any 
of the political risk models, despite being a familiar approach in other risk 
management subject fields, noted in Chapter 3, Section 3.3, and there being no 
reason found for it not being adopted. The scales developed for this work are 
presented in Table 7.2. In relation to the likelihood scale it illustrates how a range of 
numeric and qualitative descriptors can be used to convey a sense of probability that a 
hazardous event could take place. For the severity scale, this is where the table weaves 
together a variety of scales in a more original way, as it illustrates how different scales 
can be developed to better reflect a wider range of risk impact categories. For a fuller 
understanding of the variety of key impact areas, one can refer back to Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3 and Table 3.2.  In that section a typology of risk was developed, which 
gave particular attention to the key areas an organisation could be impacted on, which 
primarily related to people, physical assets, financial assets, regulations, reputation, 
ethics, emotional factors and operational practices.  
In order to make the severity scale properly operational, it is essential that it is 
contextualised to the organisation itself: what the Office of Government Commerce 
(2002, p.23) termed as setting the ‘tolerances,’ which they say can clarify the ‘appetite 
for risk.’ This is easier to do in relation to financial and physical risk tolerances or 
thresholds, which should be considered in relative, not absolute terms. For example, 
whilst the loss of £10,000 from cancelled tours could have a relatively minor impact 
on a large tour operator, and so be classified as a ‘Low Impact,’ for a micro adventure 
operator it could represent a more severe outcome in terms of their turnover and so be 
classified as ‘High Impact.’ There is also the notion of ‘proximity,’ which the Office 
of Government Commerce (2002) describes as relating to how risks will vary over 
time. In the context of this work however, this notion of proximity is used not only to 
refer to time frames, or when, but also to the actual geographic locations, or where, in 
order to reflect the key spatial characteristic of tourism. The importance of this should 
already be apparent in Table 7.1 whereby the risks are adjusted according to the 
locations.  
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 Table 7.2 Sample probability/severity assessment scales 
Numeric Qualitative  1 2 3 4 5 
90% 
or more 
Very high/certain 5      
70% or 
more 
High/possible 
 
4      
50% 
less/more 
Medium 3      
30% or 
less  
Low 
 
2      
10% or 
less 
Very 
Low/ 
Insignificant 
1      
 
 Physical 
and 
psychologic
al impacts 
(People) 
Self treatment 
e.g. cuts or 
bruises light  
First aid required Injury that needs 
medical treatment 
Severe harm 
which results in 
disability/impair
ment  
Death  
 
  
Physical 
impacts 
(Equipment/
buildings) 
 
Minor knocks 
or scratches 
to equipment 
 
Damage occurs, 
but operations 
not affected, 
more aesthetic 
loss 
 
Damage which can 
be repaired and 
continue to utilise, 
but creates 
delays/loss in value 
 
Damage to 
equipment or 
building which 
prevents usage in 
the short to 
medium term 
 
Loss of all 
equipment or 
physical 
resources 
such as 
vehicle or 
building with 
no possibility 
of future 
usage 
 
 Financial 
loss  
Very 
insignificant 
losses which 
will hardly be 
noticed 
Some loss, but 
easily absorbed  
Impacts on short 
term revenues or 
profits 
Significant 
financial loss 
which affects 
short term 
viability of the 
organisation 
 Bankruptcy  
 
 Reputation  Some 
comments, 
but no 
residual 
legacy 
Questions raised, 
but little or no 
effect on 
reputation  
Reputation affected 
so people may 
consider alternatives 
Credibility 
severely damaged 
and rebuilding 
confidence 
necessary 
All credibility 
lost 
 
 Operational  
 
Minor delays 
and 
inconvenienc
es 
Delays of  
Some hours 
Delays of some days Postponement of 
activities to later 
date 
Complete 
cancellation 
of activities 
 
 Ethical 
(overlaps 
with 
reputation) 
 
Minor ethical 
issues 
compromised 
(little while 
lie principle) 
Questions raised 
as to the rightness 
and wrongness of 
travel  
Ambiguity whether 
ethical guidelines or 
regulations are 
compromised 
A number of 
ethical 
regulations or 
guides are 
compromised 
Many or all 
moral/ethical 
statements 
clearly 
contradicted 
(see also 
reputation) 
 Severity 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
 
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y 
Pp
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y 
  
There is one further crucial difficulty to consider: how does one convey the possible 
opportunity risk impacts? Whilst the likelihood scales can remain the same, in terms 
of developing comparable opportunity impact scales for all the impact categories is 
far more difficult, but not impossible. To take the physical/psychological people 
category for example, one knows that the travel can not only bring physical harm, but 
also make people fitter, or deliver many ‘flow’ experiences, which is particularly 
important in relation to satisfaction and human happiness, but this can be difficult to 
measure in precise, quantitative terms.  In relation to reputation, it was an interesting 
observation made of XCL of how its reputation had been enhanced at times of crisis 
on previous expeditions, whereby their prompt and decisive action gave confidence in 
the people and organisation for future activities. In relation to equipment and 
buildings, or regulation, these notions of opportunities are the most difficult to specify 
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where one may have to accept at times that an opportunity risk impact cannot be done.  
This does not devalue the approach, as the key is to adopt a fourth age risk paradigm 
as a cultural mindset, which influences how risks are viewed and that opportunities 
can always exist. 
7.3 Further reflections and insights into political risk factors, 
indicators and databases 
The data from the previous tables was essentially formulated from the process model 
illustrated in Diagram 7.1. On first perusal this diagram may appear more like a 
framework than a model. What should be appreciated is that this diagram is based on 
the system model developed in Chapter 3 (Diagram 3.1), and the process stages 
distilled in Chapter 4, with the factors for analysis and the key databases given 
further refinement in Chapter 6. When combined, this forms a model as it is the 
representation of the political system and how risks can be identified, analysed and 
assessed. This model is designed to clarify the research process in terms of what to 
look for (the hazards), what to look at (the factors and indicators), and where to look 
for the information (the databases). It should be appreciated that although the table is 
presented in stages, in practice the analysis and assessment is not always quite as neat 
as this, particularly when certain key databases are accessed which can provide a 
mixture of the input, output and process indicating data, such as the CIA World Fact 
Book. It also perhaps underplays how dynamic the process has to be, where one needs 
to constantly monitor and revise the analysis and assessments. It does however help 
provide a simple structure with which to further reflect and discuss some of the 
additional findings found when looking at the factors, indicators and databases for a 
single case study, and so it structures the rest of the discussion in this Chapter. 
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Diagram 7.1 Political risk model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Stage 3 – Analysis of 
events/outputs indicators 
- Frequency profiles of key hazardous events 
- Risk ratings 
- Contextualised to specific areas and targets 
- Control measures. 
 
Stage 1 – Context 
analysis 
Nature of the organisation 
- What is at risk? 
- Who is at risk? 
- Client profile 
- Preliminary hazard identification. 
- Risk tolerances clarified (physical, 
financial, etc.) 
- Destinations tourism industry 
assessment 
 
Stage 2 –  Analysis of existing risk 
database (hazard identification): 
- Government travel advice databases consulted 
- Open country risk assessments consulted 
- Consideration can be given to utilise fee paying databases 
- What are the key hazards/risks identified contextualised to specific 
areas or regions? 
- Summary of risk categorisations 
- Identifying recommended control measures from other databases. 
 
Stage 5 - Analysis of underlying conditions/inputs/drivers 
                  -Macro and micro economic conditions  
-Social cleavages   
-Social and welfare conditions 
-Key actors (e.g. role of military) 
-Environmental factors 
-International interaction drivers 
Stage 4 – Analysis and 
political system 
- System classification using key databases. 
- Quality of institutions.  
- Assessment of government effectiveness. 
 
Stage 6 - Assess, control and reflect 
- Record, sign and date records 
- Actions required/clarified 
- Communication of control measures 
- Review, reflect and update records 
- Adjust analysis, assessments and control measures 
- Control – take, avoid, transfer or reduce 
- Reflect on assessments after control measures 
Monitor for spark/catalyst events  
Elections, death of political figures, 
diplomatic incidents etc. 
Scan news, subscribe to bulletin services, 
particularly the government advice sites. 
Update and revise analysis and assessments. 
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7.3.1 Reflection on the context process stage (Stage 1)  
The vital necessity of contextualising risk management was initially highlighted in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3, which emphasised the importance of understanding an 
organisation’s clients through the theory of heuristics. Later in Chapter 4, Section 
4.4, it was stressed that in order to properly understand the risk exposure of the 
organisation, one must understand the nature of the organisation and its tourism 
product base. The importance of this was further highlighted by some of the primary 
data collected in Chapter 6, Section 6.2, whereby it was illustrated how organisations 
could be affected by political events in different ways, dependent on the type of 
clients they catered for. It was for these reasons that XCL was examined in more 
detail in order to gain a better sense of their risk exposure, with the rationale for their 
selection discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.5. The focus for the analysis was 
XCL’s expedition to Ethiopia for August 2007, which had a two year lead in time, 
and was a not-for-profit expedition, involving a number community development 
projects, such as helping to improve a school building in a poor village. Whilst the 
expedition would involve seeing some tourist sites, part of the appeal was that it 
would tend to avoid more mainstream tourist destinations.  
There were two key parts to the research conducted with XCL. The first was to 
examine the client base through the heuristic model developed in Chapter 2, Section 
2.3 and presented as Diagram 2.1. The second was to test the value of the dimensions 
of risk, identified in Chapter 4, and presented in Diagram 4.2, in terms of the factors 
that affect the degree of risk exposure to the organisation. These were then adapted 
for a series of simple reflection questions in order to better identify the risk 
tolerances, discussed in the previous section, based on the physical, people, financial, 
ethical, emotional, reputational and regulatory risk impacts. The relevant data was 
then collected primarily via a mixture of questionnaires, interviews and observations 
made whilst attending a training weekend in May 2007, followed up by additional 
telephone and email discussions. 
Examining the data collected from the group, a number of observations can be made. 
The first is how the group membership immediately challenges any simplistic 
preconceptions that adventure travel is the domain of the young, often male and 
simply linked to high adrenalin based sports. The group profile clearly illustrates a 
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more complex and interesting picture. Of the fourteen members surveyed the 
following profiles emerge: 
• 8 of the members were over 40 years of age. 
• 4 of the members were over 50 years of age. 
• 10 of the expedition members were female. 
• 7 are married, 3 single, 3 divorced, 1 long-term partner. 
• 6 of the group have children, all of whom are over 18 years of age. 
• 10 have mortgages. 
• Occupations ranged from: secretary, project manager (x2), medical research, 
bank manager, doctor (x2), manufacturing manager, housewife, IT manager, 
teacher, tutor, and head of learning, fire-fighter. 
A summary of the responses to the questions asked about what individuals thought 
were the key risks they may come across and would need to be controlled during the 
expedition,* can be found in Appendix N. From the responses, it is clear that the 
group had a good understanding and sense of perspective of the range of risks that 
travel to Ethiopia could entail, such as in relation to the risk of kidnapping and war, 
which, whilst causing some initial concerns, did not ultimately reduce the 
determination to travel to Ethiopia.  
These responses were also reflected upon in relation to the various factors that can 
affect the perception of risk, using the heuristic model developed in Chapter 2, 
Diagram 2.1 and Table 2.1. A number of points of interest are worthwhile noting.   
The first relates to the notion of the degree of direct learning and familiarity. In the 
case of the Ethiopia expedition, twelve of the fourteen members felt that the media 
did not tend to present an accurate picture of Ethiopia, making such comments that it 
can often focus too much on negative events, such as famine and war. Looking at the 
group’s previous travel experiences (supplemented with informal interviews) it was 
clear that many of the group members were experienced travellers to lesser-developed 
countries and the demands this would place on them, with three having already having 
travelled to Ethiopia. Another important factor that seemed to shape their perceptions 
and their willingness to undertake many of the risks, related to the high degree of 
situational control the group had. This was reflected in the fact that everyone was 
                                                 
*
 Which it should be noted did not ask to just focus on political hazards and risks as the intention was to try to place these risks in 
a broader context 
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involved with researching and planning the expedition, albeit within the context of 
designated roles, together with having the opportunity to discuss, reflect and construct 
the expedition crisis plan, particularly in relation to understanding CASEVAC 
procedures (i.e. the emergency evacuation procedures).  
The degree of personal stake was another interesting factor to consider. It was noted 
that many of the members had either no children, or grown up children, which seemed 
to allow greater freedom to undertake such an expedition (a comment some did make 
in conversations). Furthermore, the high degree of investment in relation to time spent 
planning (three training weekends over a two year period plus additional work 
according to the expedition role they had), and the financial cost (£2,100, excluding 
additional equipment purchased, inoculations and travel costs for the training 
weekends), meant that the group members seemed less likely to pull out from the 
expedition in relation to hazardous events occurring. It was also observed during their 
training sessions that there was a degree of emotional commitment to fulfilling the 
expedition and not letting the team down. In terms of the more formal questionnaire 
answers, this is reflected in the responses that related to how group members feared 
getting injured or ill themselves and the impact this would have on the other team 
members.  
Overall, when all these factors are combined, one could argue that they help make the 
demand and motivation to travel far more robust, or inelastic, in comparison with 
other forms of travel; this matches with the previous findings in Chapter 6, Section 
6.3. In short, their ‘risk appetite’ to take on the risks highlighted in Table 7.1 could be 
regarded as high. Two events help to further illustrate this point. The first was the 
escalation of conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in December 2006 and January 
2007; the second was the highly publicised kidnapping of a group tourist in the 
Danakil desert (which included a number of British Embassy staff) in March 2007. In 
conversations with the group members and expedition leaders, these events did create 
hesitancy and consideration of cancelling the expedition, but it was a decision which 
would be undertaken with great reluctance and so they adopted a ‘wait and see’ policy 
to see if they could ride out the events so the expedition could still take place, which 
ultimately it did.  
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7.3.2 Reflecting on travel advice and existing risk assessments (Stage 2) 
In Chapter 6, Section 6.3 it was highlighted that despite the many shortcomings of 
travel advice issued by governments, it is still essential for organisations to consult it, 
as to ignore advice is to change the level of risk exposure to the organisation, such as 
the inability to obtain insurance, or being liable to litigation. In order to deal with  
some of these weaknesses, it was argued that it was necessary to use a variety of 
governmental databases, which could help give more detail on the variety of hazards 
and the possible control measures which an organisation could adopt. It also has 
relevancy where clients are of different nationalities, as governments can vary in the 
advice given, which has a number of implications, such as in relation to insurance. In 
addition to the government travel sites utilised in Chapter 6, the single case study 
application also allowed for a more intimate exploration of a number of travel blogs, 
which produced some interesting results. 
In terms of utilising the governmental advice sites for Ethiopia, the key English 
speaking advice sites, based on the months of May, June and August 2007, are 
examined in relation to: a) the variety and locations (if included) of the different 
hazards which an organisation could be exposed to; and b) the range of advice given 
which can be used to develop some of the risk control measures. A summary of the 
key hazards and advice data can be found in Appendix O, which again played an 
important part in the development of the completed risk assessment in Appendix M. 
The advice given by the sites was broadly similar, with the Australian and New 
Zealand sites perhaps being interpreted as more cautious, particularly with New 
Zealand’s category of ‘Extreme Risk.’ The differences that do appear tend to be 
subtle. For example, whilst the UK, Canada, Australia and the USA all advise or 
discourage travel to the border area with Eritrea, with the boundary areas usually 
being the Adigrat to the Djibouti border area, including the Danakil desert, the USA 
extends the area stating that the Adigrat to the Sudanese border area, with the 
exception of Axum, is also off limits to embassy staff.  
The data collected from the government databases clearly show the strengths of 
consulting all the sites particularly to verify and infill gaps in knowledge. They helped 
to initially identify a good range of the hazards, such as landmines, acts of terrorism, 
or train sabotage, along with some of the practical control measures that should be 
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undertaken, such as avoiding travel after dark, or avoiding the border areas. Despite 
these strengths, there are some weaknesses that should be appreciated. Although the 
advice was contextualised to regions, it still lacks subtlety as these regions still 
occupy huge geographic spaces. The second is that the advice offered can sometimes 
be in reaction to events, or based on remarkably few incidents, and be affected by 
severe time lags. The American site for example gives the strong sense that the 2007 
advice was framed in light of the 2005 elections and the subsequent violent 
demonstrations that it precipitated, even though the advice was scrutinised for June 
and August 2007; indeed at one point it does actually state that ‘overall the political 
situation for June 2006 is stable’ (USA SD 2007). 
The opportunity afforded by a single case study analysis allowed for an exploration of 
the various travel blog sites which can give a more intimate, personal travel anecdotes 
and experiences. An illustration of this is offered in Box 7.1, which is based on the 
analysis of the Lonely Planet’s Thorn Tree Travel forum site. The advice offered here 
is of the micro and specific, and based on individual, experiences, whilst that offered 
by governments may be classed as more ‘expert’, and veers towards the macro. 
Whilst the use of individual experiences can be questioned as to their validity, in 
terms of management decision making, it is important to recognise that it can be this 
single anecdotal experience that can give far more insight into a situation, compared 
with a more general, blanket statement issued by a government. It is also of interest 
how the Bradt travel guides integrate many of these travel experiences to help frame 
their analysis of travel to an area. One particularly interesting example found related 
to train travel, where on reading the government sites, this appears as a high-risk 
venture.*  The Bradt guide gives a different impression, based on a variety of 
travellers’ personal experiences, saying:  
‘The Djibouti train is not exactly the Orient Express, and the trip is perhaps 
sensibly viewed as an experience in its own right rather than public 
transport…The train is well guarded, at least to start with. To quote one 
reader: “The armed guards with rifles who reminded us of old western movies, 
were drinking beers the whole trip. After a few hours we heard shooting 
noises, but everybody was laughing hard at the ducking faranjis, although the 
                                                 
*
 The USA sites state ‘train travel is discouraged,’ whilst Canada states ‘train sabotage is common’, even though the last 
significant attack recorded by the USA SD occurred in February 2003. 
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guards did lift their rifles.”… It is such obscure, difficult journeys such as the 
Djibouti train that often result in the most memorable travel experiences (and 
the most amusing readers’ letters!). If you decide to give it a go, let me know 
how it went.’ (Briggs 2005, p.394) 
What using this micro type of anecdotal data reveals is that travel is still possible, 
despite government travel warnings. It can give encouragement to why the risks 
highlighted in Table 7.1 may be worthwhile undertaking, together with revealing 
additional hazards or control measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the severe limitations of many of the composite political and country risk 
assessments were highlighted in Chapter 6, they are still worthwhile examining. The 
same risk assessments highlighted in Chapter 6, were scrutinised here, which, with 
the exception of the ICRG ratings, are all from open sources, accessed in June 2007.  
The summaries of the assessment values are presented in Table 7.3.   
Box 7.1 Using travel blogs for travel advice 
Some people may remain sceptical about using such sites in terms of a formal risk assessment, as one is 
relying on anecdotal experiences and opinions, which may not seem as reliable as professional experts, 
such as those given by government or consultants. Yet on closer examination they reveal another 
interesting dimension to what data can be accessed via the internet. Here is one example in relation to a 
travel question posted on the Lonely Planet’s Thorn Tree blog, in relation to travel to Jijiga and into 
Somalia, both places located in areas where the general government advice is not to travel. The question 
asked - with the spelling mistakes left in - was: 
‘Hi, i am wondering if many people are currently travelling from Harar onto Jiiga – and onto the 
Somalian boarder from there? What is the current climate/situation like there at the moment? Is it 
deemed safe to travel? Im thinking the best thing to do is get to Harar and ask around …any 
advice welcome’ Lonely Planet (2008)   
It initiated four responses, with a number recounting their own personal experiences, with people relating 
to travel in the area, such as these two: 
‘ did this trip during New Year and continued from Jijigi to Wajaale and then to Hargeisa and 
found it to be very safe. You can ask around in Harar but you have to find the right person to ask. 
When I was in Harar and some people asked me where I would go next, I said Jijiga and they 
were all quite against it.’ Lonely Planet (2008)   
 ‘Don’t know how it is past Jijiga but I did take a Jijiga-bound buse (getting off at a really 
random spot halfway between Harar and Jijiga due to a misunderstanding) and the area just 
seemed really quiet. Met an American women at the Dire Dawa airport who lives in Jijiga, who 
has a friend from home visiting for a couple of weeks. This was a month ago.’ Lonely Planet 
(2008)  
There are clearly limitations, but it should not be a question of substituting blogs for official sites, but to 
take both into consideration. By doing so, one is more likely to gain those revelatory moments that are so 
important in management decision-making.  
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Table 7.3 Comparisons of summative risk assessments for selected databases for 
June 2007  
ONDD Coface 
 
EKN ICRG 
2006 
 
CIDCM 
2008 
forecast 
Travel 
Warnings 
Lonely 
Planet  
PS
T 
PM
T 
S
T 
W
ar 
E
x 
T C
R 
CRR C 
ST 
C 
LT 
PR    
6 7 6 6 5 7 C C 7 7 51 High Yes Mid 
level 
alert 
 
Source and Key: For ONDD (2007) : PST – Political Short Term; PMT – Political medium/long term: 
ST –Special Transactions; Ex – Expropriation; T – Transfer risk; CR – Credit Risk. For  Coface 
(2007): CRR – Credit Risk Rating. For EKN (2007): C ST  –  Country risk Short Term; C LT – 
Country risk Long Term. For ICRG (2007); PR – Political Risk. CIDCM (2007). Lonely Planet data 
cited in Phillips et al (2006). 
From this table, the general pattern that emerges is that Ethiopia is a country in the 
‘high’ to ‘very high’ risk categories. The limitation of these models is that many are 
geared towards credit risks, which, as stressed before, can be very different from 
travel risks, * and so are of limited use in operational risk assessments. Where they 
are of help is in the formulation and adjustments of some of the likelihood ratings 
produced for the different hazards that appeared in Table 7.1. This is particularly true 
in relation to the ONDD War score and the ‘High’ CIDCM risk rating, which is why 
it was given a high probability rating of fours and threes, but which, it must be 
stressed, was adjusted to the different border areas, rather than a simplistic, single 
composite score. Also, whilst weak in terms of specific hazards, the high scores act as 
a more general warning signal to help prick one’s consciousness that Ethiopia is a 
vulnerable country, where hazardous events are always bubbling away. 
7.3.3 Reflecting on output factors, indicators and databases (Stage 3)  
In Chapter 3, Section 3.5 the wide variety of political hazardous events which can 
generate risks to an organisation were highlighted, with further analysis of the notion 
of researching output event frequency taking place in Chapter 6, Section 6.3. In that 
Chapter it was argued that it is not only important to recognise events temporal 
distribution, but also, where appropriate, their geographic occurrence, which allows 
for the utilisation of spatial analysis. The analysis of outputs, although relatively 
straightforward, is still challenging in terms of the wealth of information that can be 
                                                 
*
 Interestingly, in terms of the ICRG risk scores in 1997 and 98, the risk rating placed it in the 
‘Moderate-Risk’ category, but then in 1999, when tourism demand recovers slightly, the risk score 
moves to the ‘High Risk’ category, later moving back to ‘Moderate-Risk’, then moving steadily back 
down to the lower end of the ‘High-Risk’ category, yet at the same time tourism continues to rise. 
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found, as can be illustrated by the information recorded in Appendix P and O, which 
is informed by a number of databases. It should be appreciated that the analysis of that 
data informed the Risk Assessment table in Appendix M, under the analysis column, 
which in turn helped to formulate the assessment values in that table. 
The single case study analysis meant that a more intimate exploration of hazardous 
events could take place in comparison with the broader-focused comparative analysis 
in Chapter 6. Overall, Ethiopia emerges as a country with a troubled past in relation 
to many hazards, ranging from war, acts of terrorism and numerous natural disasters. 
Whilst researching the output events, it soon gave an insight into the basis of many of 
the governmental travel warnings. One salient feature is how few incidents need to 
occur (sometimes just once), in order to warrant a government travel warning. This 
low frequency is also one which can be very specific to a particular part of the 
country. Terrorist events are of interest here, as further illustrated in Box 7.2, where in 
pure statistical terms the likelihood of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack, based 
on past attacks, is very remote, with the likelihood also varying according to the 
region one may be travelling to, yet government advice often presents it as a ‘high 
risk’ factor affecting travel to the whole country. 
The geographical analysis of past events also emerged as very important, as this 
spatial analysis helps to identify hazardous hotspots in a country. It is not an original 
technique, * but one very useful for giving a quick visual indicators of hazardous 
areas, which can then be used to help inform the appropriate control measures, such as 
avoiding travel to certain locations. In terms of the analysis conducted for Ethiopia, 
the technique developed was to ensure the events were mapped in terms of their 
location, a simplified illustration appearing in Appendix R. What is perhaps 
surprising is how geographically concentrated many of the hazardous events were, 
where one soon realises that whilst some governmental advice does contextualise 
travel warnings to geographic regions, these still represent huge geographic spaces.  
                                                 
*
 One can for example go to the MIPT or the MAR databases to find some very useful hotspot maps, 
but these can suffer from a lack of detail. 
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Box 7.2 Analysing and assessing the terrorism threat in Ethiopia 
The level of terrorist threat according to various governmental advice sites emerges as high for 
Ethiopia. The simple question raised is how does this relate to the frequency of attacks and notions 
of probability? Between 1968 and August 2007 MIPT (2007) identified 79 incidents, with 298 
injuries and resulting in 197 fatalities. In Graph 7.1 the entire recorded terrorist attacks since 1968 
are plotted on a graph. The higher number of incidents in the 1970s related to the separatist struggle 
and war with Eritrea, and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), who record 30 incidents, but with the 
last one taking place in 1991. The 1996 plane hijack and crash when it ran out of fuel, can also skew 
the data, accounting for 127 of the fatalities for that year. In terms of frequency, the number of 
terrorism incidents in recent years is still relatively rare, sometime even recording no attacks, such as 
in 2000 and 2001. If one was to turn these into simple ratios, of number of attacks, to the number of 
tourists, one soon realises that it would appear, in statistical terms, a low likelihood risk, which 
could be adjusted to different geographic locations.    
 
In terms of severity of outcome, there is more cause for concern. All the attacks which were found 
on the MIPT (2007) database (Appendix O), together with some additional citations, are presented 
in a table in Appendix P, which focuses on the time periods between 1994 to August 2007. The key 
information is plotted on Graphs 1 and 2 in relation to number of incidents, injuries and deaths. 
Looking at the data, most of the attacks relate to bomb attacks, with a worrying number of hand 
grenades thrown into crowded places particularly in hotels, cafes and market areas. This obviously 
changes the likelihood dimension for tourists becoming victims of an attack. Many of these attacks 
are marked by a high numbers of injuries and deaths. Also of concern, are the numbers of 
kidnappings that have occurred, which whilst quite rare, is a serious risk in terms of the organisation 
involved with tourism. Overall, what should be appreciated is that using frequency to assess the risk 
is useful to a point, but one must consider many other factors. 
Graph 1- Total Number of Terrorist Attacks (1968-2007) 
 
Source: MIPT (2007) 
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Box 7.2 Analysing and assessing the terrorism threat in Ethiopia (continued) 
Graph 2 – Incidents, Fatalities and Injuries (1968-2007) 
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Source: MIPT (2007) 
What this spatial analysis is also very good at is revealing some of the opportunity 
travel risks which can be taken, such as travelling to relatively remote areas relatively 
untouched by tourism. Of course, what is not clear is that because of an absence of 
events, this does not mean that there is no risk, but simply that a lack of tourists to an 
area means there has been no exposure to the hazard.   
7.3.4 Reflecting on the political system (Stage 4)  
In Chapter 6, Section 6.4, the value of the work carried out by the PITF was 
highlighted as they classify political systems using a variety of consistent criteria. 
Freedom House and the FSI offer additional information by which a notion of the 
quality of the political system can also be gauged. To begin with, the Polity IV polity 
score for Ethiopia was 1 in 2005, indicating a system veering towards autocracy. The 
Polity Graph for Ethiopia, which can be seen in Box 7.3, with a more detailed 
explanation in Appendix S, shows a country with a history of autocracy, although 
becoming less so in the 1990s. This classification, verified with the many incidents of 
conflict, such as the number of demonstrations, arrests and state repression which has 
taken place, give cause for concern, where violence by citizens and the state remains a 
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distinct possibility. Ethiopia’s classification as a partial democracy according to the 
PITF classification, which can be seen in Table 7.4, acts as another indicator of a 
political system that is vulnerable to turmoil. 
Table 7.4 PITF categorisation for Ethiopia and its neighbours 
Characterisation of political regimes for analysis of vulnerability to instability 
 Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP) 
Executive 
Recruitment 
(EXREC) 
Repressed (1) Suppressed 
(2) 
Unregulated 
(0) 
Factional (3) Transitional 
(4) 
Competitive 
(5) 
(1) Ascription       
(2) Ascription 
+ Designation 
      
(3) 
Designation 
 Eritrea     
(4) Self-
Selection 
 Sudan     
(5) Transition 
from self 
selection 
      
(6) Ascription 
+ Election 
      
(7) 
Transitional 
or Restricted 
Elec. 
   Ethiopia 
Djibouti 
  
 
(8) 
Competitive 
election 
    Kenya  
Source: Polity IV (2007)* 
 
                                                 
*
 Somalia has a transitional code of -77 therefore does not appear on this table, which is described as 
having a fragile democratic state 
 228 
Box 7.3 Comparing Polity IV graphs of neighbouring countries 
 
 
Source: Polity IV (2007). See also Appendix S for details of how the Polity IV graphs are 
produced and what the colour codes indicate. 
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Box 7.3 Comparing Polity IV graphs of neighbouring countries (continued) 
 
 
 
Source: Polity IV (2007). See also Appendix S for details of how the Polity IV graphs are 
produced and what the colour codes indicate 
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Box 7.3 Comparing Polity IV graphs of neighbouring countries (continued) 
 
 
 
Source: Polity IV (2007). See also Appendix S for details of how the Polity IV graphs are 
produced and what the colour codes indicate 
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When looking at Ethiopia’s political system and way in which this could shape 
hazards and risks, the analysis of its neighbouring countries systems was also found to 
be particularly useful. What the Polity IV graphs in Box 7.3, and the PITF system 
classification in Table 7.4, help to convey is an alarming picture in terms of 
Ethiopia’s neighbours,  who have all experienced a great deal of political turmoil over 
the years, together with many of the systems characterised by authoritarianism, 
interspaced with violent conflict. The graph for Sudan is particularly striking, 
indicating a great deal of turmoil. The importance of the neighbour factor was 
discussed in Chapter 6, because not only is there a strong possibility of conflict over-
spilling a country’s borders, but just as importantly there is the risk that tourists can 
project one country’s problems onto another, regardless of whether the actual hazards 
exist. This information helped further refine the assessments values given to the 
border areas in Table 7.1. Although Kenya appears as the most democratic in Table 
7.4, the events in Kenya in 2008, where the elections helped precipitate inter-factional 
violence, illustrate the vulnerability to turmoil of the ‘partial’ systems, whether 
autocratic or democratic. The FSI assessments in Table 7.5 also add to these concerns 
not only about the vulnerability of Ethiopia’s political system, but also of its 
neighbours,  as all appear in the ‘Alert’ or ‘Warning’ zone.*   
Table 7.5 FSI categorisation of case study countries 
Risk Rating Classification 
Classification Countries (2005, 2006 and 2007) 
Alert zone (120 - 90)  Ethiopia; 95.5 – 2007; 91.9 – 2006; 90.9 – 2005;  
Somalia; 105.9 2006; 102.3 2005 
Sudan; 113.7 2007;112.3 2006; 104.1 2005 
Kenya; 91.3 2007; 92.7 2005 
Warning zone (89.9 - 60) Eritrea; 85.5 2007 83.9 2006; 84.1 2005  
Djibouti; 80.3 2007 
Kenya; 88.6 2006 
Monitoring zone (59.9 - 30)  
Sustainable zone (below 30)  
Source: The Fund for Peace (2007) 
7.3.4 Reflecting on the input factors, indicators and databases (Stage 5) 
The analysis of inputs is where many structured political risk models begin, whereas 
in the model developed here it comes towards the end of the process. The rationale for 
this method was formulated in Chapter 4 and clarified in Chapter 6.  In terms of the 
                                                 
*
 It is of interest that the FSI placed Kenya in the warning zone before the problems after the elections 
in 2008, where as many other databases placed it in a lower risk category 
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actual factors and indicators used, it was also highlighted that there are numerous 
potential indicators which could be used, but not all are useful as warning indicators 
of hazardous events. The single case study application did allow for more additional 
input indicators to be analysed in comparison with the previous chapter. The key data 
found of most interest is presented in Tables 7.6 and 7.7.  
The FSI indicators, which are presented in Table 7.6 give a variety of composite 
assessment scores covering a number of economic, social and political factors. The 
value of this database is that it offers another example from which one can utilize 
some ready made assessments, before a more detailed separate analysis of more 
specific indicators is made. Each category is scored between up to a maximum of 120, 
with the higher the scores, the more cause for concern. With regard to Ethiopia, it is 
given high scores in most these areas, particularly in relation to demographic 
pressures, factionalism and poor economic performance; scores that for many areas 
have worsened rather than improved, which is cause for further concern.  
 Table 7.6 FSI assessment scores for Ethiopia 
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2007 9 7.9 7.8 7.5 8.6 8 7.9 7 8.5 7.5 8.9 6.7 95.3 
2006 9 7.6 7 7.5 8.5 8 7.6 6.2 8 7.5 8.7 6.3 91.9 
Ethiopia 
2005 8.7 8 6 7.3 9 8.5 7.9 5.5 6.3 9 8.9 6 91.1 
.Source: The Fund for Peace (2007) 
In Table 7.7, a sample of more specific indicators is presented, which offers an 
insight into some of the information that informed the FSI scores. In Appendix S, a 
more detailed analysis of each of the input categories is conducted, which is of 
invaluable help in assessing the more long terms prospects for Ethiopia. In terms of 
this section, it is felt sufficient to produce a more general summary of what the data in 
Table 7.7 conveys.  Overall, the figures convey a pessimistic picture, showing a 
country vulnerable to conflict and turmoil. The low GDP per Capita figures, its high 
infant mortality rates, its high amount of debt and its highly factionalised ethnic 
makeup, which is reflected in the political system, are all indicative of this. In terms 
of the underlying trends (not produced here), whilst some improvements were found, 
such as in economic growth, or an improving HDI score, they are very modest 
improvements, tending to still stay within the hazardous bands highlighted in 
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Chapter 6. One has to work hard to try to identify the more positive glimmers of 
change and opportunities in terms of the underlying trends. One can, however, flip the 
perspective and note not how bad the situation is, but rather that given some of the 
indicator scores, it can perhaps be surprising that the political system is not more 
turbulent. 
It is vital to stress that because a pessimistic picture emerges, this does not mean 
conflict will occur, or that travel should be ruled out; rather it creates a picture of a 
country which is vulnerable to conflict, which seems set to continue in the future, 
certainly in the medium term. Travel can also take place safely, but an organisation 
should have realistic expectations that various hazardous events could occur which 
could generate many risks to the organisation. This deeper analysis of some of the 
underpinning input factors and the trends help guard against a more naïve, simplistic 
view that because the political environment may be relatively calm at the time of 
analysis, or a country has no governmental travel warnings, that this means some of 
the underlying problems have disappeared,  or been solved. In a sense it is using the 
notion from chaos theory, where systems are viewed as always on the ‘edge of chaos’, 
or in a ‘pre-crisis’ (Faulkner 2001, p137). What the input analysis helped to show is 
just how close to the edge Ethiopia often is. 
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Table 7.7 Sample of key input indicators for Ethiopia 
 
Sub Input 
Categories 
Key Indicators  Data 
Economic basis Economic Composition (CIA FB using 
WB data 2007) 
Agriculture: 48.3% ; industry: 13%  
services: 38.7% for 2006 
 Resources  (CIA FB using WB data 
2007) 
small reserves of gold, platinum, copper, potash, natural gas, 
hydropower 
Economic Growth 
(Economic outputs)  
GDP growth annual %  (CIA FB using 
WB data 
6% (2000), 9%  (2001), 2 %(2002), 4 % (2004) 
13% (2005) 
 Inflation, GDP deflator (CIA FB using 
WB data 2007) 
3% (2000), 6 % (2001),7 %(2002), 13% (2003), 0 % (2004)  
 % below poverty line 38.7% 
 GDP per capita $1,000 
Economic Stability Inflation index 13.5%  (2006) 
 Unemployment NA 
Economic Trade Balance of payments Current account 
(000,000)  (CIA FB using WB data 
2007) 
-$1,786 deficit (2006) 
 Exports of goods and services (%of 
GDP) 
 15 (2000)), 5 (2001),16 (2002), 18 (2003),  
19 (2004) 
 Imports of goods and services (%of 
GDP): 
30 (2000); 30 (2001); 34 (2002); 36 (2003),; 0 (2004) 
 Trading partners: (CIA FB using WB 
data 2007) 
Export partners: China 11%, Germany 9.1%, Japan 7.8%, US 
7.1%, Saudi Arabia 6.1%, Djibouti 6%, Italy 5.2% (2006). Key 
Import partners: Saudi Arabia 18.1%, China 11.4%, India 
8.1%, Italy 5.1% (2006) 
Economic Debt Public Debt % of GDP (CIA FB using 
WB Data) 
80  (2006)  
 Debt external $3.75 billion (2007) 
 Economic aid recipient $1.6 billion  (2007) 
 Value of aid  Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
 Public Debt % of GDP 80 
Population 76.,511.887 
Infant mortality per 1,000 91.92 
Death rates per 1,000 14.67 
Life expectancy 49.23 
Births attended by skilled health staff (% 
of total) (WB Country Profile, 2007) 
5.6 (2000),  
5.7 (2005) 
Welfare and population 
Malnutrition prevalence                        
% of children under 5 (WB Country 
Profile, 2007) 
47.2 (2000) , 
38.4 (2005)  
 Literacy % over 15 who can read and 
write (CIA FB) 
42.7 % (2003) 
 School enrolment secondary (%) (CIA 
FB) 
63 (2000), 69 (2001),72 (2002), 73 (2003); 77 (2004) 
 Human Development Index (HDI) 0.367 
Social divisions Religious (CIA FB 2007) Christian 60.8% (Orthodox 50.6%, Protestant 10.2%), Muslim 
32.8%, traditional 4.6%, other 1.8% (1994 census) 
 Languages (CIA FB) Languages: Amarigna 32.7%, Oromigna 31.6%, Tigrigna 
6.1%, Somaligna 6%, Guaragigna 3.5%, Sidamigna 3.5%, 
Hadiyigna 1.7%, other 14.8%, English (major foreign language 
taught in schools) (1994 census) 
 Ethnic  Oromo 32.1% ;  Amara 30.1%Tigraway 6.2%; Somalie 5.9%; 
Guragie 4.3%; Sidama 3.5%;  Welaita 2.4% 
 MAR cited groups Afars; Somalis; Amhara, Tigreans, Oromo 
 
So
ci
a
l  Refugees 2007: refugees (country of origin), CIA World Factbook 2007. 
 
93,032 (Sudan) 23,578 (Somalia)  
IDPs: 132,000 (border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000 and 
ethnic clashes in Gambela; most IDPs are in Tigray and 
Gambela Provinces) (2004) 
Natural Forest area (sq. km) (CIA FB using WB 
data 2007) 
137,050 (2000), 130,000 (2005) 
 
Natural hazards: 
 
Rift Valley susceptible to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions;  
Climate: frequent droughts 
tropical monsoon with wide topographic-induced variation 
N
a
tu
ra
l/ 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t 
Disease HIV aids adult prevalence rates (CIA 
FB) 
 4.4% or 1.5 million people (2007) 
 % of GDP spent on Military over time:  
(WB Data 2007) 
10% (2000), 6% (2001), 6 (2002), 5 (2003), 4 (2004) NA 
(2005), 3%  (2006) 
 CIDCM degree of militarization: Medium (2008) 
K
ey
 
A
ct
o
rs
 
 
Key parties There are over ten parties of reasonable size, plus dozens of 
many smaller parties. 
           Source: CIA World Fact Book (2007), UN (2007), MAR (2007) and the World Bank (2007) 
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7.3.5 Control measures and scenario techniques (Stage 6)  
The area that has not been discussed in any depth in this work relates to the specific 
tools which can be used in the identification, analysis, assessment and development of 
control measures. Some have been touched on, such as the notion of spatial analysis, or 
the use of assessment matrixes, but it should be recognised there are so many more, for 
which the Office of Government Commerce (2002, p. 99), and Sherwood (2002, p.6) 
give useful overviews. Numerous tools were looked at from the different subject 
disciplines examined, ranging from forecasting techniques, such as trend extrapolation, 
game theory, contingency analysis and scenario analysis. What is given here is a short 
discussion of some of the findings found from using scenario techniques that were 
helpful in developing a number of control measures. 
In relation to scenario tools it should be appreciated that there are many possible 
approaches, with Schwartz (2001, p.42) making the basic distinction between 
exploratory type methods and decision-based scenarios, whilst Frosdick (1997, p.167) 
distinguished between intuitive, deductive and inductive based methods. Alternatively, 
one can simply list the variety of more specific techniques, such as simple mind maps, 
or the use of analogies, to the more sophisticated models which utilise complex 
software, such as the decision tree diagrams, HAZOP analysis, or the development of 
PERT charts. Of these many models, Fault Tree and Event Tree analysis were found to 
be particularly interesting. Event Tree analysis (a more inductive approach) maps out 
the critical paths of the consequences or effects of the events, whilst Fault Tree analysis 
(a more deductive approach) focuses on the variables which can cause the hazardous 
event(s).* Although these techniques have their roots in engineering, particularly 
military projects, and focus more on the notion of failure nodes (the hazardous event or 
action), they have been readily adapted to a variety of management fields. 
One of the critical factors with scenario exercises is to properly frame the question or 
context (Schwart 2001, p.42), because, as Vertberger (1998, p.31), a problem which is 
ill defined is poorly understood. To illustrate the sheer breadth of possibilities, and how 
one can distinguish between Fault Tree (causation) and Event Tree (consequences) 
                                                 
Frosdick (1997) illustrates some of the differences using an analogy of a house fire. In relation to Event Tree Analysis the house fire 
is the failure node, where one can map out the consequences of various events, together with (very importantly) the consequences of 
various control mechanisms or safety devices, such as whether there are smoke alarms or not in the house. In relation to Fault Tree 
analysis, this looks at the conditions which create a fire, working backwards in relation to what can go wrong (a form of hindsight 
review), such as a fire needing fuel, where this may leak from, what may cause the leak and so on.. 
 
 236 
questions or situations, the following examples are given which were considered for 
scenario exploration in relation to Ethiopia and XCL: 
The sample Fault Tree related questions considered: 
• What factors could lead to government change, such as Meles losing power, or a 
military coup taking place? 
• What factors could create another famine and humanitarian crisis? 
• What factors would lead to an increase in terrorism, particularly in relation to 
bomb attacks and kidnapping? 
• What factors could lead to a group, such as the Oromo or Amhara people, to 
embark on an insurgency or political dissent campaign? 
The sample event tree related questions considered: 
• What would be the impact of economic growth/decline in relation to conflict? 
• What would be the impact natural disasters, such as a drought, have on political 
stability? 
• What would be the impact of a terrorist bomb in Addis Ababa, on the 
expedition/tour operations? 
• What would be the impact of a military coup on the expedition/tour operations? 
Various Fault Tree and Event Tree scenarios were explored. What is presented in 
Diagram 7.2 is an example of one Event Tree scenario developed, which focuses on the 
possible impacts of terrorist attack for an expedition/tour group, using the Visio 
Microsoft software. 
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Diagram 7.2 Sample event tree scenario for a terrorist bomb attack 
 
Source: Author 
A number of important observations can be made in relation to scenario techniques.  It 
is here that the concept of catalyst events or triggers, noted in Chapter 3, and identified 
as one of the key elements in the anatomy of political risks, become more important. 
When considered in relation to the input and output factors for Ethiopia, it can be seen 
as a tinder box, as Table 7.8 illustrates with some simple scenarios considered in 
relation to the key catalyst events identified in Chapter 3, Table 3.5.  
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Table 7.8 Sample trigger events and scenarios summaries 
Event 
 
Description 
Key political 
leader dies 
Possible scenario: Meles dying. 
Optimistic: Depending on the nature of his death it can affect the nature of 
the outcome, but it could lead to a decentralising of executive power and a 
strengthening of the other political institutions, which makes the country 
more attractive for investment and tourists. 
Pessimistic: A power vacuum is created which may initiate a power 
struggle, where the groups revert to ethnic violence. If the death is from an 
assassination, then this could initiate violent reprisals against the group 
responsible.  
Key political 
leader removed 
from power 
Possible scenario: Meles removed from power by opposition group, 
through the political process, or a military coup. 
Optimistic: As ‘leader dies’ scenarios. 
Pessimistic: As above. If military coup, then this can lead to more 
repression, curfews and violence on opposition groups, together with 
international sanctions, creating negative images of the country. 
Death of 
significant 
‘other’ 
Possible scenario: Key leader of opposition group killed. 
Optimistic: If hostile groups, such as a criminal or terrorist organisation, 
then it could lead to an improved image of safety.  
Pessimistic: Initiates violent demonstrations and condemnation from global 
media, all creating a negative perception of the country. 
Key statements 
and actions of 
politicians 
Possible scenarios: Politician, domestic or external makes a statement 
which mobilizes opinion in some manner, which could range from the 
president of the USA, to Meles or opposition groups. 
Optimistic: It leads to peaceful protests and peaceful reform and enhanced 
public perception. 
Pessimistic: It leads to violent protests, embargoes or strikes. 
Terrorist acts Possible scenarios: Bomb and kidnapping in key tourist areas 
Optimistic: It leads to a tightening of security measures, or the seeking of a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict. Travel in short term becomes more 
secure. 
Pessimistic: It leads to an intensification of the conflict and more violent 
reprisals, with a downward spiral of violence. Affects perceptions of 
travellers and discourages them from travel. 
Natural 
disasters 
Possible scenarios: A number of years of good or bad weather. 
Optimistic: A number of years of good weather act as a solid platform for 
economic growth and improvements in the standards of living. 
Pessimistic: A number of years of poor weather destroy products, eroding 
its foreign earnings, creating humanitarian crisis and a huge refugee 
problem. 
         Source: Author 
Many of the Event Tree scenarios and the risks generated can be mapped out in a 
generic sense, therefore reducing the number of scenarios which need to be 
developed, which can be particularly important in relation to the development of 
crisis plans. * Finally, as Table 7.8 reveals, the mapping out of scenarios can also 
be useful for revealing a variety of weak signals of change, such as the implication 
for when the Meles period comes to an end. 
                                                 
*
 Whilst the cancellation of a trip or an injury to a person may be caused by a variety of factors, the mapping 
out of the organisation’s responses reveals some generic actions, whatever the cause. 
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7.4 Expedition postscript and discussion 
So how did this risk assessment compare with the expedition that XCL actually 
undertook in August 2007? It should be remembered that this assessment was 
carried out independently from XCL’s, but periodically, if any important 
information was found, this was given to XCL. Whilst this may have had some 
impact on the expedition, it was felt only right and proper on the grounds of ethics 
that if anything was found which could help reduce the negative risk exposure of 
the expedition then this would be given. 
In fact none of the political hazards identified as a possibility in this assessment 
occurred during the expedition. This is not to say that the actual expedition was 
‘uneventful.’ Dig Woodvine, the expedition leader was interviewed in June 2008. 
During the meeting, there was also the opportunity to examine a wide range of 
additional reflective materials produced by XCL after the expedition, some of 
which are presented in Box 7.4. In his words, he described the trip as the ‘most 
challenging’ of all the expeditions he has conduced over the years. The events that 
made it so challenging ranged from: 
• Expedition member’s luggage failing to turn up for the first two weeks of 
the expedition. Community projects failing because the key contacts with 
whom the work had been set up, disappeared, resulting in group frustration 
at not being able to carry out the intended community project.  
• Running over and seriously injuring a young boy, who thankfully made a 
full recovery, but resulted in an expedition vehicle being impounded. 
• A number of group members perceiving that they were threatened by local 
people. 
• Group dynamics breaking down. 
• Running over another person in Addis, but without serious injury. 
• Vehicles breaking down. 
The most obvious hotspots were in all the border areas, which were avoided. It 
was of interest how the expedition group still travelled to areas where hazardous 
events had occurred in the past, particularly in the South, near the Gambella area. 
Although this received some broad travel warnings, the spatial and temporal 
 240 
analysis still revealed that events were relatively rare and took place over a huge 
geographic area. Whilst it was clearly risky to travel there, there were also many 
opportunities for witnessing some unique areas, which Woodvine confirmed in the 
interview, stating how many members experienced some intense, provocative 
experiences, which they would always remember. It was also interesting how their 
experience of corruption and bribes was closer to Brigg’s (2006) experience of 
being of minor importance, noted in Section 7.3.2, which is contrast with some of 
the other measures, such as the TI corruption score, where it emerges as quite 
high.  
 
Box 7.4 Reflecting on the XCL expedition 
XCL are always creative in how they reflect upon events, using a creative visual process, as part 
of the ‘dust-down’ post expedition review. What is highlighted here are some of the reflections on 
the expedition produced by the expedition leaders. 
 
 
Illustration 1: Shows some of the expedition 
difficulties, leadership failures and tough 
terrain 
 
Illustration 2: Shows the accident and the 
loss of the vehicle and what was learnt 
The expedition was certainly eventful. One of the things of interest about XCL, is how they 
constantly strive to make the most of things when they went wrong, and which ultimately helped 
enhance the overall client experience. So when one project failed, they managed to improvise 
another one, helping to build a safe compound around a school where there had been a number of 
abductions of school children. A project which all the expedition members felt proud of and was 
cited as one of the expedition highpoints.  
It is also of interest how one can compare certain indicators with actual experiences. One of the 
questions asked was about the need to pay bribes or problems with corruption, which judging 
from some of the indicators would seem to be a severe problem. Yet in relation to their 
expedition, they encountered few problems, revealing an experience closer to the one highlighted 
earlier in the Bradt travel guidebooks. This is not to say it did not exist, as Dig Woodvine noted, 
but that it was ‘built into’ the price paid for goods and services. 
Although none of the hazards and risks from the political environment identified 
at the beginning of this work materialised during the expedition (thankfully), this 
does not mean that the assessment produced was of no value. The value of a risk 
assessment is not to predict that x and y will occur, rather it is to identify the range 
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of possibilities. The assessments informed their actions, such as avoiding certain 
areas, particularly the border areas. In relation to the areas travelled to where 
hazards were identified, such as to Addis, the risks were examined and the 
decision taken to still proceed; but because no risks manifested themselves, does 
not mean they did not exist. Howell (2001, p.5) makes an analogy with a weather 
forecast and the risk of rain, which means precautions may be taken, such as 
taking an umbrella to work, but because it does not rain does not mean that the 
risk forecast was wrong, or the control measure to prevent getting wet and the risk 
of ruining clothes, a wasted effort. The abductions in the Dhanakil desert and the 
outbreak of the war in Somalia in the early part of 2007, showed the vulnerability 
of the expedition, which if they had occurred at the point of departure would have 
posed more serious problems for XCL. The type of clients enlisted and the nature 
of the expedition conducted, meant that they would have been less inclined to 
cancel and would have waited to see what transpired because so much had been 
invested in the expedition.  
7.5 Chapter discussion and summary 
Exploring the process model and risk paradigm for a single case study country and 
organisation was very revealing. In terms of what the data revealed about Ethiopia 
and the risks to the organisation, it showed a country with many hazards and risks 
for tourism organisations. What is of interest, however, despite all the warning 
indicators, is the fact that XCL still undertook their expedition, which highlights the 
importance of always contextualising the assessments at the micro level.   
In terms of the actual practical process elements, it showed the problem that 
identifying the potential hazardous situations is not the same as knowing if, or when 
they may occur; factors that the catalyst and scenario techniques try to ameliorate, 
but by no means solve.  The importance of the paradigm or risk culture is also vital, 
as the tendency (particularly with Ethiopia) is to focus on the negative events; what 
the fourth age risk and complexity theory paradigms helps to do, is prick one’s 
consciousness for seeing alternative possible pathways, not just the negative. As 
such it serves as a useful counter-balancing force to help in the process of reflection 
and scenario writing. The real difficulty is in relation to trying to develop equivalent 
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risk scales for upside impact areas, to better balance and recognise the upside risks, 
which has not been fully resolved and opens up another important area for research.  
When utilising the models, it is also evident that whilst it can be useful to develop 
conceptual distinctions between the analysis, assessment and control stages, in 
practice there is greater fluidity between these process stages, where one can 
constantly go back and forth between them. One of the factors which encourages 
this movement between the stages is the accessing of a wide variety of databases, 
partly for triangulation, partly out of the need to develop a richer more holistic 
picture. This has the result that one can reappraise the analysis and assessment in the 
light of new information. Whilst the research process can appear neat in the 
diagram, in practice it is not always the case that it progresses along linear lines. The 
fact that a great deal of information can be sent via bulletin services, particularly 
from government advice websites, is of immeasurable value in this process. 
The problems found with this approach– and it is an acute one in all decision 
making - was the realisation that at times, instead of encouraging more valid, 
evidence based decision making, it could in fact mean that people and organisations 
would search for information which supported the decision or viewpoint already 
taken, rather than any real notion of an objective truth. Aspects of this could 
certainly be observed within XCL and their determination to travel. It is not an 
original critique, as there are no simple answers to this problem, but awareness can 
be useful when refining the risk culture to be adopted.  
When looking at Ethiopia, the data constantly throws up many warning indicators, 
which need to be considered, and to believe that the future will be risk free because 
the present is relatively calm is foolhardy. When the risk analysis was conducted at a 
deeper level, it revealed a political system and leadership that always has the 
potential for conflict, with the underlying input factors indicating many inherent 
weaknesses, which at times just need a trigger for turmoil to be unleashed. The fact 
that there may be periods of stability, may not always indicate that things are better, 
or problems disappearing, but that their intensity and frequency may ebb and flow 
depending on different external conditions. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
8.1 Reflecting on the originality of the work 
This could have been a shorter piece of work. To focus simply on political risk 
within the confines of the existing political risk literature, models and paradigms 
could have achieved this. For this work to just focus on one particular political 
hazard, such as terrorism, would also have set tighter parameters on this work. Yet 
to do this ignores the operational realities for tourism organisations and how risks 
present themselves: increasingly unpredictable in their nature, more complex in their 
interactions, and more variable in the opportunities and threats generated. Whilst 
having a thorough understanding of just one area of risk or political risk is 
important, it does place bounds on one’s thinking and how one can anticipate and 
plan for these risks. In relation to the many tourism operators, it manifested itself by 
the usage of risk approaches that were predominantly confined to more familiar 
operational hazards and risks, yet which often failed to take into account the 
political environment; in relation to the political risk models, this problem showed 
itself by the desire to construct a single composite risk value which ignored the 
spatial or geographic dimension of risks.  
So instead, Levi’s comment on how research can lead to ignorance, cited at the very 
beginning of this work, has helped act as a reminder that it is always worthwhile to 
stop digging in a particular direction, in order to raise one’s head above the parapet 
to gain a better sense of where one has come from and going to. This was done by 
using a comparative approach between many different subject disciplines and topic 
areas. It was a bold task. And, to continue with the trench/parapet analogy, it is one 
prone to many dangers, only in this sense, these relate to the critique of the methods 
and approaches used, and the question of why certain factors or conceptual 
constructs were not explored more deeply in this work. The breadth of the approach 
taken is both this work’s key strength and potential weakness. 
This has not been a work that offers much in the way of theorizing about causation 
of political hazardous events. No grand theory in the positivistic tradition here. 
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Readers of this work may be disappointed at this. Indeed, at the beginning of this 
work it was anticipated that this might form a key feature of the work. The research 
journey revealed otherwise. What emerged was that whilst there are numerous 
theories which can be used to explain political change, which in turn generate a 
plethora of factors that can be used in the analysis, when it comes down to the more 
specific pieces of data which can be used as a direct or indirect indicator of those 
factors, and, just as crucially just where one actually obtains that data from, the 
information becomes more opaque. So this work changed. It adapted to the world 
that tourism operators now find themselves in, whereby the drivers of regulation, 
global complexity, conflict and the impact of the internet, has meant that the need 
for operators to find a method to scan, analyse and assess the political environment 
has become more salient than ever. As such, this work slowly changed its focus, 
moving towards clarifying the language of risk, developing a variety of typologies, 
and paying particular attention to identifying the key indicators that can be used in 
the analysis and assessment of political hazards, and the risks these events could 
pose to the organisation. It was this lack of previous work carried out in relation to 
tourism and political risk that helped identify the need for this work, and producing 
a practical model illustrates the work’s originality.  
8.2 Reflecting on what has been achieved in relation to the 
assertions, objectives and aim   
  8.2.1 Reflecting on the assertions 
Rather than begin by reflecting on the extent to which the single aim of this project 
has been achieved, it is felt better to consider how far the assertions raised have been 
addressed and the objectives achieved, as these all ultimately contribute to the thesis 
aim.  
In Chapter 1 a number of preliminary assertions were raised, together with some 
additional ones identified after the initial discussion of the literature, which appeared 
in Chapter 5. As a reminder, the reasons why assertions were used, rather than 
hypotheses, was that it was not the intention of this work to prove or disprove ideas, 
rather to reveal and gain deeper insights into the topic area. In terms of what was 
revealed the results can be described as mixed. The following bullet points provide a 
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short review of the insights gained in relation to the assertions raised, with the 
assertions highlighted in bold: 
• The literature on business and political risk assessment is not 
sufficiently contextualised for the needs of the tourism/sports industry 
and is skewed towards the more traditional economic sectors, dominated 
by big business, often with an American bias: The research did indeed 
reveal this bias, particularly towards the credit related industries, with 
relatively little done in terms of developing models directly relevant towards 
the tourism industry. What was also shown was that the models do not only 
need to be contextualised for the tourism industry, but more particularly for 
the different parts of the industry and ultimately for the individual 
organisation itself. Furthermore, it was surprising how isolated some of the 
commercial risk models could be from some of the developments in risk 
management revealed by examining the different subject fields.  
• Political risk assessment is becoming more important on the grounds of 
finance, legal regulations and morality: This was easily clarified early on 
in the work, particularly with the new regulatory British Standard Institute 
(2007) developed for overseas ventures (BS 8848:2007). Whilst many 
operators also recognised the importance of it, in practice the application of a 
structured risk method varied considerably. 
• Many tourism organisations’ assessment of political risk is often ad hoc, 
intuitive and variable, with little integration of strategic and operational 
levels of management. This was certainly revealed by the number who did 
not use a structured approach, whilst those that did, showed many variations. 
Very few actually had a structured method for analysing and assessing the 
political environment, beyond the consultation of the government travel 
advice sites.  
• Travel advice issued by governments can lack subtlety as indicators of 
real political risks. The travel advice did indeed reveal many problems, 
which could often frustrate operators. What is not always appreciated, 
however, are their strengths, particularly using their bulletin services which 
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can help build up a frequency profile, and the vital importance they play in 
terms of insurance. Whilst they can also be characterised as often being over-
cautious, the UK FCO was not always as cautious as other English language 
sites. 
The following bullet points provide a short review of the insights gained in relation to the 
questions raised in Chapter 5, with the questions highlighted in bold:  
• Is any political risk model developed prone to become a country risk 
model because of the variety of factors and indicators that could be 
looked at? Whilst conceptually, political and country risk can be defined as 
different, in terms of the practical methodology, the boundaries become 
more blurred. Indeed, one of the recommendations made is that if the model 
developed is utilised, and any indicators or signals of potential hazards or 
risks which are not politically related, are identified, then these should not be 
ignored. Furthermore, it makes practical sense in relation to saving time 
looking at a variety of hazards and risks when accessing certain key 
databases. It is for this reason that the political environment is used as the 
hub of analysis, together with adopting a fourth age risk paradigm culture, 
which helps to initiate cognition, or alert an operator of the risk opportunities 
and threats which can be generated from political hazardous events. 
• Are composite indicators, such as the Human Development Index (HDI) 
better than single indicators of risk? Whilst composite indicators have 
their place, they are fraught with problems and lack subtlety. This was 
particularly true with the risk models which strived to reduce political, or 
country risk down to a single composite value, which whilst attractive, is of 
little help in operational based risk assessments. 
• How can political risk be made more dynamic and operationally focused 
in order to reflect the inherent dynamism of the political environment? 
In the discussion, a constant theme which arose concerned the complexity of 
the political environment and the speed of change. The model developed, 
reflected an approach whereby the risk process begins by consulting the 
ever-changing incident and travel advice databases. What was not addressed 
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directly is the frequency that these databases are consulted, although it 
should be appreciated that this can be governed to an extent by subscription 
to the various government bulletin advice and news services, whereby any 
new information should initiate some reflection of the risk assessment. A key 
theme which also emerged from this analysis of making models more 
dynamic, was the vital importance of triangulation to both corroborate, and 
give more detailed insights into hazards. This would involve using a variety 
of databases, which could range from ‘expert’ advice, to individual, 
anecdotal experiences found from travel blogs. 
• Does the number of risk factors utilised affect the accuracy of the 
assessment made? This was one of the more surprising discoveries of the 
study, in that increasing the number of factors and indicators analysed may 
not necessarily lead to a more accurate assessment or better control 
measures. It is more than possible to make an assessment of a hazard and the 
risks it may pose, whilst still being largely ignorant of what may drive or 
cause it. This has vital implications as it reveals that a risk assessment does 
not necessarily need to be left to an expert on the political environment. 
• Just what is the best direction of the analysis?  Should it take an 
inductive or deductive approach? In the attempt to deal with the issue of 
making a model more dynamic, and reflecting the operational realities of 
resource restricted operators, a checklist method is adopted (the tables of 
hazardous events). The direction of analysis then begins by using existing 
travel advice and assessments, followed by looking at the frequency of 
events, then looking at the political system itself, finishing, if time allows, by 
a more strategic analysis of the more complex, underpinning economic and 
social input factors which can drive the hazards and risks. What was not 
fully clarified was the actual time which should be spent on data collection, 
analysis and assessment.* 
                                                 
*
 Mark’s (1988) point, highlighted in Chapter 4 Section 4.3, that more time should be spent on collecting 
good quality data, and less time on the analysis, suggesting 70% on research, and 30% on the analysis 
cannot be commented on in such precise terms, but the basic balance is agreed with. 
 248 
8.2.2 Reflecting on the objectives 
Clearly, many of these findings from these assertions examined are intimately 
related to the objectives of this study. In relation to the more specific review of the 
objectives and their achievement, the following points can be made, with the 
objectives highlighted in bold: 
• To examine if it is possible to have a common culture, language and 
process of political risk management embedded in existing management 
practices relevant to tourism organisations. What this work has illustrated 
is how there are often similarities between some of the core risk concepts, 
but the descriptors and ways that they are used vary, depending not only on 
the subject field, but also the time that they were written in. It was 
highlighted that it is more than possible to develop a basic risk culture and 
language which can be adaptable for all aspects of risk management, whether 
this is for strategic political risk assessments, or short-term operational based 
adventure expedition risk assessments.  
• To identify and clarify the key vocabulary used to understand risk 
management in a tourism, business and political risk context. The great 
advantage of doing such a broad comparative analysis was that it revealed 
the confusing language (the messy palette) of risk. This has a serious 
implication impeding the effective communication of risk. The importance 
of this cannot be underestimated. Without the effective communication of 
risk, any risk management process will fail, no matter how good the analysis 
and assessment is, as the ultimate purpose is to help inform and guide actions 
to deal with potential risks. There is also the danger that multiple risk 
systems and vocabularies may be held within the organisation, which can 
add to the confusion. To deal with this, this work has endeavoured to 
develop many typologies, which, it must be emphasised, are not designed to 
standardise the language and approach, but rather act as a lexicon to help 
better understand the various risk management approaches.  
• To identify and analyse instances of good and bad practice for risk 
assessment from across a variety of subject fields. In the development of 
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the variety of typologies and checklist tables, constant reference was made to 
many different models and approaches. The model developed for this work 
is essentially a synthesis of a variety of approaches, whereby bad practice is 
avoided, such as a narrow focus on the negative aspects of risks, and good 
practice is built upon, such as extending the notion of risks to more esoteric 
areas, such as ethics and reputation. 
• To test the relevance of existing models of political/country risk 
assessment for the tourism industry. This proved more challenging than 
anticipated. From the initial scans of the many possible political risk models, 
they seemed to provide a detailed methodology which could be replicated; 
on closer scrutiny not only were there many vagaries as to the type of 
specific data which should actually be used and interpreted, but there were 
also issues of copyright to consider. The comparison with a number of 
existing, composite risk assessment values compared with tourism demand, 
revealed a decidedly mixed picture in relation to gauging the level of 
attractiveness of a destination. They can be useful, and the many open 
databases should be consulted, but one should avoid over-relying on just one 
method as the basis of a political risk assessment. 
• To analyse which are the best ways to ascribe a risk value, if at all? The 
results were far from conclusive. Despite many methods designed in the 
positivistic tradition, ultimately, all risk assessments are social constructs 
they require the information to be interpreted. This theme was constantly 
evident in the literature. It was not that surprising then, that so many 
different approaches were discovered. Although many classifications were 
examined, it emerged that it can sometimes be misleading, as using many 
risk values is reductionist and can give false signals. There is also the 
problem that they tend to underplay and distract from looking for the 
opportunity risks, as many of the scales were developed within an older, 
second age risk paradigm. The key is to recognise the variety and again 
adapt to the organisation itself, whether this is a seven point, five point, three 
point scale, or for that matter, no scale at all. 
 250 
8.2.3 Reflecting on the aim and the model developed 
So this leaves the project aim, which was: 
To develop a systematic, practical framework for analysing, assessing 
and controlling political risks, relevant to small to medium sized 
tourism, adventure and sport organisations. 
Certainly, the attempt to achieve the objectives and examine the assertions did help 
distil the key elements which could help construct a model. What was finally 
produced was not what was initially anticipated. The model developed gives 
guidance on the direction of analysis and some very specific details on the key 
databases which were found to be the most relevant in terms of generating 
information. The impact of the internet has been profound in this respect, as it 
means numerous databases can be accessed to help inform the risk management 
process. The problem is that one can be easily overwhelmed, as indeed I was to 
begin with. Yet after much patient reviewing and analysis, the pattern that emerged 
was that many databases are simply re-interpreting a number of key databases, 
particularly in relation to the data produced by the UN, the CIA World Fact Book 
and the World Bank. The result is that the number to consult can be reduced 
considerably. The specific attention given to the more specific pieces of data that act 
as indicators and where these are accessed from came to form a key part of this 
work. Ultimately, the diversity of the tourism industry, its segments and the 
different risk tolerances or thresholds which must be set, mean that one should guard 
against being too dogmatic and deterministic about saying what is the right and 
wrong way for analysing and assessing risks.  
Although it is acknowledged that the model developed is a synthesis of many 
models, and theories, there are still a number of unique features to it. The model 
allows for one to delve into data of varying levels of complexity in order to make an 
assessment. Of particular relevance is how the more complex analysis of causation 
factors (the input indicators) comes towards the end of the process, and indeed, 
could actually be ignored in terms of making a political risk assessment. Many may 
baulk at this, as so much of academic thinking is designed for seeking 
understanding: in contrast, so much of a practitioners’ time is trying to collect 
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information with limited time and money, in order to try and make a reasonably 
informed decision or plan. Some reading this may recognise a contradiction with an 
approach that selectively focuses on different data in order to make an assessment, 
whilst at the same time encouraging the adoption of complexity and system theory 
paradigms in the risk process; theories which constantly emphasise the importance 
of looking at the whole system and the interconnection of forces. 
There is no perfect answer to this critique, because whilst the model is designed to 
consider all aspects of the system and the inter-connection of forces, it recognises an 
operational reality where selectivity is sometimes necessary. The risk model 
developed here illustrates how one can embark on the research process, with the 
data collected broken down into more digestible components, rather than trying to 
embark immediately on a complex, inductive analysis of causation factors. Instead a 
more flexible approach is developed. After all, an adventure operator does not need 
to understand all the complexities of what actually causes an avalanche, to make an 
assessment of the risks of an avalanche to a tour group. An assessment which could 
be based on simply listening to what others say, to observing the more immediate 
conditions, to a more detailed analysis of the factors which can lead to an avalanche 
occurring. As such the model is more pragmatic, which encourages adaptation, and 
where one will often have to balance aspects of academic rigour versus management 
functionality. As one moves through the model, one also moves closer to the ideals 
of the paradigms adopted. 
The approach developed here is grounded in the context of the practitioner, who is a 
‘non-expert’ in political risk. This is why the process initially begins by accessing 
the travel advice sites (also governed by a regulatory aspect), then followed by an 
analysis of past incidents. The use of a frequency based approach is one common to 
many areas of operational risk management and is often used to help quantify 
probability. The profound weakness of this approach is recognised. The dangers of 
using the past for the projection of the future was discussed in Chapter 6 with the 
analogolous black swans. The real value of this approach is how one can adapt it in 
relation to spatial analysis, not necessarily the assessment of probability. When 
complemented with the news services of incidents which can be constantly emailed 
to operators, they act as important alert service of potential risks, both good and bad. 
 252 
It is an approach not found in any explicit way in the literature on the existing risk 
models. 
The other important feature to emphasise is in relation to the risk culture used. This, 
as said earlier, is the lens through which hazards and risks are viewed, which in this 
work is based on a preference for the fourth age paradigm, which is grounded in 
complexity theory and a view of the political environment where the notion of 
political stability is something of a misnomer, as it can detract from the inherent 
dynamism of any political system to generate hazards and risks. The latter is 
particularly important in relation to not making simplistic notions of democracy as 
less risky, rather that there are many shades, which vary in the political hazards 
created, and the risks generated. Such a culture can help in terms of creativity and as 
the cognitive prompt for seeing risks differently. This culture is also of particular 
use when attempting to apply certain tools, such as the scenario exercises conducted 
in Chapter 7 illustrated.  
But how good is this model? By no means can one say it is a perfect method. Far 
from it. As highlighted in Chapter 5, there are a number of inherent weaknesses in 
the model which can always undermine it. Clearly the model still needs more 
application, but it is anticipated that it would, indeed, should be adapted according 
to the needs of the organizations and its type of clients and assets exposed to risk. 
One of the unique aspects of the model can relate to the use of qualitative 
information, which has looked to a single story or comment to help give a revelatory 
insight into the risk process, rather than building on simple quantification of 
structured responses to questions. Some may not like this, arguing it lacks validity 
and reliability when used in other situations. But again it should be appreciated that 
in management decision making, decisions are not just made in relation to pure 
mathematical modeling and statistics: often it can take that single glimmer of 
difference which can be enough to help confirm a decision, even though all the 
evidence can point to such an action being very risky. Hauss’s work (2001, p.4) is of 
interest here. He observes that so much in international affairs is presented in a 
dispassionate way, yet in contrast the decision making process is far from rational 
and often highly emotive. So to with this work. The emotional element of risk 
interpretation is recognized, rather than simply trying to rely on cold probability. 
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This was certainly true with Ethiopia, whereby the data collected pointed to travel 
which could be risky, but within the data collected one also finds the information 
which gives  positive signals, such as with the interesting use of the micro, anecdotal 
information provided by a travel blog, rather than just relying on a theoretically 
more expert, but general travel advice site. Furthermore, it was noted that whilst for 
some, this information may instil fear and inaction, for others it can create 
excitement and action. True, sometimes this may be a question of people seeing 
what they want to see. If one gets it wrong, then the actions can be deemed as 
reckless; if one gets it right it can be seen as vanguard decision making, by leaders 
ahead of the game. Finally, there is also still the problem that a suitable scale to 
better represent the upside risks is needed. As stated earlier this was never fully 
resolved, if indeed if ever can. 
8.3 Recommendations for future research 
This work has generated as many questions as it has answered, highlighting 
numerous possible areas for more research. Indeed, one such spin-off area which has 
already been explored beyond this thesis, was in relation to giving greater 
conceptual clarity to the notion of hot war tourism (Piekarz 2007). In that discussion 
it was highlighted how the growth of the peace keeping industry, changing social 
figurations and increased opportunities for more challenging travel, has meant that 
one can find many people traveling towards conflict zones, rather than away from 
them. 
The other important areas can be listed as follows: 
• Exploring the risk in the traveller decision making process, in order to 
develop some user typologies to help in risk assessments and marketing 
strategies. The use of heuristics seemed a particularly rich area of study, 
whereby a more humanistic approach could be developed to understand how 
perceptions of political risk are formed. This also has some interesting 
implications in relation to the notion of the post-modern tourist and market 
segmentation. Related to this is the role of emotions and arousal plays in the 
decision making process. Whilst Frosdick (1999, p.122) raised this issue, 
citing Toft’s (1993) work and how too much arousal 
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blindness, it is of interest how arousal may also lead to more positive 
outcomes and the relationship to notions of acting on ‘gut feelings.’ 
• To apply the model to more organisations in order to continue to refine 
and develop it. This study allowed for a model to be developed around a 
single case study, but it would be useful to apply it to more practitioners to 
continue to refine it and learn from further instances of good and bad 
practice. 
• To research in more detail the systems used for recording, and 
monitoring data. This is often an overlooked area focusing on the simple 
practicalities of how information is actually recorded. Whilst perhaps not as 
dynamic as other areas of risk management, it is of vital importance as 
having robust systems which can stand scrutiny of an audit trail is an 
important control mechanism if litigation takes place.  
• To examine more intimately the output method, using more focused, 
statistical techniques. Although, it was briefly explored and found to be of 
limited value for this model, it would still be useful to conduct a more in 
depth, positivistic study which clarified the relationship of certain conflict 
events with tourism.  
• To explore in more detail why issues of human rights and government 
abuses are less important than environmental factors in market 
positioning. Whilst notions of ethical tourism have grown in terms of 
marketing, there is an interesting willingness of travellers and operators to 
seemingly ignore governmental abuses of its people, with the key exception 
of Burma. Whilst one can notice a growing number of campaigns which do 
discourage travel to countries with a poor record on human rights, these do 
not seem to have struck the same chord as environmental issues, and hold 
fewer marketing opportunities in comparison with issues of sustainability.  
8.4 Final thoughts 
At the beginning of this work there were aspirations to construct a neat, structured 
model that could produce clear and specific risk values. As the research progressed 
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the inherent weaknesses of such an approach was constantly exposed. One must 
accept that perfectly rational decision is near impossible; instead the key is to know 
how best to collect data, within the given resource constraints, in order to develop 
appropriate plans and control measures to deal with upside and downside risks 
generated from political hazards. 
It is also vital to stress that because a high risk assessment value may be given, it 
does not mean that travel should not take place. The point of a risk assessment is not 
to construct an iron law determining actions, rather it is to help inform the decision 
making processes. Into this mix is the vital importance of the risk culture adopted, as 
it can encourage a constant examination and reflection of the environment and the 
need to be flexible and adapt one’s actions accordingly. The final ingredient is how 
people respond to this information at an emotional level. Perfect decision-making 
should be accepted as utopia; better decision making based on good information, is 
both achievable, as well as a dynamic aspiration driving individuals and 
organisations forward. This is why the work has come to the firm conclusion, along 
with many other writers, that political risk is far more art than science, despite the 
aspiration of many for it to be otherwise.
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Appendix A - Summary of the key political hazards and related political risk events  
 
Category Description Examples of hazardous events Examples of  Impacts 
 
1. Structural 
workings of political 
systems 
This relates to the hazards that can emerge from the day-to-day 
workings of government, such as taxation changes, 
infrastructure initiatives, passport controls and dealing with 
bureaucracies. Although they may not have the visibility or 
drama of other political hazards or risk events, such as acts of 
terrorism, they are just as significant. The term risk event, as a 
consequence may be less accurate, as the timescales may be 
more gradual. It recognises that policy initiatives must not just 
be associated with changes with government, but can also be 
developed within existing governments, particularly in 
response to pressure group lobbying, or in response to events, 
such as September the 11.th. 
Bureaucratic delays  •  Nepotism   •    Policy initiatives and 
developments   •   New laws, regulations/deregulation   •    
Pressure group lobbying (e.g. human rights, environmental 
groups)  •   Bribery   •   Arrests/executions of significant 
opposition leaders   •    Illegal detentions   •    Local business 
partnerships   •  Centralising/decentralising (or strengthening of 
local democracy or strengthening of local businesses)  •   Legal 
rulings (e.g. copyright, duty of care etc.)   •   Bias in legal rulings 
(i.e. lacks neutrality from the government)  •    Adherence to laws 
and regulations  •   Public spending   •   Incentive measures .   
Exchange rate controls   •     Business protection laws or lack of   
•    Red tape/delays   •   Central/local government tensions   •  
Trade Union activity   •  Taxations.  
2. Regime Change This tends to generate hazardous events which could impact 
upon an organisation, as the changes can be quite radical and 
fundamental, seeping through all layers of society. Regime 
change, however can also create many opportunities as well as 
threats, but care must be taken that a change to a democratic 
system must not be viewed as only creating opportunities as 
earlier discussions reveal. 
Revolution (violent and non-violent, such as Czechoslovakia’s 
‘velvet revolution’)  •   Military coup d’etat     •   Radical policy 
reorientations  delays   •     Expropriation of assets   •   Changes in 
foreign relations     •   Marshall law and curfews •    Illegal 
detentions and mass arrests •   Boycotts/bans   •    Pressure group 
activity   •    Democratic elections     •    Peace initiatives. 
 
3. Leadership and 
government change 
This refers to where the government alters in some way, 
whether it relates to changes in leadership, or changes in the 
parties holding the reigns of power. Whilst there may be little 
radical change, there can be numerous micro impacts, such as 
tourism taxes, particularly at a local level.The notion of 
leadership changes can also be extended to opposition groups, 
who may generate a new set of risks. In older political risk 
models, there was often a concern for tracking the potential of 
left-wing groups/parities obtaining power or influence, but is a 
simplistic approach. Change here can take place in both a 
peaceful or violent manner  
Policy changes such as employment legislation  delays   •     
Taxation changes (national and local)     •    Expropriation 
(usually more limited) or privatisation •   Changes in international 
relations (improved/worsened)  delays   •    Sanctions/boycotts 
(placed or lifted)     •    National elections •    Local elections     •   
Prisoner releases/opposition group arrest  delays   •   Popular 
support for new leaders and parties/feel good factors   •   Local 
partnership initiatives . Changes in ownership laws •     
Ethnic/religious tensions generated/decreased   •    Exchange 
controls •     Interest rate changes. 
4. Security and 
Conflict 
War/insurgency/guer
rilla campaigns 
 
Gurr et al (1986)  makes the observation that some theories of 
conflict present the tactics of conflicts as a series of episodic 
events such as revolutions, whilst Gurr regard conflicts as a 
continuous process and flipping the perspective, not looking at 
‘why men rebel?’ but what factors or theories help explain why 
conflicts vary in the scope, intensity and general form. The 
difference between insurgency, war and terrorism can be very 
fine, and can at times be one of semantics, or some argue the 
scale of destruction and casualties 
 
Urban battles   •   Atrocities on civilian   •    Bombings/shootings     
•   Kidnappings/hostage taking   •   Border area lawlessness  •    
Travel restrictions/communication disruptions   •  Embargoes 
Operational Risk  Impacts  
 
Certain products/services may have restrictions 
placed on them (e.g. Iran in 1979 and the 
banning of Alcohol in hotels). Strikes, 
demonstrations and riots can affect immediate 
operations by placing physical restrictions on 
travel and so the suspend operations.  
 
Physical Risks Impacts 
 
Terrorists, war or demonstrations can result in 
people  being  killed or injured, or buildings and 
equipment damaged or destroyed. 
 
Financial Risk Impacts  
 
 An organisation may face increases in cost 
from taxation  from both a local and central 
level  (e.g. Newquay town council increased the 
local airport tax on incoming travellers, in 2005, 
which led Ryanair to protest about the increased 
costs and reduce the number of flights to the 
area), or new regulations can impose additional 
costs. 
 
Reputational Risk Impacts  
 
Organisations must think carefully about their 
ethical stance, as it can become compromised if 
they travel to countries where governments have 
a poor human rights/environment record.  The 
reputation can also be affected depending how 
they respond to advice and crisis situations. 
Reputation is intimately tied in with brand 
development. 
 
Emotional Risk  Impacts  
 
Passengers /customers can become stranded, or  
may be unable to continue with the holiday, 
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Genocide and 
Politicide 
 
‘Genocides and politicides are the promotion, execution, and/or 
implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or 
their agents-or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending 
authorities-that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a 
communal, political, or politicized ethnic group’ (MAR 2007). 
In genocides the victimized groups are defined by their 
perpetrators primarily in terms of their communal 
characteristics. In politicides, in contrast, groups are defined 
primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime 
and dominant groups.  
Ethnic cleansing  •     Persecution   •    Mass arrests. 
 
Terrorism 
 
Terrorism has increasingly targeted tourists, but it should be 
appreciated that countries can have a terrorist problem with 
travel and tourism not being affected in any significant way, as 
the UK and Spain illustrate. What is of particular importance is 
to understand the methods of the terrorist campaign, who is 
targeted, what is targeted and where they are targeted 
Bombings of buildings and people  •    Shootings of people  •    
Building defilement  •    Kidnapping and hostage taking  •    
Targeting of “foreign” travellers/buildings  •   Levying 
“taxes”/permits to travel   •     Illegal detentions/tortures  •    
Assassinations  •   Hijacking/hostage taking  •   State sponsored 
terrorist responses.•   Peace deals/arms surrenders  •  Political 
sections developed. •   Arson 
 
Civil Protests 
 
Whilst demonstrations can take place and be peaceful, which 
can even present an area, or country in a positive light (as the 
activities around the UK G8 July 2005 meeting illustrate, 
which was accompanied with a variety of events and concerts, 
which were used in a very positive way by the London 
Olympic bidding committee), they have the potential to turn 
more violent and descend into riots, or receive a violent 
backlash from the authority, as in Tiananmen square in China, 
in 1989. 
 
Demonstration   •  Secondary picketing   •      Rioting in towns 
and cities  •     Strikes in key sectors, such as air traffic control   •     
Blockades/restrictions on communications (e.g. French farmers 
and fisherman)  •    Curfew imposition  •     Marshal law  •      
Illegal detentions and arrests  •    Pressure group protests and 
demonstrations  •     Armed attacks  •      Curfews. 
 
Ethnic violence 
 
 
 
Rioting is more serious and can severely affect an image of a 
destination and place areas out of bounds. As the riots in 
France in 2005 illustrate, they can affect all countries. Ethnic 
violence Societies can have many cleavages and differences, 
which does not necessarily mean it is a precursor to instability, 
but it does suggest that politics will have a inherent dynamic in 
them 
 
 
Xenophobia   •     Racism   •     Discrimination 
(religion/ethnicity). 
 
Criminality 
 
 
Although many would not put this as a political hazard, the 
increasing blurring of the boundaries between criminality, 
insurgency, terrorism and war, means that it should be 
considered. This is particularly true in relation to weak or 
failing states, where criminality can thrive. 
Corruption    •      Bribery   •    Kidnapping    •    
Drug/arms/animal smuggling/selling  •    Armed attacks/robbery   
•      Hijacking  •    Executions   •    Theft   •  ‘Beneficial 
ownership’ (Grey area) •      Nepotism   •   Cronyism (Grey area) 
•     Counterfeiting  •     Fraud.  
 
leading to frustrations and the risk of 
disappointment and claims for compensation.  
The challenge and risks encountered, whilst 
difficult at the time, alternatively could lead to 
enhancing the experience. 
 
Ethical Risk Impacts  
 
Overlaps with reputational risks. 
Military/authoritarian leaderships actions, such 
a using violence to repress demonstrations, 
means many ethical and moral dilemmas can be 
raised about the ethicacy of travelling to the 
destination. (e.g. Austrian election of the Far 
Right president in 2000).  
  
Legal and Regulatory Risk Impacts  
Corruption is a particular important risk, which 
organisations must consider because if they act 
with complicity, they run the risk of arrests, 
prison and their reputation tarnished. There are 
also the risks of customers purchasing illegal 
artefacts (such as animal skins) which raises 
many more ethical and reputation risks. 
 
Strategic Risk Impacts  
 
This  may be created as peace is restored and 
the legacy of war is packaged into tourist 
attractions themselves. Something with a long 
history. The deregulation of the airline industry 
also gives one of the most dramatic examples of 
political change creating numerous market 
opportunities.  
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Government 
repression 
 
 
This is often overlooked, but can be just as important, 
particularly as it can have generate many serious ethical and 
reputational risk impacts. It should be appreciated that states 
can also be involved with terrorism upon their own citizens.  
. 
Mass arrests  •     Executions   •     Curfews   •    Opposition 
attacks   •     Media attacks. 
5.Natural Hazards For many years the impact of the natural environment has 
tended to be ignored in many political risk scanning models. In 
relation to politics, it is increasingly recognised that what 
happens in the natural environment can have profound impacts 
on future developments in the political environment. In relation 
to disease, it may seem on first glance odd that this is placed as 
a political hazard. The reason for this is that disease can not 
only affect people’s perception of a place and willingness to 
travel, but it can be the government’s response to the disease 
that can have such profound impacts on travel. Travel can be 
deemed as part of the problem in relation to how quickly it can 
spread diseases, therefore restrictions may be placed on travel 
by governments.  Previous outbreaks of  Severe Acute 
Respitory Syndrome( SARS) initiated significant political 
responses and had a huge economic impact on the Asian 
economy  (Overby et al, 2004). 
 
Environmental disasters   
Drought and Famines  •    Earthquakes and Tsunamis  •      
Hurricanes and typhoon  •    Flooding Pollution  •  Disease  •     
 Quarantine measures •    Travel restrictions •    Denial of access 
to areas. 
6. External 
interaction events 
and relations 
This relates to the idea that events beyond a country’s  borders, 
or the relations they have with other states, can generate many 
political hazards. The cartoons published in Denmark also 
show another, more complex element, whereby it is not just 
government actions, but also individuals and organisations 
associated with a country. 
Embargoes  •     Association risks (e.g. people targeted because of 
a countries support for another countries policies)  •    
Communication/travel restrictions  •     Demonstrations, riots and 
strikes  •      Terrorist/insurgency groups formed  •    NGO 
initiatives  •    Border disputes  •       Intellectual property 
disputes. 
 
Source: Synthesised table produced by the author 
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Appendix B - Categorising political risk approaches/methodologies  
Who is used  
There are many different 
organisations which can be used in 
political risk, who generate different 
types of information, use different 
analytical tools and vary in their 
degree of expertise. 
What data can be 
used 
There are now huge amounts 
of data that can be collected 
and used for analysis, yet 
different data can be used for 
different types of analysis, 
which in turn can reveal 
different types of risks. 
What is focused on (level and 
variables/factors) 
This categorisation relates to the many 
different factors that can be focused on. What 
must be emphasised is that many models do 
not just focus on criteria based on one 
category, but tend to overlap.  
When are 
they used 
The actual time 
scales and purpose of 
the analysis and 
assessment focused 
on vary, from an 
immediate daily 
assessment, to plans 
covering years  
How the methods 
or approaches 
are classified 
When examining the 
literature one can end up 
classifying the 
classifications as there are 
so many approaches. The 
methods identified here 
tend to be the most 
common approaches 
Which analytical 
tools/methods are 
used 
The degree of sophistication used 
in analysis and assessment can 
vary from using ‘gut reactions’ 
to highly sophisticated, 
computer-simulated forecasts. A 
key point to appreciate is that 
political risk can, indeed should, 
be blended in with many existing 
forecasting and planning models 
utilised 
Consultancies/agencies;  
These can be classified themselves in 
different ways, such as Bouchet et al 
(2003) distinguishing between firms 
who offer specialised rankings (e.g. 
BERI); export credit agencies (e;g 
Coface); and credit ranking agencies 
(e.g. Fitch). Some of these may or 
may not be involved for commercial 
reasons. Examples of organisations 
who conduct political risk 
assessments include: PRS; HIS 
Energy; Control Risk Group. 
Examples of organisations who 
conduct country risk assessments 
include; ICRG, EIU; BERI ; 
Euromoney; Moody’s Investor 
services; Rundt & Associates. 
Examples of organisations who 
conduct financial/credit risk: 
Institutional Investor; Standard and 
Poor.  
News agencies 
There are many global news services 
which are useful, such as the BBC 
website. What can also be beneficial, 
Country status data 
Examples can include risk 
assessment values published; 
economic data such as GDP, 
inflation rates etc.; social 
indicators, such as birth rates, 
infant mortality rates etc.. 
Incident data 
This relates specific incidents, 
such as terrorist attacks, which 
can be used to build up a 
frequency profile. Examples of 
useful  databases include; CIA 
world fact book; MIPT 
database on terrorism; Country 
Profiles provided by the UK 
FO; news databases 
Advice data  
This tends to be ignored in the 
literature on political risk. 
Examples include 
governmental advice;  
guidebook/travel site 
warnings;  insurance 
recommendations; or even 
pressure group advice such as  
The level of analysis  
By synthesising a variety of approaches a 
number of key levels can be identified. The 
global level, which reflects the importance of 
understanding events around the world, 
particularly the actions of the USA. The 
interstate-level. The macro level on analysis 
focuses on political change which affects all 
industries in a country. The micro level on 
analysis focuses on political change which 
affects only specific industries in a country. 
The organisational level can relate to inductive 
approaches, whereby one can focus more 
directly on the impacts political events may 
have, ignoring the determining variables and 
focusing on the dependent variables (this 
relates to Howell’s (2001, p..8)  type III 
classification). Within the context of the 
organisation itself, this can be further divided 
between the strategic level; programme level; 
project level and the operational level (NAC, 
2002) 
Actor/source approach 
This can have a strong behavioural approach 
and examines the importance individuals can 
have in generating risk (this relates to 
Howell’s (2001, p.8) type IV)classification. 
Short-term 
operational decision 
making 
Examples may relate 
to amending travel 
plans to countries and 
regions because of 
civil unrest. 
Medium, to long 
term strategic 
decisions making 
and planning  
Examples may relate 
to examining the 
long-term prospects 
of a countries 
political stability in 
order to decide future 
investment decisions, 
such as building a 
hotel) 
The type/scale of 
assets at risk 
Depending on just 
what is at risk can 
affect the extent of 
Intuitive, deductive or 
inductive  
Intuitive assessments 
relate to the more 
‘instinctive approaches in 
decision making; inductive 
approaches relate more to 
theory construction where 
an event is explored more 
in the context of its 
possible impacts upon the 
organisation; deductive 
approaches look more at a 
range of data and factors 
in order to reason future 
events and outcomes, 
based on a theory. 
Degree of methodological 
structure 
Three useful sub-
categories which can be 
used here are developed 
by Monti-Belkaoui et al 
(1998, p.94), adapting 
Kobrin’s (1979) and 
Kennedy’s (1987) work, 
which are: 
Intuitive assessments 
Examples may include the 
creative thinking techniques, use 
of analogies, interviewing project 
team workers and speculation. 
One of the classic examples of an 
intuitive or unstructured 
approach is the ‘Grand tour’. A 
method that has been 
characterises by executives 
travelling to a country in order to 
gain a snap shot of its viability 
for investment. A variation of 
this is to use people who have 
regional expertise, such as 
journalists, diplomats, academics 
etc., who interpret local events to 
help advise on local conditions – 
an approach described as the 
‘old-hands approach’ (Monti-
Belkaoui et al 1998, p 91). These 
methods tend be based on 
experience and are highly 
normative (Monti-Belkaoui et al 
1998, p.90).  
Scanning approaches  
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if available, is the use of a countries 
own news databases, which whilst 
they may have a degree of bias, can 
still be a useful source for collecting 
certain types of incident data (many 
examples of English speaking news 
agencies exist, such as in Morocco or 
Nepal). 
Governmental                              
Examples include the USA State 
department; CIA databases; UK FO 
etc. 
In-house                                        
This is where people within the  
organisation goes directly to the raw 
data sources (e.g. incident or country 
status data) in order to conduct the 
analysis and assessments. They can 
also use in-house experts. 
Other 
Examples include guide book 
websites (e.g. Lone planet; Local 
agents). 
 
Tourism Concern 
Ethical data 
Examples may include 
information from Amnesty 
International; Freedom House; 
Transparency International or 
the more direct, prescriptive 
comments offered by Tourism 
Concern. 
The qualitative/quantitative 
mix 
Bouchet et al (2003) actually 
make a distinction between 
country risk assessments which 
are quantitative based or 
qualitative based. 
This relates to the extent that 
qualitative data or quantitative 
data should be used – an issue 
critical in all risk management 
fields. Although a quantitative 
skew can be detected, many 
writers tend to advocate mixed 
data approaches. 
Brink (2004, p.37) identifies the: individual or 
psychological level; the group/social  level 
(e.g. ethnic groups). 
Structural conditions approach 
These can range from more specific economic, 
social and environmental factors to ethical 
issues and how the forces interact and 
correlate with each other. The tendency is to 
ignore the environmental factors in many 
models. 
Relative deprivation  approach 
These approaches focus on the economic and 
social conditions and can bring in theories of 
frustration and demonstration affects. 
Government/regime type approach 
Many types of risk assessments have been too 
simplistic in associating riskiness with certain 
types of government or regimes, particularly 
left-wing types. An approach which is 
dangerous as it ignores many other types of 
risks. 
The value systems 
This relates to the cultural make up of the 
country such as the aspect of religion, 
nationalism or language. 
Systems theory/institutions 
This approach examines systems, institutions 
(e.g. judiciary, assembly the executive etc.) 
and processes, with its inputs and outputs and 
how forces interacts to generate change and  
risks * 
 
the risk analysis and 
assessment, which 
relates to the type of 
customers and the 
amount of money 
invested. Howell 
(2001) uses the term 
investor attributes 
and classify it as a 
Type E model.  
unstructured/unsystematic 
assessments (also relates 
to intuitive approaches e.g. 
Old Hands approach); 
unstructured/systematic 
assessments (e.g. BERI) ; 
and structured/systematic 
approaches (e.g. ICRG.) 
Country, political or 
credit risk 
categorisations 
This relates to the scale of 
the analysis and 
assessment, with larger 
scale assessments which 
include looking at a wide 
range of structural factors, 
being classified more as 
country risk assessments, 
whilst those that focus on 
the political conditions are 
can be classified as 
political assessments. 
Credit rating methods 
concentrate and focuses on 
the ability of ac country to 
service its debts..  
Examples can include scanning 
news sources for signals and 
drivers of change and can be 
placed in a PESTLE, SWOT or 
SPECTACLES framework. 
Forecasting tools/methods used 
Examples can include scenario 
writing, comparative analysis, 
trend extrapolation, Delphi 
techniques Shell scenario model; 
PRINCE model  
Analytical tools used 
Examples can include fault-tree 
analysis, HAZOPS; FMECA; 
checklist indicators, statistical 
questionnaire analysis; spatial 
‘hot spot’ analysis; fuzzy logic 
analysis; checklist approaches 
Source: Author
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Appendix C – Comparative review of key process stages 
Writer Field Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 Stage 7 
Michaels 
(1996) 
Technical risk 
management 
Risk Identification 
(establish scope, define 
requirements, establish 
baseline model, identify 
hazards and perils 
Risk 
quantification 
(derive risk 
hierarchy, select 
risk formulation, 
calculate risk 
exposure) 
Risk control 
(establish risk 
organisation, fund 
organisation, 
implement audit 
trail,) 
    
Health & 
Safety 
Executive  
Operational health and 
safety 
Look for hazards Decide what can 
be harmed 
Evaluate the risk is 
from the hazards and 
decide if existing 
precautions are 
adequate 
Record your 
findings 
Review   
BMC (2007) 
using HSE 5 
Steps to Risk 
Assessment” 
Sport/adventure Look for hazards Decide who can 
be harmed 
Evaluate the risks 
and decide if existing 
precautions are 
enough 
Record your 
findings 
Review your 
assessment and revise 
if necessary 
  
Brown (1999, 
p.277) 
Adapting 
Ford & 
Blanchard’s 
(1985) model. 
Adventure Risk   
awareness 
 
 
Identification (hazard 
assessment 
Risk evaluation 
(frequency & 
severity) 
Risk adjustment or 
control (retain, 
reduce, transfer or 
avoid) 
Risk management 
plan 
Plan evaluation & 
update 
  
Sadgrove 
(1997 pp.19-
22) 
Business management Risk awareness & 
assessment 
(audit resources, 
identification) 
Set priorities 
(which hazards 
carry the most 
risk?) 
Prevent (minimise 
risk, transfer, spread) 
Plan (disaster plan 
or alternative 
adjustments) 
   
Keeling 
(2000, p.39) Project management Risk identification Risk assessment Risk analysis Risk elimination    
Burke (1999)       
 
Project Run through project 
lifecycle 
Identify who is 
responsible for 
managing risk 
Define project 
objectives 
Identify risks Quantify risks Develop 
responses 
Risk control 
Getz  
 (1997 p241) 
Event management Identification of the risks Comparative 
analysis of the 
risks 
Predicting possible 
hazards 
Evaluate 
probability of 
occurrence 
Categorise the risks 
(e.g 
high/low/medium) 
Opportunities 
and threats of 
the risks 
Formulate 
strategies (take, 
transfer, terminate, 
reduce) 
Hudson Adventure Determining exposure Identifying Evaluating those Selecting finance Implementing Planning  
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(2002, p.255) levels acceptable to the 
planning organisations 
and guests 
hazards to 
business 
hazards and control 
measures 
mitigation strategies appropriate 
responses to 
emergency 
incidents 
Bannister &  
Bawcutt 
(1981, p.22) 
Business Identification/recognition Measure Economic 
management of 
threats 
Ensure adequate 
finance to meet 
threats 
 
  
Shell 
International 
Model 
(Moody, 
2000) 
Strategic management Establish clear objectives 
(identify and evaluate 
significant risks to the 
achievement of those 
objectives 
Incorporate risk 
responses into 
internal control 
systems to 
address 
opportunities, 
control threats 
Monitor 
effectiveness of the 
risk systems 
Adopt specific 
guidelines for 
specific risks. 
   
Turnbull 
Report (1999)  Business management Setting objectives Identifying significant risks 
Ranking and 
prioritising 
Manage risks and 
control strategies 
Monitor Improve  
Hollman and 
Forrest 
(1991) 
Not specified Discovery of loss 
exposure (note 
discovery) 
Evaluation of 
loss exposure 
Select control 
techniques 
Implementation Monitor   
Frosdick 
(1999) 
citing Strutt 
(1993) 
General  Systematic analysis (all 
parts of the system are 
examined) 
Identification of 
risks (local and 
global) 
Assessment of risks 
(frequencies and 
consequences) 
Establishment of 
acceptable levels 
of risks 
Evaluation of risks 
(are they 
acceptable/can they 
be reduced) 
Determine if 
risks are as low 
as is practicable 
Determine 
reduction measures 
Burns-Howell 
et al (2003, 
p.11) 
Security risk and 
control 
Identify and list assets List and asses the 
threats 
List the 
vulnerabilities 
Define and assess 
risks 
Determine and define 
counter-measures and 
the means of 
implementation 
To initiate and 
implement the 
risk control 
process 
 
Heng (2006, 
p.54) Security studies Based on Cabinet Office 
strategy Unit 2002) 
Identify risks Assess risks Address risks Review and report 
risks 
   
Merna et al 
(2005)  Business management Identification of risk/uncertainties 
Analysis of 
implications 
Response to 
minimise risks 
Allocation of 
appropriate 
contingencies 
   
Chapaman & 
Ward (1997)  Project Define Focus Identify Structure Ownership Estimate Plan 
Hanley (2001, 
p.55) Mapping business risks Risk identification Risk assessment Risk consolidation Risk portfolio management 
   
Jodice (1984, 
p.18) Political risk Identification of risk related factors 
Prediction of 
government 
policy of risk 
factors 
Deciding effective 
corporate response 
Executing 
decisions 
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Appendices D - Key control measures 
Category Examples of specific actions Description/comment 
Terminate  
or  avoid  
-Refusing an investment opportunity in a country.  
-Change objectives (shell Oil). 
-Say no to bribes as a forcefully as possible; with a clear 
‘No’ blanket policy (Marckwick, 1998). 
-Develop corporate codes of ethics. 
Relates to risks that are high severity and probability (Hi/HI on the risk matrix). 
Gifford (1983) comments that if a risk factor is considered too high and the decision is taken to take it, 
then this can profoundly affect the credibility of the expedition and confidence in the leadership. 
 
Transferred 
 or reallocate 
-Insurance (Wilks et al, 2000). 
-OPIC, MIGA world bank Insurance (Wells, 1998, p31), 
Contracting out ( Howell, 2001). 
-Bonding option. 
This is usually for Low frequency/high severity options (Wilks et al 2000). 
The notion of transference does not necessarily always reduce the risk, as the strike of BA baggage 
handlers illustrate, when they walked out in sympathy for staff of an outside catering company, in August 
2005. The result was  BA flights  coming to a standstill and costing the company millions.  
Although an important strategy, not all would classify insurance as a specific control strategy, such as 
Howell (2001, p.14). 
Take or retain -Choosing to go ahead with the project, investment or 
tour. 
-Increase security and diligence (Marckwich 1998, p.49). 
-Be open and transparent. 
-Communication of risks to all staff. 
- Security guards and armoured vehicles.  
- Prevent kidnapping. 
The taking strategy is usually considered as an option when the frequency and severity are regarded as 
low.  
The reasons for this strategy can be varied, ranging the inherent risk where little can be done, such as the 
risk forming a crucial part of the experience. This is certainly true for hard adventure activities. However, 
this strategy can be influenced, as Sadgrove (1997 p.11) argues, by the potential rewards at the end. This 
concept of the ‘reward’ clearly influences Shell Oil approach, where a decision to take the risk is based on 
the degree of inevitability of the risk and the potential returns on a investment, where if they are high, it 
can be a risk worth taking. In this instance the risk could be deemed as high severity and frequency, but 
one still worth taking if the potential returns are high. This adds an interesting dimension to the 
assessment of risk, illustrating how the values ascribed to a risk do not make your decisions, only act as 
guidance. It should also be appreciated that using the term take can in fact create confusion as it may 
mean no action is taken to deal with the risks. The notion of trade-offs can be relevant here. 
Treat,  reduce or 
minimise 
-Training. 
-Protective equipment. 
-Information. 
-Political lobbying (Rugman et al 1995, p.360 ).  
-Cultural awareness negotiating strategies (Rugman et al 
1995, p.360). 
-Secure compounds/buildings. 
-Security Workers (Howell 2001, pp.12-13).  
This relates to reducing the frequency, severity or both. This is a critical area for al fields, at all levels of 
management. 
For example Bentley et al (2001, p.723) highlight the importance of communicating the increased 
likelihood of certain accidents occurring on holiday, where activities which are perceived as low risk, can 
have a higher likelihood of occurring. Lobbying government is something commonly cited in books on 
business management, yet is only a control strategy really suitable for large organisations. 
Mansfield (1999) notes how certain countries when dealing with cycles of violence simply spend more on 
marketing which is not always effective. 
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Appendix E - Content analysis of key questions  
Organisation 
& contact date 
“Events which have an impact on operations” “Value of UK FO 
advice” 
“Other Advice/agents” 
1 Across the divide 
12/1/07 & 15/6/07 
Risk form provided 
2001 - 9/11 many cancellations and fear of flying. Noted that not many pulled out of the charity challengers (See commitment); 
Trips cancelled when Nepal royal family killed. Commented how they had to suspend tours to Nepal for 14 months and have only recently reinstated them 
“Always go by what FO say.” Use local agents. 
2 Adventure 
Bound 
19/2/05. 
No risk form 
provided 
Adventure Bound is the umbrella organisation for a diverse number of enterprises operating all over the world. (E.g. Imaginative Traveller) )Noted how 
SARS had a big impact. Also before the Iraq war in 2003 enquiries were very slow, but once it had started he reported that 2004/2005 was one of the best 
years for a long while. Interviewee was critical of media describing it as “big insect distorting the picture.” 
 
No comment given. None given. 
3 Adventure 
Experiences: 
25/1/07. 
Risk form  provided 
 
“9/11 created one of the biggest financial impacts by tripling insurance premiums for outdoor education providers / outdoor centres. This was an attempt to 
generate more income from sections of the market which had not previously brought in much revenue, to help offset the enormous payouts post 9/11.This 
increase in running costs had obvious knock-on effects to the price of activities to the consumer, and many businesses folded as a result. Examples are all 
over the UK, local ones include two centres that I know of on Anglesey. Increased litigation has also created barriers to UK companies finding insurance to 
cover overseas activities outside of the EU, especially in the US. The UK main insurer of outdoor pursuit providers ‘Perkins Slade’ will not insure activities 
outside the EU. We had to approach organisations in the US, and use their insurance. This act of terrorism also affected holiday and lifestyle decisions of 
potential and existing customers of the tourism industry. Specialist activity providers in our field suffered large percentages of cancellations, particularly 
from customers travelling from distant destinations, reliant upon the airlines as a means of travel. In short, people decided to take their holidays ‘closer to 
home’, and the usual wealthy clientele were replaced by customers less willing to part with their cash! A certain specialist Sea Kayaking Centre attracted 
many clients from the US, Israel, and other wealthy countries, on its courses. It saw countless cancellations from these clients.   Thus, products and 
packaging had to change to meet and embrace this new demand, and those who were not able or chose not to be flexible, suffered financially. Whatever the 
reasons, the economy itself is showing signs of slowing down, and people are therefore looking to spend less. Look at recent auto companies troubles, and 
layoffs in similar organizations. Time will tell as to the extent of this impact on the travel industry, I believe that customers in general will always keep this 
aspect of their lifestyles a priority. 
The website is a useful and quick source of 
basic advice, but I generally research and find 
local contacts who prove very useful 
Similarly to the previous question, the ATM 
course put me in touch, and provided the 
catalyst for me to find and meet contacts from 
all over the world, including folk who on the 
course with me, and are now working in the 
industry, in situations ideal for gathering 
information. So I use specific people in 
organizations for travel advice. Examples of 
organisations which have knowledgeable 
people in, with up to date info on locations I’m 
interested in, include the following; Jagged 
Globe, Duke of Edinburgh’s Award, Nigel 
Dennis Kayaks / Nordkapp Trust Expedition 
Centres, Johnson Outdoors, many 
freelancers/small businesses in niche markets. 
4 Adventure 2 
Mongolia  6/3/07  
No risk form  
“The increasing awareness about Mongolia on South Korean Market was a main positive impact. We have increased our target market and could cooperate 
with Korean agencies followed by increased revenue and experience.” 
“ I do not use UK Foreign Affairs advice very 
often, but there are a lots of useful information. 
I will use it now more active” 
We use TIES advice on our operations 
5 African 
Conservation 
Experience 
12/1/07 & 27 /6/07 
Risk form provided 
“It’s really hard to say. I actually think the events such as the recent interest in Africa due to the G8 summit and the Live8 concerts have benefited us since 
more people have become engaged with issues in Africa and have wanted to travel there to volunteer. I don’t think that events such as 9/11 and 7/7 have 
negatively impacted on us, but I think that is mainly because the areas we work in are quite removed from the terrorist threats worldwide.  
“Do refer to it but our own staff could arrive at 
the conclusions just as quick, if not 
quicker!”…Don’t use it for on the ground info 
….useful for promotions to give to clients. 
MASTA for general medical advice. 
6 Africa Explorer 
31/1/08 
No risk form  
Running the Footballs 4 fun in anticipation of the 2010 world cup. Donating footballs to Africa. Interesting how a commercial company has this social 
dimension. Stopped tours to Zimbabwe in 2002, with one of the prime reasons given that they had to use the official exchange rate which meant that things 
were very expensive. There were also incidents of people cancelling tours to South Africa. Problem of projection. No formal risk assessment conducted. 
 
Don’t use it. None given. 
7 Africa in Focus  
18/3/05 & 1/2/07  
No risk form. 
Problems in Zimbabwe have affected tourism and they have now stopped operating there, although they give their tour group members the opportunity to 
cross over when they are at the border by Victoria falls. 
Strong commitment to responsible travel. Niche based organisation, with its own designer truck (Dragomen does 24, they take 16) particularly for 
photography. Comments how they have adjusted tours in light of the political problems in Zimbabwe. They let tourist cross the border as individuals, rather 
than as a formal party, to get another view of Victoria falls. - they commented  that although nothing happened, it was an atmosphere of hostility. Client 
base of around 416 people, ranging from 14 to 54 days. Problems in Northern Namibia. Said no formal risk assessment was done. Use own experience.” 
“Do not really consult it.” None given. 
8 Bushmasters  
(Mainly operate in 
Guyana) 
17/3/07  
RA form provided. 
 We have only been in existence since 2005. We are located in the Amazon in the North-eastern part of South America and few global events really have 
really had any impact here; certainly the likes of terrorism, the war in Iraq, tsunamis, hurricanes don’t affect us and where we are. The only possible impact 
in the future that we can see would be oil prices and the subsequent cost of aviation and vehicle fuel and any measures that would dramatically increase the 
costs of international flights. Obviously if they find Osama Bin laden in the jungles of Guyana …then things might change – but at least it would put 
Guyana on the map! 
Don’t find it useful at all. See and know more 
of the country then high commissioner staff and 
find it “negative” and, certainly in the 5 years 
since we’ve been here, completely inaccurate. 
Based around local media and Georgetown, 
which is not the same as the rest….crime 
against tourists in the interior almost unheard 
of. One incident stays on the FCO website for 
ever. If for example … all the incidents or 
thefts, mugging or whatever (which occur in 
the USA) were recorded by the UK (FCO) you 
would be reading volumes. 
We refer our clients to things (such as) the 
Lonely Planet, Rough Guide etc for extended 
travel after our trip, but we always warn them 
that most of the information on Guyana is 
wrong and completely out of date. But we don’t 
use anything else ourselves for Guyana because 
we live here and have found that what is 
written on the country is proven to be incorrect 
nearly everywhere. 
9 BOAB War in Iraq created a great deal of hesitancy. Once war started demand firmed up and remained strong. Tsunami diverted many enquiries to their African It is essential but lacks subtlety (e.g. for huge Subscribe to ATA website & Travel Dr, 
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18/3/08 & 12/1/07 
No risk form 
 
destinations (note the stories of people asking if they could get cheap clothes and replicas in Africa, as they do in Asia!). Regulation - ATOL licences and 
buying of flights within an country and the implications this would have. There was a degree of hesitancy before the war in Iraq, but once it started, demand 
remained strong (background noise – becomes familiar). 
countries such as for Zambia and the Sudan). 
Noted how they were bound by it. 
10. Crystal Active 
22/6/07  
Risk form provided 
I’ve only been with TUI UK for a very short period of time so I am unable to answer your first question relating to them however I have answered your 
second two as requested. “Please be advised that TUI UK, of which Crystal Active is a part, outsource all of their Risk Assessment.” 
Very useful. One stop shop that is constantly 
updated and save time trawling through lots of 
data. 
FTO 
EWGLINET 
11. Detail Events 
(Adventure 
Racing) 
5/2/07   
Risk form provided. 
 No significant events reported 
 
Never look at it None 
12 Different Travel 
10/2/07 
Risk form provided 
It has varied considerably over the years. Useful. None stated. 
13 Earth watch 
31/1/08   
Risk form provided. 
The impact of recent Kenya problems and the FCO advice. Similar problems in 2003, with the bombings. Stopped running the Sri Lanka tours, deciding 
what to do with Kenya (Note date of interview). In terms of positive impact the growing awareness of environmental issues (and particularly the media 
focus on climate change) has seen an increase in people looking for an opportunity to get involved with something that helps them understand these first-
hand. On the negative side I think country-specific events, such as the embassy bombings in Kenya in 2003, the recent Kenyan unrest, and the ongoing but 
variable unrest in Sri Lanka.  
We make use of, and abide by, this advice. We 
also make use of an independent risk 
consultant’s advisory services 
Yes – Control Risk 24 
14 Explore 
18/6/07  
No risk form 
provided. 
I am sorry to be so obscure but this is a highly sensitive commercial area. Would be very happy to discuss informally 
 
Ongoing focus on quality & safety - as we are 
constantly expanding this has a considerable 
impact. 
Multiple.. 
15 Go  See Kenya 
(GSK) 
31/1/08 & 19/3/08 
Risk form provided 
Because we only started in June 2007, this question isn’t really relevant, although you could look at the effects that the recent situation in Kenya has had on 
the economy and tourism, obviously this has affected our business hugely.  
The FCO has been a huge influence In the 
problems that Kenya has faced in relation to the 
bans that have been in place restricting tourist 
travel. The issue is that whilst there is a risk for 
some areas, other areas, especially in our case, 
like the coastal parts were unaffected. but the 
cities like Mombasa were put on the ban list as 
a precaution. I think that the FCO are there to 
provide the public with the facts but how this. 
is put across should be carefully monitored as 
the impact of what they write can severely 
affect the flow of tourism to a country 
I think in general government run orgs are the 
ones that are used for travel information as it is 
official, followed by the large well know orgs 
like Lonely Plant, Rough Guide etc. 
16 GapSports 
19/1//07  
Risk  form provided 
9/11 big hit; 7/7 not quite so much. War on terrorism continues to affect things, not least people’s perceptions (sometimes naively on their safety. Worried 
parents…Fuel prices affecting long haul flights….No real impact of what I call “Green thinking” .in my experience, interest goes up with a tragedy because 
of the high media coverage.” 
“The FCO is of limited use, but is something 
that MUST be monitored” because of insurance 
implications… 
Use credible in-country partners who are on the 
ground 
RED 24 and  Control Risk Group who deal 
with detailed information on threat and 
security. 
17. Global Vision 
International 
12/1/07 & 16/6/07 
Risk form provided. 
No global events, but local events in Nepal and Sri Lanka have affected them until they are deemed safe. 
Note their new involvement with the BS risk assessment for adventure organise Leaders in sport travel all of the world, ranging from five to 12 weeks.  
 
Follow advice as it will negate their company 
liability insurance, but won’t negate insurance 
if political troubles start whilst people are 
there…Note it is politically biased and key 
benchmark 
Flight provider Wexas 
Red 24  
Campbell Irvine Insurers 
Independent Risk Assessment Company 
18. Great Walks  
I8/3/05 
No risk form 
available 
Run 300 tours per year, with a client base of around 5,000. Specialist mountaineering company. Involved with a case of litigation. Comments how the 
political situation has affected once popular trekking areas, such as in Pakistan. Maoist activity in Nepal. Comments that travel warning are often vague and 
seem to be losing their impact (e.g comments that the one on Southern Russia and the Elba hasn’t changed in years, yet his interpretation was that it was 
quite safe. In house, but in relation to operational assessments, group members participate  
Noted how travel warnings were often vague 
and losing their impact (cry wolf) 
None given. 
19. Geurba 
12/1/07 & 16/10/07 
Risk form provided 
 
9/11, SARS, FCO warning against travelling to Kenya in 2003…”I have to say that personally I really do think a lot of this is simply stating the absolutely 
obvious, but I guess risk assessment forms are there to cover everyone's arse in case of legal problems. The risk assessment tends to crop up when we 
arrange special groups, such as charity or school trips. We don't seem to have them demanded for 'normal' individual bookings. When asked I do stress that, 
for example in the case of Kilimanjaro, that we have been operating these climbs for 26 years and although by no means everyone gets to the top we have 
not had any fatalities. 
We do use it. Australian travel advice. 
20 Himalaya 
Kingdoms 
Assassination of Monarchy/ Maoist related strikes …Invasion of Iraq as rerouted flights to go direct to Dehli rather than via Doha on Qatar airways. 9/11 
“killed” the USA client base….Estimated that enquiries up by 14% since the political situation has improved.. Most clients seem well aware of Nepal, but 
some concern s over petty crime. ..interesting that despite the troubles people continue to send in bookings despite FCO advice….with Maoist agreement 
We keep a regular eye on FCO updates, 
although advice tends to alarm clients. 
In country agents 
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21/3/07 & 12/2/07  
No risk form 
provided.   
massive upsurge in interest 
 
21. Hinterland 
Travel 
12/1/07 & 27/9/07 
No risk form 
My operations since 2000 have been effected by the Second Gulf War and the operations to counter insurgency and expelling the TALIBAN from 
Afghanistan. It has forced me to specialise and produce a product which appeals to my clients but unfortunately relying too much on my own expertise and 
experience. 
(Leads the tours personally in Afghanistan. Had to adjust tour in Afghanistan last year, avoiding Khandahar. They have been visiting Afghanistan for the 
last five years. Note how he challenges the FO advice and how he has to ignore the insurance).  
  
Aware of it but can often ignore it, but this has 
insurance implications (ignores it) and has been 
running tours for five years (included Iraq). 
Frustrated by FCO advice. It is just that 
“advice”. Look at it  and pick out what is 
useful. 
Not really, but scans for news sites on difficult 
areas. 
22. Icicle  
mountaineering 
12/1/07 &  
16/6/07 
Risk form provided 
9/11 people wary of travelling, UK foot and mouth as people couldn’t train in UK national parks 
 
Over cautious but necessary for insurance Doctors, military, mountain rescues, local 
embassies and consulates 
23. Imaginative 
traveller 
12/1/07 & 26/6/07 
Risk form provided 
September 11th had a massive impact - we have a massive operation in the Middle East and saw a big decrease in bookings. The break out of tension 
between India and Pakistan had a significant affect on our India tours. Lastly, bird flu completely wiped out the 2003 China season.  
Not at all useful in ascertaining the situation on 
the ground …use it because it impacts on what 
we are legally allowed to sell. 
Use own teams to check out operational risks 
Other government advice to allow clients to 
cancel tours. 
24. KJTI2 
3/3/07  
No risk form 
provided 
Noted the difficulties in generating demand, having experienced many problems. Since 9/11 the demand as near evaporated, even though they argue it is 
very safe and distant from the troubles.  
Not helpful. None given. 
25. Kumulka 
Travel 
1/10/07  
No risk form  
 September the 11 2001 and SARS and Iraq war  has reduced demand for our services . FOC advice also has a very negative effect on business FOC advice 
on Kenya in 2003. 
Generally useful and practical Use own local people and experienced staff. 
26. Oasis Overland 
13/6/07 
Risk form provided. 
The war in Iraq and the Israel/Lebanon conflict had an adverse effect on our Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Turkey trip.  The ongoing situation in this area 
continues to affect client numbers on this trip.  
 
Follow FCO advice and alter trips accordingly Use crisis management company Docleaf. Use 
local agents 
27. Ontdek 
18/3/07 
No risk assessment 
Customers changing and becoming more demanding and selfish (e.g. camping and the high expectations they have). Began in 1996. September 11th hit 
demand to a limited extent, but it was badly hit when British Airways (BA) said it was not safe to fly to Kenya one year later. At a stroke, it eroded their 
business.  
Little used. Have flying Dr cover 
28. Outward 
Bound  
23/3/07  
Risk form provided 
No events have had a real impact over the past few years. Not used None given. 
29. Panoramic 
Journeys 
5/3/07.  
No risk form 
provided 
11th September 2001 and SARS both had a negative impact on tourism in Mongolia. The former for the obvious reasons regarding fears of flying, and the 
latter due to the fact that the outbreak/crisis was in Asia, of which Mongolia is a part (although in reality unaffected by SARS. Positive impact was last 
year's 800th anniversary of the foundation of the Mongolian State under Chinggis Khaan. Note comment of “Risk management consists of practical advice 
not complex forms.” It's a pretty safe country, although it's a country of wild wilderness. People live as they have done for centuries. I don't think they have 
heard of the dreaded 3 words - 'health and safety' - and in my opinion the country is all the better for it! Our risk management consists of practical advice 
documents to our clients about the country and what to expect, plus recreational activities indemnity forms to cover ourselves in case of accident, and TOFC 
(Travel Organisers Failure Cover) 
Don’t need it or use it. Not on the radar for 
needing opinion and is a safe country.  
 
Mongolian embassy & local Mongolian local 
organisations ) 
 
Use more direct contacts with British and 
Mongolian embassy (friends) 
30. Raleigh 
International 
18/3/05 &  
9/10/07 
Risk form provided 
Informed of the key use operations manager to conduct the assessments. Raleigh International is a charity committed to the personal growth and 
development of young people from all nationalities and backgrounds, including disadvantaged and “at risk”. Founded in 1984 our overseas and UK 
programmes are designed to help young people develop skills and self-confidence in a fun and challenging environment beyond the classroom and 
workplace.   
  
31. Spirit of 
Adventure 
5/3/05 & 23/3/07  
9/11 only short term affect, but foot and mouth nearly wiped out their enterprise. Had to cancel tours to Nepal  for the past 3 years (not a specialist operator 
their) Starting tours again this Nov (2007). Someone dieing on another event affected their perceptions about their activities. Regulations in the UK such as 
the “Working from Heights” legislation. 
Consult FO regularly and find it  useful Say there is no substitute for talking to people 
in the actual country, 
32. Travel Pak Quite clearly the 9/11 tragedy has impacted on the whole world. The ongoing war on terror and Foreign Policy of the US and UK has been very badly 
handled when considering the impact it would have Islamic countries and I believe it has directly contributed to the rise in Islamaphobia. Misunderstandings 
Don’t find it useful at all but refer to it because 
less informed people will look at it and basing 
On ground staff only 
Common misconceptions is that it resembles 
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12/1/07 & 5/3/07 
Risk form sent. 
and a lack of education about Islam together with a media projection that in doesn’t go far from supporting the notion that Muslims on the whole support a 
terrorist ideology. We specialise in Pakistan which is an Islamic country but it always gets tagged onto any news item about the problems in Afghanistan. It 
hasn’t helped that the London bombers had Pakistani connections. All if this stops people from being encouraged to explore and learn about countries that 
have so much to offered…The question I get asked more than any other is that of whether it is safe. That fear is due to the media portrayal (see q. 1)The 
other perception is that is a hot, dry, dusty, plain. And that it resembles Afghanistan. The concept of green valleys, the largest mountains in the world, 
glaciers just don’t feature. Another is that of it’s history, not so much of a perception but a lack of knowledge that it was part of India up until 60 years ago 
and so forgetting the historical and archaeological legacy that has been left behind. There are perceptions of the development too. I have been asked if 
people live in mud huts there. Whilst there are villages where that does happen, there are also mansions and wealth there that would be beyond some 
peoples imagination. Pakistan always being tagged on with the problems with Afghanistan and simplistic media coverage. 
their decisions on it” It’s scaremongering 
frankly” . …noted a possible problem that 
information and problems go up immediately 
on website as reported by the High Com, but it 
can take far longer to take down even if the 
problem has be resolved/gone.  
Afghanistan….live in mud huts.. 
33 Travel & Trek  
13/2/07 & 25/2/07  
No risk assessment 
We have run the trips throughout the troubles which are still not over and I wonder if they ever will be. It has been difficult more than anything because the 
news freaks people out so then they choose another place for their holidays. We have stuck to the Everest region mostly however where there hasn't been a 
problem. It also helps that we use only local guides and staff so they have been good about leaving us alone..., touch wood !Not easy making sense of this 
politics out  Everest region has been less prone to trouble and strong draw there. 
  
34. Wilderness 
adventures 
6/3/07 
No risk form  
Key market has been for Korea Do not use it TIES advice 
35. Whale 
Watching Azores 
11/2/ 07 & 26/2/07  
 Local regulations controlling whale watching, boat approach, number of boats etc. broadband internet access in UK and Azores allowing more direct 
bookings, more access to us ….They think it will be dry and hot, in the South Atlantic, expect flight to be twice as long as it is, think they are Spanish, .  
 
Not used No as no one knows that much about the 
Azores 
36. Whale  and 
Dolphin 
Conservation 
Society  
15 March 07 
Use green issues for promoting activities Periodic consultation. Portman Travel newsletter  
37. Wild Earth  
12/3/07  
Risk form provided. 
We lost cruise ship work for a couple of years after 9/11. Potentially for NZ companies the carbon miles discussion could be negative for uk & European 
tourist visits, unstable rising fuel prices 
Yes. Local Tourism Dunedin office, Tourism NZ 
Govt website 
38. Wild Rose  
Interviewed 18 
March 05 
18/3/05 
No risk form 
provided 
Biggest impact was foot and Mouth for UK operations. Noted that a big risk was using agents of which they had no control over. Very high return rate, 
therefore need to develop new tours. One of the rare few who took a much broader interpretation of risk, to include the financial and H & S. …huge impact 
of foot and mouth and the many cancel elations. Comments that one of the biggest risks were using other services where there was a lack of control over the 
quality. 
Occasionally consult FO for some tours, such 
as for Morocco, but find them quite alarmist 
and running against their own experiences and 
perceptions of travelling to a destination. 
None 
39. Wilderness 
Journeys 
22/6/07 
No risk forms 
Instability in Himalayan regions led to significant growth ins South America as a destination and proliferation of cheap European flights opening up 
destinations. 
 
In general terms very useful and constantly 
referred to it.  
Local partners and agents who fill in the gaps 
of the FCO advice. 
40. VSO  
19/2/05. 
No risk form 
provided 
Noted how after each disaster they get more enquiries. Note also how the average age is getting older. Do need to use it None given 
41. XCL  
16/6/07 
Risk form provided 
War breaking out between Ethiopia and Somalia; Kidnapping of tourists.  
Useful 
 
Conduct on site visits.  
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Appendix F - Content analysis of risk assessment forms  
Name Hazard Who Likelihood 
(L)/Probability 
(P) 
Severity 
(S) 
 Risk Control 
Measures 
Scale used Comment 
Across the divide Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (risk 
level) 
Yes Likelihood descriptors: Unlikely 3; remote 6 ; possible 9 ; occasional 
12; frequent 15) 
Severity description: Minor injury (2); serious injury (6);  ?major injury   
(9); fatal injury such as death (15) 
The L x S is used with a five scale categorisation depending on the 
numeric value (very low risk 6-30; low risk 36-60; medium risk 72-90; 
high risk 120-150; very high risk 160-225). 
Use the concept of risk relating to a variety of factors. 
A four point scale is used but based on a more unusual 
numeric system. 
Africa Conservation Yes No Y (Likelihood) Yes Yes 
(Combine
d  
L  x S 
score) 
Yes The ‘risk’ is found by L x S. 
L = 1 (rare), 2 (occasional), 3 (frequent).  
S = 1 (minor), 2 (mod), 3 (serious). 
Risk Rating = L x S  
1-2.9 (low), 3-5.9 (med) 6-9 (High) 
They use the concept of hazard to refer to a wide range of 
factors which could cause harm, such as ‘human violence’. 
Or fire risk’ ore food poisoning. 
They use a 3point numeric scale for L & S which are 
multiplied 
Dated, located and named. 
Adventure Races 
(Part of detailed 
events) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Likely//Probabi
lity. 
No but 
use 
“worse 
case” 
Yes 
(Worse 
case x 
Likelihoo
d) 
Yes Key for people at risk (e.g. competitors). 
“Worst outcome “– Life threatening (4), reportable (3), First aid (2), no 
injury (1) 
Likely – Likely/frequent (4), probable (3), possible (2), unlikely (1) 
8 or more not acceptable risk; less than 8 risk is acceptable. 
 
Hazard concept is used to refer to a broad range of factors 
which can cause harm, such as getting lost, or tripping. 
 
instead of using a severity outcome descriptor, they use the 
term “worst case” which essentially relates to the idea of 
outcome, as it focuses on four possible scales. 
 
Have a section where risk results are revised in view of 
control measures implemented. 
 
Then have a simple Y or N in an acceptable risk column. 
Adventurous 
Experiences  
Yes Yes  Not stated on 
the form. 
Not stated 
on the 
form 
Risk is 
stated  
(L x S) 
Yes Likelihood 5 point scale is used (1 Highly unlikely; 2 could very rarely 
occur; 3 even chance; 4 could occur from time to time; 5 will occur 
often) 
Severity 5 point scale (1. slight inconvenience/minor injury; injury 
resulting in lost time/required first aid; 3 medical attention required; 4 
major injury/long term hospitalisation; 5 fatality/permanent disability) 
Evaluation (risk score) is found by L x S with a scale of 1-10 low to 
reasonable risk; 12 – 16 medium risk to be reviewed and controlled; 20 
+ totally unacceptable risk. 
Use the concept of hazard to refer to ‘serious’ harm. The first 
form used simply has a column focusing on whether the 
“risk adequately controlled”. Although the other concepts of 
severity and outcome are not explicitly used, this does not 
mean that it is not clear. It provides a clear checklist  of 
outcomes, with a subsequent column. The second form does 
have more detail, including the staff responsible for 
implementing the risk. 
 
Also have a “date for the next” assessment. 
Crystal Active 
 
Yes Yes 
(incl
udes 
what
) 
Yes  
(probability) 
Yes Risk is 
placed 
under the 
hazard 
category 
and not by 
a S x L. 
Yes For S and Probability, they use a simple three point scale, High (Very 
Likely/Serious injury), Medium (Possible or easily precipitated/ injury 
requiring withdrawal) and Low (Not very likely/minor injury) 
 
No risk value is produced. 
Has a sharper distinction between the Hazard category, such 
as the environment, and the more specific risks, such as 
drowning, or poisoning. Can still be a little blurred (other 
hazards include time of day, or location). 
One of the few to include what is at risk. 
They use ‘assessment’ to include the probability and 
severity. 
Interestingly the risk is not reduced down to a single value. 
Include a review section/ 
Bush Masters Yes Not 
expli
citly 
state
d 
Not explicitly 
stated 
Not 
explicitly 
stated 
Yes 
Risks are 
described 
and 
categorise
d around a 
hazard 
Yes and 
include 
additional 
actions and 
reviews 
A simple risk level is given in relation to High, Medium and Low. Simply stated and use of a scale. Still produces a useful 
checklist, but how the risk level is arrived at is not clear. 
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heading.  
Different Travel Yes Yes No No No Yes  
They have 
two control 
sections. One 
which 
includes 
existing 
controls and 
one in which 
additional 
actions are 
needed. 
No scale used Hazards use in relation to a “general hazard,” such as getting  
lost, or food poisoning (note how some would state these as 
risks) and more specific hazards such as ‘very steep climb on 
day 2’. 
 
Interesting no scales are used, but the actions are still easy 
and clear to follow. 
I M Travel 
(Imaginative 
Traveller) 
No Not 
expli
citly 
state
d 
No  No  Yes (list 
risks) 
Use the term 
risk reduction 
strategies 
No scale is used This risk assessment works more like a checklist and the 
term ‘in a crisis’ 
Form needs to be dated and signed off. 
Interestingly they note any prior skills which are needed. 
Global Vision Yes Not 
expli
citly 
state
d 
Yes Yes Yes (risk 
evaluation 
score) 
Yes Use a three and a four point descriptor scale:  
Likelihood: (Possible, Probable,  Unlikely         ) 
Severity: Mayor, Severe, Minor, Risk evaluation: Unacceptable, 
significant, moderate, minor 
Use the descriptor of a hazard, such as theft, drug used, 
bacterial etc. Simply form, but not clear about the risk 
evaluation scales. 
Oasis overland Yes Yes Yes No No unclear 1-3 Basic form 
Gapsports Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(conseque
nces) 
Yes  Not separate 
concept or list  
Unclear Basic form, but does not produce a separate risk column 
Outward Bound Yes Yes No No No Yes No scale used Relatively basic checklist type. The hazard is used to refer to 
a variety of more specific factors, such as blisters, heat 
stroke, rock fall etc. 
Travel & Trek Yes No No No Yes (use) 
the term 
residual 
risk after 
control 
measure) 
Yes (existing 
controls and 
additional 
controls) 
No scale used This uses the army form for risk assessment which contains a 
lot of technical information about the expedition group 
(timings etc.) In relation to the risk form, they identify the 
activities and the existing control measures to deal with 
them. They then consider the residual risk and what 
additional control measures are needed and if the residual 
risk is acceptable (Yes or no) 
Travelpak No  No  No no no no Yes (but not labelled as such) This contains the contacts and develops some basic 
categories and some of the more specific risks factors and 
some of the control measures. Doesn’t use a standard format, 
although the form is called a risk assessment form. 
Wild Earth 
Adventures added 
26/9.07 
Yes Yes No no no yes No scale used Use the concept of hazard in a causal sense, along with the 
notions of perils and dangers. These are organised according 
to the categories of people, equipment and the environment 
Risk is used to refer to the actual accident, injury and other 
forms of loss (very asymmetric definition) 
 
World Expeditions Yes Not 
expli
citly 
No no no yes No scale uses. Tend to use the hazards as much for a categorisation. They 
do use the standard definitions (Hazards such as 
environmental, health hazards, human and activity hazards, 
which is then followed by more specific risks). 
Tends to be more of the checklist format using just risks and 
control measures. 
Walking and 
Climbing 
Yes no no no yes Use the term 
‘explanation’ 
to refer to 
Categorise the hazards as low, medium or  high. They tend to use the concept of hazard and risk the opposite 
way round to most other organisations. 
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control 
measures 
Presented in an excel spreadsheet. 
Whale and Dolphin 
watch 
Yes 
(signifi
cant 
hazard) 
No Yes (possible 
severity) 
Yes 
(Likelihoo
d) 
Yes (risk 
rating) 
Yes Severity: 3 major; 2 minor; slight. 
Likelihood: 3 very unlikely; 2 likely; 1 likely. 
RR: 8-9 immediate remedial action; 4-7 remedial action required; 1-3 
monitor at regular intervals. 
The hazard is used in a more general way (e.g. travelling by 
air), with the risks referring to more specific actions (e.g. 
crash, hacking).  
Wilderness 
Adventures 
Yes Yes Yes (the term 
consequences 
are used). 
Yes Yes (C x 
L) 
Yes 
And revised 
rating 
Hazard consequences: 1 slight (minor injuries); 2 serious (more than 3 
days of work); 3 major (death or serious injury) 
Likelihood: 1 low (unlikely); Medium (likely to occur occasionally); 3 
High (likely to occur frequently) 
Risk Rating: 1 Trivial (no action); 2/3 Acceptable (no further 
preventative action); 4 Moderate (efforts should be made to reduce 
risk); 6 Substantial (work no to be undertaken until risk reduced) 
Focus on the activity and the hazards associated with it. 
They use the format whereby the control measures are 
examined and how this changes the risk rating. 
Wilderness 
Adventures 
Yes no Yes Yes  Yes 
(residual 
risk after 
control) 
Yes Probability: low, medium, high 
Seriousness: Minor, serious, fatal 
Refer to people at risk in a very general way. They combine 
the probability and seriousness of injury. 
 
One of the forms where the risk is reviewed in view of the 
control measure. 
XCL  Yes  Yes 
(incl
udes 
what
) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Use the H/M/L for both severity and probability but no overall risk 
score produced. 
Review system put in place. 
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Appendix G –Prime and sub criteria used for country case study selection based on 
situational factors in 2004/5 
Prime criteria Sub-criteria for country selection  Country selected 
Collapse of communism. Neighbouring Croatia conflict 
zones. Mintel (2004) fastest growing destination. Cluster 
analysis with Croatia. 
Bulgaria,  
Emergence from years of war and genocide. Mintel 
(2004) fastest growing destination. Past incidents of 
attacks on travellers. 
Cambodia 
Collapse of communism. Emergence from war. 
Neighbouring other conflict zones. Mintel (2004) fastest 
growing destination. Cluster analysis with Bulgaria. 
Croatia, 
Collapse of communism. Mintel (2004) fastest growing 
destination. Cluster analysis with other Asian countries. 
Mongolia 
Military coup and neighbouring conflict zones. Cluster 
analysis with India and Afghanistan. Past incidents of 
attacks on tourists. 
Pakistan 
Countries which have 
experienced profound 
political events such 
as having emerged 
from war, or 
experienced a 
significant regime 
change  
 
End of apartheid. Neighbouring conflict zone. Cluster 
analysis with Zimbabwe. Benchmark country for other 
African countries because it is viewed as the richest and 
perceived as the most stable. 
South Africa 
Years of conflict. In process of state rebuilding. History 
of tourism (Hippy trail). Cluster analysis with Pakistan. 
In the lowest band of the HDI index 
Afghanistan 
Years of conflict. Bordering many conflict zones. In the 
lowest band of the HDI index. Ethnically complex. 
Uniqueness of tourism industry (significant aid industry). 
Ethiopia 
Military regime. Unique in the scale of the campaign to 
boycott tourism. Neighbouring other conflict zones. 
Cluster analysis with India, Nepal and Thailand. 
Insurgency problems. In the lowest band of the HDI 
index 
Burma 
Continuous changes in government. Continued tensions 
and conflicts. In the lower bands of the HDI index 
Haiti 
Significant conflict zone when the research process 
began. Cluster analysis with Iran. In the process of state 
rebuilding. Past incidents of attacks on travellers.  
Iraq 
Conflict zone. Has a well established tourism industry 
which goes through a number of peaks and troughs. 
Cluster analysis with India. 
Sri Lanka 
Countries which were 
currently in a process 
of political volatility 
such as an endemic 
insurgency problem 
 
Profound economic decline. Erosion of civil and human 
liberties. Had a vibrant tourism industry in the 1990s, 
which has been eroded because of the political and 
economic problems. Cluster analysis with South Africa. 
In the lowest band of the HDI index. 
Zimbabwe 
Oldest democratic system in South America. Long 
history of political stability, in comparison with other 
South American countries. In the top band of the HDI 
index. 
Costa Rica 
World’s largest democracy. Significant economic 
growth. Have problems with terrorism. Neighbouring 
conflict zones. Cluster analysis with Burma, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka. 
India  
Democratic system. In the top band of the HDI index. 
Established tourism industry. 
New Zealand 
Democratic system. In the top band of the HDI index. 
Established tourism industry. 
Norway 
Countries which are 
regarded as politically 
stable and of low risk, 
to act as a benchmark 
for other countries  
 
Democratic system. In the top band of the HDI index. 
Established tourism industry. Terrorist problem and 
Spain 
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significant attacks. Past incidents of attacks on travellers. 
Democratic system. Established tourism industry. 
Cluster analysis with Burma, Cambodia. History of 
military coups (yet can still appeared as low risk on some 
scales).  
Thailand 
Democratic system. In the top band of the HDI index. 
Established tourism industry. Place of residence and high 
degree of familiarity to help put some of the indicators 
into perspective. Benchmarking. 
UK 
Communist political system. Growing tourism industry. 
Relationship to the USA. Appeal of Castro. Poor 
economic performance, but emergences strongly in many 
welfare related indicators. In the top end of the HDI 
index. 
Cuba 
Political system that does not fit neatly it many political 
categorisations. Relationship to the USA and its 
improved standing in the world allowing tourism to 
grow. 
Libya 
Theocracy. Cluster analysis with Iraq. Poor relationship 
with USA. 
Iran 
Uniqueness of 
political system  
 
Chavez moving politics to a more radical left wing, 
ideological position. Rich in oil and economic growth. 
Poor relationship with USA 
Venezuela 
Highest number of attacks on tourists over the years. 
Cluster analysis with other African/Middle East 
countries. Oldest tourism industry. Large scale tourism 
industry. Terrorist problems. Neighbouring conflict 
zones 
Egypt 
Bali bombs and the highest death/injury rate. Cluster 
analysis with Cambodia and Thailand. History of 
terrorism. Significant political change, moving from an 
authoritarian to a democratic system. 
Indonesia 
Democratic system. In the top band of the HDI. Long 
history of conflict. Well established tourism industry. 
Neighbouring conflict zones. Terrorist problems. 
Israel 
Uniqueness of tourist 
resource, or 
significant attacks on 
tourists  
Large, growing tourism industry. High number of 
terrorist attacks on tourists. Past experience of political 
turmoil. 
Turkey 
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Appendix H - Sample turmoil ratings for PRS 
Year Cuba Egypt Iran New Zealand India Thailand 
 
5 yr regime 18mth 
Turmoil 
 
5 yr 
Turmoil 
5 yr  
Regime 
18mth 
Turmoil 
 
5 yr 
Turmoil 
5 yr 
regime 
18mth 
Turmoil 
 
5 yr 
Turmoil 
5 yr 
regime 
18mth 
Turmoil 
 
5 yr 
Turmoil 
5 yr 
regime 
18mth 
Turmoil 
 
5 yr 
Turmoil 
5 yr 
regime 
18mth 
Turmoil 
 
5 yr 
Turmoil 
2006 Raul Castro 
40% 
Reformist 
com 35% 
% 
Low with 
Castro; 
.more with 
Raul, More 
with Hard 
Line 
Mod 
Others 
scenarios 
slightly more 
Mubarak 45% 
Mil-Civ 40% 
 
High Moderate Conservati
ve 60% 
Divided 
Govt 30% 
High High Labour 
minority 
45% 
 
Low Low UPA-led 
coalition 
45% 
 
 
High 
High coalition 
55% 
Military 
civilian 
35% 
10% 
military 
Mod Mod 
2005 N/A N/A N/A Mubarak 45% High Moderate Conservati
ve 60% 
 
High High Labour 
minority 
45% 
 
Low Low UPA-led 
coalition 
45% 
 
High High TRT 55% Mod Low 
2004 N/A N/A N/A Mubarak 55% High Moderate Conservati
ve 45% 
 
High High Labour 
minority 
45% 
 
Low Low UPA-led 
coalition 
45% 
 
High High TRT 
55% 
Mod Low 
2003 Fidel 40% 
 
N/A N/A Mubarak 55% High Moderate Conservati
ve 45% 
 
High High Labour 
minority 
45% 
 
Low Low BJP 60% High High TRT 
75% 
low Low 
2002 Fidel 60% 
 
Low  Low High Moderate  Reformist  
 
High High Labour  
minority 
45% 
 
Low Low BJP 50% High High TRT 
65% 
low Low 
Source: PRS (2007)
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Appendix I - Sample classifications of political systems or government 
Writer/Source Categories 
 
Aristotle (cited in 
Hague and 
Harrop 2001, 
p.13) 
One person – Tyranny (Perverted), monarch/kingship (Genuine); 
The few – Oligarchy (Perverted), aristocracy (Genuine); The many- 
Democracy(Perverted), polity (Genuine). 
3 world typology Capitalist first world; Communist second world; Developing third 
world. 
Heywood (2002, 
Chapter 2) 
Western Polyarchies; New Democracies; -East Asian regimes; 
Islamic regimes; Military regimes. 
Monti-Belkaoui et 
al (1998, p.13)  
ideological base 
Liberalism; Communism; Totalitarianism; Fundamentalism; 
Capitalism; Socialism. 
Hague et al (2001, 
p.14)  
Established consolidated democracy (e.g. UK, Spain, New Zealand, 
Norway). 
New Democracy (e.g. Bulgaria, Mongolia, Venezuela); Semi 
democracy (e.g. Russia).  
Authoritarian rule (e.g. Saudi Arabia). 
Totalitarian (e.g. Iran has exhibited totalitarian characteristics).  
Newton and Deth 
(2005, p. 244) 6 
democratic 
ideologies 
Conservatism; Liberalism; Christian democracy; Socialism; 
Nationalism; Green political though. 
Sources of 
authority 
classifications 
(Morrison 2006, 
p.247): 
Traditional Monarchy; Constitutional Monarchy; Theocracy; 
Constitutional Republic; Communist States. 
 
ICRG types of 
governance 
(Howell, 2001, 
p.23) 
Accountable (alternating) Democracy; Dominated Democracy; De 
facto One-Party State; De jure One-Party State; Autarchy  
CIA World Fact 
Book (2007) 
Government type 
descriptors used 
Absolute; Anarchy; Authoritarian; Commonwealth; Communist; 
Confederacy (Confederation); Constitutional; Constitutional 
democracy; Constitutional monarchy; Democracy; Democratic 
republic; Dictatorship; Ecclesiastical Emirate; Federal (Federation); 
Federal republic; Islamic republic; Marxism; Marxism-Leninism; 
Monarchy; Oligarchy; Parliamentary democracy; Parliamentary 
government (Cabinet-Parliamentary government; Parliamentary 
monarchy; Presidential; Republic Socialism; Sultanate; Theocracy; 
Totalitarian  
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            Appendix J – Case study political system classification using government 
databases 
Country Government classification descriptor  
(June 2007) 
State type (Canada 
only) 
Other classifications and date last updated. 
Afghani
stan 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(UKFCO); Islamic Republic 
(USA), Republic (Canada) 
Not named Islamic regime (Heywood 2002); 
Transitional (Goldstone et al, 2005); 
Not Free  Status ( FH 2006 & 2005); 
Polity IV score - 66  (2005 ) 
102.3 FP 2007 score (Alert) 
Bulgaria Parliamentary Republic (UK ) 
Parliamentary democracy (USA); 
Parliamentary democracy ( 
Canada) 
Republic New democracy (Heywood 2002); 
Partial democracy (Goldstone); Free  
Status ( FH 2006); Polity IV score 9 
(2005 ) 
60.3  FP 2007 score (Warning) 
Cambod
ia 
Constitutional Monarchy (UK); 
Multiparty democracy under a 
constitutional monarchy (USA); 
Upper chamber: Senate Lower 
chamber: (Canada) 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
New democracy (Heywood 2002) 
Partial Autocracy (Goldstone et al 
2005) 
Not Free Status ( FH 2006) 
Polity IV score 2 (2005 ) 
85.7 FP 2007 score (Warning) 
Costa 
Rica 
PLN party (UK);Democratic 
Republic (USA) 
No details provided by Canada 
No details provided 
by Canada 
Western polyarchies (Heywood 2002 
); Full democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Free  Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score  10 (2005 ) 
50.5  FP 2007 score (Monitoring) 
Croatia Parliamentary Democracy (UK): 
Parliamentary democracy 
(USA);Parliamentary democracy 
(Canada) 
Republic New democracy (Heywood 2002); 
Partial democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Free  Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score 9  (2005 ) 
60.5 FP 2007 score (Warning) 
Cuba One party system/Communist 
government (UK);  
Totalitarian Communist state 
(USA); current government 
assumed power by force; Republic 
(Canada) 
Communist state No suitable classification using 
(Heywood, 2002); Full autocracy 
(Goldstone et al 2005) 
Not Free Status ( FH 2006); Polity 
IV score - 7  (2005 ); 78.6 FP 2007 
score (Warning) 
Egypt Republic (UK);Republic (USA); 
Cabinet is appointed by the 
President/bicameral legislature 
(Canada) 
Presidential / 
Parliamentary 
system 
Islamic regime ? (Heywood 2002) 
Partial autocracy (Goldstone et al 
2005) 
Not Free  Status ( FH 2006) 
Polity IV score - 3  (2005 ); 89.2 FP 
2007 score (Warning) 
Ethiopia No classification provided 
(UK);Federal Republic 
(USA);Bicameral Parliament 
(Canada) 
No details provided 
by Canada 
No suitable category (Heywood 
2002) 
Partial democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005) 
Partly Free Status ( FH 2006); Polity 
IV score 1 (2005 ); 95.5 FP 2007 
score (Alert) 
Haiti No classification provided 
(UK);Republic (USA); 
Presidential republic (Canada) 
Republic No suitable category (Heywood 
2002); Transitional (Goldstone et al 
2005); Not Free  Status (FH 2006); 
Polity IV score - 88  (2005 ); 100.9 
FP 2007 score (Alert) 
India United Progressive Alliance led 
20-party coalition (UK); Federal 
republic (USA);Bicameral 
parliament (Canada) 
Federal Republic Asian regime (Heywood 2002); 
Partial democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Free Status ( FH 2006); Polity 
IV score 9 (2005 ); 70.8 FP 2007 
score (Warning) 
Indonesi
a 
Republic  (UK); Independent 
republic (USA); Republic 
(Canada) 
No details provided 
by Canada 
Asian regime  (Heywood 2002); 
Partial democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Free  Status ( FH 2006); 
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Polity IV score 8 (2005 ); 84.4 FP 
2007 score (Warning) 
Iran Islamic Republic (UK); Islamic 
republic (USA); Islamic 
Consultative Assembly ("Majles-e-
Shura-ye-Eslami")(Canada) 
Islamic Republic Islamic regime (Heywood 2002); 
Full autocracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Not Free Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score - 6 (2005 ); 82.4 FP 
2007 score (Warning) 
Iraq Government of Iraq (UK); 
Parliamentary democracy (USA); 
Parliamentary Democracy 
(Canada) 
Republic  Islamic regime (Heywood 2002); 
Transitional (Goldstone et al 2005); 
Not Free  Status ( FH 2006);  Polity 
IV score - 66   
(2005 ); 111.4 FP 2007 score (Alert) 
Israel Coalition led by Kadima (UK) 
Parliamentary democracy (USA) 
Unicameral Knesset or Parliament 
(Canada) 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
Western polyarchies (Heywood 
2002) 
Full democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Free  Status ( FH 2006);  
Polity IV score - 10  
 (2005 ); 79.4 FP 2007 score 
(Warning) 
Lebanon Republic (UK) ;Republic (USA)                                  
Unicameral National (Canada) 
Republic New democracy? (Heywood 2002 ) 
Partial democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005)   
Partly Free Status ( FH 2006); Polity 
IV score - 66  (2005 ); 92.4 FP 2007 
score (Alert) 
Libya Jamahiriya (UK) Great Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(USA) ‘state of the masses’ 
Republic. General People's 
Congress, General People's 
Committee (Canada) 
No details provided 
by Canada 
Islamic regime ? (Heywood 2002) 
Full autocracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Not Free  Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score - 7  (2005 ); 69.3 FP 
2007 score (Warning) 
Myanm
ar 
(Burma) 
Military junta - State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) 
(UK); Military junta (USA); 
Military Regime, State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) 
(Canada)  
No details provided 
by Canada 
Asian regime (Heywood 2002); Full 
Autocracy (Goldstone et al 2005); 
Not Free  Status ( FH 2006); Polity 
IV score - 8  (2005 ); 97 FP 2007 
score (Alert) 
Mongoli
a 
76-member Ikh Hural/Parliament 
(UK), Multiparty parliamentary 
form of government 
(USA);Republic (Canada) 
No details provided 
by Canada 
New democracy (Heywood  2002)                          
Full democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Free  Status ( FH 2006) ; 
Polity IV score 10  (2005 ); 58.4 FP 
2007 score   (Warning)                                                                  
Nepal Constitutionally, parliamentary 
democracy /interim  govt(UK); 
interim parliament 
(USA);Parliamentary Democracy 
with Constitutional Monarchy 
(Canada)   
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
Asian regime (Heywood 2002); 
Partial democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Not Free Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score - 6  (2005 ); 93.6 FP 
2007 score (Alert) 
New 
Zealand 
Unicameral House of 
Representatives (UK); 
Parliamentary style (USA) ; 
Parliamentary Democracy  
(Canada) 
No details provided 
by Canada 
Western polyarchy (Heywood 2002); 
Full democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Free  Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score 10  (2005 )  
20.5 FP 2007 score (Sustainable) 
Norway Centre-left "red-green" majority 
coalition (UK); Hereditary 
constitutional monarchy (USA) 
;Parliamentary democracy 
(Canada) 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Western polyarchy (Heywood 2002); 
Full democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Free  Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score 10 (2005 ) 
17.1FP 2007 score (Sustainable) 
Pakistan Classification  not given (UK);  
Parliamentary democracy (USA)            
Federal Republic (Canada) 
No details provided 
by Canada 
Asian system (Heywood 2002) 
Full autocracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Not Free  Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score - 5 (2005 ); 100.1 FP 
2007 score (Alert) 
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South 
Africa 
Alliance - ANC/SACP/ COSATU 
(UK); Parliamentary democracy 
(USA);Bicameral Parliament 
(Canada) 
Constitutional 
democracy 
Grey area, possibly a New 
democracy (Heywood 2002); Partial 
democracy (Goldstone et al 2005); 
Free  Status ( FH 2006); Polity IV 
score 9 (2005 ); 57.4 FP 2007 score 
(Monitoring) 
Spain  Monarchy, democracy and 
parliament (UK); Constitutional 
monarchy (USA); Parliamentary 
democracy/Bicameral National 
Assembly (Canada) 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Western polyarchy (Heywood 2002) 
Full democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Free  Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score 10  (2005 ) 
39.2 FP 2007 score (Monitoring) 
Sri 
Lanka 
Unicameral Parliament with 
Executive Presidency (UK) 
;Republic (USA);No details 
provided by Canada 
No details provided 
by Canada 
Asian system (Heywood 2002); 
Partial autocracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Partly Free  Status ( FH 
2006); Polity IV score 5  (2005 ); 
93.1 FP 2007 score (Alert) 
Turkey Parliamentary republic (UK) 
Republic (USA); Parliamentary 
democracy (Canada) 
Republic Grey area. Islamic regime? New 
democracy? (Heywood 2002); Partial 
democracy ((Goldstone et al 2005) 
; Partly Free  Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score 7 (2005 ); 76 FP 2007 
score (Warning) 
Thailan
d 
Constitutional Monarchy (UK); 
Constitutional monarchy with 
interim constitution (USA); 
Constitutional monarchy (Canada) 
No details provided 
by Canada 
Asian system (Heywood 2002); 
Partial democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Polity IV score 9 (2005 ); 76 
FP 2007 score (Warning) 
UK Constitutional monarchy (USA) 
Parliamentary democracy (Canada) 
Constitutional 
monarchy 
Western Polyarchy (Heywood 2002) 
Full democracy (Goldstone et al 
2005); Free  Status ( FH 2006); 
Polity IV score 10  (2005 ) 
34.2 FP 2007 score (Monitoring) 
Venezue
la 
Federal Republic (UK); Federal 
Republic; Unicameral assembly 
(Canada) 
Federal republic No suitable classification (Heywood 
2002); Partial democracy (Goldstone 
et al 2005); Partly Free  Status ( FH 
2006); Polity IV score 6 (2005 ) 
79.8 FP 2007 score (Warning) 
Zimbab
we 
No classification, only Mugabe 
named (UK) 
Parliamentary Constitution (USA); 
Bicameral Parliament (Canada) 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
No suitable classification (Heywood 
2002); Partial democracy (Goldstone 
et al 2005)Not Free  Status ( FH 
2006); Polity IV score - 4  (2005 ) 
110.1 FP 2007 score  (Alert) 
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Appendix K - Divisions in society 
Country  
 
Ethnic and Religious Groups (CIA World Fact book, 2007) MAR Hot Spots and High Risk Terrorism  Since 1997 War (internal) 
Since 
1997 
Afghanistan
: 
 
 
Ethnic groups : Pashtun 42%  (R ), Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, (R), Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 
3%, Baloch 2%, other 4% .  
Religious: Sunni Muslim 80%, Shi'a Muslim 19%, other 1% 
Languages: Afghan Persian or Dari (official) 50%, Pashto (official) 35%, Turkic languages 
(primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) 11%, 30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashai) 4%, much 
bilingualism 
At risk groups: Hazaras; Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks (all communal contenders). 
Pashtuns High Risk of Rebellion Protests will continue at a Moderate level 
Tajiks: Unlikely to Rebel. Continued inter-communal warfare. Engaged with 
Moderate levels of protests. Hazara: Unlikely to rebel in near future because of 
inclusion in govt. Higher risk of inter-communal clashes .Moderate likelihood of 
protest. Uzbeks: Unlikely to Rebel as long as representation maintained. 
Continue with inter-communal warfare, primarily with Pashtuns. Low likelihood 
of protests. 
Yes Yes 
Bulgaria Ethnic groups: Bulgarian 83.9%, Turk 9.4%, Roma 4.7%, other 2% (including Macedonian, 
Armenian, Tatar, Circassian) (2001 census) 
Religious: Bulgarian Orthodox 82.6%, Muslim 12.2%, other Christian 1.2%, other 4% . 
Languages: Bulgarian 84.5%, Turkish 9.6%, Roma 4.1%, other and unspecified 1.8% . 
Bulgaria no groups cited. No No 
Cambodia  
 
Ethnic groups: Khmer 90%, Vietnamese 5% (P), Chinese 1%, other 4%. Religious: Theravada 
Buddhist 95%, other 5% 
Languages: Khmer (official) 95%, French, English 
At risk groups: Vietnamese - increase likelihood of future protests: Unlikely to 
engage in rebellion 
No No 
Costa Rica –  
 
Ethnic groups: white (including mestizo) 94%, black 3%, Amerindian 1%, Chinese 1%, other 1%. 
Religions: Roman Catholic 76.3%, Evangelical 13.7%, Jehovah's Witnesses 1.3%, other Protestant 
0.7%, other 4.8%, none 3.2% 
Languages: Spanish (official), English 
At risk groups: Antillean Blacks; Low risk of rebellion, some risk of protests 
and strikes. (class based) 
 
 
No No 
Croatia Ethnic groups: Croat 89.6%, Serb 4.5%, other 5.9% (including Bosnian, Hungarian, Slovene, 
Czech, and Roma (P) (2001 census). 
Religions: Roman Catholic 87.8%, Orthodox 4.4%, other Christian 0.4%, Muslim 1.3%, other and 
unspecified 0.9%, none 5.2% (2001 census). 
Languages: Croatian 96.1%, Serbian 1%, other and undesignated 2.9% (including Italian, 
Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, and German) (2001 census) 
At risk groups: Roma: Low risk of rebellion. Serbs: Protests likely. Militant 
activity unlikely. 
 
No No 
Cuba Ethnic groups: mulatto 51%, white 37%, black 11%, Chinese 1%. 
Religions: nominally 85% Roman Catholic prior to CASTRO assuming power; Protestants, 
Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews, and Santeria are also represented.  
Languages: Spanish 
Nothing cited. No No 
Egypt Ethnic groups: Egyptian 98%, Berber, Nubian, Bedouin, and Beja 1%, Greek, Armenian, other 
European (primarily Italian and French) 1%  
Religious: Muslim (mostly Sunni) 90%, Coptic 9%, other Christian 1% 
Languages: Arabic (official), English and French widely understood by educated classes 
At risk groups: Copts (religious minorities): Low risk factors for rebellion. 
Protest will probably remain at low levels. Inter-communal violence possible. 
 
Yes No 
Ethiopia Ethnic groups: Oromo 32.1%, Amara 30.1%, Tigraway 6.2%, Somalie 5.9%, Guragie 4.3%, 
Sidama 3.5%, Welaita 2.4%, other 15.4% (1994 census).  
Religions: Christian 60.8% (Orthodox 50.6%, Protestant 10.2%), Muslim 32.8%, traditional 4.6%, 
other 1.8% (1994 census).  
Languages: Amarigna 32.7%, Oromigna 31.6%, Tigrigna 6.1%, Somaligna 6%, Guaragigna 3.5%, 
Sidamigna 3.5%, Hadiyigna 1.7%, other 14.8%, English (major foreign language taught in schools)  
At risk groups: Afars: Future rebellion and protests possible; Somalis: minority 
at risk. Amhara: militant action possible; Amhara rebellion unlikely..Tigreans: 
possess special status not formally a minority at risk per se, several factors are 
causes for concern. Oromo miltant action possible 
Yes Yes 
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Haiti 
 
Ethnic groups: black 95%, mulatto and white 5%. 
Religions: Roman Catholic 80%, Protestant 16% (Baptist 10%, Pentecostal 4%, Adventist 1%, 
other 1%), none 1%, other 3% note: roughly half of the population practices voodoo. 
 Languages: French (official), Creole (official). 
Nothing cited. No No 
India 
 
Ethnic group : Indo-Aryan 72%, Dravidian 25%, Mongoloid and other 3% (2000) (Kashmiris R; 
Assamese R, M, RE Bodos R, Scheduled tribes. 
Religions: Hindu 80.5%, Muslim 13.4%, Christian 2.3%, Sikh 1.9%, other 1.8%, unspecified 0.1% 
(2001 census). 
Languages: English enjoys associate status but is the most important language for national, 
political, and commercial communication; Hindi is the national language and primary tongue of 
30% of the people; there are 14 other official languages: Bengali, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, Urdu, 
Gujarati, Malayalam, Kannada, Oriya, Punjabi, Assamese, Kashmiri, Sindhi, and Sanskrit; 
Hindustani is a popular variant of Hindi/Urdu spoken widely throughout northern India but is not an 
official language. 
 
At risk groups: Assamese: 4 of the 6 factors that increase likelihood of 
rebellion: 
Kashmiris: 4 of the 6 factors that increase likelihood of continued rebellion: 
note also factors inhibiting rebellion. 
Bodos: Moderate risk for rebellion. Protests will likely to continue at low to 
moderate level in the near future. Most at risk of inter-communal conflict.  
Mizos: The Mizos in India have three of the factors that increase the chances of 
future rebellion: Muslims: The Muslims in India have two of the factors that 
increase the likelihood of rebellion in the future:  
Nagos (indigenous): The Nagas in India have four of the factors that increase 
the likelihood of continuing rebellion: Scheduled tribes (indigenous): There are 
three factors that promote the continuation of future rebellion by the Scheduled 
Tribes: Sikhs The Sikhs have two of the factors that increase the likelihood of 
rebellion in the future: Tripura: The Tripuras have four of the factors that 
increase the likelihood of continuing rebellion:  
Yes Yes 
Indonesia Ethnic groups: Javanese 40.6%, Sundanese 15%, Madurese 3.3%, Minangkabau 2.7%, Betawi 
2.4%, Bugis 2.4%, Banten 2%, Banjar 1.7%, other or unspecified 29.9% (2000 census) (Acehnenes 
(R) and Chinese P, Papuans (P) M. 
Religions: Muslim 86.1%, Protestant 5.7%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 1.8%, other or unspecified 
3.4% (2000 census). 
Languages: Bahasa Indonesia (official, modified form of Malay), English, Dutch, local dialects (the 
most widely spoken of which is Javanese),Low risk of rebellions, some risks of protests. 
At risk groups :Achenese: unclear; Chinese: low risk of rebellion; violence 
against Chinese possible Papuans: There have been massive protests and 
sporadic rebellions among Several factors suggest the likelihood of the 
continuation of future rebellion Aceh, Irian Jay (Papua) have all flared up. Note 
the dangers of factionalism here. Conflicts between Christians and Muslims 
opportunist political leaders. 
 
Yes Yes 
Iran 
 
Ethnic groups:: Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, (P) Arab 3%, Lur 
2%, Baloch 2% (P), Turkmen 2%, other 1%. 
Religious: Muslim 98% (Shi'a 89%, Sunni 9%), other (includes Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and 
Baha'i) 2%. 
Languages: Persian and Persian dialects 58%, Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 
2%, Balochi 1%, Arabic 1%, Turkish 1%, other 2%. 
At risk groups: Kurds: Precarious situation/militant action possible. 
Turkman: relative stable. Christians: Conditions remained unchanged, 
although levels of discrimination against evangelical Christians has increased, 
groups will remain at risk. Baluchis: of sporadic violence is possible./protest or 
rebellion seems low  
Baha’i: outlook not good.  . Most persecuted group in Iran.  
Bakhtiari,: low risk. Azerbaiijanis, not at risk of explicit political, cultural, or 
economic discrimination. Arabs: no immediate risk to Iran’s Arabs. 
Yes No 
Iraq 
 
Ethnic groups: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20% (R), RE) Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5%. 
Religions: Muslim 97% (Shi'a 60%-65% (R), Sunni 32%-37% (R),(RE) Christian or other 3%. 
Languages: Arabic, Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Assyrian, Armenia. 
 
At risk groups: Kurds From 2001 future of Iraq is extremely hard to predict 
right now. Security concerns are real for much of the population, Sunni and 
Shiite alike – indeed, perhaps the Kurds are safest in their Shias: since 1992: 
they were severely discriminated against culturally apolitically, and government 
repression came in many forms. High risk of inter-communal violence. Sunnis: 
From 2001 until the first few months of 2003, the situation of the Sunni in Iraq 
remained basically unchanged. High risk of inter-communal violence 
Yes Yes 
Israel 
 
Ethnic groups: Jewish 76.4% (of which Israel-born 67.1%, Europe/America-born 22.6%, Africa-
born 5.9%, Asia-born 4.2%), non-Jewish 23.6% (mostly Arab) (2004). 
Religions; Jewish 76.4%, Muslim 16% Arab Christians 1.7%, other Christian 0.4%, Druze 1.6%, 
unspecified 3.9% (2004). 
Languages: Hebrew (official), Arabic used officially for Arab minority, English most commonly 
used foreign language.Unclear the level of risk. 
At risk groups: Palestinians Bleak forecast. High risk of rebellion/uprising 
(intifada). Both violent and peaceful demonstrations (High risk) continue. Many 
sources of grievances remain unresolved, ranging from state violence (e.g. 
assassinations), economic inequalities, building the security wall. 
Arabs: Perhaps the greatest risk to Israeli Arabs  
 
Yes No 
Lebanon 
 
Ethnic groups: Arab 95%, Armenian 4%, other 1%  (P) 
note: many Christian Lebanese do not identify themselves as Arab but rather as descendents of the 
At risk groups: Palestinians: Difficult to be optimistic.  
Druze: Like most other Lebanese ethnopolitical groups, the future condition of 
Yes Yes 
 301 
ancient Canaanites and prefer to be called Phoenicians. 
Religions: Muslim 59.7% (Shi'a, Sunni, Druze, Isma'ilite, Alawite or Nusayri), Christian 39% 
(Maronite Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, 
Armenian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt, Protestant), other 
1.3% note: 17 religious sects recognized. 
Languages: Arabic (official), French, English, Armenian. 
 
 
Druze is equally influenced by domestic factors and continued external 
manipulation . Maronite Christians churches have been subject to random 
bombings by Sunni extremists, been scattered instances of conflict between 
Maronites, Druze, and Sunni Muslims. Maronite Christians face an uncertain 
future discrimination is a possibility given that there were instances of more 
discrimination against Shi’is: violence between Hizbollah and Amal is 
indicative of a wider dilemma for the Lebanese Shi’a community. Although they 
do not face overt economic discrimination, the economic conditions in the South 
and in the Bekka remain quite poor. Suni’is: As with other Lebanese 
ethnopolitical groups, the future of Sunnis depends on a variety of factors.  
Libya Ethnic groups :Berber and Arab 97%, other 3% (includes Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians, 
Pakistanis, Turks, Indians, and Tunisians). 
Religions: Sunni Muslim 97%, other 3%. 
Languages: Arabic, Italian, English, all are widely understood in the major cities. 
.Nothing cited. 
 
No No 
Mongolia Ethnic groups: Mongol (mostly Khalkha) 94.9%, Turkic (mostly Kazakh) 5%, other (including 
Chinese and Russian) 0.1% (2000)Religions: Buddhist Lamaist 50%, Shamanist and Christian 6%, 
Muslim 4%, none 40% (2004)Languages: Khalkha Mongol 90%, Turkic, Russian (1999) 
Nothing cited. No No 
Myanmar 
 
Ethnic groups : Burman 68%, Shan 9%(P), R) Karen 7% (P), R) Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Indian 
2%, Mon 2%, other 5% . 
Religions: Buddhist 89%, Christian 4% (Baptist 3%, Roman Catholic 1%), Muslim 4%, animist 
1%, other 2% (Chins P)(R). 
Languages: Burmese, minority ethnic groups have their own languages. 
 
At risk groups: Rohingyas – 3 of the 6 factors increase chances of future 
rebellion:.  
Shans: 5 of the 6 factors that increase chances of future rebellion; Also 
instances of past inter-communal violence with other ethnic groups. Zomis 
(Chins): four of the six factors which increase the chances of future rebellion. 
Low level resistance likely to continue in the future despite ceasefire 
agreements. Discrimination and many demographic and welfare pressures. 
Karens: 4 of 6 factors that increase chance of future rebellion: Likely to be 
reduced to a moderate-level rebellion. Represented through military 
organisations.  
Mons: Mon have three of the six factors that increase the chances of future 
rebellion:; Protest is unlikely to go above verbal opposition, given the repressive 
nature of the regime and the weakness of Mon political organization. 
Yes Yes 
Norway Ethnic groups Norwegian, Sami 20,000. 
Religions: Church of Norway 85.7%, Pentecostal 1%, Roman Catholic 1%, other Christian 2.4%, 
Muslim 1.8%, other 8.1% (2004). 
Languages: Bokmal Norwegian (official), Nynorsk Norwegian (official), small Sami- and Finnish-
speaking minorities; note - Sami is official in six municipalities. 
Nothing cited. No No 
New 
Zealand 
Ethnic groups: European 69.8%, Maori 7.9%, Asian 5.7%, Pacific islander 4.4%, other 0.5%, 
mixed 7.8%, unspecified 3.8% (2001 census). 
Religions: Anglican 14.9%, Roman Catholic 12.4%, Presbyterian 10.9%, Methodist 2.9%, 
Pentecostal 1.7%, Baptist 1.3%, other Christian 9.4%, other 3.3%, unspecified 17.2%, none 26% 
(2001 census). 
Languages: English (official), Maori (official), Sign Language (official). 
Unlikely that the Maori will begin or sustain a campaign of militant activity.  
 
No No 
Nepal Ethnic groups: Chhettri 15.5%, Brahman-Hill 12.5%, Magar 7%, Tharu 6.6%, Tamang 5.5%, 
Newar 5.4%, Muslim 4.2%, Kami 3.9%, Yadav 3.9%, other 32.7%, unspecified 2.8% (2001 
census)Religions: Hindu 80.6%, Buddhist 10.7%, Muslim 4.2%, Kirant 3.6%, other 0.9% (2001 
census) note: only official Hindu state in the world. 
Languages Nepali 47.8%, Maithali 12.1%, Bhojpuri 7.4%, Tharu (Dagaura/Rana) 5.8%, Tamang 
5.1%, Newar 3.6%, Magar 3.3%, Awadhi 2.4%, other 10%, unspecified 2.5% (2001 census) note: 
many in government and business also speak English (2001 est.). 
Nothing cited. 
 
Yes Yes 
Pakistan Ethnic groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun (Pathan), Baloch, Muhajir (immigrants from India at the At risk groups : Ahmadis: Not currently in open rebellion, chances of rebellion Yes Yes 
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time of partition and their descendants). 
Religions: Muslim 97% (Sunni 77%, Shi'a 20%), other (includes Christian and Hindu) 3% 
Languages: Punjabi 48%, Sindhi 12%, Siraiki (a Punjabi variant) 10%, Pashtu 8%, Urdu (official) 
8%, Balochi 3%, Hindko 2%, Brahui 1%, English (official; lingua franca of Pakistani elite and most 
government ministries), Burushaski and other 8%. 
 
are near zero. Their position remains precarious.  
Hindus: Weak political organisation mean it is unlikely that they will opt for 
open rebellion Plagued by sectarian violence since its inceptions. Rise of 
religious extremism. Ethno-regional divisions has also threatened to teat the 
country apart, along with increasing levels of sectarian violenc. Baluchus: Few 
factors indicate that Baluch movements will choose rebellion also suggests that 
Baluch rebellion is unlikely in the near future ; Mohajars: Mohajirs are likely to 
continue their non-violent protest strategies for the foreseeable future. 
Pashtuns: The Pashtun exhibit several of the risk factors for rebellion.. Sindhis 
are unlikely to take their political opposition to the level of rebellion.  
 
Spain Ethnic: composite of Mediterranean and Nordic types. 
Religions: Roman Catholic 94%, other 6%. 
Languages: Castilian Spanish (official) 74%, Catalan 17%, Galician 7%, Basque 2%(M), are 
official regionally. 
At risk groups: Basques: There is no reason to think that the militant activity of 
the ETA will cease anytime in the near future. Catalans: There is no evidence 
to suggest that Catalans are likely to use militant Roma: Roma in Spain are not 
likely to engage in violence against the state in the foreseeable future.  
Yes No 
South 
Africa 
Ethnic: black African 79%, white 9.6%, colored 8.9%, Indian/Asian 2.5% (2001 census). 
Religions: Zion Christian 11.1%, Pentecostal/Charismatic 8.2%, Catholic 7.1%, Methodist 6.8%, 
Dutch Reformed 6.7%, Anglican 3.8%, Muslim 1.5%, other Christian 36%, other 2.3%, unspecified 
1.4%, none 15.1% (2001 census). 
Languages: IsiZulu 23.8%, IsiXhosa 17.6%, Afrikaans 13.3%, Sepedi 9.4%, English 8.2%, 
Setswana 8.2%, Sesotho 7.9%, Xitsonga 4.4%, other 7.2% (2001 census). 
At risk groups :Asians in South Africa face a low risk of rebellion and protest. 
Coloreds: face a low risk of rebellion and protest. There is no repression against 
the group. Europeans in South Africa face a low risk of rebellion and protest. 
Xhosa :The Xhosa seem unlikely to rebel or even protest. Zulus face only a 
very limited risk of future rebellion. The group has a history of protest to seek 
greater autonomy. South Africa’s stable and democratic regime has, however, 
taken steps to reduce repression against the Zulus and to accommodate the 
concerns. 
Yes No 
Sri Lanka 
 
Ethnic: Sinhalese 73.8%, Sri Lankan Moors 7.2%, Indian Tamil 4.6%, Sri Lankan Tamil 3.9%, 
other 0.5%, unspecified 10% (2001 census provisional data). 
Religions: Buddhist 69.1%, Muslim 7.6%, Hindu 7.1%, Christian 6.2%, unspecified 10% (2001 
census provisional data). 
Languages: Sinhala (official and national language) 74%, Tamil (national language) 18%, other 8% 
note: English is commonly used in government and is spoken competently by about 10% of the 
population. 
At risk groups:  Sri Lankan Tamils: 3 factors that increase likelihood of 
rebellion in future; protracted nature of insurgency, groups territorial 
concentration, history of lost autonomy.  Indian Tamils have only one of the 
factors that increases the likelihood of persistent future protest. 
Yes Yes 
Thailand Ethnic: Thai 75%, Chinese 14%, other 11% (Chinese, M). 
Religions: Buddhist 94.6%, Muslim 4.6% (R). 
Language: ethnic and regional dialects 
At risk groups: Chinese in Thailand have none of the factors that increase the 
likelihood of future protest. The Muslims in Thailand have four of the factors 
that increase the likelihood of continued rebellion: The Northern Hill Tribes 
have two of the factors that increase the likelihood of future rebellion. 
Yes no 
Turkey 
 
Ethnic: Turkish 80%, Kurdish 20% (estimated) (P) 
Religious: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), other 0.2% (mostly Christians and Jews) 
Languages: Turkish (official), Kurdish, Dimli (or Zaza), Azeri, Kabardian  
note: there is also a substantial Gagauz population in the European part of Turkey 
Kurds: Slightly improved situation, although many obstacles. Serious 
discrimination. Reduced military skirmishes.  
Yes No 
UK Ethnic: white (of which English 83.6%, Scottish 8.6%, Welsh 4.9%, Northern Irish 2.9%) 92.1%, 
black 2%, Indian 1.8%, Pakistani 1.3%, mixed 1.2%, other 1.6% (2001 census). 
Religions: Christian (Anglican, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist) 71.6%, Muslim 2.7%, 
Hindu 1%, other 1.6%, unspecified or none 23.1% (2001 census). 
Languages: English, Welsh (about 26% of the population of Wales), Scottish form of Gaelic (about 
60,000 in Scotland). 
At risk groups: Afro-Caribbean’s have not used violence for political purposes 
in the past nor are they likely to in the future. The likelihood of continued 
protest, conversely, is higher, and race riots also are likely to recur. There is also 
the possibility that tensions between Afro-Caribbean’s and Asians will lead to 
violent inter-communal conflict. 
The risk of rebellion by Asians in the United Kingdom is low, although not 
nonexistent. However, violence that does erupt is more likely in reaction to the 
central government’s foreign policies.Although violence may recur in Northern 
Ireland, several recent events are hopeful. The Catholics have several of the risk 
factors that sustain rebellion including high levels of group concentration and 
organization, experience of repression, and a long and active heritage of violent 
Yes No 
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opposition to Protestant domination and British rule. However, the Good Friday 
Accords, There is virtually no risk of Scottish militancy in the near future. 
Protest is not likely to rise beyond verbal opposition, although larger scale 
protest is possible.  
Venezuela Ethnic: Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Arab, German, African, indigenous people (M) 
Religions: nominally Roman Catholic 96%, Protestant 2%, other 2%. 
Languages: Spanish (official), numerous indigenous dialects. 
 
At risk groups: Blacks in Venezuela. Discrimination is of a distinctly social 
nature; there appears to be no policy of discrimination; he indigenous of 
Venezuela have few of the risk factors for rebellion.  
Yes no 
Zimbabwe Ethnic: African 98% (Shona 82%, Ndebele 14%, other 2%), mixed and Asian 1%, white less than 
1% (P). 
Religions: syncretic (part Christian, part indigenous beliefs) 50%, Christian 25%, indigenous beliefs 
24%, Muslim and other 1%. 
Languages: English (official), Shona, Sindebele (the language of the Ndebele, sometimes called 
Ndebele), numerous but minor tribal dialects. 
At risk groups: Europeans: Based on factors known to encourage rebellion. 
Increased its anti-European policies in recent years.  
Ndebele Several factors known to increase the likelihood of rebellion are 
present in the Ndebele case.  
Yes no 
Source: CIA World Fact Book (2007), Minorities at Risk Project (2007).  
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Appendix L - Key actor indicators 
 
Country Number of 
political 
parties 2007 
& year of 
constitution 
CIA World Fact book 
Political pressure groups and leaders  
 
CIA World Fact Book 
Key Export  Partners 
CIA World Fact 
Book 
Key Import  
Partners 
% of 
GDP on 
Military 
Afghanistan 79  
2004 (C)  
N/A India 22%, Pakistan 21%, US 
14.6%, UK 6.3%, Denmark 
5.5%, Finland 4.3% (2006) 
Pakistan 37.5%, US 
11.9%, Germany 7.1%, 
India 5.1% (2006) 
1.9% 
(2006) 
Bulgaria 12 
1991 (C) 
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria or CITUB; Podkrepa Labor Confederation; 
numerous regional, ethnic, and national interest groups with various agendas 
Turkey 12%, Italy 10.4%, 
Germany 10%, Greece 8.2%, 
Belgium 6.8%, France 4.3% 
(2006) 
Germany 15%, Italy 
10.6%, Turkey 7.2%, 
Greece 6.3%, China 5%, 
France 4.9%, Romania 
4.5% (2006) 
2.6 % 
(2005) 
Cambodia –  4 
1993 (C) 
N/A US 53.3%, Hong Kong 15.2%, 
Germany 6.6%, UK 4.3% (2006) 
Hong Kong 18.1%, China 
17.5%, Thailand 13.9%, 
Taiwan 12.7%, Vietnam 
9%, Singapore 5.3%, 
South Korea 4.9%, Japan 
4.3% (2006) 
3% (2005) 
Costa Rica –  
 
17 
1949 (C) 
Authentic Confederation of Democratic Workers or CATD (Communist Party affiliate); Chamber of Coffee 
Growers; Confederated Union of Workers or CUT (Communist Party affiliate); Costa Rican Confederation 
of Democratic Workers or CCTD (Liberation Party affiliate); Costa Rican Exporter's Chamber or 
CADEXCO; Costa Rican Solidarity Movement; Costa Rican Union of Private Sector Enterprises or 
UCCAEP [ Federation of Public Service Workers or FTSP; National Association for Economic 
Development or ANFE;.  
US 27.4%, Netherlands 12.2%, 
China 11.7%, UK 6.2%, Mexico 
5.8% (2006) 
US 41.2%, Venezuela 
5.4%, Mexico 5.2%, 
Ireland 5%, Japan 4.9%, 
Brazil 4.3%, China 4.1% 
(2006) 
0.4% 
(2006) 
Croatia 11 
1991 (C) 
N/A Italy 23.1%, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 12.7%, Germany 
10.4%, Slovenia 8.3%, Austria 
6.1% (2006) 
Italy 16.7%, Germany 
14.5%, Russia 9.7%, 
Slovenia 6.8%, Austria 
5.4%, China 5.3% (2006) 
2.39% 
(2005) 
Cuba 1 
1959 (C) 
N/A Netherlands 21.8%, Canada 
21.6%, China 18.7%, Spain 5.9% 
(2006) 
Venezuela 26.6%, China 
15.6%, Spain 9.6%, 
Germany 6.4%, Canada 
5.6%, Italy 4.4%, US 
4.3%, Brazil 4.2% (2006) 
3.8% 
(2006) 
Egypt 3 
1971 (C) 
Despite a constitutional ban against religious-based parties, the technically illegal Muslim Brotherhood 
constitutes Hosni MUBARAK's potentially most significant political opposition; MUBARAK tolerated 
limited political activity by the Brotherhood for his first two terms, but moved more aggressively since then 
to block its influence; civic society groups are sanctioned, but constrained in practical terms; trade unions 
and professional associations are officially sanctioned 
Italy 12.1%, US 11.3%, Spain 
8.5%, UK 5.5%, France 5.4%, 
Syria 5.2%, Saudi Arabia 4.3%, 
Germany 4.2% (2006) 
US 11.4%, China 8.3%, 
Germany 6.4%, Italy 
5.4%, Saudi Arabia 5%, 
France 4.6% (2006) 
3.4% 
(2005) 
Ethiopia 8 
1994 (C) 
Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front or EPPF; Ogaden National Liberation Front or ONLF; Oromo Liberation 
Front or OLF [DAOUD Ibsa] 
China 11%, Germany 9.1%, 
Japan 7.8%, US 7.1%, Saudi 
Arabia 6.1%, Djibouti 6%, Italy 
5.2% (2006) 
Saudi Arabia 18.1%, 
China 11.4%, India 8.1%, 
Italy 5.1% (2006) 
3% (2006) 
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Haiti 24 
1987 (C) 
Autonomous Organizations of Haitian Workers or CATH [Fignole ST-CYR]; Confederation of Haitian 
Workers or CTH; Federation of Workers Trade Unions or FOS; General Organization of Independent 
Haitian Workers [Patrick NUMAS]; Grand-Anse Resistance Committee, or KOREGA; National Popular 
Assembly or APN; Papaye Peasants Movement or MPP [Chavannes JEAN-BAPTISTE]; Popular 
Organizations Gathering Power or PROP; Roman Catholic Church; Protestant Federation of Haiti 
US 80%, Dominican Republic 
7.6%, Canada 3% (2006) 
US 46.5%, Netherlands 
Antilles 11.9%, Brazil 
3.8% (2006) 
0.4% 
(2006) 
India 17 
1950 (C) 
Numerous religious or militant/chauvinistic organizations, including Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Bajrang Dal, 
and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh; various separatist groups seeking greater communal and/or regional 
autonomy, including the All Parties Hurriyat Conference in the Kashmir Valley and the National Socialist 
Council of Nagaland in the Northeast 
US 17%, UAE 8.3%, China 
7.8%, UK 4.3% (2006) 
China 8.7%, US 6%, 
Germany 4.6%, Singapore 
4.6%, Australia 4% 
(2006) 
2.5% 
(2006) 
Indonesia 7 
1945 (C) 
N/A Japan 19.4%, Singapore 11.8%, 
US 11.5%, China 7.7%, South 
Korea 6.4%, Taiwan 4.2% (2006) 
Singapore 29.6%, China 
11.2%, Japan 8.8%, South 
Korea 5.3%, Malaysia 
4.8% (2006) 
3^ (2005) 
Iran 8  
1979 (revised 89) 
The Islamic Revolutionary Party (IRP) was Iran's sole political party until its dissolution in 1987; Iran now 
has a variety of groups engaged in political activity; some are oriented along political lines or based on an 
identity group; others are more akin to professional political parties seeking members and recommending 
candidates for office; some are active participants in the Revolution's political life while others reject the 
state; political pressure groups conduct most of Iran's political activities; groups that generally support the 
Islamic Republic include Ansar-e Hizballah, Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam, Tehran 
Militant Clergy Association (Ruhaniyat), Islamic Coalition Party (Motalefeh), and Islamic Engineers 
Society; active pro-reform student groups include the Office of Strengthening Unity (OSU); opposition 
groups include Freedom Movement of Iran, the National Front, Marz-e Por Gohar, and various ethnic and 
Monarchist organizations; armed political groups that have been repressed by the government include 
Mujahidin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO), People's Fedayeen, Democratic Party of Iranian 
Kurdistan (KDPI), and Komala 
Japan 14%, China 12.8%, Turkey 
7.2%, Italy 6.3%, South Korea 
6%, Netherlands 4.6% (2006) 
Germany 12%, China 
10.5%, UAE 9.4%, 
France 5.6%, Italy 5.4%, 
South Korea 5.4%, Russia 
4.5% (2006) 
2.5% 
(2005) 
Iran 19 
2005 (C) 
Coalition and end US influence in Iraq; a number of predominantly Shia militias, some associated with 
political parties, challenge governmental authority in Baghdad and southern Iraq 
US 46.8%, Italy 10.7%, Canada 
6.2%, Spain 6.1% (2006) 
Syria 26.5%, Turkey 
20.5%, US 11.8%, Jordan 
7.2% (2006) 
8.65 
(2006) 
Israel 13 
1948 (C) 
Israeli nationalists advocating Jewish settlement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip; Peace Now [Yariv 
OPPENHEIMER, Secretary General] supports territorial concessions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; 
Yesha Council of Settlements [Bentzi LIEBERMAN, Chairman] promotes settler interests and opposes 
territorial compromise; B'Tselem monitors human rights abuses 
US 38.4%, Belgium 6.5%, Hong 
Kong 5.9% (2006) 
US 12.4%, Belgium 8.2%, 
Germany 6.7%, 
Switzerland 5.9%, UK 
5.1%, China 5.1% (2006) 
7.3% 
(2006) 
Lebanon 17 
1926 (C) 
N/A Syria 26.8%, UAE 12%, 
Switzerland 6%, Saudi Arabia 
5.7%, Turkey 4.5% (2006) 
Syria 11.6%, Italy 9.8%, 
US 9.3%, France 7.7%, 
Germany 6%, China 5%, 
Saudi Arabia 4.7% (2006) 
3.1% 
(2005) 
Libya None 
1969 (revolution) 
Various Arab nationalist movements with almost negligible memberships may be functioning clandestinely, 
as well as some Islamic elements; an anti-QADHAFI Libyan exile movement exists, primarily based in 
London, but has little influence 
Italy 37.1%, Germany 14.6%, 
Spain 7.7%, US 6.1%, France 
5.6%, Turkey 5.4% (2006) 
Italy 18.9%, Germany 
7.8%, China 7.6%, 
Tunisia 6.3%, France 
5.8%, Turkey 5.3%, US 
4.7%, South Korea 4.3%, 
UK 4% (2006) 
3.9% 
(2005) 
Mongolia 6 
1990 (C) 
N/A China 71.8%, Canada 11.7%, US 
7.3% (2006) 
Russia 29.8%, China 
29.5%, Japan 11.9% 
(2006) 
1.4% 
(2006) 
Myanmar 3 
1974 (suspended 
Ethnic Nationalities Council or ENC (based in Thailand); Federation of Trade Unions-Burma or FTUB 
(exile trade union and labour advocates); National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma or NCGUB 
Thailand 48.8%, India 12.7%, 
China 5.2%, Japan 5.2% (2006) 
China 35.1%, Thailand 
22.1%, Singapore 16.4%, 
2.1% 
(2005) 
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in 88) (self-proclaimed government in exile) ["Prime Minister" Dr. SEIN WIN] consists of individuals, some 
legitimately elected to the People's Assembly in 1990 (the group fled to a border area and joined insurgents 
in December 1990 to form parallel government in exile); Kachin Independence Organization or KIO; Karen 
National Union or KNU; Karenni National People's Party or KNPP; National Council-Union of Burma or 
NCUB (exile coalition of opposition groups); several Shan factions; United Wa State Army or UWSA; 
Union Solidarity and Development Association or USDA (pro-regime, a social and political mass-member 
organization) 88 Generation Students (pro-democracy movement) 
Malaysia 4.8% (2006) 
Nepal 12 
No date 
Maoist guerrilla-based insurgency [Pushpa Kamal DAHAL, also known as PRACHANDA, chairman; Dr. 
Baburam BHATTARAI]; numerous small, left-leaning student groups in the capital; several small, radical 
Nepalese antimonarchist groups 
India 67.9%, US 11.7%, 
Germany 4.7% (2006) 
India 61.8%, China 3.8%, 
Indonesia 3.3% (2006) 
1.6% 
(2006) 
New Zealand 8 
None written 
N/A Australia 20.5%, US 13.1%, 
Japan 10.3%, China 5.4%, UK 
4.9% (2006) 
Australia 20.5%, China 
12.3%, US 11.8%, Japan 
9.2%, Germany 4.4%, 
Singapore 4.4% (2006) 
1% (2005) 
Norway 9 
1814 (C) 
N/A UK 26.8%, Germany 12.3%, 
Netherlands 10.3%, France 8.2%, 
Sweden 6.4%, US 5.7% (2006) 
Sweden 15%, Germany 
13.5%, Denmark 6.9%, 
UK 6.4%, China 5.7%, 
US 5.3%, Netherlands 
4.1% (2006) 
1.9% 
(2005) 
Pakistan 20 
No date given 
Military remains most important political force; ulema (clergy), landowners, industrialists, and small 
merchants also influential 
US 21%, UAE 9%, Afghanistan 
7.7%, China 5.3%, UK 5.1% 
(2006) 
China 13.8%, Saudi 
Arabia 10.5%, UAE 
9.7%, US 6.5%, Japan 
5.7%, Kuwait 4.7%, 
Germany 4.1% (2006) 
3.2 % 
(2006) 
Spain 14 
1978 (C) 
Business and landowning interests; Catholic Church; free labor unions (authorized in April 1977); Socialist 
General Union of Workers or UGT and the smaller independent Workers Syndical Union or USO; university 
students; Trade Union Confederation of Workers' Commissions or CC.OO. 
France 18.9%, Germany 11%, 
Portugal 8.9%, Italy 8.6%, UK 
7.8%, US 4.5% (2006) 
Germany 14.7%, France 
13.2%, Italy 8.1%, UK 
5%, Netherlands 4.8%, 
China 4.8% (2006) 
1.2% 
(2005) 
South Africa 7 
1997 (C) 
Congress of South African Trade Unions or COSATU [Zwelinzima VAVI, general secretary]; South 
African Communist Party or SACP [Blade NZIMANDE, general secretary]; South African National Civics 
Organization or SANCO [Mlungisi HLONGWANE, national president]; note - COSATU and SACP are in a 
formal alliance with the ANC 
Japan 12.1%, US 11.8%, UK 9%, 
Germany 7.6%, Netherlands 
5.3%, China 4% (2006) 
Germany 12.6%, China 
10%, US 7.6%, Japan 
6.6%, Saudi Arabia 5.3%, 
UK 5% (2006) 
1.7% 
(2006) 
Sri Lanka 20 
1978 (C) 
Buddhist clergy; labor unions; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or LTTE insurgent group fighting for a 
separate state); radical chauvinist Sinhalese groups such as the National Movement Against Terrorism; 
Sinhalese Buddhist lay groups; Tamil Eela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, TMVP or "Karuna group" 
[Vinayagamurthi MURALITHARAN] (paramilitary breakaway from LTTE and fighting against LTTE) 
US 27.6%, UK 11.3%, India 
9.3%, Belgium 4.7% (2006) 
India 19.6%, China 
10.5%, Singapore 8.7%, 
Iran 5.7%, Malaysia 
5.1%, Hong Kong 4.2%, 
Japan 4.1% (2006) 
2.6% 
(2006) 
Thailand 5 
No date given 
N/A US 15%, Japan 12.7%, China 
9%, Singapore 6.4%, Hong Kong 
5.5%, Malaysia 5.1% (2006) 
Japan 20.1%, China 
10.6%, US 6.7%, 
Malaysia 6.6%, UAE 
5.6%, Singapore 4.5% 
(2006) 
1.8% 
(2005) 
Turkey 12 
1982 (C) 
Confederation of Public Sector Unions or KESK [Ismail Hakki TOMBUL]; Confederation of Revolutionary 
Workers Unions or DISK [Suleyman CELEBI]; Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association 
or MUSIAD [Omer BOLAT]; Moral Rights Workers Union or Hak-Is [Salim USLU]; Turkish 
Confederation of Employers' Unions or TISK [Tugurl KUDATGOBILIK]. 
Germany 11.3%, UK 8%, Italy 
7.9%, US 6%, France 5.4%, 
Spain 4.4% (2006) 
Russia 12.8%, Germany 
10.6%, China 6.9%, Italy 
6.2%, France 5.2%, US 
4.5%, Iran 4% (2006) 
5.3 (2005) 
UK 8 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament; Confederation of British Industry; National Farmers' Union; Trades US 13.9%, Germany 10.9%, Germany 12.8%, US 2.4%  
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Unwritten 
constitution 
Union Congress France 10.4%, Ireland 7.1%, 
Netherlands 6.3%, Belgium 
5.2%, Spain 4.5% (2006) 
8.9%, France 6.9%, 
Netherlands 6.6%, China 
5.3%, Norway 4.9%, 
Belgium 4.5% (2006) 
(2005) 
Venezuela 9 
1999 (C) 
FEDECAMARAS, a conservative business group; VECINOS groups; Venezuelan Confederation of 
Workers or CTV (labor organization dominated by the Democratic Action) 
US 46.3%, Netherlands Antilles 
13.5%, China 3.2% (2006) 
US 30.6%, Colombia 
10.2%, Brazil 10.1%, 
Mexico 5.9%, China 
4.9%, Panama 4.8% 
(2006) 
1.2% 
(2005) 
Zimbabwe 8 
1979 (C) 
Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition [Arnold TSUNGA]; National Constitutional Assembly or NCA [Lovemore 
MADHUKU]; Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions or ZCTU [Wellington CHIBEBE] 
Sudan 24.9%, Republic of the 
Congo 17.7%, Burkina Faso 
15.8%, US 10.5% (2006) 
South Africa 40.8%, 
Zambia 29.6%, US 4.9% 
(2006) 
3.8% 
(2006) 
Source: CIA (2007) 
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Appendix M - Sample operational (short to medium term) political risk assessment for Ethiopia (August 2007 + 5 years) 
Possible  
hazardous 
events/outcomes 
identified 
Likelihood (and 
location if 
appropriate) (R) 
Possible risk impacts and  severity 
rating (S) 
Control based on risk  Qualitative comment and analysis 
1. Changes in government 
Changes in 
government 
leadership/Meles 
loses power 
1/ Very  
Low   
(3 after five years) 
1 Changes in policy towards tourism, 
Change leads to 
violence/demonstrations and travel 
disruptions  
2/4 if cancel/curtail trip. 
(Op) Improved image and destination 
attractiveness leading to an increase in 
enquiries. 
Track elections 
dates/actions of 
government 
Changes in leadership or government are more likely to lead to other hazardous events.  
Likelihood will increase with time, particularly with the fractional basis of the political and the 
ethnic divisions. 
The very low likelihood of government change in the short term is based on the dominance by 
Meles who has been in power since 1991, winning the three elections and maintaining a tight 
control of power, operating within system classified by Freedom House as Partially Free. One of 
the warning indicators to consider is the factor raised by the PITF and how the likelihood of 
change and instability increasing after leaders have been in power for more than eight years, 
hence the adjusted score after five years. The longer Meles tries to hold onto power, the more he 
may have to use a greater mix of force rather than consent, which will undermine his legitimacy 
and can generate more conflict. 
Military coup 2/Low  4/5 if cancel trip because of FO travel 
warning 
2/4 if expedition/tour  is already in 
Ethiopia it can depend on the 
repercussions, ranging from a 2, 
where the destination image is 
affected, going up to a 4 if  evacuation 
is needed.  
 
Ensure details of consulate 
are held and how regular 
communication with 
Satellite phone have to be 
up dated by UK base. 
Although military coups having taken place in the past there are few indicators in the short to 
medium term this is likely to occur again. Issues of ethics and reputation may need to be 
considered. The coup in Thailand in 2006 illustrates an instance where it had remarkably little 
effect on tourists. The key impacts can relate to demonstrations, riots and impositions of curfews. 
The military coup has a low likelihood because of the dominance of Meles. It remains however a 
possible hazard as coups have occurred in the past and the relatively strength of the military, as 
revealed by other indicators, such as the size of military spend. 
2. Structural workings of government 
Continued policy 
to move rural 
population, 
primarily from the 
highlands to deal 
with agriculture.  
 
No clear direct 
policies discerned 
which can make 
tourism more or 
less attractive at 
the moment 
4 rural policies which 
impact on the 
environment. 
2 positive policies that 
enhance tourism. 
Policies reduce risk of famines 
occurring (Op risk as it improves 
perception/increases 
interest/perception of safety). 
3 Policy has serious negative 
environmental affects.  
1/Changes in policy towards tourism. 
Consider type of tourism 
or expedition project work, 
such as dealing with any 
negative effects/research. 
The rural relocation policy affects tourism by its indirect effects, such as the impact on the 
environment and the attempt to reduce the risk of famine. Whilst on the one hand they have been 
designed to deal with the constant risk of famine, the have been controversial with concerns over 
the number of negative environmental impacts. The result is that a number of physical and ethical 
risks may be generated which the tourism organisation would need to manage. Little evidence of 
any significant policy developments towards tourism, such as taxation changes. 
Bribery and 
corruptions. 
Obtaining passes 
3 dealing with 
government/officials. 
2  Failure to pay may prevent travel, 
result in intimidation  resulting in fear 
and expedition experience affected 
4  If it is to secure a project/contract 
-Avoid key border areas 
where ‘fees’ may be 
‘requested’. 
-Avoid paying bribes to 
Here it can be difficult to build up a frequency profile, hence the use of indirect indicators 
produced by TI corruption scores, the World Banks Enterprise Survey results and the World 
Banks Development Indicators. These indicators reveal a country that is deemed at very corrupt, 
but relatively unfettered by other aspects of business regulation in comparison with other 
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and it is exposed in relation to 
reputation/regulation 
secure projects. 
-Prepare group members 
that bribes may be asked 
for by government 
officials/police when 
travelling. 
countries.  Using the World Bank Development Indicators Report (2007), Ethiopia for the 
indicators of time spent dealing with regulations equated to 2.05%, which in comparison with the 
region (7.96) and globally (7.27) is relatively low (no data was available from the potential useful 
Enterprise Survey bureaucracy measures, such as consistency of regulations by officials).  
Using the Bradt Ethiopia Travel Guides gives a different slant, with Briggs, the author, saying it 
was not a problem (Bragg 2005, p.110). 
The risks for more significant capital based projects, such as a hotel development are much 
higher. 
If it is part of an expedition, then risks are lower, but possible. 
3. Conflicts 
War/border 
incursions & 
conflict 
Refugees. 
Government 
mobilises troops to 
deal with 
incursions/terrorist
s/invasion. 
 
4 border areas with 
Eritrea (Tigray and Afar 
regions highly 
militarised). 
2 Djibouti border 
3 border areas with  
Sudan. 
3 border areas with  
Sudan. 
3 border areas with 
Somalia. 
 
All these conflicts seem 
set to continue over the 
next five years, with 
few positive signals 
emerging that things 
will get better.  
3 Travel disruptions, 2 to 4  travel 
restrictions, 4 cancellations,  
4 Ethical risks if travelling to areas 
with refugee populations. 
4/5 victim of violence (injury and 
death). 
3/5 on reputation, depending on FCO 
advice. 
Track news, contact 
addresses of key clients to 
send updates/deal with 
enquiries.  
Avoid border areas. 
Insurance cover  
Subscribe to bulletin 
services by key 
government advice sites 
for Ethiopia and its 
neighbours. 
The border areas remain highly sensitive, particularly as conflicts can overspill, such as with 
Somalia and Sudan. 
One of the results of conflicts are refugees, whereby this can raise serious ethical questions of 
travelling to areas. If the work has an aid element to it this can change the risks. 
In relation to the various war indicators, the UCDP, CSP, CIA and UN data in relation to peace 
operations, all indicate that conflict seems to be a constant factor in Ethiopia (the key areas, such 
as Gambella area,  and the border areas with Eritrea). Based on past frequency, could conclude 
that it has a medium/high likelihood of flaring up, but this does not mean no travel can take 
place, because of its geographic concentration. 
 
Peace initiatives 
initiated or break 
down 
2 (short term)  Peace 
initiatives in Eritrea.   
 
3 Peace developments 
in Somalia. 
These events have the impact of 
enhancing the attractiveness not only 
of the country, but also particular 
destinations which are rich in tourism 
resources.  
 
 Few indicators seem to suggest a solving of some of the problems, only a lessening of the 
tensions in the short term, where it seems to be in a pattern of going hot and cold, as the countries 
react to events. 
Landmines  3 all Border areas with 
Eritrea and Somalia. 
4/5 Severe injury/death. 
4/5 Reputation, particularly if ignored 
government advice. 
Avoid travelling to these 
areas. If do find these 
problems, then avoid going 
off road. 
The full extent of the risk is difficult to gauge, but here it is far better to err on the side of caution 
Military 
operations/ 
movements 
3 Military operations in 
Badme. 
3 Military operations in 
South of Jijiia/Ogaden 
region and Ararge area/ 
Somalia border area 
2/4 Travel restrictions 
4 visitors arrests in military sensitive 
areas. 
 
Keep track of events 
before travel use bulletin 
services. 
Up dates by satellite phone 
from UK base. 
See peace initiatives analysis. 
Terrorism     
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Terrorism:  
Bombings/ 
shootings  
 
 
3 Addis. 
3 Jijiigi/Ogaden region. 
 
4/5 Group members injured/ killed   
FO Issues Travel Warning. 
3 Group making detours. 
3 Communication disruptions. 
 
 
-Adhere to FCO advice to 
protect reputation. ‘-
Validate insurance, adhere 
to regulation 
-Avoid the open, public 
spaces where foreign 
nationals congregate. 
Acts of terrorism, although relatively infrequent have been marked by high severity rating in 
terms of the number killed. The key acts recorded relate to primarily bombings, particularly by 
hand grenades thrown into crowded areas, kidnapping and shootings.  
Note that UK FCO class it as a ‘High Threat’. When looking at the various government travel 
advice one can gain the impression that terrorism should perhaps be categorised as high risk. 
They all record a high threat from terrorism in Ethiopia. There is a risk recorded of British 
nationals and other foreigners becoming indiscriminately caught up in attacks.  
Yet, when looking at the actual events in more detail, whilst the severity certainly would be 
placed in the high-risk category, in terms of likelihood, this would perhaps come a little lower, 
with this likelihood varying considerably according to different regions. Details of all the 
incidents that have taken place appear in Appendix M and N, with a more intimate analysis 
appearing in Box 7.2. Although attacks on tourists have been rare, * the fact that hotels and cafes 
have been targeted in the past gives an important warning signal of a potential threat. 
Terrorism/kidnapp
ing 
3 Danakil desert, 
marked by Dessie-
Adrigrat. 
4/5 Emotional or physical harm 
4/5 Reputation if ignored advice. 
Crisis plan which outlines 
response actions. 
Insurance cover. 
Avoid Danakil area to 
adhere to government 
guidelines and all border 
areas. 
Although the risk of such an occurrence in such a huge area can perhaps be lower then 
government advice would suggest, the severity of impacts in terms of reputation, even if 
everyone is released safely, could be very severe, because of the advice and previous incidents. 
Train derailment/ 
sabotage 
3 for the 
Ethiopia/Djibouti route. 
2 Travel disruptions, 
4/5 Injury/death from crash. 
4/5 Reputation if ignored advice. 
Avoid train travel as 
should not be needed as 
part of the expedition. 
Although the US and Canada say train travel should be avoided, the frequency and travel blogs 
can give a different perspective. 
Petty crime, car 
jacking, violent 
crime 
 
3.(Addis -Piazza area) 
petty crime 
2 violent crime in cities 
3/4 car jacking at night 
in remote outskirts of 
towns 
2 car jacking/robbed 
none border remote 
areas excluding border 
areas. 
4 car jacking/robbed 
Border areas 
 (loosely defined as 50 
Km). 
2 Lost or stolen 
documents/equipment, 2 Delays, 
experience tainted 
2/4 emotional trauma, which could 
range from anger and frustration, to 
fear/anxiety if violence involved. 
4/5 if incident occurs in border areas 
(Op) Examples of honest encountered 
which strengthen the quality of the 
experience. 
Copies of passports kept 
separately and additional 
copies in UK. 
Travel in small groups in 
busy areas. 
Avoid travel at night. 
Avoid border areas. 
UK FCO report increasing petty crime incidents in key public places. The fact that it is petty 
means the severity rating is reduced. 
Relatively however, Ethiopia does not compare badly in terms of crime with many other African 
nations. 
The World Bank’s Development Indicators, include some crime related indicators, such as the   
Crime Investment Constraint indicator, which is cited by a modest 9.2% as a major issue (World 
Bank Development Indicators 2007). Using the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, it can be 
observed that in 2002 the Security costs (% of sales) was 0.75, which was below the global 
average for security costs (1.66 %) and the regional average of 1.69%; for the Losses due to theft, 
robbery and arson (% of sales) measure, Ethiopia was given 0.39, which is again below the 
average for the world (0.99) and the region (2.06). Perhaps of more concern is that the CIA 
database highlights that Ethiopia acts as a distribution hub for a variety of drugs, which could 
drive a variety of risks, particularly if clients of a tour group are tempted to consume illegal 
drugs. The MIPT country profile databases have the number of homicides per 1000 people, but 
no data was available for Ethiopia. 
Riots, demonstrations ethnic unrest 
Government 
arrests oppositions 
groups, arbitrary 
3.Key towns in Ogeden,  
(rising to 4 at next 
election). 
4 Ethical risks in relation to human 
rights abuses. 
3 travel restrictions. 
Consider ethical position 
and articulate policy of 
how one can deal with this 
Increased risk in certain areas and time. The increasing authoritarian aspect to the regime is also 
born out by the instances of government repression over the years that have increased in 
frequency. This is further validated by Amnesty International (Amnesty International 2007) 
                                                 
*
 The 2002 bombing of a hotel in Addis Ababa, when 38 people were injured and 1 fatality caused, has been one of the most serious, along with the bomb attacks on the Market places in 
2006. 
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arrests, summary 
executions 
Amnesty/Freedom 
House publicise 
abuses 
 
Government 
repression in 
Gambella,  
3 Gambella (ethnic 
unrest).  
3 Northern Afar. 
3/4 foreign government 
condemnation of human 
rights abuses. 
 
3 Reputation . 
2/4 Travel disruptions. 
 
issue. This clarifies the 
significance or impact 
value. 
Inform group and what can 
be done to help (at home 
not in country, such as 
supporting Amnesty 
International campaigns). 
claiming that after the 2005 demonstrations, 10,000 were arrested and many were killed and 
injured and Freedom House Reports, with areas in the Gambella area highlighted in particular as 
an area which has experienced many human right abuses, such as extra-judicial executions, rape 
and mass arrests, raising an important number of ethical risks. 
 
This is challenging, as this must be considered in relation to the organisations ethical stance. 
Strikes and 
opposition 
demonstration 
protests 
3 Addis Ababa (rising to 
5 at 2010 elections). 
 
4 National Days. 
4/5 2005 election in 
Addis and other key 
regional cities. 
3 Travel restrictions short term travel 
adjustments.  
¾ if government changes advice in 
response to incidents and if the group 
about to leave or already at the 
destinations. 
3/4 Image destination affected in a 
negative way. 
 
 
Take into account the 
election times and when 
tours are likely to take 
place. 
Mark out key urban 
populations and times 
when group will be there. 
Fewer problems are likely 
to occur in remote rural 
areas. 
Looking at the political system and past trends, where it has moved towards authoritarianism, 
there is every likelihood that there could be demonstrations, which can be met by government 
repression and violence.  
The lack of effective avenues for oppositions groups, grievance expression, means that these 
expressions are likely to simmer than appear on the scene in a more explosive manner. 
The events after the 2005 elections are illustrative of how demonstrations can spiral into violence 
and government repression, particularly in Addis Ababa and the western lowland area of 
Gambella, where ethnic tensions and border incursions from the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA), have helped fuel a number of violent demonstrations, riots spiralling into 
violence. 
 
Refugees 4 Border areas & 
conflict. 
4/if ongoing drought 
conditions operate. 
4 Serious considerations must be 
given to travelling to refugee locations 
because of the profound ethical 
implications. 
Review locations of 
conflicts and 
environmental conditions. 
This emerged as a key hazard to consider as a mixture of conflict, environmental disaster and 
governmental policy is driving it.  It is intimately entwined with the other areas, but is 
worthwhile assessing in its own right. 
4. International 
International 
aid/Investment by 
big hotel operators 
4 aid. 
3 Investment (Addis and 
key tourist locations). 
2 Access grants/funds 
(Op) Profit from investments  
Examine possible sources 
of funds/aid projects in 
areas. 
 
Such was the impact of the 1980s famine, that it helped establish a discrete tourism sector in 
Ethiopia. Also worth noting that some big hotel operators run very profitable enterprises there 
because of the scale of the aid industry. 
All of Ethiopia’s neighbours have been vulnerable to conflict, with the problem of overspill 
manifesting itself in the way of refugees, terrorism, crime and international sanctions.* It is also 
important to monitor the tourism generator government’s responses to various incidents, 
particularly statements of condemnation over human rights abuses (as the UK has done), which 
can alter the level of risk exposure of the clients, as the expulsion of Norwegian Diplomats in 
2007 illustrate, after the criticised the Government’s poor human rights record.  
These are 
intimately linked 
to conflicts.  
 
4 Diplomatic incidents 
with Eritrea, Somalia 
3 Kenya/Sudan 
2 Djibouti Other 
4 (other as election 
nears). 
2/4 Physical safety depending on the 
actions of own national government if 
groups targeted. 
3 Travel restrictions 
applied/expulsions. 
 
Track 
situations/neighbouring 
country bulletin services. 
Here it is vital to appreciate the links elsewhere, such as conflicts and how events may interact. 
The actions of ones own governments can also affect the degree of risk exposure. The complex 
relationship here of American citizens and USA government support of the Ethiopia War against 
terrorism, particularly in the Somalia area is of particular concern. 
5 Natural 
                                                 
*
 Sadly, looking at the data for that period, Kenya seemed to have some of the most positive prospects in terms of notions of stability and economic growth; the elections in January 2008 
and the contested electoral result, with an unleashing of violence and ethnic killings, soon revealed the vulnerability of this country as well 
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Flooding & 
droughts 
4 Flooding in June – 
September  
4 Drought 
2 Travel disruptions 
5 Drowning 
3/4 loss or damage to equipment 
Track areas and highlight 
vulnerable areas 
Government response to aid. It is clear that Ethiopia can be particularly prone to environmental 
problems, which run from periods of drought affecting agricultural production in some parts, 
whilst for other parts of the country the problems relate to flooding destroying crops. The results 
of these hazards, can impact on the economy, create refugees and also drive conflict as 
competition for scarce resources are generated. Key areas of environmental problems driving 
resource conflict are highlighted with the Afar minority group bordering Eritrea has been 
particularly prone to resource pressures and displacement. The past patterns indicate a high 
probability of such problems occurring again in the future 
Disease    This is a difficult one to rate here. There are many diseases, particularly waterborne diseases, 
which would need consideration in a wider operational risk assessment,  but this is not done here 
in this work.  
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Appendix N - The key risks identified by expedition members 
Fear most …. Most likely to occur … 
 
Most severe …. 
 
- Security (personal): Losing passport, 
Crime/Mugging (x2), Banditry (x1),  
violent crime, thefts, robbery. 
-Security (external):  
Kidnapping: (x4), Political unrest (x4), 
war (x2)  
-Illness & Disease (internal):  
Health problems, Sickness/illness (x 6), 
Bites related, water related, digestive 
related, hygiene related, Diarrhoea (x3), 
Infection (x 2),infected health care, 
RTA, health issues, Lack of water:, 
Dehydration 
Illness & Disease (external): Family 
illness at home (x2)  
Accidents: (general) accidents (x 6), 
personal injury (x 3), driving accident 
(x3), Plane crash: 
Personal failure/group dynamics: 
(personal) illness affecting team 
enjoyment/performance affected by 1 
personal performance failure, Personal 
fitness/coping 
Transport: Transport 
failures/breakdowns (x2) 
Equipment Failure: Loss of 
radio/phone contact 
Weather: Severe flooding: 1 (fear of 
drowning), unexpected weather,  
Misc:  Fear misnomer to use, Snakes, 
spiders, Toilets 
 
Security (personal): Mugging/theft 
(x2), crime (x3) 
Security (external) 
Kidnapping/abduction (x3), political 
unrest 
Illness & Disease (internal):  
Sickness/illness: 1 (altitude), 1 
(stomach), water related illness (x3), 
(complications from) delays in 
treatment, infection, Infection: 
Diarrhoea, health issues, personal injury, 
RTA, long term disease affects 
Illness & Disease (external): 
Accidents:: Driving/accident (x2), Plane 
crash:, (general) accident 
Personal failure/group: personal) 
illness affecting team, group dynamic 
problems, failing group. 
Dynamics:   
Transport: Transport failures (x3),  
Equipment Failure: Loss of 
radio/phone 
Weather: Severe flooding, heat 
Misc: e.g. lack of water  
 
Security (personal):  
Losing documentation,  
Crime/security (x3), equipment stolen 
(x2)  
Security (external) 
Kidnapping (x2), Political 
unrest/security (x2), (Unable to depart or 
return (x2)  
Illness & Disease (internal): Personal 
injury (x2)  
Sickness/Illness (x6), altitude, 
dehydration (x1) 
blood borne disease (x1), 
cuts and abrasions (x1),  
Health issues/Casevac issues 
 
Illness & Disease (external): Family 
illness 
Accidents: slips and trips, 
Driving/accident: (x 2) , limited 
hospitals, Plane crash (x3)  
 
Personal failure/group dynamics 
Equipment failure  
Transport: transport failures/delays 
(x3) 
Weather; weather 
Misc.  
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Appendix O - Summary of government advice and identification of the hazards for Ethiopia 
UK FCO USA SD Australia Canada NZ 
Key Advise: Advices against all travel to 
parts of the country (principal roads/towns 
50KM with border areas with Eritrea; 
Gambella region; all roads 50km of border 
areas with Sudan and Kenya; Dhanakil desert 
area bounded by Dessie-Adigrat road, Advise 
against crossing Somalia border by road. 
Additional advice: You are advised to 
remain prudent and keep a low profile, avoid 
public demonstrations and large crowds and 
remain vigilant in public places throughout 
the country, avoid travelling after dark, book 
flights and accommodation in advance, dress 
in a conservative manor 
UK Listed risks: landmines, kidnapping, 
terrorism (high threat) , replacing lost 
passports, passports or dealing with victims 
of crime, politically motivated violence, 
ongoing violence in Somalia, sporadic 
violence in Gambella, explosions, sabotage 
and train derailment between Ethiopia and 
Dijibouti is possible., serious disturbances in 
Adsis, poor human rights record, Tigray, Afar 
and remain predominantly a military zone, 
Homosexuality is illegal, and five years 
imprisonment, drug offences serious. Visa 
needed, Yellows fever, departure tax, malaria 
prevalent, water borne diseases, HIV, Petty 
theft and mugging in the Piazza are 
increasing 
 
 
Key Advice: The overall countrywide situation 
as of June 2006 is stable.  Exercise caution in 
Eritrea border areas; Discourages travel to 
Ethiopia’s Somali region and travel warning 
issued for Somali; travel to Afar discouraged; 
travel to Gambella region discouraged.  
Additional advice: Visa requires, declare 
electronic goods and foreign currency 
Discourage rail travel 
Regularly monitor internet site. Maintain 
security awareness and avoid large crowds. 
Exercise caution in Mercato area. Caution at all 
times when travelling by roads and in daylight. 
Remain extremely vigilant (USA). Exercise 
caution in remote areas (USA)  
Overall situation is stable; Disturbances/civil 
unrest in Addis and other Cities; opposition 
leaders arrested.; Bomb explosions in Addis 
and Jiijiga 
Peace deal signed in 2002 with Eritrea; 
Abductions and banditry in  
Sporadic ethnic clashes in Gambella (presently 
calm but unpredictable).Kenyan border area 
incidents of ethnic conflict and banditry; Pick 
pockets and snatch and run are common is 
Addis ; Highway robberies, carjacking 
outside urban areas; Limited emergency 
medical facilities; Malaria is prevalent outside 
of highland areas; High prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS. Possible outbreaks of typhoid,; 
Unpredictable driving and poorly 
maintained roads 
 
Key Advice: Strongly advised not to travel 
To (border areas with Kenya, Somalia 
(particularly Ogaden) and Sudan border areas, 
including Gambella area; border area with 
Eritrea. described as extremely dangerous). 
Reconsider the need to travel to Ethiopia 
because of high threat of terrorism against 
western interests.  
Additional advice:  Particularly vigilant in 
lead up to national days of significance as 
militants may use this time for attacks; 
consider places known for terrorist attacks, 
such as public places or those frequented by 
foreigners. Make two copies of valuable 
documents 
Don’t carry too much cash; Lock luggage. 
Keep passport safe; Concerns over airline 
safety search Civil Aviation authority. 
Ensure comprehensive insurance is had. 
 
Listed risks: Upsurge in violence in Harer 
and Gode; explosions, protestors killed,  no 
consulate services (use Canadian),  
Kidnapping, Conflict in neighbouring 
countries could spill over, attacks against 
symbols and buildings of the government, 
terrorism, civil unrest,  border tensions with 
Eritrea,  landmines,  High prevalence of HIV, 
pickpockets, bag and jewellery snatching is 
common.. flooding in June –September, death 
penalty for serious crimes, Homosexuality 
illegal, photography around military bases, 
Malaria prevalent, water borne diseases, 
altitude sickness, cases of bird flue, 
 
 
Key Advise: (Official Warning) Avoid all travel to: border areas with Eritrea 
and Dhanakil Desert, bounded by the Dessie-Adrigrat road; Dijouti roat and 
Ethio- Eritrean border; east and south of Jijiiga in Ogaden and Ararge areas 
towards toward  Somali border areas. Countries or parts of countries we advise 
caution to Addis Abada. Exercise high degree of caution (to all country or 
region 
Additional advice: Avoid Public areas demonstrations/large crowds (UK) / 
Avoid large gatherings (Australia) Monitor local developments, avoid large 
crowds and demonstrations (Canada). Carry photo ID and cooperate with law 
enforcement officials (Canada). Remain in contact with embassy. Ensure 
personal belongings secure: Canada. Visa necessary /proof of yellow fever 
vaccination/declare large electrical goods, avoid photographs of military, avoid 
night overland travel. Not recommended to travel by train. Stay informed of 
local weather conditions. Avoid swimming in lakes because of parasites. 
Permits required for animal/antique products. Avoid speaking in public areas 
about politics (Canada) 
Low level unrest  and sporadic clashes between students and security forces in 
rural areas (especially Oromiya and Amhara regions); Armed clashes with 
Ethiopia and Kenya/refugees (Canada);Cross border banditry in Ethiopia 
(Canada); Bombings, general strikes and security force deployment in 
Addis. Can reoccur with out warning, despite relative peace since 2005 ; 
Ethnic unrests, violent demonstrations and military operations in Gambella 
region. Banditry common (Canada); Military operations/landmines east and 
south of Jijiiga in Ogaden and Ararge areas towards toward  Somali border 
areas; Several armed groups hostile to govt operate in Kenya border areas 
(Canada); Risk of terrorist attack remains high in Addis and other Cities 
(Hotels targeted). Canada; Petty theft and violent crime increased in Addis. 
Pickpocket and thieves active, particularly in Piazza, Merkato and other areas 
where foreigners congregate. Strict punishments for overstaying visa  
(Canada) 
Evidence of yellow fever vaccination (Canada); Homosexuality is illegal; 
Permits required for animal skins and antique religious artefacts. Must declare 
computers, video equipment; Photography prohibited near military 
installations; Roads poorly paved and lit. Highway robberies increasing. Train 
derailments/bombings frequent.; Active seismic area 
June – September subject to flooding. ATMs limited/ensure adequate supplies 
of hard cash 
Advise against 
border crossings  
with Eritrea. 
Advise against 
non-essential 
travel east of Hara 
to gode line 
Advise against 
travel to Gambella 
region 
Travel in convoy 
to Kenya border 
Check political 
situation before 
setting out to 
Dijoubity by road 
or rail. 
Security 
conscious  
Hazards:  tense 
political situation 
in Gambella; 
situation volatile 
in Addis; 
demonstrations 
and bombings 
have occurred. 
 
 
Source: UK FCO (2007), USA SD (2007), ADFA (2007), CFAIT (2007) and NZMFA (2007) 
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Appendix P - Table highlighting the key security and instability events 
 
Uppsala Data Base CSP DATA War  
Neighbours 
 
Terrorist 
Attacks and 
kidnapping 
Government 
Change 
Ethnic 
Tensions 
Strikes Riots, 
Demonstrations 
Other key events (e.g environmental 
disasters) 
2
0
0
7
 
5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M); 
 
March/April Ethiopian 
army used heavy artillery 
indiscriminately in 
Mogadishu, Somalia, 
displacing 40 to 50,000 
people. 
Conflict  1 Ethiopia (EW, 
M1, C 500, L, NA); 
UCDP – Sudan/other 
groups   – W 
5 Aug (1F, 12 
injured) ; 28 May (5 
F, 52 I) ; 24  April ( 
1 F, some 
kidnapped); 1 
March 13 
(Kidnapped); 24 
Aug (74 F); 
   Government committed serious human rights 
abuses, including rape, torture and village burning 
during campaign against Ethiopian rebels in Somali 
region, most notably Orami state. Mass arrests and 
extra-judicial killings, economic sanctions 
 
In Addis govt pardoned many opposition leaders 
and journalists detained since 2005 
 
Mass arrests in Mogadishu 
 
2/3 of Norwegian diplomats expelled for criticising 
governments human rights record 
2
0
0
6
 
1000 of soldiers deployed 
in Mogadishu in late 2006 
as part of the campaign 
to rid the government. 
 UCDP – Sudan/other 
groups – W Sudan Conflict 
1 – W intensity; Somalia 
Conflict M intensity16 Oct 
reports of  troop/tank 
movement by UN mission. 
No fly zone declared 
3 Sept (,1 F, 7 
injured.); 27 May 
bomb (?); 11 June 
(number of F); 12 
May explosions (4 
F, 43 I). More 
explosions on 7 and 
27 March  (1 F, 17 
I);20 Sept  2 aid 
workers kidnappted 
near. 
 
   Troops go into Somalia; Rising tensions with Eritrea 
More arrests by govt on opposition. Journalists 
jailed 
Orama Liberation Front continued armed campaign 
against the government 
Threats of drought 
 
Islamic groups in South have increased with more 
sophisticated weapons.. 
2
0
0
5
 
5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M);  
 UCDP – Sudan/other 
groups- MinorUCDP –
Eritrea/EIJM)- Minor 
Sudan  
Conflict 1 – M intensity 
 May Elections-
EPRDF remain 
in power 
Sept – Oct clashes 
between Christian 
and Muslims in 
Jimma Zone, Agaro 
town. 
June –Nov Protests and riots/Serious 
disturbances after elections 
42 Killed initial protests of elections 
result and 60 wounded. 4,000 
arrested.  
Drought continues .1.75 million in need of 
humanitarian aid in South. 
 Prospect of border violence reported 
 
Leading NGO in Oramia state was closed by 
government. 
 
Ban on demonstrations placed 
 
Mengista convicted in Absetia. 
2
0
0
4
 
5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M);  
 UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
W 
Sudan Conflict 1 – W 
intensity 
   Rally demanding fair vote 
Jam 330-340 Addis university 
students demonstrating against 
arrests, were themselves arrested.  
Ambitious relocation programme hoping to move 
people from over-used highland area 
(controversial), from BBC Time line 
2
0
0
3
 
5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M);  
 UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
W 
Sudan Conflict 1 – W 
intensity 
  US SD note episodes 
of train derailment 
in Feb 2003/ 
  
2
0
0
2
 
5. Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 
2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, M);  
July 150 Oromo rebel; 
and 340 captured in 2 
battles with national 
army near Gambela. 
 UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
W 
Sudan Conflict 1 – W 
intensity;Somalia Conflict 
M intensity 
  In Tepi, 2 ethnic 
groups the Shekio 
and the Majenger 
clashed in March 
with local officals 
and police over 
human rights. At 
least 18 died. 
Subsequently more 
were killed and 
villages raised, 
leaving some 5,800 
people homeless  
Over 1,ooo 
arrested. 
Early 2002, 5 students killed as 
protests violently dispersed in 
Oramiya state 
More unrest in July and more 
violence in region  
May soldiers fired upon 3,000 
demonstrators in Awasa (South of 
Capital) 
Police violence in Tepi and Awassa in 
Sourth resulted in hundreds dead and 
mass arrests. In  
In city of Awassa on 24 May police 
used machine guns on armoured cars 
to shoot into a crowd of protesting 
farmers. At least 17 died. 
March/April in Oromiya police shot 
into student demonstrations, 700 or 
more arrested 
Boundary Commission  set up in 2000 April EEBC 
announce decision on border 
Admitted to the IMF Heailly Indebted Porr 
Countries (HIPC) and so gets debt relief 
Violent crackdown on students in Oromiya regional 
state. 
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2
0
0
1
 
5. Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 
2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, M); 2. 
Turkey (T. Intra, M) 
 UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
W 
Sudan Conflict 1 – W 
intensity 
  November riots 
with many arrests 
and injuries 
April students went on strike in 
Addis to protest against governments 
repressive policies.. Repressed by 
government resulting in 40 deaths, 
200 injuries, hundreds arrested 
 
2 leading human rights activities arrestee on 
grounds of incitement..  
August 2001 respected Women’s Lawyers groups 
suspended. 
100 members of Ethiopian Democratic Party and 30 
members of the AAPO were arrested. 
Opposition parties boycott zonal elections in 
December 2001 
2
0
0
0
 
5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M); 6. 
Ethiopia (T, Inter, W, 
Terminated);  
2.Ethiopia/Oromo(EW, M1, 
F, C 2000,  TG) 
3. Ethiopia/Eritrea (IW, M5, 
C100,000, F,  TG) 
 
UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
W 
Sudan Conflict 1 – W 
intensity ;Somalia Conflict 
M intensity 
Dece 2003 UN 
personnel 
ambushed and 
killed in Gambella 
region 
May elections- 
EPRDF remain 
in power. Meles 
2nd victory 
  Accusations of electoral rigging and irregularities 
1
9
9
9
 
5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M); 6 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M);; 
2.Ethiopia (EW, M1, A, TG) 
G) 
UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
W 
UCDP –Djibouti i/FRUD 
Minor 
Sudan Conflict 1 – W 
intensity 
     
1
9
9
8
8
 
5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M); 6. 
Ethiopia (T, Inter, W); 
 UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
W 
UCDP –Eritrea/EIJM)- 
Minor 
Sudan Conflict 1 – W 
intensity 
     
1
9
9
7
 
5 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M); 6 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M);  
 UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
WUCDP –Eritrea/EIJM)- 
Minor 
Sudan Conflict 1 – W 
intensity 
 
     
1
9
9
6
 
3 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M), 5. 
Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 2 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M); 6 
Ethiopia (T, Intra, M);  
 Sudan Conflict 1 – W 
intensity; 
Somalia Conflict M 
intensity 
UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
WUCDP –Djibouti i/FRUD 
Minor 
 
     
1
9
9
5
 
2 Ethiopia (T, Intra, M); 1.  
 UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
W 
 May 1st elections 
EPRDF 
Landslide 
victory 
  New constitution in theory and extreme progressive 
document 
1
9
9
4
 
2 Ethiopia (G, Intra, M); 
 UCDP – Sudan/SPLM/A – 
W 
     
 
Source of data: UCDB (2007),CSP (2007), UKFCO (2007), Polity IV (2007), FH (2007) and Human Rights Watch (2007). 
UCDB Key: Type of incompatibility: G= Government; T = Territory; Dimension: Intra = Intrastate; Inter = Interstate); Conflict Intensity: W = War; M = Minor  
Key (EV = Ethnic Violence; EW = Ethnic War; IV =  Interstate Violence; CV = Civil Violence; IW = Interstate War; EV = Ethnic Violence; CW – Civil War). M = magnitude and scale; C = number of casualties, 
which is only recorded in the last date of conflict as it is a summative value): HR = means high risk of conflict returning; A = means the conflict is still live or active; D = means the conflict has diminished in intensity; 
CSP Key: Key –Episode type is listed according to two character codes. The first character denotes either a Civil-intrastate involving rival political groups; (E)thnic-intrastate involving the state agent and a distinct 
ethnic group; or (I)international event-interstate, usually two or more states, but may denote a distinct polity resisting foreign domination (colonialism). The second character connotes either an episode of (V)violence-
the use of instrumental violence without necessarily exclusive goals; (W)ar-violence between distinct, exclusive groups with the intent to impose a unilateral result to the contention; or i(N)dependence-an attempt to 
forcibly remove an existing foreign domination. Red = Polity IV source; Blue = Fund for Peace; Green = Freedom House commentary; Purple UCDP ;Yellow = Advice sites 
Pink = Freedom House; Turquoise – Human Rights Watch. 
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Appendix Q - Recording the number of terrorist incidents for Ethiopia 
Year Month Type of  
incident 
Injuries Fatalities Location Target Group Source Comment 
2007 6 Aug bomb 8 1 City of Jijiga 
Eastern Ogaden 
(Somali region) 
Religion 
Christians 
Mujahideen 
Youth 
Movement 
MIPT 
ADFA 
UFCO  
Church and market bomb 
Note: A DFA locates this attack in the area east of Harer & Gode on 5th August..UK FCO also date it on the 5th August, but cite 
1 killed and dozen injured. 
2007 Sept bomb 7 1 Jijiga Business Unknown MIPT Grenade thrown into a bar  
2007 28 May    Jijiga 
Stadium 
Civilians Not cited ADFA 
UKFCO  
ADFA cite that one of the attacks was in the stadium which killed 5 and injured 50. 
UK FCO cite it as at least 5 killed and 52 injured. 
2007 24 April Firearms 
And kidnapping 
unclear 74 Obele, Ogaden 
region 
Business OLF ADFA 
UKFCO 
US SD 
Cite 74 people killed working for an oil company, including 9 Chinese nationals in Ogaden area. .A number of foreigners was 
also kidnapped but later released.UK locates it more specifically in Obele region. 
2007 1 March Kidnapping 0 0 Danakil desert 
area/Afar region 
Tourists  ADFA 
UK FCO 
Western nationals kidnapped including embassy staff. No reports of final results reported by ADFA) 
UKFCO report 14 kidnapped and later released unharmed on the 13 March and locate it more specifically near lake Asele 
2006 20 Sept kidnapping 0 0 Gode  NGOs Unclear UKFCO Note report by ICRC that two aid workers were kidnapped but later released. 
2006 11 June Bomb Unclear Unclear Gambella Transport Not specified UKFCO Stated that a number of deaths occurred on a bus travelling from Addis to Gambella region. 
2006 3 Sept bomb 1 7 Jijiga Civilians Not specified UKCO UKFCO note that a recreation centre was attacked with grenades 
2006 27May bomb 42 0 Jijiga Business Unknown MIPT 
UKFCO 
3 bombs one in a café 
UK FCO note the same number of injuries. 
2006 27May bomb Unknown Unknown Jijiga Business Unknown MIPT 
 
One of the 3 bombs 
2006 27May bomb Unknown Unknown Jijiga Business Unknown MIPT One of the 3 bombs 
2006 12 May Bomb 43 4 Addis Ababa Civilians Not specified UKFCO Explosion sin Addis in Plazaa and Mercato  
2006 April bomb 37 3 Gedo city, 250 km 
west of Addis 
Civilians Unknown MIPT Possible connections to protests over 2005 elections. 
2006  7 March bomb 4 0 Addis Ababa Business Unknown MIPT 
UKFCP 
3 bombs, with 3rd outside a hotel (hints of Eritrean involvement) 
UKFCO also cite an attack on the 27th March and state that one person killed and 17 injured, but it is unclear if this relates to 
the 7th march or the 27tgh. 
2006  7 March bomb 4 0 Addis Ababa Business Unknown MIPT 3 bombs, with 3rd outside a market(hints of Eritrean involvement) 
2006  7 March bomb 4 0 Addis Ababa Business Unknown MIPT 3 bombs, with 3rd outside a restaurant(hints of Eritrean involvement) 
2006 Jan bomb 0 0 Ambo City in West Education Unknown MIPT School targeted, locals blame ERDF (ruling party) to legitimise school crackdown 
2004 May bomb 0 0 Gedeo zone Educational OLF MIPT Grenade attack on a teacher college 
2004 May bomb 3 1 Bishoftu Business OLF MIPT Grenade attack 
2004 Jan bomb 0 0 Addis Ababa Transport Unknown MIPT Oil tanker sabotaged  
2003 Dec Firearms Not 
specified 
Not 
specified 
Gambella region NGOs Not specified UKFCO UKFCO note that a number of UN workers ambushed and killed. 
2003 Sept Armed attack Unknown 1 Figa, South Eastern NGO Unknown MIPT 
 
Staff from a UK NGO ambushed (Near Somali). Rebels attacked a land cruiser, from Save the Children 
2003 May Bomb 2 9 Adiquala Transport Unknown MIPT Attack on a train travelling from Dire Dawa to Djibouti. Detonated outside the train. OLF blamed but denied responsibility. 
2003 May Bomb 12 0 Moyale, near Kenya Business Unknown MIPT 12 people in a hotel wounded. Area of unrest. 
2003 Feb Sabotage Not 
specified 
Not 
specidied 
 Transport Not specified US SD Just comment that trains sabotaged in 2003. 
2003 Jan Bomb 1 0 Agrodat city unknown unknown MIPT Mortar explosion near livestock 
          
2002 Sept Bomb 38 1 Addis Ababa Tourists Unknown MIPT Hotel destroyed OLF blamed 
2002 July bomb Unknown Unknown Dire Dawa Citizens OLF MIPT Bomb set in a parked fuel tanker. 
2002 June Bomb Unknown Unknown Dire Dawa Government OLF MIPT Bomb attack of railway headquarters 
2000 Aug Assassination 
Rocket attack 
0 6 Liben, Eastern 
Ethiopia  
Govt Unknown MIPT 6 election monitors killed in run up to election 
2000 March Bomb/landmine 1 14 Moyale Citizens OLF MIPT 14 Kenyans killed when truck went over a landmine 
1999 Nov Bomb 1 2 Melka Jeldu Transport Unknown MIPT Train attack on a Addis Ababa train travelling from Dire Dawa OLF claimed 
1999 April  Kidnapping 0 0 Not specified NGO OLF MIPT French aid workers kidnapped 
1997 March Kidnapping 0 1 Delo Menna NGO Unknown MIPT Danish nurse kidnapped and killed and another passenger 
1997 Feb Bomb 7 2 Harer Business Unknown MIPT Grenades thrown into Belaneh hotel. British, German and Dutch citizens injured. 
1996 Nov Hijacking 48 127 Addis Ababa Airline Unknown MIPT Ethiopian airline plane crashed into ocean after running out of fuel. 125 killed out of 175. 
1996 Aug bomb 17 1 Addis Ababa Business Unknown  MIPT Hotel bomb, including a Belgian citizen killed. 
1996 Jan bomb 20 4 Addis Ababa Business Al-ittihaad al-
Islami (AIAI) 
MIPT Bomb in a hotel with many foreigners amongst the injured. 
1995 Sept Firearms 0 2 Not specified NGO Unknown MIPT 2 Sudanese killed 
1995 June Firearms/ 
Assassination 
 
0 4 Addis Ababa Govt Hezbolallah 
Al-Gama’a 
al-Islamiyya 
MIPT Attempt to assassinate Mubarek of Egypt 
1995 Mar Bomb 0 0 Addis Ababa Govt Unknown MIPT 2 grenades thrown in USAID offices 
1994 Jan firearm 0 0 Addis Ababa Diplomatic Unknown MIPT US diplomat fired at. 
Source of Data: MIPT (2007) 
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Appendix R- Identification of key hazardous events in terms of geographic locations 
Internal Conflicts: 
Ethiopian govt – Afar region (1975 -1996); Ethiopian government – Ogaden region (1996 – ongoing); 
Ethiopia government – Oromiya  (Combined opposition groups, OLF & ONLF) (1974 – ongoing);  
The conflict between the Ethiopian government – Opposition groups  is not highlighted as it was 
geographically dispersed, occurring between 1977 -1991) . Armed rebel groups/military activity: 
Somali, Oramiya and Afar regions. 
 
Terrorism Incidents:  
T 1 .Addis Ababa (11incident) ; T2  City of Jijigi (7 incident); T3 
Obele (Ogaden region) ( 1 incident ); T4  Danakil desert (afar region) 
(1 incident); T5 Gode (1 incident);  T 6 Gambella (2 incidents); T7 
Gedo City (West of Addis) (1 Incident ); T 7 Ambo City (West)(1 
incident);  T8 Gedeo zone (2004 bomb); T 9 Figa town (SE near 
Somali)(1 incident); T10 Adiquala / (2003 train attack  from Dire 
Dawa to Dijoubiti); T 10 Moyale (near Kenya,) (2 attacks also risks 
of banditry/kidnapping highlighted by UK FCO) ; T 11 Agrodat city ( 
1 incident); T12 Dire Dawa (2 incidents);T 13  Liben (east) (1 
incident); T 14 Mela Jeldu (I incident); Dela Menna (1 incident); T 
15 Harer ( 1 bomb incident) 
 
External Conflicts: 
Ethiopia-Eritrea (1964 – 1991 then 1998-2000);  
Ethiopian invasion of Southern Somalia (January 2007). 
Somalia town of Guriet on place of conflict in December 
2006. Note border towns of Bula Hawo, near Kenyan 
border, and occupied Somalia towns of Luk, Baidoa (BBC 
News, July 2006) 
Ethiopia – Somalia (1996-1999); 
Border/diplomatic issues: Djibouti and border areas with 
Somaliland; disputes over Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
primarily based around town of Badme  which still hasn’t 
been resolved; disputes over areas between Kenya and 
Ethiopian borders; Somalia claims part of Ogoden 
territory, and the war with Somalia in 1977 still lingers in 
the memory (legacy of vengeance). 
UN Peace keeping operations: UNMEE Ethiopia/Eritrea 
(2000 to 2007) – the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ)  
which is mostly in Eritrea border areas. 
Landmines – Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia border areas  
Key attractions and Ethnic Groups:-  
A1. Askum (UN Listed) (former site of great civilisation); A2  
Lalibela  (rock hewn churches, compared with Petra).); A3 Gondor 
17th Century castles, Fasil Ghebbi UN Listed; A4 Harar Jugol 
fortified town, in Eastern part (UN Listed); A5  Lower valley of 
Awash, paleontogical remains (UN Listed) ; A6 Tiya (UN Listed); 
A7 Qohaio – ancient monastery ruins clinging to a rock face (p353 of 
Lonely Planet); A8 Tigray( LP,p147) 
 
Refugees: 
(Country of origin): 93,032 (Sudan) 23,578 (Somalia) 
IDPs: 132,000 (border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000 
and ethnic clashes in Gambella; most IDPs are in Tigray 
and Gambella Provinces) (2004) 
 
 
Key Ethnic Groups  
E1 Oromo 32.1% ; E2 Amara 30.1% 
E 3 Tigraway 6.2%; E4 Somalie 5.9%; E5 Guragie 4.3%; E6 Sidama 
3.5%; E 7 Welaita 2.4% 
Riots: 
General: Addis Ababa – large scale riots reported in 
2005 and 2001, which spiralled into violence, hundreds of 
deaths and thousands arrested 
Ethnic: Gambella region (Western lowlands of Addis) – 
violent clashes between Anuak and Nuer (Sudanese 
heritage) (Lonely Planet 2007, p248); In 2002 violent riots 
and killings recorded in towns of  Itang and Gambella; 
2003 more reports of attacks in areas, but specific 
locations not specified. Annuaks killed and homes burnt in 
2003. More reports continue into 2004. Tepi (In 
Sourthern Lowlands) – two ethnic groups the Shekio and 
the Majenger clash in March 2002, Many die and 
thousands made homeless. 
Jimma Zone & town of Agaro – violent clashes between  
Christians and Muslims 
Other (e.g. crime, accidents etc.) 
Travel Risks Travel border restrictions with Eritrea 
Train derailment/sabotage: Between Ethiopia and Djibouti    
UKFCO: Essential travel only (principal roads/towns within 50 kilometres of the border areas with Eritrea; Danakil 
desert area bounded by the Dessie-Adigrat road, the Dessie-Djibouti road and the Ethiopian/Eritrean border; 50 
kilometres of the borders with Sudan and Kenya; travel within 20 kms of the Eritrean border in the Tigray and Afar 
regions; Gambella region 
Natural Hazards 
N1 – Flooding; N2 Droughts ; N3 Locusts 
Government repression 
Orami state (Somalli region) – village burning, mass arrests and other 
human rights abuses. 
 
Source of map: Planning expedition map from XCL expedition, drawn during a training weekend.
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Appendix S - Explaining the polity IV scores for Ethiopia 
 
1. Introduction: They use Webster’s New World College Dictionary definition of polity as “a political or 
governmental organization: a society or institution with an organized government: state: body politic”  
2. Explaining the Graph 
Looking at the graph a number things can be 
observed:  
The graph examines the Polity Score (see below) 
over time. The graph illustrates how it has made 
some progression from being strongly autocratic, 
when it was below 0, to slightly less so. The score of 
1 in the 1990s is one skewed towards autocracy, 
which can be verified by other data (e.g. FH data).  
• The blue line and marker  denotes a 
revolutionary war. 
• The green line marks denotes  a transitional 
period, which is reflected in the EPRDF seized 
power from Menigisu  Marxist dictatorship, with 
a new interim government set up, led by Meles 
Zenawi. 
• The red line marks the new polity scores (most 
will be in red),  the beginning of a new regime 
established by the elections in 1995. 
• The C refers to military coup, which occurred in 
1974, deposing Haile Salassie, followed by 
another in 1977. 
• The ETH . 
• The vertical dotted line is a marker point for the 
collapse of the communist regimes. 
 
 
The Polity scores is computed by subtracting the 
Autoc with the Democ score, with + 10 being 
strongly democratic and -10 being strongly 
autocratic. In the instance of Ethiopia it is much 
more strongly skewed towards the autocratic scale. 
The low score reflects the fact that despite having the 
process of elections, these are weak in terms of 
competitiveness and quality. 
The Durable Score relates to the number of years the 
regime has been in power, which for Ethiopia has 
3. Explaining the Codes 
The Democ codes the degree of institutional democracy, 
and is based on assessing the degree of democracy which is 
conceived as three independent elements: presence of 
institutions and procedures through which citizens can 
express interests in the political process; presence of 
institutions which constrain the executive; the guarantee of 
civil liberties. The Democ indicator is an additive eleven 
point scale (0-10) is based on these concepts, and is made up 
by cumulatively adding the following weighted factors: 
XRCOMP; XROPEN; XCONST & PARCOMP (See 
below).  
The Autoc codes the degree of institutional autocracy 
(interestingly they use it in a more neutral way, rather than a 
pejorative term), which essentially focuses on examining the 
degree the process of the selection of elites is regularised; 
the repression of political competition and the ability of the 
executive to operate with few constraints, along with the 
degree of regulation of economic and social life. The same 
11 point additive scale is used, derived from certain the 
weighted coding or elements of the: XCOMP; XROPEN; 
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been 13 years, which reflects when in 1995 there was 
a semblance of return to democracy, but it was 
dominated by the EPRDF and marred by violence 
(part of the reason for the low Polity score). 
XCONST; PARREG; PARCOMP. 
In the instance of Ethiopia then, it failed to score high in any 
of the selected sub categories of the XCOMP; XROPEN; 
XCONST; PARREG; PARCOMP.  
4. Explaining the composition of the scores 
The reason why the Democ and Autoc scores do not reflect the cumulative values from the categories in the below 
table, is because each of these are elements constructed by a number of sub-categories, but the Democ, or Autoc 
code only use some of these  For example, the XCOMP uses three weighted measured categories: Selection , 
Transitional  (+ 1) and Election (+2) and selection (+2). For the Democ it uses on the Election and Transitional, 
whilst the Autoc score uses only the Selection score. There are a number of codes which indicate foreign 
interruption (-66), cases of “interregnum” or anarchy (-77) or cases of transition government (-88), which can actual 
exist for a number of years./ 
 
 
  
5. Explaining the Codes  
The CCDE refers to the country number code relevant when looking up the values in the Excel spreadsheet. 
• The XXREG refers to the regulation of the executive, with three categories coded to differential the extent of 
institutionalization (1.Unregulated; 2 Designation/Transitional ; 3 Regulated). For Ethiopia, the score of 2 
reflects the Designation/Transitional category, which reflects the process of the chief executives selected 
without formal competition (e.g. one-party systems or rigged elections).   
• The  XRCOMP refers to the competitiveness of the executive recruitment with three sub categories used 
(1.Selection; 2  
• Dual/Transitional; 3. Election.) The code of 2 for Ethiopia reflects the transitional and restricted nature of the 
elections. 
• The XROPEN refers to the openness of executive recruitment and is based on 4 sub categories (1.Closed; 2 
.Dual Executive Designation; 3.Duel Executive-; 4  Open). For Ethiopia the code of reflects the fact that the 
chief executives are selected by transitional arrangement, which in practice are closed. 
• The XCONST  refers to the constraints on the executive and has 7 sub category codes (1.Unlimited Authority; 2 
intermediate category; 3 Slight to moderate control; 4 intermediate category; 5 Substantial limitations on 
Executive; 6. Intermediate category; 7 Executive parity).The score of 3 for Ethiopia reflects the slight to 
moderate constraints code, with the legislature still very weak. 
• The PARREG relates to the regulation of participation and how preferences are expressed, such as through the 
channelling of expression through single or multi party systems. There are 5 sub-category codes (1. 
Unregulated; 2. Multiple identify; 3 Sectarian; 4. Restricted; 5. Regulated). The code of 3 for Ethiopia reflects 
the sectarian/ethnic nature of the politics which can be marked by incompatibility of interests, intransigence and 
posturing by multi-identity groups. Also restrictions on groups. 
• The PARCOM refers to the degree of competitiveness of political participation. It has 6 sub categories (0 not 
applicable; 1. Repressed; 2 Suppressed; 3. Factional; 4. Transitional; 5. Competitive). The score of 3 reflection 
the factional and restricted competition of Ethiopian politics, which has been dominated by the EPRDF party, 
which in turn is dominated by the Tigrayan elites. 
 
Very importantly it should be noted that one of the concept variables ARE NOT presented in the data summary 
above, which is the Executive Recruitment variable (EXREC), yet this is one of the key variables which Goldstone 
et al (2005) use in their classification. To find this value, one needs to scrutinizes the qualitative analysis which 
follows the summary scores and look at the numbered figure in brackets next to the Executive Recruitment  
categorisations 
Source: Polity IV (2007)  
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Appendix T – Analysis of key input indicators 
Factor  Analysis 
 
Economic 
indicators 
(Growth related) 
In relation to the key economic measures the picture is not necessarily optimistic, as Table 
7.7 reveals. Ethiopia emerges as one of the poorest countries in the world, with its GDP per 
capita for 2005 being only $1,000, which when considered in relation to the percentage 
below the poverty line of 38 %, reveals that what wealth there is, is unevenly distributed. 
In terms of the patterns of growth, it is still relatively modest, punctuated by some periods 
of decline, which reflects the fragility of its economic base, being agrarian based, operating 
in some very hazards environmental conditions. These factors can make it particularly 
prone to the development of frustration gaps. 
Economic 
indicators 
(Stability) 
In terms of inflation, the rate of 13.5% is quite high, but when looked at over time, one can 
see a wide degree of fluctuation in terms of inflation and deflation.  This can be used as 
another indirect indicator for frustrations. 
Economic 
indicators (debt) 
The high amounts of internal and external debt, low exports and a balance of trade deficit, 
together with the composition of the economy being heavily dependent on agriculture, 
vulnerable to natural hazards, or global price fluctuations, such as its dependency on coffee 
as a key export, all point to further signals that can give cause for concern and show a 
vulnerable economic system. 
Social welfare 
indicators 
One of the most alarming figures is the very high infant mortality rates, which for 2005   is 
91.92 per 1,000. This rate places Ethiopia in the 75th plus score, which the PITF  observed 
can indicate a country far more vulnerable to  conflict. The relatively low life expectancy 
(49.23 years), high incidence of aids and very low HDI scores also act as additional 
warning signals of some inherent social problems which need to be dealt with and could 
act as a potential source of tension and frustration. Although there are improvements in 
these scores, they are still very modest. 
Social  Divisions The social division indicators point more towards a country vulnerable to conflict and 
instability, rather than stability. Here the data from the CIA database does not do justice to 
the full range of diversity for the country, as they only highlight eight key ethnic groups, in 
addition to the various religious and language differences, compounded by poor welfare 
standards and high degrees of poverty. The nature of the political system can mean it can 
serve to reinforce ethnic divisions, whilst the autocratic nature of the government can mean 
group frustrations may be denied legitimate means of expression, and so grievances can 
grow, even fester. As it stands, calls for change are likely to take a more dramatic, 
explosive form, such as riots and demonstrations, unless avenues of political expression 
are opened up.   
Social  Divisions The MAR data is particularly useful in assessing the different key groups and the potential 
for conflict (Afars; Somalis; Amhara, Tigreans, Oromo are the key groups highlighted), 
with the Oromo being the most active and involved in a variety of terrorist attacks over 
recent years 
Social  Divisions Group tensions are compounded by the high numbers of refugees which seem to occur 
annually, some through conflict, but many through food scarcity as a result of the natural 
environment; a scarcity, which can be intensified by the population growth and the youth 
bulge.   
Natural 
indicators 
(climate and 
geography) 
The climate and geography make up means that it is particularly vulnerable to natural 
disasters. In its favour, however, the relative lack of resources (a key driver of conflict in 
other parts of Africa) is reduced. Many restrictions by opposition group (indicated by the 
PARCOM code), the modest controls on the executive (indicated by XCONST code) and 
Perhaps most worryingly from the Polity score is the high fractional/ethnic nature of 
politics and political divisions (indicated by the PARREG code). 
 
Natural 
indicators 
(Disease) 
The high incident rate of Aids is a cause for concern and places more stresses on an 
already poor welfare structure. 
Key Actors In terms of the military, the GDP % expenditure has been reduced, which could be 
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interpreted as a reduction in the possible influence of the military, but the conflict nature of 
the region, means one should interpret this with caution. The other key indicator to 
consider relates to the high number of political parties which tend to fragment on ethnic 
lines, which can be a source of tension and possible conflict. 
International 
interaction 
events 
Ethiopia has been a strong supporter of America’s War on Terrorism and has as a result 
benefited from aid. This policy, however, can act to heighten tensions with the significant 
Muslim population, particularly in the Somalia border areas, where more radical groups 
operate. As highlighted earlier, when one extends the analysis to Ethiopia’s neighbors are 
economically weak and riven by internal violent conflicts, which have a tendency to 
overspill in both physical terms and travelers’ perception. Finally, there is the difficulty 
that as the Government has clamped down on opposition, it has received more 
condemnation by many Western governments, criticizing its human rights record, which 
can pose a number of ethical risks for tourism organizations. 
 
 
Source; Author 
 
 
